JUDGEMENT Consolidated Appeal (No. 30 of 1941) from a judgment and two orders of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (October 16, 1939) which varied an order of the same Court made in its insolvency jurisdiction (July 21, 1937) which had reversed an order of the Official Assignee of Madras (November 16, 1936). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee; In 1919 there existed an undivided Hindu family, consisting of the father, A. R. Somasundaram, and his four sons, Arunachalam, Ramanathan, Sundaresan and Lakshmanan, which carried on business in divers places in British India, and at Jaffna and Colombo in Ceylon. In 1919 Ramanathan died, and in 1923 the father died. On May 14, 1925, letters of administration were granted by the District Court of Jaffna to Arunachalam and Sundaresan on the footing that their father had died intestate, but subsequently the Secretary of the Court was associated in the administration as official administrator, and was virtually in charge of the administration. By an order of the High Court of Madras, dated July 15, 1925, it was ordered that Arunachalam and Sundaresan be adjudged insolvents, and that their properties, wherever situate, do vest in the official assignee of that Court. By an order of the High Court, dated August 6, 1928, and made in those insolvency proceedings, it was ordered that sanction be accorded to an agreement by way of compromise, and that the entire interest of the insolvents firm, including the interest of Lakshmanan and the two sons then living of the insolvent Arunachalam, in the properties of the insolvents firm situate within and outside British India, movable and immovable, do vest in the official assignee. At some time in or about the year 1928 it was discovered that A. R. Somasundaram had left two wills, by one of which (dated October 2, 1922) he disposed of his own separate property, consisting of Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 62 businesses carried on at Rangoon and Jaffna by the other (dated October 23, 1922) he purported to dispose of the property of the joint family. As a result a grant of letters of administration with the said wills annexed was made by the High Court at Madras to the official assignee. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 62 businesses carried on at Rangoon and Jaffna by the other (dated October 23, 1922) he purported to dispose of the property of the joint family. As a result a grant of letters of administration with the said wills annexed was made by the High Court at Madras to the official assignee. A similar grant was made by the District Court of Jaffna to Messrs. Harding and Thornton, of Colombo, who were the duly constituted attorneys of the official assignee. Meanwhile, a suit had been instituted on January 19, 1926, in the District Court of Colombo (No. 18800) by one Panya Reena Navenna Soranna Mana Somasundaram (hereinafter for brevity referred to as Panya) against the Secretary of the Court of Jaffna, the official administrator of the father of the insolvents, praying for judgment against the defendant as official administrator for a sum of Rs.1,61,127, being the amount alleged to be due to the plaintiff in respect of moneys advanced to the said father and interest thereon, Panya died in March, 1929, and subsequently his son, the appellant, was substituted as plaintiff, and Messrs. Harding and Thornton were substituted as defendants in the Colombo suit No. 18800. Judgment was delivered in that suit on January 12, 1933, and resulted in a decree of that date, by which it was ordered that Messrs. Harding and Thornton as administrators of A. R. Somasundaram do pay to the appellant as administrator of the estate of Panya " the sum of Rs.1,61,127-22 with "interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum from "January 20, 1926, till payment in full and costs of suit." Following on that judgment the appellant seemed to have attached a fund in the Jaffna Court. From that judgment an appeal was lodged, on which on November 17, 1933, an order was made in the following terms "Of consent it is considered and adjudged that the decree "made in this action by the District Court of Colombo and "dated January 12, 1933, be and the same is hereby affirmed "and this appeal is dismissed subject to the terms of settlement "arrived at between the parties and filed herewith. And it is " further ordered and decreed that each party do bear his costs "of this appeal." The terms of settlement referred to ran thus "Substituted plaintiff is to be paid his taxed costs "incurred in 18800 D. C, Colombo, such costs not to exceed "Rs.9000. He agrees to share pro rata with all the other "creditors the assets of the deceased. He is entitled to "proceed for the recovery of any balance that may be due to "him in action No. 18800 D. C., Colombo, from assets that "may exist out of Ceylon. The Official Administrator under-" takes to withdraw his appeal in 18800 D. C, Colombo." In accordance with those terms (hereinafter referred to as " the "compromise ") the appellant received out of the Ceylon assets of A. R. Somasundaram, as his share pro rata with the other creditors of that person, a sum of Rs.47,573, leaving a balance of Rs.i,13,554 unpaid of the said judgment debt of Rs.1,61,127. The appellant then lodged a claim in the insolvency proceedings in Madras. From the wording of his affidavit in support he would appear to have been claiming to be paid the full amount of the judgment debt and interest out of the joint family property in priority to the creditors of the insolvents; but in fact his claim was limited (as of necessity it should be) to the unpaid balance. His claim wasrejected in toto by the official assignee. The appellant thereupon applied to the judge of the High Court sitting in insolvency asking that the order of the official assignee rejecting his claim be rescinded, and that his claim be admitted, for the following reasons (among others), namely (iii.) because the claim was to make the joint family assets in the hands of the official assignee liable for the debts due by the father of the insolvents, and (ix.) because the official assignee was estopped by the compromise from repudiating or rejecting the claim. On August 23, 1937, Wadsworth J. made an order on that application, allowing the appeal and declaring and ordering as follows "1. That the claim of the applicant herein for "the sum of rupees one lakh sixty one thousand one hundred " and twenty seven (Rs.1,61,127) with interest thereon excluding "the sum of rupees forty seven thousand five hundred and "seventy three (Rs.47,573) received under Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. That the claim of the applicant herein for "the sum of rupees one lakh sixty one thousand one hundred " and twenty seven (Rs.1,61,127) with interest thereon excluding "the sum of rupees forty seven thousand five hundred and "seventy three (Rs.47,573) received under Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 63 the compromise "dated October 2r, 1933, due under the decree in Suit No. " 18800 of 1926 on the file of the District Court, Colombo, "be and is hereby allowed ; 2. that the applicant shall be at "liberty to prove the balance of his debt due under the said "decree before the said Official Assignee subject to the limit "that it shall not exceed the assets of the joint family and "the assets of Somasundaram Chettiar, deceased, the father "of the applicant herein, which have come into the hands of "sons; 3. that the applicant shall not be entitled to any "priority over the separate estate of Somasundaram Chettiar, "deceased, which has come down to the sons/ Against that order the present appellant appealed in so far as it declined to give him priority ; and the official assignee appealed against it in so far as it allowed him to prove in the insolvency proceedings at all. The appeals were heard by the High Court (Pandrang Row and Venkataramana Rao JJ.) in August, 1939. Judgment was reserved, and was delivered on October 16, 1939. The appeal of the present appellant was dismissed, and the appeal of the official assignee was in part allowed, i.e., the order of Wadsworth J. was modified to the following extent "Order and decree that the claimant ". . . . shall be entitled to prove in the above insolvency "for the balance of the debt due to him after giving credit "for the amount realised by him in the Jaffna administration ". . . . and that the said claimant shall not be entitled to "interest in respect of the said debt due to him from the date "of the adjudication of the insolvents .... and that, save as " aforesaid, the said order of the High Court, dated August 23, " 1937 .... be, and hereby is, confirmed in other respects." Each appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent to his appeal. and that, save as " aforesaid, the said order of the High Court, dated August 23, " 1937 .... be, and hereby is, confirmed in other respects." Each appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent to his appeal. The present appellant obtained leave in Madras to appeal to His Majesty in Council in regard to the variation as to interest. He was refused leave to appeal from the dismissal of his own appeal, but he subsequently obtained special leave from His Majesty in Council. In was in those circumstances that the order of the High Court of October 16, 1939, had come up in its entirety for consideration before their Lordships Board. The official assignee had not appealed. 1942. July 20, 21, 22, 23. Sir Herbert Cunliffe K.C. and Subba Row for the appellant. There are three sources from which it appears that the assets came into the respondents hands in his triple capacity as official administrator of the father, as official assignee of the insolvent sons, and as assignee of the other members of the joint family (a) separate property of the father in British India ; (b) joint family estate which at the date of the insolvency still remained in the hands of the sons ; and (c) separate estate of the sons—they carried on the business for two years after the death of their father. The compromise, which both courts below have held to be binding on the respondent, is on construction a binding agreement entitling the appellant to payment of the entire balance of his judgment debt, with interest thereon, out of the joint family estate in the hands of the respondent, and if that be right no question of what the position is under Hindu law will arise that question is whether or not, and independently of the compromise, the appellant is entitled to be paid as a creditor of the father out of the family property in priority to the sons personal creditors. The basis of that is that it is the duty of the sons under the Hindu law to pay the debts of the father before the division of the family estate, and the appellant as creditor of the father is entitled to recover his debt in full from the sons to the extent of the joint family assets in their hands in preference to creditors of the sons. The Imperial legislature and charters of the High Courts have guaranteed to Hindus the administration of their own laws, and the High Courts have been enjoined to administer Hindu law to Hindus unless abrogated by statute. The appellant is entitled to be paid out of so much of the joint family estate as was In the hands of the sons and has now come into the hands of the respondent Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, 8th ed., paras. 290, 292. If there are claims against the fathers separate estate the administrator must pay those claims out of that estate, and there is no question of priority. The appellant is entitled to be paid in three ways (a) so far as the separate estate is concerned, by the Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 64 administrator and to the extent of that estate ; in any event directions should be given that the respondent should not use any of that estate for the purpose of paying the debts of the sons without giving the appellant an opportunity of contesting it; (b) in priority against the whole joint family estate so far as it has not been converted and got into the hands of bona fide alienees, that is, so far as it is still in the hands of the Official Assignee ; (c) to proceed against the estate of the sons in respect of so much of the joint family estate as was liable to be used for the liquidation of the fathers debts and which has been sold and the proceeds of which have got into the hands of the sons. The sons, on the death of the father, only took what the father had in the common estate subject to the liability to pay his debts Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage, 10th ed., para. 310 the statements there should be accepted unless modified by authority and it is conceded that they have been cut down to the extent that the sons separate estate cannot be claimed against for payment of the fathers debts. Immediately a son begins to pay his own debts out of the joint family estate he is to that extent menacing the payment of his fathers debts. Immediately a son begins to pay his own debts out of the joint family estate he is to that extent menacing the payment of his fathers debts. The appellant is entitled to be paid out of so much of the joint family property as came to the hands of the respondent. [Reference was made to Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (( 1874) L. R. 1 I. A. 321, 330-1) ; Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh (( 1878-9) L.R. 61. A. 88,104.) ; Muttayan Chettiar v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnatambiar (( 1882) L. R. 9 I. A. 128, 133.) ; Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (( 1923) L.R. 511. A. 129,139.) ; Masit Ullah v. Damodar Prasad (( 1926) L. R. 53 I. A. 204.) ; Koduru Venkureddi v. Magunta Venku Reddi (( 1926) I. L. R. 50 M. 535.) ; and Shankar Lal v. Mohammad Ismail (( 1930) A. I. R. (All), 522.) ; and to the Code of Civil Procedure, ss. 50, 52 and 53.] The question of interest depends, it is submitted, on the wording of the compromise. The decree gave the appellant interest, and there was nothing in the compromise to cut down its effect. The appellant is entitled to interest up to the time when he put in his claim. J. M. Pringle for the respondent. The compromise, on construction, merely gives the appellant the right to prove his debt in the insolvency proceedings, and that right is conceded. He is entitled to prove for the principal debt and interest down to the date of adjudication s. 46, sub-s. 3, of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act. The question of the fathers creditors being paid out of the fathers separate estate does not really come into these proceedings at all, and there is no objection to the Board indicating that this separate estate, if any, should be taken out of the insolvency proceedings. The only suggestion that under the Hindu law the fathers debts have preference as against the sons debts is the case cited in Maynes Hindu Law, para. 258. The only suggestion that under the Hindu law the fathers debts have preference as against the sons debts is the case cited in Maynes Hindu Law, para. 258. There are three cases bearing fairly closely on this point Gade Lakshme Narasimham Pantulu v. Pillalamarri Jaganadha Row Pantulu (( 1916) A. I. R. (Mad.) 645.) ; Venkatesam v. Viswanadham (( 1918) A. I. R. (Mad.) 512.) ; and Thumbalam Gooty Thimmiah v. Official Receiver, Bellary (( 1939) A. I. R. (Mad.) 276.) ; the last 6i which appears to be on all fours with the present case ; it was there said (Ibid. 278.) " The "provisions of these Acts [Provincial or Presidency-towns "Insolvency Acts] must be taken to be exhaustive so far as "they go and there is no room for the contention that the "doctrines of a personal law must be read in conjunction with "the provisions of these Acts so as to extend or limit their "operation." [Reference was also made to Bhola Nath v. Maqbul-un-Nissa (( 1903) I. L. R. 26 A. 28, 32.).] It is submitted that the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act supplies the answer to the appellants claim to priority ss. 17, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52 and 70. He made Ids claim on the footing that the property is that of the insolvents, divisible amongst the insolvents creditors, and on the footing that he himself has a debt provable in the insolvency. It is difficult to appreciate how on that basis he can claim any priority. In many parts of the statute law of India certain priorities have been laid down as to the order in which the creditors of a dead man can recover. If the appellants contention that the fathers debts should have priority is right, one would expect some recognition of that right defined in the statutes; there is no such recognition Indian Succession Act (XXXIX. of 1925), ss. 211, sub-s. 2 ; 320, 323 ; Code of Civil Procedure, O. xx., r. 13, sub-r. 2 ; Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909, ss. 108, 109. [Sect. Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. of 1925), ss. 211, sub-s. 2 ; 320, 323 ; Code of Civil Procedure, O. xx., r. 13, sub-r. 2 ; Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909, ss. 108, 109. [Sect. Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 65 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Veerasokkaraju v. Papiah (( 1902) I. L. R. 26 M. 792,796.) were also referred to.] The appellants argument is that the duty of the son to pay the fathers debts logically involves that he should pay those debts before his own because he is in a different position from the dead man, who has already gone out of the world without paying his debts. That is the sole reason which distinguishes the duty of the son to pay his fathers debts from the duty of the son to pay his own. But the law has drifted away in that respect from the basis of the appellants argument, with the recognition of the fathers power to bind family property in his own lifetime for the payment of his own debts Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (L. R. 51 I. A. 129, 139.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, 10th ed., para. 332. As to interest, the respondent is content to rest on the judgment that the appellant gets no interest after the date of the order of adjudicaion. [Reference was made to Jamiyatram Ramchandra v. Parbhudas Hathi (( 1872) 9 Bom. H. C. R. 116.).] Sir Herbert Cunliffe K.C. replied. Oct. 13. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, who stated the facts, and continued The resultant effect of the variation of the order of August 23, 1937, and its confirmation in other respects by the High Court, is that the order of Wadsworth J. stands verbatim as before set forth, with the single exception that the words " with interest thereon " are omitted from the first paragraph. Whether an order so framed is to any and what extent wrong, is the question which their Lordships now proceed to consider. A few preliminary observations are advisable. It had been contended by the official assignee that he was in no way affected or bound by the compromise; but both courts in India held that it was binding on him. Whether an order so framed is to any and what extent wrong, is the question which their Lordships now proceed to consider. A few preliminary observations are advisable. It had been contended by the official assignee that he was in no way affected or bound by the compromise; but both courts in India held that it was binding on him. With this view their Lordships agree; indeed, the contrary contention was not raised before them. In the next place, it is to be observed that owing to lack of clear and definite information, there has arisen in this case much uncertainty and confusion as to what property is being administered by the official assignee in the insolvency, and in particular whether it includes any property which was the separate property of the father of the insolvents. Some complication no doubt springs from the fact that during the two years which intervened between the death of A. R. Somasundaram and the adjudication of insolvency, the two insolvents had (acting on the footing of intestacy) carried on businesses which were the separate property of their father, a proceeding which may well have resulted in making them creditors of their fathers estate. Further, the official assignee may, as administrator of the father, have obtained possession or control of his separate property. However this may be, it seems clear to their Lordships that before any of the fathers separate property can be applied in payment of any of the sons creditors in the insolvency proceedings, all creditors of the father must first have had their claims satisfied thereout. All that can vest in the official assignee under s. 17 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act is the property of the insolvents, and therefore as regards separate property of the father, all that can properly be dealt with in the insolvency proceedings for the benefit of the creditors of the insolvents is the interest of the insolvents which will remain after the fathers debts have been ascertained and paid. This may well necessitate some proceedings in the nature of a suit for administration. Their Lordships were, however, given to understand that the only separate estate of the father (beyond the Ceylon assets which have been distributed as contemplated by the compromise) consists of the business carried on by him at Rangoon. Of its value they know nothing. This may well necessitate some proceedings in the nature of a suit for administration. Their Lordships were, however, given to understand that the only separate estate of the father (beyond the Ceylon assets which have been distributed as contemplated by the compromise) consists of the business carried on by him at Rangoon. Of its value they know nothing. It will, however, be open to the present appellant to take such administration or other proceedings (if any) as he may be advised, to secure that any separate estate of the father which exists is properly administered by the administrator before any part thereof is made available in the insolvency proceedings for payment of the creditors of the insolvents. The doubts and difficulties which their Lordships have felt as to the property which is being administered in the insolvency proceedings have been to a great extent cleared by what the judges have indicated in the High Court on appeal. They say that by the agreement sanctioned by the order of August 6, 1928, "all the property possessed by the joint family became "vested in the official assignee " Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 66 ; and later on in their judgment they state "The separate property in British India "left by the father was the business in Rangoon and its assets. "The rest of the properties were owned by the father and sons "as joint family property." It thus becomes apparent that the only property with which this appeal can be concerned is the joint family property which on the death of the father devolved by survivorship. It is out of this property, the entirety of which has (with the courts approval) been vested in the official assignee, and is being administered in the insolvency proceedings, that the appellant claims to be paid his debt in priority to the creditors of the insolvents. He bases this claim (i.) on a right to priority which he says is conferred on him by the compromise, and (2.) on a right alleged to be conferred on him by the Hindu law, which makes sons (to the extent of their interest in joint family property) liable to pay their fathers debts, provided they are not debts incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose. This claim to priority, which is the first and most important question raised on this appeal, must now be dealt with. The contention that any priority is conferred by the compromise appears to their Lordships to be without foundation. The compromise merely provides that the taking by the appellant of a dividend on his judgment debt out of the Ceylon assets shall be no bar or prejudice to his proceeding to recover the balance from assets outside Ceylon. Their Lordships are unable to find in the compromise any words which purport to confer any priority in recovery. It was said that under the compromise he was to be entitled to recover the balance, and that such a right necessarily postulated priority. But the compromise gives him no such right; it merely ensures to him the right to proceed to recover, i.e., to take proceedings to recover. As already stated, it ensures to him that his taking a dividend in Ceylon shall not prejudice or bar his proceeding against assets elsewhere. His claim to priority under Hindu law is founded mainly, if not entirely, on a text of Brihaspati referred to in Maynes Hindu Law, s. 313, in the following words "The fathers "debt must be first paid, and next a debt contracted by the "man himself." No other authority in relation to Hindu law was cited in support of the proposition. Although the question must frequently have arisen as a matter of great practical importance, it is strange that, if it existed, no case is found in the books establishing such priority. As was pointed out by Abdur Rahman J. in Thumbalam Gooty Thimmiah v. The Official Receiver, Bellary (( 1939) A. I. R. (Mad.) 276.), if a fathers debts have priority, a sons creditor could not obtain payment out of the sons undefined share in the family property. He would have to wait until all the fathers creditors had been paid; in other words, a sons creditor would be driven to enforce his claim in some kind of administration suit in which the fathers creditors would have to be ascertained and their debts paid. He would have to wait until all the fathers creditors had been paid; in other words, a sons creditor would be driven to enforce his claim in some kind of administration suit in which the fathers creditors would have to be ascertained and their debts paid. The case referred to above is to some extent an authority against the appellants claim to priority under the Hindu law, but in fact the learned judge rejected the claim to priority in that case by reason of the statutory provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act. There is no trace of any such priority being recognized by the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, which in terms assign specific priorities to the debts of a dead man (see ss. 320-322), although no doubt the concluding words of s. 322 would preserve any priority which in law existed. Sect. 323, however, indicates a prima facie condition of equality by enacting that "Save as aforesaid, no creditor shall have aright "of priority over another." Reference may also be usefully made in the same connection to the Civil Procedure Code, O. xx., r. 13, sub-r. 2, in the case where the deceaseds estate is insolvent. There can be no doubt that, in many respects, the Hindu law as administered to-day has departed from the old Hindu law, the tendency being to restrict and not to extend the limits of its doctrine. Thus, while under the old Hindu law the liability for a fathers debt extended to the personal property of a son, it is now limited to his interest in the joint family property. Again, while under the old Hindu law the liability of sons and grandsons as heirs for the debts of their deceased father or grandfather extended to their own property, this rule was only followed, in British India, in the Bombay Presidency. Elsewhere the liability of* sons and grandsons as heirs was limited (as in the case of other Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 67 heirs under Hindu law) to the extent of the property inherited by them from the deceased ; and by the Bombay Hindu Heirs Relief Act, 1866, the liability of sons and grandsons as heirs in that Presidency was placed on the same footing. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 67 heirs under Hindu law) to the extent of the property inherited by them from the deceased ; and by the Bombay Hindu Heirs Relief Act, 1866, the liability of sons and grandsons as heirs in that Presidency was placed on the same footing. Their Lordships are not prepared to depart from this tendency by holding that a priority of payment out of the joint property, which so far as they are aware has never prevailed in practice among the Hindus in British India, exists to-day in favour of the creditors of a father as against the creditors of a son. But even if such a priority had existed under the Hindu law, it would have had to yield to any statutory provision inconsistent therewith, and in the present case the provisions of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act afford a complete answer to the appellants claim. He is proceeding to recover the balance of his judgment debt by proving in the insolvency proceedings ; he is therefore subject to the provisions of the Act, unless the compromise to any extent excludes them, and their Lordships have already stated that the compromise confers no priority. The appellant is therefore subject to s. 49 of the Act, which after providing for certain priorities in the payment of debts, enacts (by sub-s. 5) that " subject to the provisions of this Act, all debts proved in insolvency shall be paid rateably according to "the amounts of such debts respectively and without any "preference." Nowhere in the Act is any priority conferred on the debts of an insolvents father, and by sub-s. 5 the appellant is bound. The second claim put forward by the appellant was that the High Court had erred in striking out the reference to interest from the order of Wadsworth J., and that he was entitled to prove for a sum amounting to the said sum of Rs. 1,13,554 together with interest at nine per cent, thereon down to the lodgment of his claim with the official assignee. On the respondents behalf it was contended that no interest on the principal sum could be claimed because of r. 23 in the second schedule to the Act, which provides —"Interest.—23. 1,13,554 together with interest at nine per cent, thereon down to the lodgment of his claim with the official assignee. On the respondents behalf it was contended that no interest on the principal sum could be claimed because of r. 23 in the second schedule to the Act, which provides —"Interest.—23. (1.) On "any debt or sum certain whereon interest is not reserved or "agreed for, and which is overdue when the debtor is adjudged "an insolvent, and which is provable under this Act, the "creditor may prove for interest at a rate not exceeding six "per centum per annum—(a) if the debt or sum is payable by "virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, from the "time when such a debt or sum was payable to the date of "such adjudication; or (b) if the debt or sum is payable "otherwise, from the time when a demand in writing has been "made giving the debtor notice that interest will be claimed "from the date of the demand until the time of payment "to the date of such adjudication. (2.) Where a debt which "has been proved in insolvency includes interest or any "pecuniary consideration in lieu of interest, the interest or "consideration shall, for the purposes of dividend, be calculated "at a rate not exceeding six per centum per annum, without "prejudice to the right, of a creditor to receive out of the "debtors estate any higher rate of interest to which he may "be entitled after all the debts proved have been paid in full." This rule does not appear to their Lordships to apply to this case, in which the date of adjudication is antecedent to the judgment debt, and in which by the decree express provision is made for the debt to carry interest. Moreover, the compromise authorizes a proof by the appellant for "any "balance that may be due to him in action No. 18800," words which would appear to include the interest given by the judgment. On other grounds, however, there is a difficulty in the way of the appellant. Moreover, the compromise authorizes a proof by the appellant for "any "balance that may be due to him in action No. 18800," words which would appear to include the interest given by the judgment. On other grounds, however, there is a difficulty in the way of the appellant. His counsel in the High Court at Madras on the hearing of the appeal conceded that if the provisions of the Insolvency Act were to be applied his client would not be entitled to this interest; but he argued that under the compromise his client was entitled to "get " the balance of the amount due under the decree of the Colombo Court, and that the official assignee had therefore agreed that he should get interest on the decreed amount. This contention their Lordships have already said to be unfounded. The compromise gives the appellant no right to "get " or recover any sum. It only ensures to him the right to take proceedings against assets outside Ceylon. In the result, the High Court, after rejecting the suggested construction of the compromise, relied on the concession by counsel and rejected the claim to prove for interest on the sum of Rs. 1,13,554. Their Lordships think that in view of these facts the disallowance of this interest must stand. Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 68 One further point remains for consideration. Counsel for the Official Assignee claimed that the Official Assignee was entitled to dissect the claim for Rs.1,13,554 by ascertaining how much of the original judgment debt of Rs.1,61,127 represented interest on the fathers debt, and that the proof could only be admitted subject to the provisions of r. 23, with the result that the proof could be rejected to the extent to which it was composed of interest subsequent to the date of the adjudication. With this contention their Lordships do not agree. One thing which they think the compromise clearly does is to prevent any one bound by the compromise from going behind, or in any way disputing, the judgment debt. Another is that it fixes the amount, which the appellant is to be entitled "to proceed to recover," at the balance due under the judgment, namely (in the events which have happened), Rs.1,13,554. Another is that it fixes the amount, which the appellant is to be entitled "to proceed to recover," at the balance due under the judgment, namely (in the events which have happened), Rs.1,13,554. It would not be right if in the face of that agreement the proof was only admitted for the smaller sum. A further answer to this contention lies in the fact that the order of the High Court on appeal fixes the proof at Rs.i,13,554, and against that order there has been no appeal by the official assignee. Moreover, while no doubt the provisions of r. 23, sub-r. 2, are applicable to the case where a creditor proves for a debt and in addition for interest added thereto as provided by r. 23, sub-r. I, their Lordships are of opinion that they do not apply to the present case of a judgment debt obtained against the repre sentative of the father, which by a special agreement of compromise by which the official assignee is bound, the parties are precluded from going behind or disputing in any way. The ultimate result of this appeal may now be stated as follows There being no question but that the fathers separate property must be administered in such a way that all the fathers creditors are paid thereout before any interest of the insolvents therein can be made available in the insolvency proceedings for the benefit of the creditors of the insolvents, the question of the priority in respect of the fathers separate property does not arise in the insolvency proceedings at all. The order of August 23, 1937, as varied by the order of October 16, 1937, requires to be recast, and should run as follows "l. That the claim of the applicant herein for the "sum of rupees one lakh sixty one thousand one hundred and "twenty seven (Rs.1,61,127) excluding the sum of rupees "forty seven thousand five hundred and seventy three " (Rs.47,573) received under the compromise dated October 21, " 1933, due under the decree in Suit No. 18800 of 1926 on the "file of the District Court, Colombo, be and is hereby allowed. "2. That the applicant shall be at liberty to prove the said "balance of his debt due under the said decree before the said "Official Assignee subject to the limit that it shall not exceed "the assets of the joint family. 3. "2. That the applicant shall be at liberty to prove the said "balance of his debt due under the said decree before the said "Official Assignee subject to the limit that it shall not exceed "the assets of the joint family. 3. That the applicant shall "not be entitled to any priority over the said assets of the "joint family." The provisions of para. 4 of the said order will remain unaltered. The appellant, although their Lordships have indicated the manner in which he may (if so advised) proceed in order to obtain payment (together with other creditors of the father) out of the fathers separate property, if it be of any value, has nevertheless failed in establishing the main part of his claim, namely, for priority in payment out of the joint family estate. He has, however, established that the debts of the father should be paid before the separate estate of the father is applied to any extent in paying creditors of the insolvents, and that his proof in the insolvency should stand at Rs. 1,13,554. For the reasons herein appearing their Lordships are of opinion that the order appealed from should be varied as indicated, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. There will be no order as to the costs of this appeal; but the costs of the Official Assignee will form part of his expenses of administering the estates of the insolvents. Practice Note. Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 157 ( 1941- 1942) Pr. N. Sm. C hockalingam v. Official Assignee of Madras 69 Appeal to Privy Council—Question of fact only—Taking of accounts— Subject-matter of appeal. Lord Romer, delivering the judgment of the Board in an appeal from a decree of the High Court at Lahore made the following preliminary observations This appeal by the plaintiff and cross-appeal by the defendant arise out of a suit brought for the purpose of winding up the affairs of a partnership that existed many years ago between the two parties. The questions that the plaintiff seeks to have decided on his appeal (apart from a question relating to interest) are questions whether in taking the accounts of the partnership certain items should or should not be allowed on one side or the other. They are purely questions of fact. It is not, and cannot be, suggested that they involve any question of principle whatsoever. They are purely questions of fact. It is not, and cannot be, suggested that they involve any question of principle whatsoever. Such being the case, they most emphatically are not questions that ought to be made the subject of an appeal to His Majesty in Council. It is true that the appeal is concerned with only six out -of a great number of items appearing in the account, and that two out of the six were very properly abandoned during the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant. But that is not to the point. If four of such items are to be regarded as a proper subject-matter of appeal to His Majesty in Council, every such item in the accounts must equally be so regarded. It is not, in their Lordships opinion, either right or proper that the Board should Present; Lord Atkin, Lord Romer, and Sir Madhavan Nair, in this way be required to take partnership or any other accounts. If a question of principle be involved it is, of course, another matter. But where this is not the case, the decision of the court below on the various items of an account should, in their Lordships opinion and for the reasons just given, be treated as conclusive unless the appellant can prove that the decision is beyond all question erroneous.