JUDGMENT Khundkar, J. - The Petitioner executed mortgages of certain immovable properties in Calcutta and Darjeeling, in favour of the National Tobacco Company of India, Limited, the first Respondents in this application. The latter instituted a suit on those mortgages, and obtained a preliminary decree on 2nd June, 1939, and a final decree on the 27th December, 1939. Thereafter, the Petitioner judgment-debtor applied for reliefs under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, and on the 24th February, 1941, the aforesaid decrees were re-opened, and in lieu thereof, a new preliminary decree was passed, whereby the liability of the Petitioner judgment-debtor under the mortgages, together with interest thereon up to the date of the new decree, was fixed at Rs. 59,290, and this sum was directed to be paid in three installments. A default having occurred in the payment of the first installment which was payable on the 1st January, 1942, the Plaintiff Company obtained a final decree for sale of the mortgaged properties, with liberty to bid and to set off the purchase money against their claim 2. At the sale, which was held by the Registrar on the 18th July, 1942, the Plaintiff Company was declared the highest bidder and purchaser of the Calcutta properties for Rs. 52,500, and one Hajee Mumtazuddin, the second Respondent to this application, was declared the highest bidder and purchaser of the Darjeeling properties for Rs. 27,100. In pursuance of the decree the Plaintiff Company was permitted to set off the decretal amount against the purchase money, and therefore deposited nothing on account of purchase money. Hajee Mumtazuddin on the other hand deposited with the Registrar a sum of Rs. 6,775, being 25 per cent. of the purchase money of the Darjeeling properties as required by the terms and conditions of sale. The Registrar's report of the sale under Rule 29 of Ch. XXVII of the Original Side Rules was filed on the 6th August, 1942, and has not yet been confirmed either by effluxion of time, or by an order of the Court under rr. 30 and 31 of Chapter XXVII 3. The judgment-debtor then presented this application, citing the Plaintiff Company and Hajee Mumtazuddin as Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. In it she stated that she was desirous of having the sale set aside, and asked for leave to deposit with the Registrar the decretal amount of Rs. 30 and 31 of Chapter XXVII 3. The judgment-debtor then presented this application, citing the Plaintiff Company and Hajee Mumtazuddin as Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. In it she stated that she was desirous of having the sale set aside, and asked for leave to deposit with the Registrar the decretal amount of Rs. 59,290, as also the sum of Rs. 3,980, being five per cent. of the Plaintiff Company's bid of Rs. 52,500 and Hajee Mumtazuddin's bid of Rs. 27,100. It is to be noted, that under the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment-debtor who seeks to have an execution sale of his immovable properties set aside, must in the first instance, deposit the amount of the decree as well as a sum equivalent to five per cent. of the purchase money, which latter sum is intended as a solatium for the purchaser. In the present case, the applicant was willing to deposit a sum equivalent to five per cent. of the two final bids, regardless of what had actually been paid by the purchasers into Court. She nevertheless contended in her application that the Plaintiff Company was not entitled to any solatium, inasmuch as they had not deposited any money in Court, and that the second Respondent Hajee Mumtazuddin was entitled to a solatium of five per cent. on the sum of Rs. 6,775 only, which was all that he had actually paid into Court. 4. On the 14th August, 1942, the Petitioner judgment-debtor obtained from me an ex parte order granting her leave to deposit with the Registrar the sum of Rs. 63,270, and to pay to the Registrar his commission of and incidental to the sale. 5. I am now asked to make an order in terms of the other prayers in the application which are as follows:- (Prayers c to i) (c) That the Plaintiff Company do deliver up to the Petitioner all documents in its possession or power relating to the said mortgaged properties. (d) That the Plaintiff Company do transfer and reconvey the said mortgaged properties as directed in the said preliminary decree dated 24th February, 1941. (e) That the said sale of premises 91/1 and 92 and 92/1, Ripon Street, Calcutta and 25/26, Mount Pleasant Road, and 9, 10 and 11, Daroga Bazaar Road, Darjeeling, be set aside. (f) That the Registrar's sale report herein be also set aside if necessary. (e) That the said sale of premises 91/1 and 92 and 92/1, Ripon Street, Calcutta and 25/26, Mount Pleasant Road, and 9, 10 and 11, Daroga Bazaar Road, Darjeeling, be set aside. (f) That the Registrar's sale report herein be also set aside if necessary. (g) That the Plaintiff Company is not entitled to the said solatium of 5 per cent. of the purchase money. (h) That the said Hajee Mumtazuddin is entitled to the solatium of 5 per cent. of the sum of Rs. 6,775 and not of the entire purchase money of Rs. 27,100. (i) That the sum of Rs. 6,775 paid by the said Hajee Mumtazuddin to the Registrar of this Hon'ble Court as aforesaid, be refunded and paid to him by the Registrar. To this is added a further prayer in the notice of motion for a refund to the applicant of the sum of Rs. 3,641-4 out of the sum of Rs. 3,980 deposited with the Registrar, as the auction-purchaser's solatium. 6. The Plaintiff Company and Hajee Mumtazuddin have both appeared to oppose the application, and the only question in dispute is as to the amount to which the two Respondents are entitled as auction-purchaser's solatium. The provisions of the CPC in which this matter is treated are Or. 21, r. 89, and Or. 34, r. 5 of the first schedule. Both these rules require the judgment-debtor to deposit in Court for payment to the purchaser, a sum equivalent to five per cent. of the purchase money. But whereas Or. 21, r. 89 (1) (a) speaks of "a sum equal to five per cent. of the purchase money," Or. 34, r. 5 (2) says: "a sum equal to five per cent. of the amount of the purchase money paid into Court by the purchaser. 7. On behalf of the Respondents it is contended that Or. 21, r. 89 governs Or. 34, r. 5, and that "purchase money" in the former rule means the entire purchase money, whether paid into Court or not. Alternatively it is argued on behalf of the Respondents, that even if Or. 34, r. 5 is the prevailing provision, then under that provision also the amount to which the purchaser is entitled is 5 per cent. of the amount of the accepted final bid, and not merely 5 per cent. of the amount which the purchaser may deposit. 8. Mr. 34, r. 5 is the prevailing provision, then under that provision also the amount to which the purchaser is entitled is 5 per cent. of the amount of the accepted final bid, and not merely 5 per cent. of the amount which the purchaser may deposit. 8. Mr. N.C. Chatterjee, who appears for the first Respondent, the Plaintiff Company, who are the decree-holder auction-purchasers, has argued the question of law as it affects both Respondents. His contentions are firstly, that the decree-holder purchaser cannot be excluded from the benefit of the five per cent. solatium; secondly, that Or. 21, r. 89 controls Or. 34, r. 5 and is the governing provision; and thirdly that the words "the amount of the purchase money paid into Court" in Or. 34, r. 5 (2) mean and include the amount which a decree-holder purchaser may set off against his claim under the decree. 9. In support of his first point, Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon Chandi Charan Mondal v. Banku Behary Lal ILR 26 Cal. 44, in which Maclean, C.J., observed that he could see no intention to exclude a decree-holder purchaser from the five per cent. benefit. In this case the question arose under sec. 310A of the Code of 1898. Mr. Chatterjee has also relied on Tirumull Rao v. Syed Dastaghiri Miyah ILR 22 Mad. 286 (1893), another decision under sec. 310A of the previous Code. It was here held that it was that section, and not the then existing provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, which applied to applications to set aside sales of mortgaged property. It was also held, that under that section, the owner of immovable property who applied to set aside a sale, was under a liability to deposit a sum equal to five per cent. of the purchase money for payment to the purchaser, even where the land had been purchased by the decree-holder. 10. Neither of these decisions has any bearing on the provisions of r. 5 of Or. 34 of the present Code 11. In support of his second point that Or. 21, r. 89 controls Or. 34, r. 5, Mr. Chatterjee cited Virjibandas Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargobind ILR 48 Cal. 69 (1920). This case laid down that Or. 10. Neither of these decisions has any bearing on the provisions of r. 5 of Or. 34 of the present Code 11. In support of his second point that Or. 21, r. 89 controls Or. 34, r. 5, Mr. Chatterjee cited Virjibandas Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargobind ILR 48 Cal. 69 (1920). This case laid down that Or. 21, r. 89 which is expressed in perfectly general terms, applies to sales in execution of mortgage decrees, including sales in execution of mortgage decrees on the Original Side of this Court. This case was decided in 1920 before the sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of Or. 34 came to be enacted. R. 5 was amended and sub-r. (2) was first introduced in the year 1930. Prior to that, Or. 21, r. 89 was the only provision in the Code which required a deposit of five per cent. of the purchase money to be made, for payment to the purchaser, as a condition precedent for the setting aside of a sale. Now, Or. 34, r. 5 (2) embodies that requirement, so far as mortgage sales are concerned. This decision is there-fore no authority for holding that Or. 21, r. 89 (1) (a) controls Or. 34, r. 5 (2) 12. In support of his third point, that the words "the amount of purchase money paid into Court," in Or. 34, r. 5 (2), mean and include the amount which the decree-holder purchaser may set off against his claim under the decree, Mr. Chatterjee has invited my attention to four cases. Jyotish Chunder Ghose v. Bireswar Halder 39 C.W.N. 829 (1935) and National Insurance Co. v. Ezekiel Araon David ILR [1937] 2 Cal. 606 were cases which related to applications to set aside sales under Or. 21, r. 89. In both these cases it was held that the deposit which cl. (b) of sub-r. (1) of that rule requires for payment to the decree-holder, need not be made in its entirety into Court in cash, and that it may take the form of a payment or adjustment out of Court before the date of the application. The case of Chatraban Firm v. Satyanandan ILR 57 Mad. (b) of sub-r. (1) of that rule requires for payment to the decree-holder, need not be made in its entirety into Court in cash, and that it may take the form of a payment or adjustment out of Court before the date of the application. The case of Chatraban Firm v. Satyanandan ILR 57 Mad. 38 (1933) laid down that when a decree-holder has been given permission to bid and set off, and when the amount of a successful bid is less than the decretal amount, the whole of the set off must be deemed as made on the date of sale, and the whole of the amount must be deemed to have been received or realised eo instanti the sale is made. The question in this case was, as to the exact point of time at which the receipt by the Court of assets, within the meaning of sec. 73 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, would be deemed to have occurred, and it arose out of petitions for rateable distribution under that section. It was held that as soon as the decree-holder is declared a purchaser, the set off must be taken as having been made, and sec. 73 will give no benefit to other decree-holders who apply for rateable distribution after the conclusion of the sale. 13. Muthuvenkatapathy Reddi Vs. Kuppu Reddi and Others, (1940) ILR (Mad) 699 was a Full Bench decision which also arose out of an application under Or. 21, r. 89 to set aside a sale, and in which the earlier cases were reviewed. Here again it was laid down that the deposit required by cl. (b) of sub-r. (1) for payment to the decree-holder need not be in cash. In this case the decree-holder had been paid most of the amount due to him by assignment of a mortgage out of Court. 14. None of these four cases throws light on the provisions of Or. 34, r. 5, nor does any of them afford authority for the proposition that the words "purchase money paid into Court by the purchaser," which occur in Or. 34, r. 5 (2), mean or include purchase money set off against the amount of the decree, in cases where the decree-holder is the purchaser. 15. Or. 34, r. 5, nor does any of them afford authority for the proposition that the words "purchase money paid into Court by the purchaser," which occur in Or. 34, r. 5 (2), mean or include purchase money set off against the amount of the decree, in cases where the decree-holder is the purchaser. 15. Or. 21, r. 89 is a general provision which governs all applications by an owner or other person holding an interest acquired before the sale, to have the sale set aside, whether the sale was in execution of a mortgage decree, a decree giving effect to a charge, or a decree for money. Or. 34, r. 5 is a special provision relating particularly to such applications when preferred by a mortgagor judgment-debtor. Its intention is to give the fullest effect to the mortgagor's right to redeem. This is, I think, sufficiently clear when r. 5 is read along with two previous rules of Or. 34 to which it relates back, namely rr. 4 (1) and 2 (1) (c). In sub-r. (1) of r. 5 the words "or at any time before the confirmation of the same made in pursuance of a final decree passed under sub-r. (3) of this rule," recognise the principle that a decree for sale does not extinguish the equity of redemption until the sale is confirmed. See in this connection Kalipado Mukherjee v. Basanta Kumar ILR 59 Cal. 117 (1931) . 16. The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant applies not only to general and special Acts, but also when a general enactment and a special enactment both relating to the same subject are contained in the same Act. In Churchill v. Crease 5 Bing. 177, Best, C.J., expressed the matter thus:-- When a general intention is expressed and the Act expresses a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception. 17. In Pretty v. Solly 26 Beav. 606, Sir John Romilly, Master of the Rolls, enunciated the rule as follows: Whenever there is a particular enactment and a 'general enactment in the same Statute and the latter taken in its most comprehensive sense would over-rule the former, the particular enactment must be operative and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the Statute to which it may properly apply.... Again whenever two parts of a statute are contradictory, the Court endeavours to give a distinct interpretation to each of them by looking at the context. 18. Mr. B.C. Ghose on behalf of the applicant has cited two Indian cases which relate to the attractibility of the specific rather than the more general articles of the first schedule of the Limitation Act. They are Sridhur Mahadeb v. Godulal Jethmull ILR [1989] Bom. 722 and Municipal Board of Mussoorie v. Goodall ILR 26 All. 482 (1904). In Subramania v. Ramaswamy AIR [1937] Mad. 560, the mortgagor judgment-debtor applied for the setting aside of the sale of the mortgaged property thirty-two days after the sale in execution of the mortgage decree had taken place. One of the questions in the case was whether the application was barred under Art. 166 of the Limitation Act. It was held that Art. 166 being a general provision, could not override the special provisions of Or. 34, r. 5 of the CPC which gives a time other than that provided by Art. 166. In Sm. Shamangini Roy Chowdhurani Vs. Sm. Mahalakshmi Rakshit, AIR 1942 Cal 44 an application by the mortgagor judgment-debtor to set aside a sale under Or. 21, r. 89 was dismissed and the judgment-debtor then applied for the same relief under Or. 34, r. 5. It was argued that the first application having been dismissed, the second did not lie. It was also argued that Or. 34, r. 5 did not apply, because that rule contemplates the confirmation of the sale, whereas no question of confirmation of the sale could arise since the sale was held under the rules contained in Ch. XXVII of the Rules and Orders of the Original Side of this Court, which contain no specific provision for the express confirmation of sales. Both objections were overruled, and the application under Or. 34, r. 6 was allowed. From this decision it would follow firstly, that Or. 21, r. 89 is not exhaustive, inasmuch as relief may be granted under Or. 34, r. 5 after it has been refused under Or. 21, r. 89, and secondly, that Or. 34, r. 5 applies to sales by the Registrar under the Original Side Rules. In this case, the question whether the auction-purchaser was entitled to five per cent. 21, r. 89 is not exhaustive, inasmuch as relief may be granted under Or. 34, r. 5 after it has been refused under Or. 21, r. 89, and secondly, that Or. 34, r. 5 applies to sales by the Registrar under the Original Side Rules. In this case, the question whether the auction-purchaser was entitled to five per cent. of that sum only which he had actually paid into Court, and not to five per cent. of the entire purchase price was not raised. In fact, the entire purchase money would seem to have been paid into Court in this case. In considering the earlier cases cited by Mr. Chatterjee, it has to be distinctly borne in mind, that sub-r. (2) of r. 5 of Or. 34 was enacted by Act XXI of 1929, and that till then the only provision of the Code which dealt with the solatium to which the purchaser was entitled was r. 21 of Or. 21. 19. I am clearly of opinion that the question for consideration in this case has to be decided upon the language of Or. 34, r. 5 (2), and not by reference to the more general provision contained in Or. 21, r. 89. That question lies in a narrow compass, and amounts to no more than this:--What is the meaning of the words "the amount of the purchase money paid into Court by the purchaser" in Or. 34, r. 5(2) ? In Vacher and Sons, Limited v. London Society of Compositors [1913] A.C. 107, the House of Lords considered the proper method of interpreting and applying a statute. Certain passages from the speeches were quoted by Remfry, J., in Ashutosh Basu v. Sudhangsu Bhusan Mukherjee ILR 58 Cal. 510 (1930) to which case my attention was drawn by Mr. Ghose. It would be helpful to repeat the quotation here. Haldane, L.C., said: In endeavouring to place the proper interpretation on the section of the statute... I propose to exclude considerations of everything excepting the state of the law as it was then when the statute was passed, and the light to be got from reading it as a whole... Subject to this consideration I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense. 20. Subject to this consideration I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense. 20. Lord MacNaughten said: In the absence of a preamble, there can, I think, be only two cases in what it is permissible to depart from the ordinary and natural sense of the words of an enactment. It must be shown that either the words taken in their natural sense leod to some absurdity, 21. or that in the Act there is something repugnant to or inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words used. 22. Lord Atkinson says: A Court of Law has nothing to to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a provision of a statute, except so far as it may help it in interpreting what the legislature has said. If the language of a statute be plain, admitting of only one meaning, the legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced though it should lead to absurd or results. 23. Lord Shaw says, a Court must loyally accept and plainly expound the simple words employed and must not "vaporise" them. 24. Lord Moulton says that the consideration of the result of a provision is only relevant when there are two rival interpretations of the words. 25. There are not, in the present case, two rival interpretations of words, because the words "paid into Court" in Or. 34, r. 5 do not occur at all in Or. 21, r. 89. But if one has to consider the result of the provision nevertheless, to what does it lead? The stranger purchaser gets five per cent. on the amount he has actually paid into Court; the mortgagor purchaser who sets off his decree against the price gets nothing on the amount set off. Is he in a less advantageous position than the stranger purchaser? I think not. The latter has parted with cash. The former has, to the extent of his set off, not done so. It may be said that he parted with his cash long ago, that is when he advanced it as a loan to the mortgagee. Is he in a less advantageous position than the stranger purchaser? I think not. The latter has parted with cash. The former has, to the extent of his set off, not done so. It may be said that he parted with his cash long ago, that is when he advanced it as a loan to the mortgagee. But then he is entitled to interest on his loan, and continues to be so entitled up to the date of realisation or actual payment. Under Or. 34, r. 11(b) the Court may order payment of interest to the mortgagee up to the date of realisation or actual payment. In Khalil-ur-Rahaman v. Gokul Prosad ILR 41 All. 526 (1919), which referred to the earlier case of Ganesh v. Purshottem ILR 33 Bom. 311 (1908), the question was whether, if a decree carries interest, the decree-holder is entitled to claim interest between the date of the sale and the date of its confirmation. The question was answered in the affirmative oft the ground that a decree, the satisfaction of which has resulted from the decree-holder himself bidding the full amount of the same at the execution sale, is not actually satisfied until the sale has been confirmed. 26. It has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the five per cent. on the amount deposited by the purchaser is intended, not as a payment in lieu of interest on the amount deposited, but purely as a solatium to the purchaser for the loss of his bargain, and there is no sufficient reason for depriving a decree-holder purchaser of this solatium while allowing it to a stranger purchaser. That may be so, but the Court has to give effect to the plain meaning of the words "paid into Court," which occur in Or. 34, r. 5(2), and which are not to be found in Or. 21, r. 89 27. If, as has been contended, the words "the amount of the purchase money paid into Court" in Or. 34, r. 5(2) express exactly the same thing as the words "the purchase money" in Or. 21, r. 89, which mean the whole of the purchase money, whether paid into Court or not, the result in many instances would be absurd. Consider the second paragraph of Or. 34, r. 5(2) express exactly the same thing as the words "the purchase money" in Or. 21, r. 89, which mean the whole of the purchase money, whether paid into Court or not, the result in many instances would be absurd. Consider the second paragraph of Or. 34, r. 5(2) which is in these words: Where such deposit has been made, the purchaser shall be entitled to an order for repayment of the amount of the purchase money paid into Court by him, together with a sum equal to five per cent. thereof. 28. Now take the case of a stranger purchaser, who under Or. 21, r. 84(1) has paid into Court a deposit of only twenty-five per cent. of his purchase money, according to the suggested interpretation of the words "purchase money paid into Court" in the first paragraph of sub-r. (2), he would be entitled to withdraw not merely what he has paid in, but a sum equivalent to the entire amount of his accepted bid: Looked at as a transaction in which the mortgagee decree-holder is the purchaser, the result would be at least equally absurd. Suppose the mortgagee purchaser's bid and set off have operated so as to cancel the whole of the judgment-debtor's indebtedness to him on account of the loan and interest, the decree-holder mortgagee is nevertheless still entitled to interest up to the time when the sale will be confirmed. Moreover, and this is more important, he has actually paid nothing into Court, yet he also would be entitled to withdraw a sum equal to the amount of his final bid. 29. In my judgment the words "purchase money paid into Court" must mean money actually so paid, and do not embrace a notional payment. 30. My attention has been drawn by Mr. Chatterjee to sec. 65 of the CPC which says, that, Where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold, and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. 31. This provision merely fixes the time al which the purchaser's title accrues, but it neither says nor implies that the purchase money must be deemed to be paid into Court by the purchaser at the time when the property is sold. 32. 31. This provision merely fixes the time al which the purchaser's title accrues, but it neither says nor implies that the purchase money must be deemed to be paid into Court by the purchaser at the time when the property is sold. 32. In Ganesh v. Pursuttom ILR 33 Bom, 311 (1908), the holder of a money decree had, in execution thereof, purchased immovable property subject to a mortgage in favour of a third person, who was in possession. Before the sale was confirmed the decree-holder brought a suit for a declaration that the mortgage was without consideration and ineffective. It was contended that such a suit could only be brought by a person who was still a judgment-creditor, and not by a purchaser whose decree had been satisfied. It was held that the decree-holder was still a judgment-creditor as the suit had been brought before the sale was confirmed and before the decree was satisfied. 33. In my judgment, the Plaintiff Company the first Respondent are not entitled to withdraw a sum equivalent to five per cent. of the amount of their accepted bid, and the second Respondent is entitled to withdraw a sum equivalent to five per cent. of only that amount which he has actually deposited in Court. 34. There will be an order in terms of the prayers (c), (d), (e), (g), (h) and (i) of the petition. 35. I also direct as follows: 1. The Plaintiff Company will lodge their bill of costs for taxation within one week from the date on which the office copy of this order is received. 2. The Plaintiff Company will be entitled to retain the title deeds until such time as their taxed costs have been paid. The Plaintiff Company will then re-convey the property to the Defendant. 3. The Plaintiff Company's costs of and incidental to this application will be added to their claim as mortgagees. 36. Out of the money deposited by the Defendant Petitioner in Court the Registrar will pay the following sums: To the Plaintiff Company (a) the decretal amount of Rs. 59,290. (b) the sum of Rs. 1,353-8, being the Registrar's commission paid by the Plaintiff Company as auction-purchasers. 37. To Hajee Mumtazuddin the other Respondent in this application: (a) Rs. 6,775, being the amount deposited by him in Court without deduction of the Registrar's commission. 59,290. (b) the sum of Rs. 1,353-8, being the Registrar's commission paid by the Plaintiff Company as auction-purchasers. 37. To Hajee Mumtazuddin the other Respondent in this application: (a) Rs. 6,775, being the amount deposited by him in Court without deduction of the Registrar's commission. (b) The costs incurred by this Respondent on account of investigation of title: (c) The costs of this Respondent of and incidental to this application. (d) A sum equivalent to five per cent. of the amount of Rs. 6,775 of re-mentioned, deposited in Court by this Respondent as purchaser. 38. The Official. Receiver is discharged, subject to his passing his final accounts, and he is directed to make over immediate possession of the property to the Defendant. This will be subject to payment of any liabilities incurred by the Official Receiver on account of the assets and still outstanding. The Official Receiver and the Registrar will act on Counsel's endorsement. The balance, if any, of the amount deposited into Court, after giving effect to the foregoing order, and after all proper costs and charges which the Registrar may determine, have been paid, will be paid by the Registrar to the Defendant Petitioner. Solicitors: N.C. Baral & Pyne for the Plaintiffs*; Kar Mehta & Co.; Mitra & Mukerji for the Respondents.