JUDGEMENT Appeal (No. 46 of 1940) from a decree of the High Court (April 13, 1937) which affirmed a decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Muttra (September 13, 1933). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee The only question for decision in this appeal was one of law, namely, whether the words " sisters "son" in s. 2 of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929—hereinafter referred to as " the Act "—included the son of a half-sister. "Sect. 2 of the Act is as follows "A sons daughter, daughters daughter, sister, and sisters "son shall, in the order so specified, be entitled to rank in the "order of succession next after a fathers fat! and before a "fathers brother "Provided that a sisters son shall not include a son adopted "after the sisters death." The facts of the case were not in dispute. The parties were Hindus governed by the law of the Mitakshara. The property in the suit belonged to one Krishna Murari, who was the last male owner. It was claimed by the respondent, Ram Babu, the plaintiff in the action, who was Krishna Muraris fathers uncles son. His claim was resisted by Musammat Sahodra, the defendant, for herself and on behalf of her son Dhanpat. Musammat Sahodra was the half-sister of Krishna Murari, being his fathers daughter by his first wife. When succession opened, those were the two claimants to the estate, namely, Ram Babu and Dhanpat. Dhanpat died during the pendency of the appeal. Apart from the Act, Ram Babu as Krishna Muraris fathers uncles son would, as a sapinda, have been entitled to succeed to the estate of Krishna Murari as the nearest reversioner, in preference to Dhanpat, his half-sisters son, who was only a bandhu. Under the Act, however, the persons named in s. 2 inherited with gotraja sapindas, and a " sisters son " coming next after a " sister " enjoyed priority in succession over the fathers paternal uncles son. If Dhanpat, as the son of the half-sister of Krishna Murari, was entitled under the Act to inherit the suit property, then Musammat Sahodra as his mother would have been entitled to succeed him under the ordinary law. If Dhanpat, as the son of the half-sister of Krishna Murari, was entitled under the Act to inherit the suit property, then Musammat Sahodra as his mother would have been entitled to succeed him under the ordinary law. The subordinate judge decided in favour of the respondent, and decreed the suit for possession, and on appeal his judgment was affirmed by the High Court (Thorn and Iqbal Ahmad JJ.), following the decision in Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (( 1933) I. L. R.55 A. 725.), where it was held that " sister " in s. 2 of the Act of 1929 does not include a half-sister either consanguine or uterine. 1942. July 15, 16. Khambatta for the appellant. The question, whether the terms " sister " and " sisters son " in s. 2 of the Act of 1929 include a half-sister and a half-sisters son, has been answered differently in India Allahabad, Lucknow, Madras and Patna have all taken the view that a half-sister and a half-sisters son are not included in " sister " and " sisters son." Lahore is doubtful about that ruling, and has not expressed a final decision. A Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court have held that " sister " and " sisters " son " do include a half-sister and a half-sisters son. First, on the construction of the Act, the courts in India appear to have been in some doubt whether the Act alters only the order of succession among the heirs who were heirs before the passing of the Act, or whether it amends the law of inheritance under the Mitakshara so as to create as new heirs persons who were not so before the Act was passed Bhagwan Dei, Mst. v. Radha, Mst. (( 1933) I. L. R. 8 Luck . 646, 652-4.) ; Shrimati Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi (( 1935) I. L. R. 17 Lah. 356,359, 361.) ; Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai (( 1936) I. L. R. 58 A. 1041, 1049.) ; and Dalsingar Singh v. Jainath Kuar (( 1940) A. I. R. (Oudh) 138.). What the position was before the Act {see Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, 8th ed., paras. 38-40, 61A) does not really arise, because, it is submitted, the Act amended the law of inheritance so as to create and bring in new heirs as from the date of its passing. What the position was before the Act {see Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, 8th ed., paras. 38-40, 61A) does not really arise, because, it is submitted, the Act amended the law of inheritance so as to create and bring in new heirs as from the date of its passing. Next, the general Mitakshara doctrine of the preference for the whole-blood over the half-blood in the case of sapindas and bandhus of the same class applies to the provisions of this Act, that is, there is nothing in the Act which excludes that doctrine. Whole-blood including half-blood in the case of sapindas and bandhus therefore brings in the half-sister and the half-sisters son Ganga Sahai v. Kesri (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 177,183.) ; Jatindra Nath Roy v. Nagendra Nath Roy (( 1931) L. R. 58 I. A. 372,374.) ; Garuddas v. laidas (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 189.) ; which refer with approval to the Full Bench decision in Suba Singh v. Sarafraz Kunwar (( 1896) I. L. R. 19 A. 215.). The Mitakshara doctrine, which, it is submitted, is to be referred to for the construction of the Act, would bring in the half-sister and the half-sisters son where the sister arid the sisters son come in, except in a competition inter se, in which case the whole-blood would prevail over the half-blood. On the particular question of law now in issue it was held in Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (I. L. R. 55 A. 725.) that " sister " in s. 2 of the Act does not include half-sister, and the reasoning in that case was followed in Kabootra, Mst. v. Ram Padarath (( 1935) I. L. R. 11 Luck . 148.). The same view was also taken in Angamuthu v. Sinnapennammal (( 1938) A. I. R. (Mad.) 364, .366-7.) and Daulat Kuar v. Bishundeo Singh (( 1940) A. I. R. (Pat.) 310.). [Reference was also made to Guranditta v. Jiwani (( 1937) A. I. R. (Lah.) 11, 13.), Bhola Nath Roy v. Rakhal Dass Mukherji (( 1884) I. L. R. 11 C. 69, 70.), Rameshwar v. Ganpati Devi, Mst. (( 1936) I. L. R. 18 Lah. 525,532-4), and to Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, 8th ed., para. [Reference was also made to Guranditta v. Jiwani (( 1937) A. I. R. (Lah.) 11, 13.), Bhola Nath Roy v. Rakhal Dass Mukherji (( 1884) I. L. R. 11 C. 69, 70.), Rameshwar v. Ganpati Devi, Mst. (( 1936) I. L. R. 18 Lah. 525,532-4), and to Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, 8th ed., para. 51.] The first of the High Court decisions in favour of the appellant here, and taking the view that " sister " in the Act does include a half-sister, is Shankar v. Raghoba (( 1938) A. I. R. (Nag.) 97.), which was relied on in Amrut v. Thagan, Mst. (I. L. R. [ 1938] Nag. 115.), which dissented from Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (I. L. R. 55 A. 725.). Shankar v. Raghoba (( 1938) A. I. R. (Nag.) 97.) does not go the whole way, because the judges there were not placing reliance on the Mitakshara doctrine as applicable to all the Provinces. It is submitted, however, that that doctrine prevails in all the Provinces. The last case, in 1940, Daulat Kuar v. Bishundeo Singh (( 1940) A. I. R. (Pat.) 310.), puts the case for the respondent at its highest. The reasoning adopted on the interpretation of the Act by the Full Bench in Shankar v. Raghoba (3) is right. The Act must be read as a part of the Hindu law as a whole, and wherever a sister and a sisters son are entitled to inherit, then the half-sister and the half sisters son are also entitled to inherit on the general principle that the Hindu law recognizes no difference between the full-blood and the half-blood except in a competition inter se. A sister succeeds as the fathers daughter, and a half-sister having the same father is therefore an heir if the sister would be an heir, and therefore the word " sster " in the Act should be interpreted as " fathers daughter." It is contrary to the underlying ideas of the Mitakshara and of the society whose laws were there expressed to attach any particular importance, legally, to the fact that one daughter was born of one wife and another daughter of another wife ; to let in one as being the whole sister of the fathers son (the propositus) and exclude another altogether as being the half-sister is not founded on any ascertainable principle or binding text. It is not therefore right so to construe the Act as to give it an entirely different effect Province by Province according to the judicial opinions expressed on a highly debatable subject as to the ground for the inclusion or exclusion of sisters from the succession. Regarding the purpose of the Act, and considering the preexisting law, it should be concluded that " sister " in the Act includes a half-sister. On the point of carrying forward disabilities reference was made to Baboo Bodhnarain Singh v. Baboo Omrao Singh (( 1870) 13 Moo. I. A. 519.) and Kooer Goolab Singh v. Rao Kurun Singh (( 1871) 14 Moo. I. A. 176.). [Reference was also made to Venayeck Anundrow v. Luxumeebaee (( 1864) 9 Moo. I. A. 516.) and Raghuraj Chandra v. Subhadra Kunwar (( 1928) L. R. 551. A. 139,149.).] The respondent did not appear. Oct. 13. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Madhavan Nair, who stated the facts, and continued It was urged in the courts in India that the words "sisters son " in s. 2 of the Act would include a half-sisters son, and Dhanpat would therefore have a preferential claim to succeed to the estate of Krishna Murari, but this contention was negatived by the courts, following the decision in Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (1). In this appeal the same contention has been urged, the argument being that by the Act "sister " has been admitted as an heir under the Mitakshara law, that the term "sister " in s. 2 includes a half-sister, and that by parity of reasoning, the words "sisters son" would include a half-sisters son. It is to be regretted that the respondent has not been represented, but Mr. Khambatta, who has argued the case for the appellant with skill and ability, has placed before the Board fairly and fully all the relevant facts and arguments. There is divergence of judicial opinion in India regarding the construction of s. 2 of the Act. In Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (( 1933) I. L. R. 55 A. 725.), the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that "the word sister in s. 2 of the Hindu Law of Inheritance” (Amendment) Act, 1929, does not include a half-sister, either "uterine or consanguine" (Ibid. 727.). In Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (( 1933) I. L. R. 55 A. 725.), the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that "the word sister in s. 2 of the Hindu Law of Inheritance” (Amendment) Act, 1929, does not include a half-sister, either "uterine or consanguine" (Ibid. 727.). The main grounds for the decision are that the word sister in the English language ordinarily means a sister of the whole-blood, and that "if we " hold that sister in s. 2 of Act II. of 1929 includes a half-sister, "we shall be putting a sister and a half-sister in the same "category" (Ibid. 727.)—which would be against the spirit of the Mitakshara law under which a relation of the full-blood excludes a relation of the half-blood, and "shall be introducing "a half-sister between the words sister and sisters "son . . . ." (2). The learned judges observed that the Act "is an enabling Act which introduces certain persons as "heirs who had no such place according to the ordinary "interpretation of the Mitakshara law." Unless we have a "clear reason to believe that the legislature was introducing, "by implication, a person not specifically mentioned as an heir, "we have no right to give the word sister a wider meaning "than it would ordinarily bear" (Ibid. 727.). They also observed, "if we hold that a sister includes a half-sister, then there will "be no reason to make a distinction between a uterine sister and a consanguine sister.....Ordinarily it would be repugnant to the notions of Hindus to recognize a woman "as a sister who has not the same father as the person "himself " (I. L. R. 55 A. 725, 727.). This decision was followed by a single judge of the Oudh Chief Court in Kabootra, Musammat v. Ram Padarath (( 1935) I. L. R. 11 Luck . 148.), and also by the Madias and Patna High Courts Angamuthu v. Sinnapennammal (( 1938) A. I. R. (Mad.) 364.) ; Daulat Kuar v. Bishundeo Singh (( 1940) A. I. R. (Pat.) 310.). The judgment of Chatterji J. in the last-mentioned case is noticeable as it contains the fullest statement of the various reasons that could be urged in support of the rival contentions. All these decisions held that "sister " in s. 2 of the Act does not include a half-sister. The judgment of Chatterji J. in the last-mentioned case is noticeable as it contains the fullest statement of the various reasons that could be urged in support of the rival contentions. All these decisions held that "sister " in s. 2 of the Act does not include a half-sister. Besides the reasons given in Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (I.. L. R. 55 A. 725.), the other grounds mentioned in these decisions, shortly stated, are that the Act, inasmuch as it alters the law of succession to a certain extent, should be strictly construed, that it proceeds on the principle of affinity, that the legislature might have advisedly left out of consideration the "half-sister," and the position of the half-sister is distinct from that of the full sister even in those provinces where she is an heir ; all of which, it is said, would show that there is no justification for interpreting the word "sister " as including a half-sister. Differing from the above view, the Nagpur High Court in its Full Bench decision in Amrut v. Thagan, Mst. (I. L. R. [ 1938] Nag. 115.) held that " a half-sister who is a child of the same father is an heir under "the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act of 1929. "The word sister includes a sister by the same father even "though the mother be different." The court proceeded on the view that under the Act a sister is an heir in all the provinces to which the Mitakshara law applied, that it should be interpreted according to the notions of Hindu law, of which it forms part, and that as a general rule the law of the Mitakshara recognizes no distinction between the full-blood and the half-blood except in a competition inter se. The learned judges pointed out that as a sister succeeds as a fathers daughter, a half-sister having the same father is an heir if the sister would be an heir. The same court has also held that a half-sisters son is in the line of heirs, and that a " sisters "son" in s. 2 of the Act would include a half-sisters son see Shankar v. Raghoba (( 1938) A. I. R. (Nag.) 97.). In Rameshwar v. Ganpati Devi, Mst. The same court has also held that a half-sisters son is in the line of heirs, and that a " sisters "son" in s. 2 of the Act would include a half-sisters son see Shankar v. Raghoba (( 1938) A. I. R. (Nag.) 97.). In Rameshwar v. Ganpati Devi, Mst. (( 1936) I.L.R.18 Lah.525,534.) Tek Chand J., with whom Dalip Singh J. agreed, doubted the correctness of the decision in Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (I. L. R. 55 A. 725.), stating "with great respect, I think that the conclusion of the learned judges is "expressed too broadly, and I confess, I have grave doubts "as to the soundness of the decision and the reasons on which "it is based" (I. L. R. 18 Lah. 534.). The Act is described as, "An Act to alter the order in which "certain heirs of a Hindu male dying intestate are entitled to "succeed to his estate/ and the preamble is, "Whereas it is "expedient to alter the order in which certain heirs of a "Hindu-male dying intestate are entitled to succeed to his "estate." As the object of the Act is thus to alter the order of succession of certain persons therein mentioned, it is desirable to examine how the law stood with reference to their rights of succession before the Act, and how those rights have been altered by it. Before the Act the only females recognized as heirs under the Hindu law, except in Bombay and Madras, were (1.) the widow, (2.) the daughter, (3.) the mother, (4.) the fathers mother, (5.) the fathers fathers mother. Accordingly, "a sons daughter, daughters daughter and sister "—the first three persons mentioned in the Act—were not heirs at all, except in the presidencies of Bombay and Madras, where the first two of them ranked as bandhus. In Bombay, the third, a "sister” is expressly mentioned as an heir in the Mayukha ; though not expressly mentioned as such in the Mitakshara, her right as an heir has long since been recognized. A sister is recognized as a gotraja sapinda both in the Mayukha and in the Mitakshara. In Madras, she was recognized as entitled to succeed as bandhu but only after the male bandhus. A "sisters son " ranked everywhere as a bandhu before the Act. A sister is recognized as a gotraja sapinda both in the Mayukha and in the Mitakshara. In Madras, she was recognized as entitled to succeed as bandhu but only after the male bandhus. A "sisters son " ranked everywhere as a bandhu before the Act. Under the Act, all the above-mentioned four persons, "A "sons daughter, daughters daughter, sister and sisters son " are ranked as heirs in a specified order of succession, and placed next after a fathers father and before a fathers brother, thus enabling them to inherit with gotraja sapindas. The Act came into force on February 21, 1929. When it began to be enforced the question arose in certain courts in India (see Bhagwan Dei, Mst. v. Radha, Mst. (( 1933) I. L. R.8 Luck . 646.) ; Shrimati Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi (( 1935) I. L. R. 17 Lah. 356.) ; Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai (( 1936) I. L. R. 58 A. 1041.) ; Dalsingar Singh v. Jainath Kuar (( 1940) A. I. R. (Oudh.) 138.)) whether, having regard to the language of the preamble, the provisions of the Act would apply not only to persons who were already heirs under the Mitakshara law, but also to those of the specified persons who were not heirs before the Act, because the Act, it was said, was merely intended to alter the order in which persons already recognized as heirs would succeed and not to create new heirs. The heading and preamble of the Act do not accurately summarize its provisions, but having regard to the language of s. i, sub-s. 2, of the Act which says that "it applies only to persons who, "but for the passing of the Act, would have been subject to "the law of the Mitakshara in respect of the provisions herein "enacted, . . . ." te courts concluded, and in their Lordships view rightly, that it would apply to the persons specified so as to constitute them heirs even in those provinces where they were not heirs according to the prevailing view of the law of the Mitakshara. It will thus be seen that the Act has amended and altered the old order of succession in Hindu law. It affects all Hindus governed by the Mitakshara. It will thus be seen that the Act has amended and altered the old order of succession in Hindu law. It affects all Hindus governed by the Mitakshara. Hence it appears to their Lordships that in the absence of an interpretation clause, the courts should interpret the terms of the enactment in the sense in which they are used in the Mitakshara law. In Raghuraj Chandra v. Subhadra Kunwar (( 1928) L. R. 55 I. A. 139.), in considering whether the natural" brother " of the deceased Hindu taluqdar who was an adopted son, was a " brother " within the meaning of s. 22, cl. 5, of the Oudh Estates Act, I. of 1869, as amended by s. 14 of the U.P. Act, III. of 1910, and was consequently entitled to the estate in preference to the widow, their Lordships answered the question in the negative, on the ground that the personal law was applicable to the interpretation of the word "brother." They rejected the argument that the Act being expressed in English is its own dictionary. In the law of the Mitakshara the principle is fundamental that the primary test on all questions of inheritance is propinquity in blood. “To the nearest sapinda the inheritance " next belongs.” (Manu, 9.187,) Applying this basic principle of succession, the Hindu law gives preference, to the whole-blood over the half-blood. As applied to brothers, the rule is thus stated in the Mitakshara, ch. 2, s. 4, w. 5 and 6. These run as follows (5.) "Among brothers, such, as are of the "whole-blood, take the inheritance in the first instance, under "the text . . . . To the nearest sapinda, the inheritance next "belongs. Since those of the half-blood are remote through "the difference of the mothers." (6.) "If there be no uterine "(or whole) brothers, those by different mothers inherit the "estate." (See Colebrookes translation of the Mitakshara.) In Garuddas v. laidas (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 189.) the Board held that "the Mitakshara, ch. 2, s. 4, vv. Since those of the half-blood are remote through "the difference of the mothers." (6.) "If there be no uterine "(or whole) brothers, those by different mothers inherit the "estate." (See Colebrookes translation of the Mitakshara.) In Garuddas v. laidas (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 189.) the Board held that "the Mitakshara, ch. 2, s. 4, vv. 5 and 6, states a principle with regard "to the preference of the whole-blood to the half-blood " applicable to all sapindas in the same degree of consanguinity." In Jatindra Nath Roy v. Nagendra Nath Roy (( 1931) L. R. 58 I. A. 372.), which was a case between bandhus, it was held that in a Hindu family governed by the Benares school of the Mitakshara law the fathers half-sisters sons have preference as heirs over the mothers sisters sons. In the course of the judgment their Lordships observed, "In Ganga Sahai v. Kesri (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 177,184.) it is laid "down that having regard to the general scheme of the "Mitakshara the preference of the whole-blood to the half-" blood is confined to members of the same class, or to use "the language of the judges of the High Court in Suba Singh "v. Sarafraz Kitnwar (( 1896) I. L. R. 19 A. 215.) to sapindas of the same degree of " descent from the common ancestor " (L. R. 58 I. A. 375.). In their Lordships1 opinion, the principle of the decision applies equally in the case of bandhus, not descended from a common ancestor but claiming merely on the basis of propinquity. Again the Mitakshara (ch. 2, s. 4, vv. 5 to 7) definitely prefers a half-brother to the son of a full brother see Krishnaji Vyanktesh v. Pandurang (( 1875) 12 Bom. H. C. 65.). It follows that the law of the Mitakshara recognizes no difference between relations of whole-blood and those of half-blood, which would include sisters and half-sisters as well, except when there is a competition inter se. This has been understood and acted upon as a general principle of Hindu law by the Lahore High Court in Gurandita v. Jiwani (( 1937) A. I. R. (Lah.) 11.), in which it was held that a half-sisters son is an heir, according to its general principles. This has been understood and acted upon as a general principle of Hindu law by the Lahore High Court in Gurandita v. Jiwani (( 1937) A. I. R. (Lah.) 11.), in which it was held that a half-sisters son is an heir, according to its general principles. There is nothing in the Act itself to show that the interpretation of the word " sister" as including a " half-sister " sanctioned by the Mitakshara, is contrary to its intention, either express or implied. In Lion Mutual Marine Insurance Association v. Tucker (( 1883) 53 L. J. (Q. B.) 185,189.) Brett M.R. observed " It is, I consider, a well settled rule that in "construing a statute or a document it is not right to follow "merely the words of the statute or document, taking them "in their ordinary grammatical meaning but it is necessary "also to apply those words to the subject-matter dealt with "in the statute or document, and then to construe them with "reference to that subject-matter, unless there is something "which compels one not so to construe them. The rule is, "I think, that the ordinary meaning of the words used in the "English language must be applied to the subject-matter "under consideration." In their Lordships opinion, the Act should be read as a part of the general Hindu law of inheritance, and when so read it should be held, as already explained, that the word "sister " used in it would include a half-sister. It is obvious that the object of the Act is to give effect to the principle of propinquity by bringing into the order of succession some of those persons more nearly connected with the propositus by ties of blood than others whose connection with him, though as sapindas, is but remote. On the whole, in giving full effect to the principle of propinquity their Lordships cannot find any sufficient reasons to exclude the half-blood as such. However, in thus interpreting the term "sister " as including half-sister one qualification should be made. It is said that if we hold that a "sister " includes a half-sister, there will be no reason to make a distinction between a uterine and con sanguine sister, and that it will be repugnant to the ordinary notions of Hindus to recognize a woman as a sister who has not the same father as the person himself. It is said that if we hold that a "sister " includes a half-sister, there will be no reason to make a distinction between a uterine and con sanguine sister, and that it will be repugnant to the ordinary notions of Hindus to recognize a woman as a sister who has not the same father as the person himself. This objection does not seem to be insurmountable. In his annotation under v. 5 in s. 5 of ch. 2 of the Mitakshara, the learned commentator Colebrooke refers to the following text of Nandapandita wherein he says " Kinsmen (bandhus) are sapindas; and these "may belong to the same general family or not..... The daughters of the father and other ancestors must be admitted, "like the daughter of the man himself, and for the same "reason.11 Following this text the sister was recognized as heir as gotraja sapinda in Bombay; though elsewhere she was not recognized as an heir except in Madras, where she was treated as a bandhu. Their Lordships think that the description given by Nandapandita "the daughters of the "father " is helpful in interpreting the term "sister " where, as in this Act, it is used to signify an heir with reference to persons governed by the Mitakshara. In their Lordships opinion, the term sister " in the Act would include a half-sister, i.e., a sister by the same father even though the mother be different, but cannot be extended beyond that to include one who has not the same father. It is stated as an objection that the full sister and the half-sister must take together if the word "sister" in the Act includes a half-sister ; but this is too rigid a view. On ordinary principles, the difficulty will not arise; for, although as recognized under the Mitakshara, a sister will include a half-sister, the latter will take the inheritance only when there is no full sister to claim it. If the term "sister” in the Act includes a half-sister, then it must be held by parity of reasoning, that the term "sisters "son" would include a half-sisters son. If the term "sister” in the Act includes a half-sister, then it must be held by parity of reasoning, that the term "sisters "son" would include a half-sisters son. In this connection their Lordships would draw attention to the decision in Subbaraya v. Kylasa (( 1891) I. L. R. 15 M. 300, 301.) where in holding that a half-sisters son is entitled to inherit under the Hindu law in force in the Madras Presidency, the learned judges pointed out that the position of a half-sisters son in the line of heirs is the same as that of a sisters son. In the course of the judgment they stated as follows "The relationship between the maternal "uncle and his sisters son or step-sisters son is alike that of "sapindas, for, in both cases, there is a common grandfather "and the relation of sapindas arises from connection as parts "of one body " (Ibid. 301.). In Shankar v. Raghoba (( 1938) A. I. R. (Nag.) 97.) the learned judges of the Nagpur High Court observed, "once it is accepted "that the son of a half-sister occupies the same position as "the son of a full-sister and consequently falls within that "class, and once it is seen that the Hindu law does not speak "of them separately in the texts, it must be taken that the "legislature was using language familiar to Hindu lawyers "and meant to elevate all the persons who formed that "particular class and who are ordinarily designated by the "term sisters sons " (Ibid. 99.). Their Lordships find themselves in agreement with the above observations of the learned judges of the Nagpur High Court. For the above reasons, their Lordships are unable to accept the conclusion arrived at by the learned judges in Ram Adhar v. Sudesra (I. L. R. 55 A. 725.), on which the decision under appeal is based. The courts in India have not viewed the question from the correct standpoint. In their Lordships opinion, Dhanpat, the son of the half-sister of Krishna Murari, who succeeded to the estate under the Act, having died, his mother has under the ordinary law inherited from him. In the result, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, and that the decrees of the courts in India should be set aside and the suit dismissed. In the result, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, and that the decrees of the courts in India should be set aside and the suit dismissed. The respondent will pay the appellants costs in the High Court and in this appeal; but in the trial court, each party will bear its own costs in consonance with its order.