JUDGMENT Das, J. - This is an application for an order that the Receiver appointed by an order of this Court made in this suit may be directed to forthwith take possession of the properties charged under a consent order made by this Court on the 22nd July, 1936, and that the Court of Wards be directed to afford all facilities to the said Receiver for the purpose and that the Receiver do sell the properties in execution of the order and other incidental reliefs. The only, point argued before me is of some importance and, as far as I can see, is not covered by any authority. The decision of the point depends on the construction to be put upon sec. 10C, sub-sec. (1) of the Bengal Court of Wards Act, 1879 as amended by the Bengal Court of Wards (Amendment) Act, 1935 (Act VI of 1936). 2. The facts leading up to the present application are shortly as follows: On August 21, 1925, a consent decree was passed in this suit whereby, amongst other things, the Defendant submitted to a decree for Rs. 4, 00, 000 with interest at 10 per cent. per annum, the decretal amount being payable by certain installments and secured by a charge on certain colliery properties therein specified. The Defendant having failed to make payment in terms of the decree the Plaintiff Company applied for execution of the decree and by an order made on that application on the 15th December, 1928, a Receiver was appointed of the Chalbalpur Colliery (being one of the properties charged by the consent decree) with liberty to sell the same. This order was substantially confirmed on appeal. The Receiver, however, was unable to sell the Colliery and ultimately gave up possession of the same. In 1935, the Plaintiff again applied for execution of the decree, but the said application was dismissed on the 13th February, 1936. From the last-mentioned order of dismissal there was an appeal which was disposed of by an order made on the 22nd July, 1936, in accordance with certain terms of settlement. The said order is annexure "B" to the petition. 3. In 1937, the Defendant was declared a disqualified proprietor and the Court of Wards assumed charge of his estate on the 1st June, 1937. The said order is annexure "B" to the petition. 3. In 1937, the Defendant was declared a disqualified proprietor and the Court of Wards assumed charge of his estate on the 1st June, 1937. On the 15th August, 1940, the Defendant died leaving two sons, who are now wards of the Court of Wards. 4. In August, 1941, an application was made on behalf of the two sons for relief under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. This application was, however, withdrawn on January 6th, 1942, with liberty to bring a suit for appropriate reliefs under the said Act. Such suit was tiled on January 29th, 1942, and the writ of summons in that suit was served on February 13th, 1942. On February 18th, 1942, the Plaintiff Company, which is the Defendant in that suit, retaliated by an application for execution of the decree in this suit. That application came up for hearing before Sen, J., and was dismissed by him on March 17th, 1942. After the disposal of that application the sum of Rs. 27,000 was paid by the Court of Wards on April 27th, 1942. No further payment having been made the Plaintiff Company took out the present notice of motion on the 11th August, 1942. 5. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10C of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, as amended by Act VI of 1936, provides as follows: Where any property is in charge of the Court of Wards no Civil Court shall execute any decree or order against the person or property of the ward within four years from the date of the commencement of the Bengal Court of Wards (Amendment) Act 1935, or from the date of the assumption of the charge of the property by the Court of Wards, whichever is later, and for seven years thereafter if the interest due under such decree or order be paid, in full every year during the said seven year. 6. It will be noticed that in its earlier part the sub-section imposes a bar against execution against the person or property of the ward during four years from the date of the commencement of the Bengal Court of Wards (Amendment) Act, 1935 or from the date of the assumption of the charge of the property by the Court of Wards whichever is later. This bar for four years affects all decree-holders irrespective of whether their decrees do or do not carry interest and in the former case whether the judgment-debtors do or do not pay the interest due under the decrees. In other words, the earlier part of the sub-section gives an absolute moratorium for four years to the judgment-debtors who are wards of the Court of Wards. The intention of the legislature obviously is to give a reasonable time to the Court of Wards to look into and straighten out the affairs of the estate taken charge of by them. 7. This sub-section came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manager, Kassimbazar Raj Wards Estate v. Rakhal Das Tarafdar ILR [1942] 2 Cal. 241: s.c. 46 C.W.N. 454.. It was there held that the decrees referred to in the last part of sec. 10C of the Court of Wards Act, the execution of which will be stayed for seven years, are only decrees which carry interest and in which interest has been regularly paid for that period. The result of this decision is that holders of decrees which do not provide for interest can execute their decrees and realise their moneys by taking out execution after four years but in respect of decrees carrying interest the bar continues for seven years if the interest due under such decree or order be paid in full every year during the said seven years. 8. The above sub-section again came up for consideration before this Court at the time of the hearing of the application for execution made in this very suit and to which I have already referred. The position then was that the first period of moratorium, namely, four years from the date of the assumption of charge of the properties by the Court of Wards had expired, no interest had been paid during those four years and the fifth year was running and even the interest of the fifth year had not been paid. In his judgment which is reported in H.V. Low v. Pramatha Nath Malia ILR [1942] 2 Cal. 295 and to which I have been referred, Sen, J., held that the words "for seven years thereafter" in sec. In his judgment which is reported in H.V. Low v. Pramatha Nath Malia ILR [1942] 2 Cal. 295 and to which I have been referred, Sen, J., held that the words "for seven years thereafter" in sec. 10C meant for seven years after the expiry of four years mentioned in the earlier part of that section and that in the case of a decree bearing interest the period of seven years should be added to the period of four years where interest is paid in full during the period of seven years. As the fifth year was still running and the judgment-debtor had the whole of the fifth year to perform his obligations, whatever they were, Sen, J., dismissed that application as premature. It was not necessary for Sen, J., to decide and he did not decide what amount had to be paid during the fifth year. 9. After the dismissal of that application and while the fifth year was still running the sum of Rs. 27,000 being interest in full for the fifth year was paid on April 27th, 1942, but no part of the arrears of interest for the first four years had been paid. It is in these circumstances and during the currency of the sixth year that the Plaintiff Company made the present application for execution and the question now is whether the judgment-debtor has, by paying interest for the fifth year only, complied with the conditions laid down in the latter part of the sub-section so as to entitle him to the benefit thereof. 10. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the Plaintiff Company contends that inasmuch as this section interferes with the vested rights of the decree-holder it should be very strictly construed and he argues that in order to avail himself of the second period of exemption for seven years the judgment-debtor must pay during the fifth year not only the interest of the fifth year but the whole of the arrears of interest and thereafter he must go on paying interest for every year during each of the six succeeding years. He strongly relies on the words "the interest due under such decree or order" and the words "paid in full" and contends that those words clearly indicate that all arrears of interest and the current interest of the fifth year must be paid during the fifth year as otherwise "the interest due under such decree or order" cannot be said to be "paid in full. 11. The learned Advocate-General has drawn my attention to the case of The National Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Gaganendra Nath Tagore 42 C.W.N. 374 (1937) and while conceding that the case is not in point he has relied on the following observations in the judgment of Remfry, J., in that case: But the order asked for is simply for the appointment of a receiver, who will not be able to take possession under the provisions of the Act, specially under sec. 10C until the Court of Wards either relinquishes the property or after four years fails to pay the interest due. 12. The point now in issue was not in issue in that case and the above observation of Remfry, J., cannot, in my opinion, be taken as an adjudication thereof. 13. The learned Advocate-General has also relied on the case of Manager, Kassimbazar Raj Wards Estate v. Rakhal Das Tarafdar ILR [1942] 2 Cal. 241: s.c. 46 C.W.N. 454 to which I have already referred. He points out that according to the decision in that case the holder of a decree which does not carry interest can after four years take out execution and realise and profitably re-invest his money. He argues that if the holder of a decree carrying interest is postponed for another seven years merely on payment of the current interest during those seven years, he will be prevented from realising not only the principal amount, but also the arrears of interest for the earlier years. He points out that although this would not involve any disadvantage to the decree-holder as regards the principal amount because current interest will be paid, the decree-holder will loose the interest which he could have earned by realising and then re-investing the arrears of interest. 14. Mr. S.N. Banerji on behalf of the wards has drawn my attention to the scheme of the Bengal Court of Wards Act in general and the evils sec. 14. Mr. S.N. Banerji on behalf of the wards has drawn my attention to the scheme of the Bengal Court of Wards Act in general and the evils sec. 10C of the Act was designed to remedy in particular and he argues that the latter part of the sub-section by its necessary intendment confers on the ward exemption for a further period of seven years if interest for each year is paid during each of the seven years. In other words, he contends that during the fifth year the ward need only pay the interest for that year alone. He contends that "the interest due under such decree or order" in relation to the fifth year is the interest of that year and if that amount is paid during the fifth year then the condition is fulfilled. 15. Of the two rival contentions I am inclined to accept those of Mr. S.N. Banerji. The sub-section requires not only that "the interest due under such decree or order" must be "paid in full" but that such payment must be made "every year during the said seven years." This language indicates that "the interest due under such decree or order" must be the same amount which must be "paid in full every year during the said seven years." The language used in the sub-section conveys to my mind the idea of recurring annual payments during seven years and the idea of recurring annual payments, to my mind, seems to be naturally consonant with payments of equal amounts during each of those seven years. To hold otherwise would mean that the same words, namely " the interest due under such decree or order" will mean different amounts in different years. To put it in another way, the words "the interest due under such decree or order" in relation to the fifth year will mean an amount which will be the aggregate of the arrears of interest and the current interest of that year, while the same words in relation to the subsequent years will mean a different amount namely the interest of one year. This interpretation seems to me to ignore the words "every year." I am not prepared, as a matter of sound principle of construction, to give different meanings to the same word or set of words, unless I am forced to do so. This interpretation seems to me to ignore the words "every year." I am not prepared, as a matter of sound principle of construction, to give different meanings to the same word or set of words, unless I am forced to do so. I hold therefore that "the interest due under such decree or order" which has to be "paid in full every year during the said seven years" is interest for each of those seven years. 16. The construction which I am adopting seems to mo to be consonant with what I conceive to be the intention of the legislature. The section is in its nature and purpose a remedial measure and I cannot think that the legislature could have contemplated that an estate which could not pay the interest in the earlier years would in the fifth year be suddenly in a position to pay not only the current interest of that year but all arrears of interest of the earlier years. The intention of the legislature appears to me to give an absolute moratorium for the first four years so as to enable the Court of Wards to look into and straighten out the affairs of the estate and, if in the fifth year the Court of Wards can show that by its management the position of the estate has improved and it is in a position to go on paying the current interest for each year, to give a further moratorium for seven years. In my judgment, the object of the legislature being to give relief to disqualified proprietors and their estates the language should be construed, if possible, in furtherance of such object. To accede to the interpretation insisted upon by the learned Advocate-General may, in many cases, frustrate this object. Mr. Banerji's contention, which I accept, will, on the other hand, fully give effect to it. As I find the words capable of bearing a construction which will be consonant with the object of the legislature as I conceive it to be, I prefer to adopt such construction. 17. Mr. Banerji's contention, which I accept, will, on the other hand, fully give effect to it. As I find the words capable of bearing a construction which will be consonant with the object of the legislature as I conceive it to be, I prefer to adopt such construction. 17. If it were permissible for me to decide the question on a consideration of comparative hardship I should think that the hardship of the decree-holder by loss of interest on arrears of interest is less than the hardship that would be inflicted on the wards by exposing the estate to divers execution proceedings which may compel the Court of Wards to relinquish the management thereof. I, therefore, hold that the fifth year's interest having been paid the wards have complied with the condition laid down in the sub-section and are entitled to the benefit thereof and this application must be dismissed with costs.