JUDGMENT Verma, J. - These two appeals have arisen out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent, Srimati Kunwar Rani Prembada Kunwar, for the recovery of possession over certain zamindari and house property and for mesne profits. First Appeal No. 87 of 1939 is by defendant 2, Sri Thakur Radha Krishnaji, an idol, and First Appeal No. 90 of 1939 is by defendant 1, Kunwar Krishna Pratap Singh. The Court below has decreed the suit for possession and for the recovery of certain mesne profits and has also declared that the plaintiff is entitled to recover pendente lite and future mesne profits. Apart from the two appellants, there were certain other defendants. Defendant 3 was Srimati Beti Govind Kunwar, the elder sister of defendant 1's deceased mother. She pleaded that she was not in possession of any portion of the property in dispute in her own right, that no relief was claimed against her in the plaint and that she had been improperly impleaded. This was found in her favour and the Court below has accordingly ordered that the suit as against defendant 3 was to stand dismissed with costs. The remaining defendants were interested in certain portions of the property in suit, but they never appeared in the Court below and have submitted to the decree passed by that Court against them. The following pedigree will be helpful: 2. Raja Khushal Singh was the holder of an estate known as the Rajor Raj in the District of Etah. He died in 1901 and was succeeded by his elder son. Sanwal Singh. We are not concerned in these appeals with the Rajor Raj. The younger son, Dharam Singh, was the owner of a number of villages and shares in certain villages and of two houses described as garhis. He used to reside at a village called Kharaua in the District of Etah. As shown above, he had two wives, the senior being Inder Kunwar and the junior being the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar. As is indicated in the pedigree given above, his two daughters, Govind Kunwar and Jot Kunwar, were born of the senior wife, Inder Kunwar. Dharam Singh died in 1912 leaving him surviving the two widows, Inder Kunwar and the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar, and the two daughters, Govind Kunwar and Jot Kunwar. As is indicated in the pedigree given above, his two daughters, Govind Kunwar and Jot Kunwar, were born of the senior wife, Inder Kunwar. Dharam Singh died in 1912 leaving him surviving the two widows, Inder Kunwar and the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar, and the two daughters, Govind Kunwar and Jot Kunwar. The elder girl, Govind Kunwar, was married to Moti Singh in 1921 or 1922 and the younger girl, Jot Kunwar, was married to Moti Singh's younger brother, Bahadur Singh, in 1926. Jot Kunwar died in 1932 leaving a son, Krishna Pratap Singh, who is the first defendant and appellant in First Appeal No. 90 of 1939. Inder Kunwar died on 28th November 1934, and the present suit was commenced by the surviving co-widow, Prembada Kunwar, on 18th November 1935. 3. Among the properties owned by Dharam Singh was the village Kharaua. One of the pleas taken in the plaint was that the village Kharaua was a part of the Rajor Raj, that Dharam Singh bad been in possession thereof as a guzaradar, and that he and his successors in interest had no power to transfer it. It was alternatively averred by the plaintiff that, even if it was found that Kharaua had not been a part of the Raj and that Dharam Singh had been in possession of that village as full owner and not merely as a guzaradar, the suit would not be affected and that the plaintiff's claim with regard to village Kharaua would stand on the same footing as the claim in respect of the remaining items of property. The defendants did not admit the allegations as to the inalienability of village Kharaua and the questions thus raised formed the subject-matter of the first two issues framed in the Court below. The Court, however, having subsequently found that the plaintiff's suit was based on the right of survivorship given by Hindu law to a surviving co-widow, and not on any custom of inalienability of any part of the property in suit, came to the conclusion that issues 1 and 2 did not arise and, by an order dated 10th February 1938, directed that no evidence on the questions involved in these issues was to be adduced. The suit thereafter proceeded on the footing that Dharam Singh was the owner of the entire property claimed by the plaintiff, and the appeals have been argued before us on either side on that footing and no question has been raised as to Dharam Singh's title to Kharaua having been only a qualified one. 4. The case of the plaintiff was that, on Dharam Singh's death in 1912, his two widows - Inder Kunwar and the plaintiff-succeeded as joint tenants with a right of survivorship; that they remained in joint possession and management for a few years; that a dispute having arisen between the widows in connexion with the enjoyment of the rents and profits, their deceased husband's elder brother, Raja Sanwal Singh, made a division of Dharam Singh's estate into two equal portions and put each widow in possession of a half though no change was made in the entry of names in the Government records; that Inder Kunwar had disposed of the moiety of the estate in her possession by means of certain transfers; that these transfers' were of no effect beyond the life time of Inder Kunwar and that the plaintiff, as the surviving widow, was Entitled to recover possession of the properties, of which the defendants were in possession by virtue of the transfers made by Inder Kunwar as the plaintiff, by right of survivorship, was, on Inder Kunwar'a death, entitled to the possession of the whole estate. 5. For some reason or other, there was considerable delay in the appearance of the defendants, and the written statement of defendant 1 was not filed until 8th October 1936 and that of defendant 2 until 3rd November 1936. Defendant 3 appeared as late as 8th February 1938. Before dealing with the pleas raised by the defendants, it will be convenient to give a list of the transfers made by Inder Kunwar under which the various defendants had come into possession of portions of the estate and which the plaintiff impugned. This list is to be found in the statement made by the plaintiff's pleader under O. 10, R. 2, Civil P.C., on 8th October 1936. This list is to be found in the statement made by the plaintiff's pleader under O. 10, R. 2, Civil P.C., on 8th October 1936. In chronological order the transfers were as detailed below: (1) A deed of gift, executed on 5th July 1926, in favour of Jot Kunwar in respect of 10 biswas, in other words, half, of village Kharaua, Defendant 1 claimed to have succeeded to this property on the death of his mother, Jot Kunwar. (2) A deed of sale, executed on 17th August 1929, in favour of defendants 4 to 7. It is not necessary to give any further particulars of this transfer as defendants 4 to 7 have, as already stated, submitted to the decree and the transaction is no longer in question. (3) A deed of gift, executed on 23rd October 1934, in favour of defendant 2, Sri Thakur Radha Krishnaji by means of which the moiety share held by Inder Kunwar in two villages - Chhaprai, Secunderabad and Harnaoli - and in the residential house at Kharaua was endowed. (4) A will, executed on 23rd October 1934, by means of which Inder Kunwar bequeathed the rest of the property in her possession to defendant 1, Krishna Pratap Singh. Among other things, it was stated in this deed of will that the testator's junior co-widow, Prembada Kunwar, was in possession "as a life tenant" of half of Dharam Singh's estate in accordance with a division made by Raja Sanwal Singh, and that Krishna Pratap Singh, as the lawful reversioner, would come into possession of that portion of the estate also on the death of Prembada Kunwar. 6. Defendant 1, by his written statement, raised a number of pleas. We are, however, concerned with only two of those pleas, as learned counsel appearing in this Court for Krishna Pratap Singh has confined himself only to those two pleas. The paragraphs of the written statement which relate to these pleas are paras. 7 and 11. 6. Defendant 1, by his written statement, raised a number of pleas. We are, however, concerned with only two of those pleas, as learned counsel appearing in this Court for Krishna Pratap Singh has confined himself only to those two pleas. The paragraphs of the written statement which relate to these pleas are paras. 7 and 11. The manner in which learned counsel has put the points before us are as given below: (1) At the time of the division between the widows, which was made in 1915, with the help of Raja Sanwal Singh, the widows did not merely divide the estate for purposes of separate management and enjoyment, but each of the two widows relinquished in favour of the other her right of survivorship, and consequently the plaintiff was debarred from claiming the property by right of survivorship. (2) The gift of 5th July 1926, of the half share of village Kharaua in favour of Jot Kunwar was valid for the following reasons: (a) It was made with the consent of the plaintiff, (b) In any event the gift having been made as a dowry on the occasion of Jot Kunwar's marriage and being in respect of property which was not more than one quarter of Dharam Singh's estate, Inder Kunwar was competent under the law to make the gift even without the consent of her co-widow (c) Dharam Singh before his death had given a direction that his daughters should be married in a respectable family and that village Kharaua should be given to them in dowry, and so the gift was in accordance with an oral will made by Dharam Singh. (d) It was necessary, in fulfilment of the wishes of Dharam Singh, to marry Jot Kunwar to a boy belonging to a highly respectable family; Bahadur Singh was such a boy, but Bahadur Singh's father insisted on a substantial dowry and Inder Kunwar had no money at that time, and Bahadur Singh's father was prevailed upon with difficulty to agree to the marriage on condition that half of village Kharaua was given as a dowry. The point raised is that the gift was made in circumstances which amounted to pressure and legal necessity. 7. The point raised is that the gift was made in circumstances which amounted to pressure and legal necessity. 7. By his written statement filed on 3rd November 1936, defendant 2 raised substantially the same pleas as had been raised by defendant 1, An application was, however, subsequently made on his behalf on 5th January 1937, praying that a further plea be added and this application was allowed. The plea thus raised was that one Khiali Singh had, on Dharam Singh's death, become entitled to the estate left by Dharam Singh "in accordance with the deed of adoption dated 5th November 1909," that Inder Kunwar had taken adverse possession of the property, not allowing Khiali Singh to get into possession, and that Inder Kunwar had consequently acquired an absolute title to the property by adverse possession, and was therefore entitled to make transfers and to confer a good title on her transferees. It was urged that, whatever the rights of the heirs of Khiali Singh might be, the plaintiff had no right whatsoever to challenge the transfers made by Inder Kunwar. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in First Appeal No. 87 of 1939 has raised the points raised by learned counsel for Krishna Pratap Singh, as mentioned above, and has further urged this plea based on the alleged adverse possession of Inder Kunwar, It has been conceded that if this plea is accepted, the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar, also must be held to have acquired an absolute title to the moiety share of the estate of which she has been in possession. A further point raised on behalf of the idol is that the endowment was made in accordance with the wishes of Dharam Singh and so must be upheld. Lastly, it has been argued that, in any event, the endowment was for the benefit of Dharam Singh's soul and was in respect of a very small fraction of the estate and is consequently valid. 8. We take up the appeal of Krishna Pratap Singh first. Learned counsel has pointed out that if the first point raised by him, namely, the relinquishment of the right of survivorship by each widow in favour of the other at the time of the division in 1915, is accepted, no other question need be considered as the suit must of necessity be dismissed in that case. Learned counsel has pointed out that if the first point raised by him, namely, the relinquishment of the right of survivorship by each widow in favour of the other at the time of the division in 1915, is accepted, no other question need be considered as the suit must of necessity be dismissed in that case. On the other hand, it is conceded that, if that contention of the appellant is not accepted, the will of 23rd October 1934 must be held to be invalid and inoperative and the properties covered by that will must be decreed to the plaintiff. But, even it that point of the appellant fails, the gift of the 10 biswas of Kharaua made on 5th July 1926 and the endowment created by the deed of 23rd October 1934 will have to be considered on their own merits in the light of the particular contentions raised with regard to them as indicated above. 9. Dr. K.N. Katju, who has appeared for the appellant Krishna Pratap Singh, has argued the case with fairness and ability. Having heard him at length, we have come to the conclusion that the first point raised by him need not detain us long. The question raised is one of fact, and as we are in complete agreement with the decision on this point of the learned Judge of the Court below, who has written an able and exhaustive judgment and has examined the evidence in detail and with care, we are relieved of the necessity of dealing with the evidence in any great detail. The evidence relied upon in support of this contention is, in our judgment, wholly valueless. Learned counsel has referred to certain documents, but none of them supports his contention in any manner whatsoever. [After going through the documentary evidence their Lordships proceeded.] So far as oral evidence is concerned, reliance has been placed on the evidence of four witnesses, Himanchal Singh, Man Khan, Tota Ram and Ram Lal. We have been taken through the evidence of these witnesses and we have no hesitation in agreeing with the Court below that these are not witnesses on whose testimony any reliance can be placed. We also agree with the Court below that the evidence given by the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar, is reliable. We have been taken through the evidence of these witnesses and we have no hesitation in agreeing with the Court below that these are not witnesses on whose testimony any reliance can be placed. We also agree with the Court below that the evidence given by the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar, is reliable. In our judgment the finding of the Court below that there has never been any surrender or relinquishment by the plaintiff of her right of survivorship, that no such question was raised at the time of the division in 1915 and that Raja Sanwal Singh never gave any decision on any such point, is correct. It may be pointed out that Raja Sanwal Singh was really not an arbitrator, formally appointed, and no formal reference of any disputes had been made to him. All that happened was that quarrels had arisen between the two widows of Dharam Singh in the matter of the division of the rents and profits and Sanwal Singh advised them to divide the property into two halves and came and prepared two lots. There was no other dispute and no other questions arose. We are satisfied that the witnesses mentioned above, produced on behalf of the appellant in support of this story of the abandonment of the right of survivorship, gave false and tutored evidence when they stated in examination in chief that questions as to succession on the death of either of the Kunwar Ranis and as to the expenses of the marriages of the daughters were raised, and decided by Sanwal Singh, at the time of the division in 1915. Some of the statements made by these witnesses in cross-examination put the matter beyond doubt. [Their Lordships discussed the oral evidence and proceeded.] Our conclusion is, as has already been stated, that the learned Judge below was perfectly right in declining to place any reliance on these witnesses. 10. It is also noteworthy that, before the written statements in the present suit were filed, no one had ever alleged that there bad been a surrender on the part of the widows of the right of survivorship. There is no such allegation in any of the various deeds executed by Inder Kunwar. It appears to have been argued in the Court below that there was something in the language of the sale deed of 17th August 1929, Ex. 39. There is no such allegation in any of the various deeds executed by Inder Kunwar. It appears to have been argued in the Court below that there was something in the language of the sale deed of 17th August 1929, Ex. 39. executed by Inder Kunwar in favour of defendants 4 to 7, which lent some support to the defendants' allegation. Having examined the document carefully, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the Court below that the contention was without foundation. On the contrary, the recitals in the other deeds executed by Inder Kunwar-viz., the deed of gift dated 5th October 1922, Ex. E; the deed of gift dated 5th July 1926, Ex. P; the deed of endowment dated 23rd October l934, Ex. Q, and, particularly, the will dated 23rd October 1934, Ex. R-militate against the truth of the defendants' allegation. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has attempted an explanation of the invention for the first time of this story by the defendants in the present suit and has said that it is possible that the plea was suggested to the defendants and their advisers by the decision of the High Court of Patna in ('36) 23 AIR 1936 Pat. 200 : 155 I.C. 213 : 14 Pat. 518 : 16 P.L.T. 713, Parbati Kuer v. Baijnath Prasad Narain Singh, which must have been published shortly before the institution of the present suit. In view of all the circumstances, the suggestion of respondent's learned counsel appears to be not without basis. 11. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the story put forward by the defendants is not an improbable one. Learned counsel recognises the force of the objection that it is unlikely that such an important transaction as the abandonment of the right of survivorship, which a co-widow has on the death of the other widow, could have been carried out orally, particularly as the division of the property was admittedly reduced to writing in the shape of lots prepared by Sanwal Singh to which he got the ladies to affix their signatures, and it is the defendants' case that it was on the occasion of that division that the surrender of the right of survivorship also took place. But he advanced two arguments which he says minimise the force of the objection, He points out that Sanwal Singh admittedly allotted different portions of the residential house to each of the two ladies but this allotment was not mentioned in the written lots prepared by him. He next refers to Ex. D., the deposition of Prembada Kunwar in Suit No. 156 of 1933, of the Court of the Munsif of Etah, in which she stated that the ornaments were distributed by the Collector and that the distribution had been "according to the writing left by Raja Sanwal Singh", and argues that this distribution of the ornaments was also not reduced to writing. We do not, however, agree with learned counsel that the circumstances relied upon by him in any manner detract from the force of the respondent's argument that it is highly improbable that the surrender of the right of survivorship could have been oral. 12. So far as the matter of the residential house is concerned, it must be borne in mind that Sanwal Singh really made no division. The house was already divided into a mardana portion (portion used by males) and a zanana portion (portion occupied by females), and all that Sanwal Singh did was to give the direction that Inder Kunwar should occupy the portion known as zanana and that Prembada Kunwar should live in the portion known as mardana. We agree with the Court below that the surrender of the right of survivorship was a much more important matter than the giving of directions as to the portion of the house which each of the ladies was to occupy. With regard to the distribution of the ornaments, it is to be noted that the passage in Ex. D on which reliance is placed shows that Prembada Kunwar spoke of a "writing left by Raja Sanwal Singh." That writing must obviously have been retained by the Collector. All that the Collector did was to distribute the ornaments in accordance with that writing. It is, thus, not correct to Say that there was no writing with regard to the distribution of the ornaments. Ex. D is the only piece of evidence to which our attention has been drawn in connection with this argument with regard to the distribution of ornaments. As shown above, the very statement in Ex. It is, thus, not correct to Say that there was no writing with regard to the distribution of the ornaments. Ex. D is the only piece of evidence to which our attention has been drawn in connection with this argument with regard to the distribution of ornaments. As shown above, the very statement in Ex. D On which reliance is placed in support of the argument destroys that argument. It may be pointed out that we have dealt with this point of the absence of any writing, embodying the alleged surrender or abandonment, as a question of fact-as one raising the question that the defendant's story is not probable and not as a question of law, namely, whether such a surrender or abandonment can be made orally or must, in order to be valid, be in writing, duly stamped and registered. In view of the decision at which we have arrived on the question of fact, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the question of law. 13. The result is that in our judgment the story of the surrender of her right of survivorship by Prembada Kunwar, put forward on behalf of the defendants, is not only not proved, but is highly improbable and cannot be believed. In view of the decision recorded above, the will executed by Inder Kunwar on 23rd October 1934, must, as is conceded by learned counsel for the appellant, be held to be ineffectual and the plaintiff must be held to have established her claim to the properties covered by the will. 14. It may be mentioned that the question of law, namely, whether such a surrender or abandonment of a Hindu co-widow's right of survivorship as is contended for by the appellant is permissible under the law, has also been debated at the bar. For the appellant strong reliance has been placed on the Patna case already mentioned: Parbati Kuer Vs. Baijnath Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1936 Patna 200 On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has contended, firstly, that the opinion expressed in that judgment, that a surrender by Hindu co-widows of their right of survivorship could validly be made, was, in view of the facts of that case, wholly obiter. Baijnath Prasad Narain Singh and Another, AIR 1936 Patna 200 On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has contended, firstly, that the opinion expressed in that judgment, that a surrender by Hindu co-widows of their right of survivorship could validly be made, was, in view of the facts of that case, wholly obiter. The suit was by the reversioners of one Raghubans Narain Singh who on his death left two widows, Deo Murat Kuer and Birita Kuer, and two daughters by Deo Murat Kuer, Bhagwati Kuer and Asturan Kuer. It was instituted during the life-time of one of the widows, Birita Kuer. The other widow, Deo Murat Kuer, had died and the moiety held by her had come into the sole possession of one of her two daughters, Asturan Kuer, with the consent of the other daughter, Bhagwati Kuer. The suit was brought on Asturan Kuer's death and it was claimed that the plaintiffs were entitled to immediate possession of the properties which had been in Deo Murat Kunwar's possession and which had, on her death, come into Asturan Kunwar's possession, on the allegations that each of the widows had surrendered her right -of survivorship, that Birita Kuer must therefore be treated as non-existent so far as the share in Deo Murat Kuer's possession was concerned, and that succession to that share must be held to have opened to the reversioners of Raghubans Narain upon the death of his daughter, Asturan Kuer, who had been in sole possession with the consent of her sister. It was prayed in the alternative that, if the Court was of opinion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession as long as Birita Kuer was alive, a declaratory decree be granted that a deed of sale with had been executed by Asturan Kuer in favour of the defendant, Dulhin Parbati Kuer, would not be binding on the reversioners on Birita Kner's death. The trial Court had decreed the claim for possession, and the only contention, on this part of the case, raised by the defendant. appellant was that one of the widows, Birita Kuer, being alive, succession to the estate of her husband had not opined and that the only decree which the plaintiff could get was a declaration that the sale deed executed by Asturan Kuer would not bind the reversioners when the succession opens on the death of Birita Kuer. appellant was that one of the widows, Birita Kuer, being alive, succession to the estate of her husband had not opined and that the only decree which the plaintiff could get was a declaration that the sale deed executed by Asturan Kuer would not bind the reversioners when the succession opens on the death of Birita Kuer. 15. It is pointed out that the learned Judges came to the conclusion that, as a matter of fact, the alleged surrender by the widows of the right of survivorship had not been established, and that they went on to hold that, even if the surrender had been proved, the plaintiffs could not get a decree for possession as succession to the estate could not open as long as Birita Kuer was alive. It is urged by learned counsel for the respondent that, in these circumstances, the question of law mentioned above did not arise for decision. It has next been contended that the decision is wrong. Learned counsel points out that where a sonless Hindu dies, leaving more widows than one surviving, the widows succeed by inheritance to their husband's property as one joint estate in coparcenary, with a right of survivorship: ('66-67) 11 M.I.A. 487 : 9 W.R. 23 : 2 Suther. 124 : 2 Sar. 327 (P.C.), Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee. They can, if they so desire, divide the property, and take possession of separate parcels, for the purposes of convenient management and enjoyment (('28) 15 AIR 1928 P.C. 251 : 111 I.C. 485 : 55 I.A. 399 (P.C.), Gauri Nath v. Mt. Gaya Kuar), but that is only a mode of enjoyment, and there can be no severance of title. It is urged that the right of survivorship, depending as it does on the chance of one of the widows surviving the other or others, is a mere spes successionis, or, to borrow the expression used by the Judicial Committee in ('98) 21 All. 71 : 25 I.A. 183 : 7 Sar. 417 (P.C.), Sham Sundar Lal v. Achhan Kunwar, an expectant interest and cannot be the subject of any bargaining. 16. It is further argued that, if one of the widows makes a valid adoption, the rights of the adopted son would be affected if a surrender of the right of survivorship by the widows is held to be valid. 417 (P.C.), Sham Sundar Lal v. Achhan Kunwar, an expectant interest and cannot be the subject of any bargaining. 16. It is further argued that, if one of the widows makes a valid adoption, the rights of the adopted son would be affected if a surrender of the right of survivorship by the widows is held to be valid. Learned counsel next contends that such surrender amounts to an alteration, by agreement, of the nature of the estate, as fixed by Hindu law, to which the widows succeed, and that such an alteration of the course of devolution is not permissible. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the case in AIR 1932 216 (Privy Council) and has relied on the decision of their Lordships that the birth right of the senior member of a family holding an impartible estate, to take by survivorship is not a mere spes successions similar to that of a reversioner succeeding on the death of a Hindu widow to her husband's estate, but that it is a right which is capable of being renounced and surrendered. It is argued that the doctrine of spes successions must be confined to the right which a reversioner, succeeding on the death of a Hindu widow to her husband's estate has, and should not be extended to other cases of expectant interest. Reliance is further placed on Uchmatan Bibi and Others Vs. Rajendra Nath Sanyal and Others, AIR 1938 Cal 689 and Valluru Appalasuri and Others Vs. Sasapu Kannamma Nayuralu, AIR 1926 Mad 6 Interesting and thought-provoking as these arguments are, we do cot, in view of our decision that as a matter of fact no surrender ever took place in the present case, wish to express any opinion on their respective merits. 17. We come now to the second point raised by Dr. Katju on behalf of the appellant Krishna Pratap. We consider it desirable at this stage to examine the written statement of the appellant and see what his allegations were with regard to the deed of gift in question. An analysis of the relevant portion of the written statement which is para. Katju on behalf of the appellant Krishna Pratap. We consider it desirable at this stage to examine the written statement of the appellant and see what his allegations were with regard to the deed of gift in question. An analysis of the relevant portion of the written statement which is para. 11 yields the following result: (i) It was the desire of Dharam Singh that Govind Kunwar and Jot Kunwar should be married "in some high family according to the custom of the family." (ii) It was also the desire of Dharam Singh that mauza Kharaua should be given to Govind Kunwar and Jot Kunwar as dowry, (iii) Dharam Singh made an oral will directing that his desires mentioned in (i) and (ii) above should be carried out. (iv) "Accordingly" Inder Kunwar celebrated the marriage of Govind Kunwar with Moti Singh, son of Raja Bahadur Raja Lakhpat Singh, Bais of Karauli, and "spent Rs. 60,000." (v) "With the same consideration" Inder Kunwar settled the marriage of Jot Kunwar with Bahadur Singh, another son of Baja Bahadur Raja Lakhpat Singh. (vi) As, however, Inder Kunwar "had no cash to present," she gave half of village Kharaua as dowry to Jot Kunwar at the time of her marriage in accordance with the desire of Dharam Singh and executed the deed of gift dated 5th July 1926 in favour of Jot Kunwar, (vii) That the gift was made with the consent of the plaintiff and the members of the family, (viii) The gift is "valid according to law and shastra and was executed for lawful necessity and the necessity of the family." (ix) The plaintiff has "all along been admitting the said deed of gift to be valid and correct" and so she is estopped from taking any objection to it. Two matters may be disposed of at once. The plea of estoppel mentioned above has not been raised before us and does not appear to have been argued before the Court below. It has also not been stated what other "members of the family" than the plaintiff there were whose consent to the gift in question was taken. The case has been argued before us, and appears to have been argued before the Court below on the footing that the consent of the plaintiff alone was obtained. It has also not been stated what other "members of the family" than the plaintiff there were whose consent to the gift in question was taken. The case has been argued before us, and appears to have been argued before the Court below on the footing that the consent of the plaintiff alone was obtained. It is obvious that there were no other members of the family whose consent was necessary and that the plaintiff's consent was all that was required and, if established, would be sufficient so far as a suit by the plaintiff is concerned. 18. It would be convenient now to examine the recitals made in the deed of gift in question. These recitals may be summarised as follows: (i) The entire 20 biswa zamindari of mauza Kharaua is part of the estate left by Dharam Singh, the husband of the executant, Inder Kunwar. (ii) Half of the village aforesaid is "owned, possessed and enjoyed" by the executant, who is also the lambardar of the entire village. (iii) The executant has two daughters, Govind Kunwar and Jot Kunwar, of whom Govind Kunwar has already been married by the executant into a very respectable and big family, namely, to Moti Singh, son of Raja Bahadur Raja Lakhpat Singh, Rais of Karauli, "at an expense of Rs. 30,000." (iv) Jot Kunwar has now reached marriageable age. It is the duty of the executant to perform her marriage and it has been settled with Bahadur Singh, the younger son of Raja Bahadur Raja Lakhpat Singh aforesaid. (v) "But I have not got enough money in cash to give Beti Jodha Cunwar in dowry as I gave to Govind Kunwar." (vi) Besides mauza Kharaua, the executant has got other zamindari properties, inherited from her husband, which are quite sufficient for her maintenance. (vii) It was the desire of the executant's husband that his daughters "should be married into some respectable family, higher than his and, if possible, in some riyasat." (viii) In accordance with the desire of her husband the executant has already married one daughter at considerable expense and now wants to marry the other daughter also "in some respectable family in a decent way according to the desire and wishes of" her deceased husband. (ix) "Bat now I have not got enough money in cash to give Beti Jot Kunwar as dowry as is necessary for marrying a girl into a respectable family according to status." (x) "Therefore, I, the executant.....out of natural love and also according to the desire of my husband, make a gift of 10 biswas out of the 20 biswa zamindari share in mauza Kharaua....in favour of my minor daughter, Beti Jot Kunwar, under my own sarbarahkarship." (xi) The property gifted shall be the stridhan of the donee, Mt. Jot Kunwar. (xii) The value of the property gifted is rupees 40,000. 19. Certain points emerge from a comparison of the above recitals with the allegations made in para. 11 of the appellant's written statement. In the first place, it will be noticed that no oral will of Dharam Singh is mentioned in the deed of gift. In the second place, the only desire of Dharam Singh which is specifically mentioned in the deed of gift is that his daughters should be married into some respectable family of a higher status than his own and, if possible, in some riyasat. It is not recited there that it was the desire of Dharam Singh that village Kharaua should be given to his two daughters as a dowry. In the third place, it is not stated in the deed that the gift was made with the consent of the executant's co-widow, Prembada Kunwar, or, for the matter of that, of anybody else. On the contrary, the whole tone of the document creates the impression on one's mind that the executant considered herself fully entitled to make the gift and that she did not stand in need of anybody's consent. The justifications for the gift mentioned in the deed are that Jot Kunwar's marriage has got to be performed "in a respectable family in a decent way," and "according to status," that that cannot be done without funds which the executant did not possess, and that even after making a gift of the village in question the executant would be left with sufficient properly for her maintenance. 20. Of the four sub-heads under which learned counsel for the appellant has advanced his arguments on this part of the case, it would be convenient first to dispose of those which involve questions of fact, namely, (a), (c) and (d). 20. Of the four sub-heads under which learned counsel for the appellant has advanced his arguments on this part of the case, it would be convenient first to dispose of those which involve questions of fact, namely, (a), (c) and (d). Of these latter, we propose to lake up (c) first. 21. The allegation is that Dharam Singh had made an oral will directing that village Kharana should be given to his two daughters as dowry when their marriages were performed, and the question is whether the appellant has succeeded in establishing that allegation. The first objection to the story is that no such oral will - or any oral will at all-is mentioned in the deed of gift itself, the recitals of which appear to have been prepared with considerable care and forethought. The second objection is that, if there had been any such oral will of Dharam Singh, it would have been mentioned at the time of the division in 1915. We have not been referred to any evidence Showing that any mention of such an oral will was made at the time of the division. On the contrary, village Kharaua was divided between the two ladies just as the other properties were divided. Further, the story that, at the time of the division of 1915, Inder Kunwar said that "she had two daughters and some arrangement should be made for their marriages" and that Sanwal Singh "settled that the entire income from Fatehpur Chaurasi and Jamaina Kachh should be set apart for the marriages''-to quote the words of the witness Tota Ram-negatives the story that Dharam Singh had made a will that village Kharaua should be given to his daughters on the occasion of their marriage. If the allegation that Dharam Singh had made a will as mentioned above were true, the necessary "arrangement" had already been made by no less a person than the last male owner of the property, and so there would have been no occasion for Inder Kunwar to raise the question again at the time of the division in 1915. The two allegations of the appellant are inconsistent with each other. The fact of the matter is that neither allegation is true. The two allegations of the appellant are inconsistent with each other. The fact of the matter is that neither allegation is true. In the anxiety to defeat the just claim of the plaintiff, a number of groundless stories have been invented and, as experience shows, those embarking upon such an undertaking are often landed in inconsistencies. Dharam Singh was not more than 28 at the time of his death in May 1912 (vide Tota Ram). There can be no doubt on the evidence that he was addicted to drink. Apart from the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, such of the witnesses of the defendants as were questioned on the subject admit that Dharam Singh was given to drinking. Ram Lal states: Kunwar Dharam Singh did not first use to drink but he started drinking on marrying the Karhar girl namely the plaintiff. It is possible that ever since I took up employment under Kunwar Dharam Singh drinking expenses were daily shown at Rs. 1 or Rs. 2 in Dharam Singh's accounts, but I do not remember about this. 22. The then Collector of the district, Mr. F.J. Cooke, in his appellate order dated 17th December 1912 passed in the mutation case which, on the death of Dharam Singh, arose between Khiali Singh - who alleged that he was an adopted son of Dharam Singh-on the one side, and Inder Kunwar and Prembada Kunwar on the other, states "the late Kunwar Dharam Singh was, it is admitted, a hard drinker and he was evidently a man of very weak character," and lower down employs the adjective 'besotted' to Dharam Singh. The plaintiff herself, not unnaturally, speaks with some reserve on the subject and states that Dharam Singh "used to take wine" and that he "used to take liquor" at the time of her marriage. Her witness, Megh Singh, who is a relative of the family, puts the matter clearly and states that "Kunwar Dharam Singh used to drink wine excessively." He does not appear to have been cross-examined on this point, and no reason has been Shown for disbelieving him. Lastly, we have Dharam Singh's own declarations in a deed executed by him on 18th January 1910 (Ex. 44) which show beyond doubt that he was a man of intemperate habits. Lastly, we have Dharam Singh's own declarations in a deed executed by him on 18th January 1910 (Ex. 44) which show beyond doubt that he was a man of intemperate habits. Considering his age and his character, it is in oar judgment, highly improbable that he had the foresight and wisdom attributed to him. The improbability becomes Still greater when it is remembered that, at the time of his death, his two daughters were mere infants, Govind Kunwar being about 2 1/2-having been born on 18th December 1909 (vide Ex. 44) - and Jot Kunwar still younger. It is impossible to believe that Dharam Singh, being what he was, ever gave any thought to the question of the marriage of his infant daughters. We have therefore no hesitation in agreeing with the finding of the Court below that it has not been established that Dharam Singh had made a will that village Kharaua should be given as dowry to his daughters. The learned Judge of the Court below is perfectly right in holding that Sardar Singh and Kashi Ram are wholly unreliable witnesses. The falsity of the story, that Dharam Singh had made a will that village Kharaua should be given as dowry to his two daughters, is established by the admitted fact that when Govind Kunwar was married she was not given any portion of village Kharaua, but money in cash, as dowry, and by the recital in the deed of gift that half of village Kharaua was being gifted to Jot Kunwar as Inder Kunwar had "not got enough money in cash to give Beti Jot Kunwar in dowry." 23. We come now to sub-head (d). The argument is that if Inder Kunwar had not made a gift of the 10 biswa share of village Kharaua in favour of Jot Kunwar, the girl would have remained unmarried, or would have had to be married to a boy the status of whose family was not as high as it had to be in fulfilment of the wishes of Dharam Singh. We have held above that the story that Dharam Singh had expressed any wishes on the subject of the marriages of these girls is not true. That being so, the whole basis of the contention that Inder Kunwar had no option but to marry Jot Kunwar to the younger son of Raja Bahadur Raja Lakhpat. We have held above that the story that Dharam Singh had expressed any wishes on the subject of the marriages of these girls is not true. That being so, the whole basis of the contention that Inder Kunwar had no option but to marry Jot Kunwar to the younger son of Raja Bahadur Raja Lakhpat. Singh, or someone of that type, disappears. The admitted fact that in 1922 Jot Kunwar had been betrothed to Ram Chandra Singh, son of Madho Singh, who, on his own showing, pays only Rs. 200 per annum as land revenue, clearly shows that Inder Kunwar was under no such compulsion in the matter of Jot Kunwar's marriage as is now alleged. There must be thousands of pure blooded and highly respectable Rajput families into which Jot Kunwar could easily have been married without any necessity arising for the gift of a portion of the estate. The fact that the engagement of Jot Kunwar to Ram Chandra Singh was subsequently cancelled is relied upon as showing that Inder Kunwar was helpless and had to settle the marriage of Jot Kunwar with Lakhpat Singh's younger son on the terms imposed by Lakhpat Singh. Reference is made to the deed of gift which Inder Kunwar had executed on 5th October 1922 in favour of Ram Chandra (Ex. E), and to the deed dated 5th March 1923 executed by Madho Singh relinquishing the property in favour of lnder Kunwar (Ex M), and to the evidence given by Madho Singh. The reason now given by him for the proposal of the marriage of his son Ram Chandra with Jot Kunwar falling through is as follows: The marriage did not take place because there was disagreement respecting the dowry. It had been promised to me that I would be given half of Kunwar Rani Inder Kunwar's haqiat in the marriage. 24. So, according to Madho Singh, what he had been promised was not only half of one village, Kharaua, but half of the entire property which was in Inder Kunwar's possession. This is a remarkable story, to say the least of it. The recital made by Madho Singh in Ex. 24. So, according to Madho Singh, what he had been promised was not only half of one village, Kharaua, but half of the entire property which was in Inder Kunwar's possession. This is a remarkable story, to say the least of it. The recital made by Madho Singh in Ex. M was this: "Now, on account of some private reasons, the marriage contract has been dissolved...." The witness, Lachhman Prasad, on the other hand, has stated that "Madho Singh wanted Inder Kunwar to make a gift of her entire property to Ram Chander Singh." It is clear that neither of them can be believed. We entirely agree with the learned Judge below that Madho Singh is not a witness of truth. The real reason which led to the abandonment of the proposed marriage of Jot Kunwar with Ram Chandra Singh has not been disclosed. Then, again, we have not been referred to any credible evidence showing what steps Inder Kunwar took to find a suitable match for Jot Kunwar before she discovered that in the entire Rajput community no suitable young man other than the younger brother of her elder daughter's husband was available and that she had no option but to give half of village Kharaua in order that Jot Kunwar might be married to him. 25. As to the existence of a compelling necessity which left no choice to Inder Kunwar, the story is that when Inder Kunwar opened negotiations for the marriage of Jot Kunwar with Lakhpat Singh's younger son, Bahadur Singh - the father of the appellant - Lakhpat Singh made such demands as left no option to Inder Kunwar but to make a gift of a 10 biswa share of Kharaua, There is, however, no satisfactory explanation as to why Inder Kunwar could not negotiate the marriage in some other respectable family. In support of the story mentioned above the evidence of five witnesses, Baja Bahadur Raja Lakhpat Singh, Rai Saheb Jugal Kishore, Lachhman Prasad, Kanhaiya Lal and Madho Singh has been relied upon by appellant's learned counsel. The Court below has mentioned 6th witness, Prabhu Lal the evidence given by all these witnesses has been dealt with in detail by the learned Judge of the Court below. We have already expressed our agreement with his conclusion that Madho Singh is not a reliable witness. The Court below has mentioned 6th witness, Prabhu Lal the evidence given by all these witnesses has been dealt with in detail by the learned Judge of the Court below. We have already expressed our agreement with his conclusion that Madho Singh is not a reliable witness. With regard to the other witnesses also, we entirely agree with the learned Judge that none of them is reliable and with the reasons given by him for that conclusion. That being so, it is not necessary for us to say much with regard to these witnesses. Lakhpat Singh is the appellant's grandfather and is obviously deeply interested in the appellant's success. In fact, he is the real defendant-appellant. Jugal Kishore is a friend of his and is clearly under his influence. The other witnesses are, if possible, even more obviously untrustworthy. 26. In considering whether the story related by these witnesses is true, two facts have to be borne in mind, (1) that Lakhpat Singh was no stranger, but was already a relation, as his son Moti Singh had been married to Govind Kunwar four or five years earlier, and (2) that Moti Singh and Govind Kunwar had admittedly taken up their residence in Kharaua and were living with Inder Kunwar. In these circumstances, it is on the one hand, impossible to believe that Lakhpat Singh behaved in the manner in which he and the witnesses allege that he behaved when the proposal was made to him that Jot Kunwar should be married to his son Bahadur Singh. On the other hand, the truth is not far to seek. In our opinion, the fact is that Inder Kunwar was gradually led into marrying Jot Kunwar to Bahadur Singh and making a gift of the property by the machinations of Lakhpat Singh, Moti Singh and Govind Kunwar to which her own inclinations made her yield readily. Certain other points deserve consideration. The allegation in the deed of gift dated 5th July 1926, and in para. 11 of the written statement is that Inder Kunwar had spent Rs. 30,000 over the marriage of Govind Kunwar. Lakhpat Singh's statement in the witness-box, on the other hand, is that in Govind Kunwar's marriage he "received cash and articles worth Rs. 30,000" The discrepancy is obvious. 11 of the written statement is that Inder Kunwar had spent Rs. 30,000 over the marriage of Govind Kunwar. Lakhpat Singh's statement in the witness-box, on the other hand, is that in Govind Kunwar's marriage he "received cash and articles worth Rs. 30,000" The discrepancy is obvious. Apart from the giving of a dowry, a good deal of other expenditure has to be incurred on the occasion of a marriage. The witness, Kanhaiyalal, related a different story. We do not believe either that Inder Kunwar spent a sum of Rs. 30,000 on the occasion of Govind Kunwar's marriage or that the presents given by her to Lakhpat Singh were worth Rs. 30,000. We do not also believe the story that Inder Kunwar had no money when Jot Kunwar's marriage was celebrated. It is obvious that she must have spent money over the entertainment of the barat (bridegroom's party) and other guests, and over the numerous other matters connected with a marriage. We have no doubt that, if she had not made up her mind to give away the share in Kharaua to her daughter, she could easily have arranged for a reasonable dowry in cash and kind, The learned Judge of the Court below has made the following observations on this part of the case: It will be noticed at once that it is not the defendant's case that the said 10 biswa share of mouza Kharaua was given to Beti Jot Kunwar on the occasion of her marriage as a customary ceremonial gift. Further, in the deed of gift itself that property has been valued at Rs, 40,000 and its annual net profits, after deducting collection charges, amount to Rs. 1936. Such a big property would not be a reasonable ceremonial gift to be made, in the name of custom, by a lady of Kunwar Rani Inder Kunwar's position, whose annual income was in the neighbourhood of Rs. 3000 only..... The present case is not one where, in order to meet the reasonable expenses of the marriage of a daughter, the mother, representing the estate of her deceased husband has for want of funds alienated a reasonable portion of such estate.... 3000 only..... The present case is not one where, in order to meet the reasonable expenses of the marriage of a daughter, the mother, representing the estate of her deceased husband has for want of funds alienated a reasonable portion of such estate.... The gift in question is only one of a series of transfers that Kunwar Rani Inder Kunwar made in respect of the property allotted to her share under the private partition made by Baja Sanwal Singh, and it rather seems that these transfers, including the gift, proceeded from a desire that, if possible, plaintiff Kunwar Rani should not, on the death of Kunwar Rani Inder Kunwar, come into possession of any portion of the property held by her. 27. We entirely agree with these observations, and would only add that the gift in question, the will and the deed of endowment (under which Govind Kunwar has been appointed the mutwalli of the endowment) clearly point to a deliberate intention on the part of Inder Kunwar to give away the entire property in her possession to her daughters, and the stories now put forward are pure inventions for the purposes of this case. The only other sub-head in which a question of fact is involved is sub-head (a). The plea is that the gift was made with the consent of the plaintiff, and the argument is that the plaintiff, having consented to the gift, cannot challenge it. The question that arises for consideration is whether it has been proved that the plaintiff had given her consent to the gift. We have already dealt with several allegations of fact made on behalf of the defendant-appellant and have shown that every one of them is devoid of truth. It may be stated at once that this one is no better. The very first point that is noteworthy is, as has already been pointed out that there is no such recital in the deed of gift itself. It is impossible to believe that such an important fact as the consent of Inder Kunwar's co-widow could possibly have been omitted from the carefully prepared recitals incorporated in the deed if there had been consent on the part of Prembada Kunwar. Further, if Prembada Kunwar had given her consent, she would most certainly have been an executant of the deed along with Inder Kunwar. 28. Further, if Prembada Kunwar had given her consent, she would most certainly have been an executant of the deed along with Inder Kunwar. 28. Appellant's witness, Laehhman Prasad already mentioned, has stated that Prembada Kunwar was not present at Kharaua when the deed of gift was executed and that she did not join Jot Kunwar's marriage. If Prembada Kunwar had given her consent to the gift, or had in any manner been consulted in the matter of Jot Kunwar's marriage to say nothing of her having taken an active part along with Inder Kunwar in the negotiations which culminated in the settlement of the marriage with Bahadur Singh, as is alleged by the witnesses she would have joined the marriage. The fact appears to be that the relations between the two ladies were not of the happiest and that Inder Kunwar never consulted Prembada Kunwar about anything. [After going through the evidence produced on behalf of the appellant their Lorships proceeded.] Our conclusion, therefore, is that the appellant entirely failed to prove that the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar, had in any manner consented to the gift in question. 29. It would be convenient at this stage to advert to the law on the subject. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has contended that the transfer made by Inder Kunwar, being without the consent of Prembada Kunwar, were invalid and were not binding on Prembada Kunwar. He has cited and relied upon three decisions of the Judicial Committee, ('66-67) 11 M.I.A. 487 : 9 W.R. 23 : 2 Suther. 124 : 2 Sar. 327 (P.C.), Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee, ('93) 16 Mad. 1 : 19 I.A. 184 : 6 Sar. 1 (P.C.), Sri Gajapati Radhamani Garu v. Maharani Sri Pasupati, and ('28) 15 AIR 1928 P.C. 251 : 111 I.C. 485 : 55 I.A. 399 (P.C.), Gauri Nath v. Mt. Gaya Kuar. In the first case, one Deenanath, a Hindu governed by the Benares School, died childless, possessed of a considerable estate, and left two widows, Doola Baee and Myna Baee, surviving him. The widows succeeded to his estate. In consequence of certain disputes the estate was divided between the widows by an order of the District Judge under Act No. 19 of 1841 and each widow came into possession of a half share. The widows succeeded to his estate. In consequence of certain disputes the estate was divided between the widows by an order of the District Judge under Act No. 19 of 1841 and each widow came into possession of a half share. Doola Baee made a will whereby she disposed of her share of the property in favour of her father and her brother. She died shortly afterwards. Myna Baee thereupon brought the suit, out of which the appeal before the Judicial Committee had arisen, to recover possession of the half share in respect of which Doola Baee had made the will. The trial Court had dismissed the suit, but the Sudder Dewany Adawlut ultimately allowed the appeal of Myna Baee and made a decree in her favour. The defendants Doola Baee's father and brother thereupon appealed to His Majesty in Council. Their Lordships, in the course of their judgment, after stating the facts, observed; ....the principal question between the parties is the broad and general one, whether, according to the law of Benares School, a Hindu widow is competent to dispose, by will or deed of gift, of either moveable or immovable property inherited from her husband, to the prejudice of his next heirs. 30. Having discussed the relevant authorities, their Lordships made this observation: It must, then, be taken upon the authorities to be settled law that under the law of Benares a Hindu widow has not the power to dispose of immovable property inherited from her husband to the prejudice of his next heirs; and the only question open to doubt is, whether she has any such power ever moveable property. 31. Their Lordships then proceeded to consider the question with regard to the widow's power over moveable property, and expressed their decision thus: Their Lordships, therefore, have come to the conclusion that, according to the law of the Benares School, notwithstanding the ambiguous passage in the Mitakshara, no part of her husband's estate, whether moveable or immovable, to which a Hindu widow succeeds by inheritance, forms part of her stridhan, or particular property; and that the text of Katyayana, which is general in its terms, and of which the authority is undoubted, must be taken to determine first, that her power of disposition over both is limited to certain purposes; and, secondly, that on her death both pass to the next heir of her husband. 32. 32. Having thus answered the broad and general question, their Lordships next proceeded to consider "whether the effect of the so-called partition was to give Doola Baee any power of disposition over her share which she would not otherwise have had." Their Lordships found that there was "no proof of any contract to make a partition, and as part of that contract, to release the rights of survivorship, supposing it to have been competent to the widows to enter into such a contract," and that the transaction was "merely an arrangement for separate possession and enjoyment, leaving the title to each share unaffected." Their Lordships then gave their decision in these words: The estate of two widows, who take their husband's property by inheritance, is one estate. The right of survivorship is so strong that the survivor takes the whole property, to the exclusion even of daughters of the deceased widow. They are, therefore, in the strictest sense, coparceners, and between undivided coparceners there can be no alienation by one without the consent of the other. 33. The appeal of the defendants was dismissed and the decree in favour of Myna Baee was upheld. In ('93) 16 Mad. 1 : 19 I.A. 184 : 6 Sar. 1 (P.C.), Sri Gajapati Radhamani Garu v. Maharani Sri Pasupati, two widows, Neelamani and Radhamani, had succeeded to the estate of their husband as his heirs. Neelamani had executed two deeds of mortgage in favour of the plaintiff in the action, which was for the recovery of the amount due upon those deeds, and Neelamani being dead, it was brought against Radhamani. She pleaded that the alienation having been made without her consent, was invalid and further that there was no necessity for the loans so as to bind the estate beyond the life time of Neelamani. The trial Court had dismissed the suit but the High "Court at Madras reversed that decree and gave a decree against Radhamani for the amount found due upon the mortgages. Eadhamani thereupon appealed to His Majesty in Council. The decision of their Lordships was in favour of Radhamani, The headnote may conveniently be quoted: A mortgage by a Hindu widow even for necessary purposes without the concurrence of her co-widow is not binding upon the joint estate which has descended from their deceased husband so as to affect the interest of the co-widow. Quaere. The decision of their Lordships was in favour of Radhamani, The headnote may conveniently be quoted: A mortgage by a Hindu widow even for necessary purposes without the concurrence of her co-widow is not binding upon the joint estate which has descended from their deceased husband so as to affect the interest of the co-widow. Quaere. Whether a case for borrowing without the co-widow's consent could be established so as to empower one widow so to bind the estate; certainly it cannot where the concurrence of the co-widow was not even applied for.... 34. In the course of the judgment, their Lordships made these observations: It may be assumed for the present judgment, without deciding the point, that there was a sufficient necessity for borrowing money to pay the Government revenue of even for the payment of (sic) debt; but that necessity did not render a mortgage by one widow binding upon the joint estate which had descended from their deceased husband so as to affect the interest of the surviving widow: ('66-67) 11 M.I.A. 487 : 9 W.R. 23 : 2 Suther. 124 : 2 Sar. 327 (P.C.), Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee. 35. The law thus laid down in the two cases mentioned above was re-affirmed in the third case, viz., ('28) 15 AIR 1928 P.C. 251 : 111 I.C. 485 : 55 I.A. 399 (P.C.), Gauri Nath v. Mt. Gaya Kuar. The last male owner there was Laiq Singh who was the owner of certain villages. He died childless or, at any rate, sonless and was survived by two widows, Umrao Kunwar and Gaya Kunwar. The widows partitioned the property through the revenue Courts. Their Lordships observed that what the widows did by means of this partition was "to separate and divide the enjoyment of the widow's life estate." In the year 1891 Umrao Kunwar executed two deeds of mortgage in favour of the appellant in respect of certain villages which had been assigned to her at the partition. The first of these mortgages was a mortgage with possession, and the second was a deed in respect of further charges. The mortgagee obtained possession over the mortgaged villages. Umrao Kunwar died in 1908, and Gaya Kunwar brought the suit, which gave rise to the appeal, within 12 years of Umrao Kunwar's death. The first of these mortgages was a mortgage with possession, and the second was a deed in respect of further charges. The mortgagee obtained possession over the mortgaged villages. Umrao Kunwar died in 1908, and Gaya Kunwar brought the suit, which gave rise to the appeal, within 12 years of Umrao Kunwar's death. Their Lordships observed that the sole question for their decision was "whether these two mortgages of 1891 are valid and binding on the respondent, who succeeded in 1908 to the villages by right of survivorship." Their Lordships then stated the law thus: The general law is so well settled that it scarcely requires restatement. If a Hindu dies leaving two widows, they succeed as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. They are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions of the property so that each may enjoy her equal Share of the income accruing therefrom. Each can deal as she pleases with her own life interest, but she cannot alienate any part of the corpus of the estate by gift or will so as to prejudice the rights of the survivor or a future reversioner. If they act together, they can burden the reversion with any debts contracted owing to legal necessity, but one of them acting without the authority of the other, cannot prejudice the right of survivorship by burdening or alienating any part of the estate. The mere fact of partition between the two, while it gives each a right to the fruits of the separate estate assigned to her, does not imply a right to prejudice the claim of the survivor to enjoy the full fruits of the property during her lifetime. 36. Their Lordships then observed that these principles had been established by a long series of decisions, one of the earliest and the most authoritative of which was the case in ('66-67) 11 M.I.A. 487 : 9 W.R. 23 : 2 Suther. 124 : 2 Sar. 327 (P.C.), Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee. Proceeding further, their Lordships made the following observations: There remains the question whether to the extent that the mortgages were made for a legal necessity they are binding on the respondent. This was not expressly decided by the case in ('66-67) 11 M.I.A. 487 : 9 W.R. 23 : 2 Suther. 124 : 2 Sar. Proceeding further, their Lordships made the following observations: There remains the question whether to the extent that the mortgages were made for a legal necessity they are binding on the respondent. This was not expressly decided by the case in ('66-67) 11 M.I.A. 487 : 9 W.R. 23 : 2 Suther. 124 : 2 Sar. 327 (P.C.), Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee, which dealt with a gratuitous alienation by one widow to the prejudice of the other, but it was made the subject of decision in the well known case in ('93) 16 Mad. 1 : 19 I.A. 184 : 6 Sar. 1 (P.C.), Sri Gajapati Radhamani Garu v. Maharani Sri Pasupati. There, it was held, as expressed in the headnote, that a mortgage by a Hindu widow, even for necessary purposes, without the concurrence of her co-widow, is not binding upon the joint estate which has descended from their deceased husband so as to affect the interest of the co-widow but the question was left open whether a 'case for borrowing without the co-widow's consent could be establised so as to empower one widow so to bind the estate,' and the only thing that was definitely decided was that it could not do so where the concurrence of the co-widow was not even applied for. 37. The opinion expressed by this Court in Jai Narain Singh Vs. Munna Lal and Others that, where two Hindu widows have separated for purposes of conveniently enjoying the estate left by the husband, if one of them alienates a portion of the estate in her possession under the pressure of legal necessity, the reversioner is bound by such alienation, was disapproved. It is thus clear that the Privy Council have definitely and repeatedly held that, where a sonless Hindu is survived by more than one widow, alienation of any part of the estate, even for legal necessity, is not valid unless all the widows act together, and that the fact that the widows have divided, and have taken possession of separate portions of the estate is of no effect. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the following passage in the judgment in ('28) 15 AIR 1928 P.C. 251 : 111 I.C. 485 : 55 I.A. 399 (P.C.), Gauri Nath v. Mt. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the following passage in the judgment in ('28) 15 AIR 1928 P.C. 251 : 111 I.C. 485 : 55 I.A. 399 (P.C.), Gauri Nath v. Mt. Gaya Kuar: "Their Lordships can conceive of cases where when the concurrence of the co-widow has been asked for to a borrowing by the other for necessary purposes and unreasonably refused, a mortgage for such a debt granted only by the one widow might be held binding on what may be termed the corpus of the estate," and drew our attention to an answer given by the plaintiff to a question put to her in cross-examination: "If I had been asked about the giving of Kharaua in the marriage of Jot Kunwar, I would have forbidden (Inder Kunwar to do so)," and argued that, in view of this statement of the plaintiff, it must be held that it was not necessary for Inder Kunwar to apply to the plaintiff for her concurrence. We cannot accept this argument. The crucial point is that the concurrence was never applied for. An answer, obtained in cross-examination, to a hypothetical question, to the effect that the plaintiff would have acted in a certain manner if a certain step had been taken by her co-widow, cannot be founded upon for an argument that the co-widow was relieved of the necessity of taking the step which the law required her to take. The important fact is that the step was not taken. There is, also, the further question whether Prembada Kunwar's refusal would, in the circumstances of this case, have been unreasonable. It may be pointed out that the law as stated above was not, as far as we can judge from the judgment of the Court below, in doubt in that Court. The defendant there rested this part of his case on the allegation of fact that the gift in question had been made with the consent of the plaintiff. It must also be noted, in view of what follows, that the judgment of the Court below on issue 3-which was the issue relating to the gift of 5th July 1926 - shows that the only questions raised and argued on behalf of the defendant in that Court were the questions of fact covered by subheads (a), (c) and (d) of the arguments of appellant's learned counsel on the second point. 38. 38. In this Court, however, learned counsel for the appellant has raised a wholly new point, and that is the point involved in sub-head (b) of his argument, to the consideration of which we now turn. The argument may be thus summarised: "Even if the defendant's allegation as to Dharam Singh's direction and oral will is not proved; even if the defendant has failed to prove his allegation that the gift in question was made in circumstances amounting to legal necessity; and even if it is not established that the gift was made with the plaintiffs concurrence, the gift is valid and binding on the plaintiff because it is laid down in certain text books on Hindu law that, where a Hindu dies leaving an unmarried daughter, besides a widow or widows, him surviving, the daughter has an absolute right to receive on the occasion of her marriage a one-fourth share of the estate in the hands of the widow or widows, which right does not depend on the bounty or generosity of the mother or step-mother, and the gift in the present case is of a share of the estate which admittedly is less than one fourth of the whole estate." No such plea was raised in the written statement; there was no issue on the point, and no such ground has been clearly raised even in the memorandum of appeal Sled in this Court. We, however, allowed the point to be argued as it involved a pure question of law and as no objection was raised by plaintiff-respondent's learned counsel. 39. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited the following rulings in support of his argument: ('10) 37 Cal. 1 : 1 I.C. 945 : 10 C.L.J. 545 : 13 C.W.N. 994, Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu, ('26) 13 AIR 1926 Pat. 582 : 99 I.C. 782 : 5 Pat. 646 : 7 P.L.T. 821, Ram Sumran Prasad v. Gobind Das, ('24) 11 AIR 1924 All. 23 : 73 I.C. 648 : 45 All. 297 : 21 A.L.J. 232, Bhagwati Shukul v. Ram Jatan Tiwari, Sailabala Deb and Others Vs. Baikuntha Nath Ghose and Others, AIR 1926 Cal 486 , AIR 1933 426 (Oudh) and ('29) 16 AIR 1929 Mad. 586 : 121 I.C. 113 : 53 Mad. 84 : 57 M.L.J. 826 (F.B.), Subbayya v. Ananta Ramayya. He has also read various passages from certain text books. Baikuntha Nath Ghose and Others, AIR 1926 Cal 486 , AIR 1933 426 (Oudh) and ('29) 16 AIR 1929 Mad. 586 : 121 I.C. 113 : 53 Mad. 84 : 57 M.L.J. 826 (F.B.), Subbayya v. Ananta Ramayya. He has also read various passages from certain text books. We shall deal with the rulings first. The headnote of the case in ('10) 37 Cal. 1 : 1 I.C. 945 : 10 C.L.J. 545 : 13 C.W.N. 994, Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu is in these words: It is competent to a Hindu widow governed by the Mitakshara law to make a valid gift of a reasonable portion of the immovable property of her husband to her daughter on the occasion of the daughter's gowna ceremony; and such a gift is binding upon the reversionary heirs of her husband. 40. The gift there was of a house and had been made by the widow of a sonless Hindu to her daughter on the occasion of the latter's gowna. The question that had been raised in the case was that a Hindu widow had no power to make a gift to her daughter on the occasion of the gowna ceremony whatever her powers for making a gift in the occasion of the marriage of the daughter might be. The trial Court held that the gowna ceremony was practically the completion and consummation of the marriage ceremony and that a gift of immovable property to the daughter by the mother on such an occasion was, therefore, valid, and had dismissed the suit which had been brought by the reversioner of the last male owner. The lower appellate Court had differed and had decreed the suit, and the defendants had taken the case to the High Court in second appeal It is stated in the judgment that "the substantial question of law," which had been argued on behalf of the defendant-appellants, was, "whether a Hindu widow, governed by the Mitakshara law, is competent to make an absolute gift in favour of her daughter, on the occasion of the latter's gowna ceremony, of a reasonable portion of the immovable property left by her husband". It is next stated that the contention of the appellants was that this question must be answered in the affirmative, while it had been strenuously contended on behalf of the respondents that, "although, under the Hindu law, it may be open to a widow to make a suitable gift to her daughter on the occasion of her marriage, neither principle nor authority can be invoked in support of the validity of a post-nuptial gift to a daughter." 41. It will thus be noticed that the actual question which arose for consideration, and which was argued, was the narrow question of the widow's power to make a gift on the occasion of the gowna ceremony. In considering this question, however, the learned Judge began by referring to a number of texts in the ancient books of the Hindus, from the Rig Veda downwards, dealing with gifts to girls on the occasion of marriage. Dr. Katju has particularly invited our attention to the texts quoted from Manu, Book 9, Verse 118, and Yajnavalkya, Book 2, Verse 124 - which laid down that brothers should give to their unmarried sisters one fourth of their own share - and to the observation of the learned Judges that "it is clear from the Mitakshara, Chap. 1, S. 7, paras. 5 to 14, and from Viramitrodaya, Chap. 2, Part 1, S. 21, that the maiden daughter is entitled to a share, which represents her dowry and marriage expenses, and such share is one-fourth of what she would have been entitled to receive, ii instead of being a daughter she had been a son." The conclusion at which the learned Judges arrive, upon a consideration of these texts, is expressed in these words: These texts are, in our opinion, sufficient to support the view that when, upon the death of Hindu governed by the Mitakshara law, his property is taken by his widow, a gift by the widow to her daughter on the occasion of her marriage out of the estate of her husband is within her powers, provided that the portion so given is reasonable in amount, and that the question whether it is reasonable or not is to be determined with regard to what would have been the share of the unmarried daughter under the rules laid down in the Mitakshara, Chap. 1, S. 7, paras. 5 to 14. 42. 1, S. 7, paras. 5 to 14. 42. These paragraphs of the Mitakshara contain an explanation of the following text of Yajnavalkya: "But sisters should be disposed of in marriage, giving them as an allotment, the fourth part of a brother's own share." That the phrase, 'the fourth part of a brother's own share,' is ambiguous cannot be denied. It seems to us that the explanations given by the author of the Mitakshara in paras. 6 to 14 of Chap. 1, S. 7 do not make the position any better. To continue with the judgment in ('10) 37 Cal. 1 : 1 I.C. 945 : 10 C.L.J. 545 : 13 C.W.N. 994, Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu. The learned Judges then refer to certain authorities and arrive at the following conclusion: Upon the authority of the ancient texts and of the commentators, as also upon the judicial decisions to which we have referred, there cannot, in our opinion, be any reasonable doubt that a gift by a Hindu widow of a reasonable portion of her husband's immovable property to her daughter in connection with her marriage is within the scope of her authority as a qualified owner and is binding upon the reversionary heirs of her husband. 43. We consider it sufficient to say that this is very far from the proposition contended by Dr. Katju. Having arrived at the conclusion mentioned above, the learned Judges proceed to consider what the gown ceremony is and state that it is also known as the dwiragaman ceremony. They then state their conclusion thus: In our opinion there is no substantial distinction between gifts made at the nuptial fire or in the bridal procession and gifts made at the time of the dwiragaman ceremony. In fact, gifts made at the time of the dwiragaman ceremony may rightly be regarded as dowry deferred... 44. It is noteworthy that, after stating their conclusion as quoted above, the learned Judges observe: "The only question is whether the gift was of a reasonable portion of her husband's immovable property," and proceed to consider that question. If Dr. Katju's contention is correct, and the texts mentioning the one-fourth share are to be interpreted literally 2nd followed strictly, no question of reasonableness can arise. The daughter must, according to Dr. Katju, be held to have an "absolute right" to a one-fourth share. Dr. If Dr. Katju's contention is correct, and the texts mentioning the one-fourth share are to be interpreted literally 2nd followed strictly, no question of reasonableness can arise. The daughter must, according to Dr. Katju, be held to have an "absolute right" to a one-fourth share. Dr. Katju has had to go to the length of arguing that the daughter is entitled to enforce in a Court of law this "absolute right" to a one-fourth share of her father's estate. He has had to admit, however, that he is not aware of a single case in which any such claim has ever been put forward in, or recognised by, any Court. One of the precedents cited and relied upon in the judgment in ('10) 37 Cal. 1 : 1 I.C. 945 : 10 C.L.J. 545 : 13 C.W.N. 994, Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu is ('99) 22 Mad. 113, Ramsami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar. The judgment of that case has been so well summarised by the learned Judges of the Calcutta Court at p. 8 of ('10) 37 Cal. 1 : 1 I.C. 945 : 10 C.L.J. 545 : 13 C.W.N. 994, Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu that we cannot do better than quote that summary: The texts justified something more than a disbursement out of the estate of only the price of things required in connection with celebration of the marriage. The better and sounder view was that the authorities should be understood to empower a qualified owner, like a widow, to do all acts proper and incidental to the marriage of a female, according to the general practice of the community to which she belongs. 45. If we may say so with great respect, this is perfectly intelligible, and this is the principle on which the Courts have always acted. We would repeat that this in no way supports the contention put forward by Dr. Katju. The relevant portion of the headnote in Ram Sumran Prasad Vs. Govind Das, AIR 1926 Patna 582 is in these words: A gift by a sonless Hindu widow of a reasonable portion of landed property to her son-in-law, out of the estate inherited from her husband, is permissible under the Hindu law as a part of the religious ceremony of marriage of the daughter and as being conducive to the spiritual welfare of the husband. 46. 46. The facts of that case show that the gift in that case was not an improper one. The last male owner, Banarsi Prasad, left a widow, Jainti Kumari, and an unmarried daughter, Chhotan Bibi. The estate left by him was considerable. The annual income from landed properties alone was over Rs. 50,000. Then there was a money-lending business involving 20,000 to 30,000 rupees. There were Government promissory notes of the face value of over two lacs of rupees. The evidence showed that the widow, Jainti Kumari, was a careful manager. She actually saved money and acquired properties yielding an income of 20,000 to 30,000 rupees per annum, and thus enhanced the corpus of the estate by 50 per cent. She was clearly a widow of an exceptional character. The only expenditure of a capital nature incurred by her was in connexion with works of a religious and charitable character. She constructed a thakurbari (temple) at a cost of fifty to sixty thousand rupees, and dedicated to the temple property yielding an annual income of Rs. 18,000. The money spent on the building of the temple-which is likely to have taken several years-might well have come out of the income of the estate, considering that, according to the judgment, the lady "managed the property frugally and economically," It was also found that the expenditure incurred by the lady on charitable works, though large, was "not disproportionate to her means or the extent of the property she possessed." But, apart from that, it was admitted by the reversioners, who were the plaintiffs in the suit and were challenging a gift made by Jainti Kumari to her son-in-law, that Jainti Kumari had spent these moneys on the works of charity, and had made the dedication, with their consent. The gift in question had been made orally on the occasion of the ceremony of Gantha Pakrai which is one of the ceremonies that take place in connection with the celebration of a marriage. A deed of gift, confirming the oral gift thus made, was executed two years later. 47. It was found that Jainti Kumari spent a ridiculously small sum of money - considering her status and wealth - something in the neighbourhood of one thousand rupees, on the marriage of her daughter who was the only child left by Banarsi Prasad. A deed of gift, confirming the oral gift thus made, was executed two years later. 47. It was found that Jainti Kumari spent a ridiculously small sum of money - considering her status and wealth - something in the neighbourhood of one thousand rupees, on the marriage of her daughter who was the only child left by Banarsi Prasad. The property gifted was an eight annas share in a certain mahal and one bigha of land in another village, The net profit from the eight annas share in the mahal amounted to Rs. 1200 to Rs. 1300 per annum. The one bigha of land in the other village could hardly have yielded any income. This represented one-fiftieth share of the property left by Banarsi Prasad, taking into consideration the landed properties alone. If the money-lending business and the Government promissory notes are taken into consideration the fraction becomes smaller. If the additions to the estate made by Jainti Kumari - which also came into the possession of the reversioners - are taken into consideration, the fraction becomes still smaller. Such a gift, made by such a widow, and in such circumstances, would be upheld by any Court. It is difficult to see how this decision is of any assistance to the appellant. It is not the plaintiff's case that a gilt made by a Hindu widow on the occasion of her daughter's marriage can never be valid. 48. The facts in ('24) 11 AIR 1924 All. 23 : 73 I.C. 648 : 45 All. 297 : 21 A.L.J. 232, Bhagwati Shukul v. Ram Jatan Tiwari were somewhat peculiar. A Hindu-Brahmin by caste and Krishnanand by name-died leaving a widow, Mt. Mohna, and an unmarried daughter, Mt. Oreha. The total value of the property left by him was Rs. 500, Mt. Oreha had the misfortune to be blind and a cripple. The giving in marriage of a daughter being, according to Hindu notions, a religious duty of paramount importance, the anxiety of Mt. Mohna, a widow, possessing very small means, as she was, to find a husband for such a daughter can be easily imagined. The only man whom she could succeed in persuading to marry Mt. Oreha was one Ram Jatan Tiwari, who already had a wife, and who evidently insisted on the property inherited by Mt. Mohna, a widow, possessing very small means, as she was, to find a husband for such a daughter can be easily imagined. The only man whom she could succeed in persuading to marry Mt. Oreha was one Ram Jatan Tiwari, who already had a wife, and who evidently insisted on the property inherited by Mt. Mohna from her husband being given to him - presumably as a reward for his goodness in agreeing to marry the unfortunate girl, particularly when he already had a wife. It was, in these circumstances, that Mt. Mohna made a gift of the entire property to Ram Jatan Some time later, Mt. Mohna died and, 10 years after her death, the suit giving rise to the appeal was brought by a reversioner of Krishnanand claiming possession over the property. The finding of the lower appellate Court was that, "in order to get the girl married, it was a sheer necessity for Mt. Mohna to provide a dowry of Rs. 500, or its equivalent by the gift of the property." 49. The suit having been dismissed by the lower appellate Court, the plaintiff had come up to the High Court in second appeal. The facts being as stated above, a learned Single Judge, before whom the appeal came up for hearing, dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff thereupon filed an appeal under the Letters Patent. The Bench before which it came up for a preliminary hearing - analogous to a hearing under O. 41, R. 11, Civil P.C. - dismissed the appeal summarily, observing that the learned Single Judge had decided the case rightly. The decision, in our opinion, was clearly within the principles laid down in 22 Mad. 113." The validity of the gift in each case depends on the particular facts and circumstances of that case. The decision does not support the appellant's contention before us. 50. The cases in Sailabala Deb and Others Vs. Baikuntha Nath Ghose and Others, AIR 1926 Cal 486 and AIR 1933 426 (Oudh) were also second appeals. In the Calcutta case the parties were governed by the Dayabhaga. The law on this Subject in the Dayabhaga and the Mitakshara is, however, the same. The gift in that case was of property which represented 3/4ths of the estate. The value of the property gifted was only Rs. 1000. The estate was thus a very small one. In the Calcutta case the parties were governed by the Dayabhaga. The law on this Subject in the Dayabhaga and the Mitakshara is, however, the same. The gift in that case was of property which represented 3/4ths of the estate. The value of the property gifted was only Rs. 1000. The estate was thus a very small one. The practice of exacting heavy dowries from the girl's parents is rampant in Bengal even to a greater extent than in other parts of the country. The finding of the lower appellate Court was that "the gift was a reasonable one having regard to all the circumstances disclosed in the evidence." It had also been found that the girl had been married in accordance with the wishes of her deceased father and that the ancestors of the plaintiffs had taken active part in the ceremony and also in the execution of the deed of gift. Although the latter circumstance could not estop the plaintiffs from claiming the property, it was held that the fact that those who were interested as possible reversionary heirs joined in the transaction clearly indicated that it was not considered unreasonable. The argument put forward on behalf of the plaintiffs was that the widow could not give more than one-fourth of the estate and the texts already mentioned, and similar texts from the Dayabhaga, quoted. The learned Judges held that the texts were not imperative but only directory and only indicated what should be considered as reasonable in each particular case, and referred to the Madras decision in ('99) 22 Mad. 113, Ramsami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar, which we have already mentioned. The learned Judges further observed that "to limit the amount to be spent for her marriage to a fourth part of the estate left by the father would, in many cases, make it impossible for the widow to give her daughter in marriage." 51. On the finding of facts recorded by the lower appellate Court the second appeal was bound to be dismissed. The important fact to note is that it was held that the texts were not imperative but only directory, and that the question whether the gift was reasonable must be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The case thus does not support the contention of Dr. Katju. The important fact to note is that it was held that the texts were not imperative but only directory, and that the question whether the gift was reasonable must be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The case thus does not support the contention of Dr. Katju. In the Oudh case the gift was made by the mother of the last male owner in favour of her daughter on the occasion of the latter's marriage. It was in respect of about eight bighas of land out of some 26 bighas left by the last male owner. It was observed by the learned Judges that it is competent to a widow to make a gift of immovable property to her daughter on the occasion of the daughter's marriage and that the limitation on the validity of the gift is that it must be of a reasonable portion of the property. It was further observed that the question as to what is a reasonable gift on such occasions is a question of fact which has to be decided with due advertence to all the circumstances of the case. It was further held that one-quarter mentioned in the texts is not an invariable rule. The decision thus is on the same lines as that in the Calcutta case mentioned above and is within the principles laid down in ('99) 22 Mad. 113, Ramsami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar. It is hardly necessary to point out that if, in view of the facts and circumstances of a certain case, the gift of more than one-fourth of the estate can be valid, in other cases the gift of less than one-fourth or of any property at all may in view of the facts and circumstances of those cases, be invalid. 52. The last case is that in Chedalavada Subbayya Vs. Chedalavada Ananda Ramayya, AIR 1929 Mad 586 The suit there was for partition, instituted by the son of defendant 1 by the latter's first wife. Defendant 1's son by his second wife was defendant 2. Defendant 1 had, at the date of the institution of the suit, three unmarried daughters by the second wife. The father claimed a provision for the marriage expenses of his daughters one of whom was married subsequent to the suit and before decree, and the remaining two had yet to be married. Defendant 1 had, at the date of the institution of the suit, three unmarried daughters by the second wife. The father claimed a provision for the marriage expenses of his daughters one of whom was married subsequent to the suit and before decree, and the remaining two had yet to be married. The plaintiff contended that he, or his share in the family property, was not liable therefor after the disruption of the coparcenary. Two of the three learned judges who heard the case held in favour of the father - defendant 1-and the third held that the plaintiff's contention was correct. There was a considerable discussion of the texts, and an attempt was made to determine the basis of the daughter's right to marriage expenses, whether it was maintenance or participation, But even Ramesam J., who delivered the leading judgment upholding the father's claim, recognized that the rights of a daughter to maintenance and to marriage expenses are 'in substitution for an ancient right to a share which has now become obsolete," and that "there can be no suit for partition with her as a sharer." The decision is no authority for Dr. Katju's contention. The case, on the facts, has no application to the case before us. 53. So far as the passages in the text-books on Hindu law on which Dr. Katju has relied are concerned, reliance is placed in them on the original texts, the more important of which have been mentioned above, and on the rulings cited by Dr. Katju and similar other rulings. They do not therefore afford any further assistance. Dr. Katju has had to go to the length of arguing that a daughter, if one-fourth of her deceased father's property has not been given to her at the time of her marriage, is entitled, after she has been married, to claim that share against those who are in possession of the estate. The arguments put forward on behalf of the appellant, if accepted, will lead to the result that a daughter is entitled to claim partition. Learned counsel has suggested that such a result will not be undesirable. It is not for us to express any opinion on the merits of this suggestion. The Courts have to administer the law as it is and not as it should be. Learned counsel has suggested that such a result will not be undesirable. It is not for us to express any opinion on the merits of this suggestion. The Courts have to administer the law as it is and not as it should be. Whatever the contents of the ancient texts might be, the results to which the appellant's arguments lead are wholly against the Hindu law that has been administered, and is being administered, in British Indian Courts. 54. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, for the plaintiff-respondent has pointed out that not a single case has been cited by the appellant in which it has been held that the texts relied upon are mandatory and have to be followed literally with regard to the one-fourth share mentioned in those texts. In fact, the rulings to which Dr. Katju has referred show just the contrary. In Sailabala Deb and Others Vs. Baikuntha Nath Ghose and Others, AIR 1926 Cal 486 it is laid down in express terms that the texts are not imperative, but only directory, and illustrative of what should be considered as reasonable. The other case s are also, by implication, based on the same principle. Once you hold that the gift must be of what, in the circumstances of the particular case, is a reasonable portion of the estate, you destroy the rigidity and inflexibility which is the whole basis of Dr. Katju's arguments, and what Dr. Katju describes as the "absolute right "of the daughter disappears. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has argued that the ancient texts do not always lay down what, in legal language, are known as positive laws. He has laid before us the following passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the connected cases, Sri Balusu Gurulingaswami v. Sri Balusu Ramalakshmamma and Radhamohun v. Hardai Bibi, ('99) 22 Mad. 398 : 21 All. 460 : 26 I.A. 113 : 7 Sar. 330 : 9 M.L.J. 67 (P.C.) at pp. 415 416: Their Lordships had occasion in a late case to dwell upon the mixture of morality, religion and law in the Smritis, ('98) 20 All. 267 : 25 I.A. 54 : 7 Sar. 279 (P.C.), Rao Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori. 460 : 26 I.A. 113 : 7 Sar. 330 : 9 M.L.J. 67 (P.C.) at pp. 415 416: Their Lordships had occasion in a late case to dwell upon the mixture of morality, religion and law in the Smritis, ('98) 20 All. 267 : 25 I.A. 54 : 7 Sar. 279 (P.C.), Rao Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori. They had to decide whether a prohibition on alienation of property away from a man's family, certainly based on religious grounds, had a purely religious or also a legal bearing. They then said: 'All these old text-books and (sic) are apt to mingle religious and moral considerations, not being positive laws, with rules intended for positive laws'. In the preface to his valuable work on Hindu law, Sir William Machnaghten says: 'It by no means follows that because an act has been prohibited it should therefore be considered as illegal. The distinction between the vinculum juris and the vinculum pudoris is not always discernible'. They now add that the further study of the subject necessary for the decision of these appeals has still more impressed them with the necessity of great caution in interpreting books of mixed religion, morality and law, lest foreign lawyers accustomed to treat as law what they find in authoritative books, and to administer a fixed legal system, should too hastily take for strict law precepts which are meant to appeal to the moral sense, and should thus fetter individual judgments in private affairs, should introduce restrictions into Hindu society, and impart to it an in flexible rigidity, never contemplated by the original law-givers. 55. Learned counsel has argued that, although it is the duty of a Hindu mother, or brother, to provide funds-out of the estate of the deceased husband, or father, as the case may be-required for the marriage of a daughter, or sister, their duty merely is to spend, or to give, what is reasonable in the circumstances of the particular case. In our judgment these arguments of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru are well-founded. In our judgment these arguments of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru are well-founded. We have already held on the evidence that there was no necessity for the gift in question and that the gift was made, not because there was any difficulty in finding a suitable husband for Jot Kunwar without making a gift, but because Inder Kunwar wanted that her daughters should enjoy the half share of the property which was in Inder Kunwar's possession even during the lifetime of Prembada Kunwar. We have also held that the allegation that the gift was made with Prembada Kunwar's consent or acquiescence is untrue. The case of the appellant fails on this last ground alone, for the law, as laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('66-67) 11 M.I.A. 487 : 9 W.R. 23 : 2 Suther. 124 : 2 Sar. 327 (P.C.), Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee, ('93) 16 Mad. 1 : 19 I.A. 184 : 6 Sar. 1 (P.C.), Sri Gajapati Radhamani Garu v. Maharani Sri Pasupati and ('28) 15 AIR 1928 P.C. 251 : 111 I.C. 485 : 55 I.A. 399 (P.C.), Gauri Nath v. Mt. Gaya Kuar, is perfectly clear. Our conclusion therefore is that First Appeal No. 90 of 1939 is without force and must be dismissed. 56. We come now to the appeal of the idol, First Appeal No. 87 of 1939. The deed of endowment, Ex. Q, was, as already stated, executed on the same day as the will, viz., 23rd October 1934. The sole reason for the gift mentioned in this deed is that Dharam Singh had made an oral will that Inder Kunwar should dedicate the half share in the property in the two villages mentioned in the deed and in the residential house to Thakur Radhakrishanji Maharaj whom he had installed in the garhi. It is also stated in the deed that Dharam Singh had himself made a waqf of these properties in favour of the idol, "but he could not execute a deed of waqf," and that consequently, he made the oral will directing Inder Kunwar to execute a deed. It is also stated in the deed that Dharam Singh had himself made a waqf of these properties in favour of the idol, "but he could not execute a deed of waqf," and that consequently, he made the oral will directing Inder Kunwar to execute a deed. It is also stated in the deed that, when making the oral will Dharam Singh had said that "if his will was not complied with he would claim justice on the day of judgment." Those responsible for preparing this deed may have believed that the use of this picturesque language would carry conviction. The question, however, remains whether the story that Dharam Singh first made an oral waqf dedicating only a half share of certain properties and subsequently made an oral will directing - not both of his wives - but Inder Kunwar alone to execute a deed dedicating the half share aforesaid, is true. It would almost appear that Dharam Singh knew that he would be survived by both of his wives, that those wives would divide the property and that, of the two wives, Inder Kunwar alone would obey his behests, and so-in spite of all the piety and the devotion to the Thakurji with which he is credited in the deed - confined his oral waqf to only a half share in the properties in question. We have no hesitation in holding that the whole story is absurd and without any foundation whatsoever. The time when Dharam Singh made the oral waqf is not stated in the deed, nor is it stated why he failed to execute a deed in writing himself. The time of even the oral will is only vaguely described as "before his death." 57. Furthermore, we find, on an examination of the evidence, that the decision of the Court below that it has not been established by any satisfactory evidence that the Thakurji in question had been installed by Dharam Singh or existed in his life-time is correct. Thus, the whole foundation on which the recitals in the deed Ex. Q are based disappears. Two witnesses, Sardar Singh and Kashi Ram, were examined to prove the alleged oral will of Dharam Singh. We entirely agree with the learned Judge of the Court below that it is not possible to believe these witnesses. Thus, the whole foundation on which the recitals in the deed Ex. Q are based disappears. Two witnesses, Sardar Singh and Kashi Ram, were examined to prove the alleged oral will of Dharam Singh. We entirely agree with the learned Judge of the Court below that it is not possible to believe these witnesses. Our attention has not been drawn to any evidence - beyond the recital in the deed - showing that Dharam Singh bad made an oral waqf. It is also noteworthy that, although Dharam Singh died in May 1912, Inder Kunwar did not act upon the alleged solemn will of her husband for a period of more than 22 years and executed the deed in question only in October 1934. This delay alone is sufficient, in our opinion, to show that the recitals made in the deed were untrue. A plea was raised in the Court below, and has been repeated before us, to the effect that even if the recitals in the deed Ex. Q were not true. Inder Kunwar was entitled to make the dedication for the benefit of her husband's soul. But Inder Kunwar did not state in the deed Ex. Q that she was making the dedication sue motu with the object of conferring spiritual benefit on her deceased husband. All that she stated in the deed was that she was merely obeying the command of her husband. Furthermore, we do not believe that the object with which Inder Kunwar executed this deed was to confer any benefit upon her husband's soul. On the contrary, we are satisfied that her object was to enable her daughter, Govind Kunwar, to get into possession of this property in the guise of the manager of an endowment which was fictitiously created. 58. Learned counsel for this appellant also argued that the plaintiff had no right to maintain the suit as she had relinquished her right of survivorship. He did not rely on any fresh evidence but adopted the arguments put forward by the counsel for the appellant in the connected appeal, No. 90 of 1939. We have already dealt with that point at length and have held that it has not been proved that the plaintiff ever relinquished her right of survivorship. He did not rely on any fresh evidence but adopted the arguments put forward by the counsel for the appellant in the connected appeal, No. 90 of 1939. We have already dealt with that point at length and have held that it has not been proved that the plaintiff ever relinquished her right of survivorship. The last point urged is the one based on the allegation of Khiali Singh's adoption - the plea which was added to the written statement by a subsequent application for amendment. The very first question that arises is whether the allegation that Khiali Singh had been adopted by Dharam Singh is true. We have been taken through the entire evidence, oral and documentary, on which the appellant wanted to rely, and have come to the conclusion that the finding of the Court below that it has not been established that Dharam Singh adopted Khiali Singh is perfectly correct. We are in agreement with the reasons given by the learned Judge below for rejecting the testimony of the witnesses produced by the appellant and for holding that the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant did not prove the case of adoption. We are satisfied that the statements made by Dharam Singh in the deed Ex. 44, executed by him on 18th January 1910, declaring that his statements in Ex. AA and Ex. N were wrong and cancelling those two documents, were true. On a careful consideration of the materials laid before us we have no hesitatian in agreeing with the conclusion of the Court below that the story that Dharam Singh had ever adopted Khiali Singh is without foundation. 59. It may be pointed out that it was not the case of this appellant that the plaintiff, Prembada Kunwar, had given her consent to the deed of endowment in question. The endowment fails on that ground alone. Even if it be taken for granted that Inder Kunwar in reality executed the deed-Ex. Q-with the object of conferring spiritual benefit on her deceased husband, she could not do so without the concurrence of her co-widow. Our conclusion therefore is that First Appeal No. 87 of 1939 also has no merits. The result is that both the appeals-First Appeal No. 87 of 1939 and First Appeal No. 90 of 1989 are without force. They are accordingly dismissed with costs.