JUDGEMENT Consolidated Appeal (No. 45 of 1937), by special leave, from a decree of the High Court (March 17, 1936), which set aside a decree of the First Subordinate Judge, 24 Parganas (April 24, 1933). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee The suit now before the Board was begun on May 9, 1930, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, in Bengal. The substantive claim made by the plaint was for declaration of title to and possession of the movable and immovable properties which had been comprised in an impartible estate in Assam known as the Bijni Raj. By a schedule marked " B " nineteen items of immovable property and seven items or classes of movable property were specified in the plaint as the subject-matters of the claim. The suit was brought by one Debendra Narayan Roy as executor to the estate of the late Rani Abhayeswari Debi, who had died on October 17, 1918, having made her will on August 30 in that year. That lady was the survivor of two widows of Raja Kumud Narayan Bhup, who had until his death in 1883, enjoyed the undisputed ownership and possession of the impartible estate. He had died sonless ; a daughter had died, unmarried, soon after him. The other widow had died in 1891. The case made by the plaint was on the footing that the Bijni family was not a Hindu family, and that succession to the estate was governed by a family custom of primogeniture which excluded females. On that footing it was averred in the plaint, as it had been recited in the will, that from 1891 and until her death, Rani Abhayeswari had been in possession of the entire estate on her own account under a claim of absolute Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 7 right in herself and adversely to the person or persons entitled by the family custom to succeed to the estate. The cause of action alleged in the plaint was that soon after her death the Court of Wards had taken possession of the estate on behalf of Jogendra Narayan, the first defendant, nephew to her late husband, being the son of his brother Kirti Narayan. The cause of action alleged in the plaint was that soon after her death the Court of Wards had taken possession of the estate on behalf of Jogendra Narayan, the first defendant, nephew to her late husband, being the son of his brother Kirti Narayan. Jogendra had, on November 27, 1918, been found to be of unsound mind by an order made on inquisition, and it was not in dispute that the Court of Wards on his behalf had taken possession of the Bijni estate in December of that year. As against Jogendra, who was thus in possession, the person beneficially entitled under the will, and in whose interest the suit was brought, was a nephew of the ladys own, called Heramba Prosad Barua, son of her brother Bhabani Prasad. To Heramba she had bequeathed all the movable and immovable properties belonging to the Bijni estate. His representatives were the contesting respondents on this appeal. Between May 9, 1930, when the suit was filed, and December, 1918, when the Court of Wards had taken possession— not quite twelve years having elapsed—a number of other claims to the estate had been put forward in the courts. It was not necessary that those should be here detailed, but they explained why three other defendants were impleaded in addition to Jogendra, and showed that much litigation was in prospect, since highly discrepant versions of the family custom as to succession were being maintained by different members of the family. Indeed, the Court of Wards, for Jogendra, spent considerable sums in October, 1930, in compromising rival claims. His title to succeed was as the male agnate who had been nominated by Rani Abhayeswari herself on September 28, 1895. Bhairabendra, the second defendant, was the present appellant. He was a male agnate who had claimed the succession, even as against Jogendra, on the ground that his father through entering the family by adoption had been recognized as " Subha," and also because of Jogendras unsoundness of mind. He said that the family was a Hindu family governed by the Bengal school of law as modified by certain customs. He said that the family was a Hindu family governed by the Bengal school of law as modified by certain customs. By those customs, he said, the " Subha " had a right to succeed if the last holder left no male issue subject thereto the succession went to the male agnate nearest in degree to the last holder, or the eldest of such agnates if more than one—that was to say, by the rule which in India was sometimes called " ordinary " as distinct from " lineal" primogeniture. Bhairabendra had been one of the plaintiffs in a suit (No. 225 of 1919) brought against Jogendra and others in 1919, but on October 25, 1930, soon after the present suit had been begun, he had compromised with Jogendra, recognizing the latters title for life in return for a lac and a half of rupees. The third defendant to the present suit was Surendra Narayan Deb, the son of Uday Narayan, who had been Bhairabendras co-plaintiff in suit No. 25 and was also a claimant to the estate. The fourth defendant was Surendra Narayan Chaudhury, who had been substituted in another suit (No. 51 of 1922) as plaintiff on the death of one Samarendra. He, too, compromised with Jogendra on October 25, 1930, withdrawing his claim for five lacs of rupees. The place of those last mentioned defendants in the family pedigree, and their respective versions of the family custom, need not here be set out, but it might be mentioned that one claimant at least —Purnyendra, nephew of the fourth defendant—claimed on the basis of " lineal " primogeniture. Written statements on behalf of Jogendra and Bhairabendra were filed in February, 1931, and issues were settled in April, 1931. But the provincial legislature of Assam intervened in the matter by passing Assam Act II. of 1931, called the Bijni Succession Act, which received the sanction of the Governor on March 27, 1931, and of the Governor-General on May 9, 1931. Certain important parts of the Act are set out hereunder " An Act to regulate the succession in the Bijni Raj, " Whereas it is expedient to declare and supplement the "customary law of succession in the group of Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. Certain important parts of the Act are set out hereunder " An Act to regulate the succession in the Bijni Raj, " Whereas it is expedient to declare and supplement the "customary law of succession in the group of Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy estates known "as the Bijni Raj in Assam with a view to the prevention "of disputes and the preservation of the Raj ; "And whereas the previous sanction of the Governor-" General has been obtained under sub-section 3 of section 8oa "of the Government of India Act to the passing of this Act; " It is hereby enacted as follows — " 2. In this Act,— " (1.) the Bijni Raj or the Raj means the group of "estates specified in the Schedule annexed to this Act, together "with all additions and accretions to the property comprised "therein that may have been or may hereafter be made from "time to time by or on behalf of the Holder of the Raj and "includes any securities held by him or on his behalf; " (2.) family means the Bijni Raj family ; " (3.) the Holder of the Raj or the Holder means the "owner of the Raj ; . . . . " 3. The Bijni Raj is hereby declared to be an impartible "estate descendible to a single male Holder according to the "provisions of this Act. " 4.—(1.) Raja Jogendra Narayan Bhup of Bijni is hereby "declared and shall during his life-time be the Holder of the "Raj with title dating from his nomination to the succession "made by Rani Abhayeswari Debi on the 28th September, " 1895. " (2.) Upon the death of the said Raja the Holder of the "Raj shall be the person now known as Kumar Bhairabendra "Narayan Deb, son of the late Chandra Narayan Deb ; . . . . “ (3.) From and after the death of the Holder succeeding "to the Raj under sub-section 2, the succession shall be "determined by nomination or appointment as hereinafter "provided. " 10.—(i.) Without the previous sanction of the Governor "of Assam, it shall not be lawful to sell, mortgage, devise, "or in any other way transfer the Raj or any portion thereof "or any interest therein otherwise than by lease for a term "not exceeding 30 years. " 10.—(i.) Without the previous sanction of the Governor "of Assam, it shall not be lawful to sell, mortgage, devise, "or in any other way transfer the Raj or any portion thereof "or any interest therein otherwise than by lease for a term "not exceeding 30 years. 11 (4.) Without the previous sanction of the Governor of "Assam neither the Raj nor any portion thereof nor any "interest therein may be attached or sold in execution of "any decree or order or other process of law." The Schedule specified three large estates in Assam, which were said to be the same as items 1, 2 and 17 in the list of immovable properties in Schedule B to the plaint. The question for decision was as to the effect of that enactment on the claim made by the present suit on behalf of the estate of the late Rani Abhayeswari to the properties of the Bijni Raj. It came before the Board as the result of certain proceedings which may now be stated. The trial judge allowed amended written statements to be filed setting up the Act as an additional defence, and framed certain additional issues, of which those numbered 16, 17, 18 and 20 bore on that matter Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 9 “16. Does Assam Act II. of 1931 (the Act) bar the present "suit? Is the said Act ultra vires of the Government of "Assam? Is the said Act invalid as opposed to provisions "of the Government of India Act and the rules made there-"under? (“Government of India Act, 1919 (as amended to June 28, 1933) 45A. (1.) Provision may be made by rules under this Act (a) for the classification of subjects, in relation to the functions of government, as central and provincial subjects, for the purpose of distinguishing the functions of local governments and local legislatures from the functions of the Governor -General in Council and the Indian legislature; .... (4.) The expressions central subjects and provincial subjects as used in this Act mean subjects so classified under the rules. The local legislature of any province has power proceedings on the ground that subject to the provisions of this Act, to mak e laws for the peace and good government of the territories for the time being constituting that province. (4.) The expressions central subjects and provincial subjects as used in this Act mean subjects so classified under the rules. The local legislature of any province has power proceedings on the ground that subject to the provisions of this Act, to mak e laws for the peace and good government of the territories for the time being constituting that province. The local legislature of any province may not, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General, mak e or tak e into consideration any law- regulating any central subject The validity of any Act of the Indian legislature or any local legislature shall not be open to question in any legal proceedings on the ground that the Act affects a provincial subject or a central subject, as the case may be DEVOLUTION RULES. Schedule I. Part I. CENTRAL SUBJECT Civil law, including laws regarding status, property, civil rights and liabilities and civil procedure. Part II.—PROVINCIAL SUBJECTS. Any matter which, though falling within a central subject, is declared by the Governor-General in Council to be of a merely local or private nature within the province. " 17. Can the said Act affect the present suit, the right of "the plaintiff under the will, if any, having accrued long "before the Act? " 18. Can the said Act affect any of the properties outside "the local limits of the Government of Assam ? "20. Has the plaintiff any title to the Bijni Raj—the "subject-matter of the suit—in view of Assam Act II. of " 1931 (the Act)? " Those issues (and three others which need not now be referred to) were tried first. The trial judge decreed that the suit be dismissed in respect of the properties situate in Assam, and that it remain pending in respect of the properties outside Assam—that was, in respect of items 8 and 9 of Schedule B to the plaint. Those items were (8.) the premises in Calcutta known as 147 Russa Road, being about an acre of land with a masonry built house of two storeys thereon ; (9.) the land and buildings at Benares known as the Bijni rajbat Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. Those items were (8.) the premises in Calcutta known as 147 Russa Road, being about an acre of land with a masonry built house of two storeys thereon ; (9.) the land and buildings at Benares known as the Bijni rajbat Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 10 From that decision an appeal was taken by the plaintiff to the High Court (Mukherji and Ghose JJ.), who set aside the decision of the trial judge and ordered that the case be remanded for trial of the further issues, holding that the Act did not bar a claim to the Bijni estates if based on adverse possession, but only claims based on an alleged right of succession. By Order in Council, dated March 18, 1937, special leave was given to Jogendra to appeal from the High Courts decision, but he died on June 18 in that year. By Order in Council, dated February 24, 1938, special leave was given to Bhairabendra to appeal from that decision, and he was also substituted for Jogendra as appellant in the latters appeal, subject to any objection which might be raised at the hearing. The appeals were consolidated. On February 6, 1941, the plaintiff executor, Debendra Narayan Roy, having withdrawn from the contest, the legatee, Heramba Prosad Barua, was added as a respondent thereto, being respondent No. 5 in each appeal. He had since died, but his legal representatives had been substituted in his stead. 1942. Jan. 13, 14, 15, 19. J. Millard Tucker K.C. and 7. M. Pringle for the appellant. The real question is what effect the Assam Act of 1931 had on the litigation in this suit, which was in progress when that Act was passed. If it be held that the Act does not apply to stop the litigation, then the case must proceed to trial. That is the only point for consideration. It is submitted that the Act settled who was the owner of the estate, and that therefore no question of any other title, or the basis on which such title was founded, could be looked into. If that be right, then subject to a point as to the properties of the estate outside Assam, the case cannot proceed. It is submitted that the Act settled who was the owner of the estate, and that therefore no question of any other title, or the basis on which such title was founded, could be looked into. If that be right, then subject to a point as to the properties of the estate outside Assam, the case cannot proceed. At the time of the passing of the Act in 1931 the existing ownership of the Raj was fixed for all purposes ; by s. 4, sub-s. 1, it was settled who was the owner at the date of the Act and at all times before from September 28, 1895, because it declared that Jogendra should be “ during "his life-time the Holder of the Raj," and " the Holder " in s. 2, sub-s. 3, meant " the owner of the Raj/ If there be any ambiguity resort may be had to the preamble ; but " owner " of the estate means what it says. The additions and accretions are those not specified in the Schedule to the Act, but include the property outside Assam ; such properties were immovable properties, and the trial judge was in error in holding that the Act could not operate on such extra-Assam properties. A claim to recover possession of property, where the title thereto is based on the adverse possession of the plaintiff, cannot succeed against the true owner except on proof of the extinguishment of the true owners title by such adverse possession. Sect. 4, sub-s. 1, of the Act, in declaring Jogendra to be the true owner with title subsisting from 1895 to the date of the Act, which was after the suit, excludes the idea of such title having been extinguished at the date of the suit. The High Court were wrong in saying that the Act was limited to conferring ownership only in cases where succession was in dispute. The Act was within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature ; it is dealing with a central subject—right to property, ownership of property— and the necessary assent was obtained from the Governor-General. The High Court were wrong in saying that the Act was limited to conferring ownership only in cases where succession was in dispute. The Act was within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature ; it is dealing with a central subject—right to property, ownership of property— and the necessary assent was obtained from the Governor-General. Also, by virtue of s. 84, sub-s. 2, of the Government of India Act, 1919, as amended to June 28, 1933, the validity of the Act is not open to question in any legal proceedings on the ground that it affects a provincial subject or a central subject. J. M. Pringle following, dealt with the relation between the statutory Raj and the plaint properties, and referred to the Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. viii., p. 192, on the history of the Bijni family. The statutory Raj is set out in the Schedule to the Act; as regards the other items in the plaint, incorporation in the estate is a matter of intention Shiba Prasad Singh v. Prayag Kumari Debt (( 1932) L. R. 59 I. A. 331, 335, 346, 350.), which deals with the doctrine of intention to incorporate self-acquired immovable property into an impartible estate the properties outside Assam pass under the Act by the words " together with all "additions and accretios." On construction, the general effect of the Act is to give each succeeding holder a life interest, and having only that, the operation of the general law would prima facie be confined to that, and that is what the Act in terms provides. There is no room for Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 11 adverse possession—the Act says just the reverse s. 4. Sect. 10 is the only instance in which there can be severance between status and ownership —in which any part of the lands can go out of the estate. Prima facie, the Assam provincial legislative jurisdiction is territorial, and confined to the provincial boundaries of Assam Keiths Responsible Government in the Dominions, 2nd ed., vol. i., p, 321. Sect. 10 is the only instance in which there can be severance between status and ownership —in which any part of the lands can go out of the estate. Prima facie, the Assam provincial legislative jurisdiction is territorial, and confined to the provincial boundaries of Assam Keiths Responsible Government in the Dominions, 2nd ed., vol. i., p, 321. As against that, however, it is the law in India that one part of the law can be projected into another part and made to be of effect there by the operation of the doctrine of personal law Balwant Rao v. Baji Rao (( 1920) L.R. 47 I. A. 213,219.), Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor (( 1869) 12 Moo. I. A. 523.), and Samarendra Chandra Deb v. Birendra Kishore Deb (( 1908) I. L. R. 35 C. 777.). This is legislation of the Assam legislature in regard to succession in an Assam family, and qua that, there is no question of the jurisdiction of the legislature. It codifies the customary law, and on the Act becoming law it became the authoritative record or depository of the personal law of the family—it governed the devolution of the property affected by it wherever it might be situated. It enacted and declared not only the family custom in general terms, but in the most concrete form. [Reference was also made to s. 5 of the Indian Succession Act (XXXIX. of 1925).] W. W. K. Page for the representatives of respondent No. 5, Heramba Prosad Barua. There is first a preliminary point as to the right of Bhairabendra to be substituted for Jogendra in the first appeal. That appeal is only prosecuted on the footing that Jogendra had the statutory title and a life interest, and Bhairabendra cannot be substituted in that when any title Jogendra had has been extinguished by his death. [The Board indicated that in the circumstances they rejected that contention.] The propositions are (a) The Act is ultra vires, and therefore a nullity. Alternatively, (6) if the Act is intra vires it does not constitute a bar to the suit, nor affect any title of respondent No. 5 to any of the properties in suit, that is, the properties specified in the plaint. Alternatively, (6) if the Act is intra vires it does not constitute a bar to the suit, nor affect any title of respondent No. 5 to any of the properties in suit, that is, the properties specified in the plaint. Alternatively, (c) if the Act purports to deprive respondent No. 5 of any of the properties in suit, it does not affect either (i.) those situated outside the province of Assam, or (ii.) the seven items of movable property specified in Schedule B to the plaint. The question whether the Act affects any of the remaining items in Schedule B to the plaint other than items i, 2 and 17, which are specified in the Schedule to the Act, cannot be decided in this appeal, but must be decided by evidence to be deduced in the present suit, that is, on evidence proving that they are or are not included in the Rai as defined in the Act. With regard to proposition (a) (supra), the only method of ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the provincial legislature is by reference to the Government of India Act. The Assam Act was ultra vires the provincial legislature, not being a law made for the peace and good government of Assam, but an Act in the nature of a judicial decree enacted for the purpose of resolving questions of conflicting claims of title to the succession to the Raj. It was also ulora vires because no declaration of the Governor-General in Council as prescribed by item 51 of Part II. of Schedule I. to the Devolution Rules had been made. The effect of s. 8oa, sub-s. 3 (e), of that Act must, for the purposes of this case, depend on the correct meaning to be assigned to the words " regulating " and " affecting." The words are clearly not assimilated; they are intended to have distinct and separate meanings. “Regulation” means control; “affect " means to touch upon incidentally. The Act of 1931 was not one “regulating" any central subject within the meaning of s. 8oa, sub-s. 3 (e). For the purposes of the argument on the-second proposition it is assumed that the Act was valid and binding. The preamble being part of the Act, it is plain that what was then before the legislature was Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. For the purposes of the argument on the-second proposition it is assumed that the Act was valid and binding. The preamble being part of the Act, it is plain that what was then before the legislature was Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 12 the expediency of supplementing the customary law of succession to the Bijni Raj. The subject-matter of the Act was therefore succession, with a view to the prevention of disputes and the preservation of the Raj. Taking the preamble alone, the legislation was intended, and should be construed, as legislation regarding the law of succession to the estate, and had nothing to do with any litigation or disputes other than those on the question of succession, and did not affect a claim based on adverse possession. Further, the primary meaning of the words “prevention of disputes " in the preamble means, in ordinary English,” anticipatory action to forestall disputes," and does not mean to deal with disputes already in existence. The third proposition is based on the construction of s. 8oa, sub-s. of the Government of India Act. The Act of 1931 does not apply to the properties outside Assam. The legislature did not intend to legislate outside its own province, and it cannot be assumed, and there is nothing to show, that it had any knowledge of those properties outside the province. Sect. 65 of the Government of India Act shows clearly, so far as the central Government is concerned, what powers are attributed to the Indian legislature. The powers of that legislature extend beyond British India by virtue of that express enactment. Nothing, however, corresponding to that provision is to be found in the enactment conferring legislative powers on the Provinces, and there is no power in the Act of 1931 itself to legislate extra-territorially. [As to the inclusion of movable property in an impartible estate see Shiba Prasad Singh v. Prayag Kutnari Debt (L. R. 59 I. A. 331.).] The powers of local governments are expressly confined to the territorial boundaries of the province; s. 46 of the Government of India Act. [As to the inclusion of movable property in an impartible estate see Shiba Prasad Singh v. Prayag Kutnari Debt (L. R. 59 I. A. 331.).] The powers of local governments are expressly confined to the territorial boundaries of the province; s. 46 of the Government of India Act. The phraseology of s. 8oa,sub-s. 1, of that Act, " to make laws for the peace and good government," may be said to be similar to the phraseology in s. 65, sub-s. 1 (a), that is, the local legislature has power to make laws for all persons, courts, things, etc., within the territories for the time being constituting the province. To adopt the wider construction would be to give to the subordinate legislatures powers more extensive territorially than those which reside in the Indian legislature. If s. 8oa, sub-s. 1, is to be construed as enabling a provincial legislature to make laws having force outside its province, there is no ground on which that can be limited, and therefore it would extend to legislation in force in India itself. Further, such a construction would give to provincial legislation a local extent wider than the jurisdiction of the provincial executive; it would also lead to overlapping and conflict in provincial legislation. Finally, s. 8oa, sub-s. 2, lends support to the contention that legislative powers are limited locally by the boundaries of the province. J. Millard Tucker K.C. replied. The point just dealt with was not taken below, and is one of considerably difficulty; it was said in Income-tax Commissioner v. Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Kishore (( 1941) L. R. 68 I. A. 155, 169.) that the Board will not decide a new and important point of law raised for the first time before the Board. In the courts below the plaintiff proceeded mainly on the basis that the Act was invalid because it regulated a central subject, and that “regulated" had a narrow meaning, and the Board have no assistance, either of the High Court or the Subordinate Judge on the point that the Act had no extra-territorial application. [It was ruled that the point had been taken below by the plaintiff.] This point must be argued on the ground that the Rani was not a resident. If so, is the Assam legislature entitled to legislate against a person not resident in the province in respect of property not in the province? [It was ruled that the point had been taken below by the plaintiff.] This point must be argued on the ground that the Rani was not a resident. If so, is the Assam legislature entitled to legislate against a person not resident in the province in respect of property not in the province? The laws made by one legislature cannot affect a right situated in another province Wahid Uddin v. Makhan Lal (I. L. R. [ 1938] A. 781.). This Board, however, has never laid down that a local legislature cannot legislate for anything outside its own territory. An Act is valid if that part of it which is extra-territorial is necessary or ancilliary to the main object of the Act MacLeod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales ([ 1891] A. C. 455, 458.), Ashbury v. Ellis ([l893] A. C. Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 13 339, 344), Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain. Same v. Gilhula ([ 1906] A. C. 542, 545, 547.), and Croft v. Dunphy ([ 1933] A. C. 156, 161.). An accurate summary of the principles involved is given by Evatt J. in Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ld. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (( 1933) 49 C. L. R. 220, 240.). In the present case, if the legislation is extra-territorial and is for the purpose of the good government of Assam, then it does not follow that because there is some extra-territorial right affected it is invalid. The Act settles the family law wherever the right is situated. If it were held that the Act was good as regards Assam property, but bad otherwise, different rules of succession might be applcable in regard to an impartible estate. It is legislation for one of its own families, and it binds it. [Reference was also made to Lachmi Narain v. Fateh Bahadur Singh (( 1902) I. L. R. 24 A. 195, 202.) and Commissioner of Wakfs, Bengal v. Messrs. Narasing Chandra Daw & Co, (( 1939) 43 C. W. N. 415.).] In view of what was said in Shiba Prasad Singhs case (L. R. 59 I. A. 331, 346, 353.) it is impossible to suggest that movables fell as an accretion to the impartible estate. [Reference was also made to Hargulal Mal v. Mohammad Ata Elahi Khan (( 1937) I. L. R. 18 Lah. 11.).] Feb. [Reference was also made to Hargulal Mal v. Mohammad Ata Elahi Khan (( 1937) I. L. R. 18 Lah. 11.).] Feb. 16. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir George Rankin, who, after stating the facts, continued Mr. Pages first objection was that Bhairabendra should not have been substituted for Jogendra in the appeal brought by the latter pursuant to special leave. It is admitted that this objection, if upheld, could have no effect whatever on the present case, since Bhairabendra has an independent appeal of his own, but it is said that in another case some order has been made by a Bengal Court conditional on the Boards action or advice in this regard. Their Lordships have no occasion to observe upon the propriety of such an order as is said to have been made, and they do not propose to entertain an application which is without point so far as regards any matter before them. The next contention advanced for the respondents was that, independently of any question whether it affected any property outside Assam, the Assam Act was ultra vires of the Assam legislature since it did not comply with the provisions of the Government of India Act and the Devolution Rules made under s. 45A thereof. The grounds of invalidity suggested are really two. First, that the case was within the 51st item of Part II. of Schedule I. of the Rules, which classes as a " provincial subject " " any matter which, though falling "within a central subject, is declared by the Governor-General "in Council to be of a merely local or private nature within the "province "—but no such declaration was obtained. Secondly, that though " civil law, including laws regarding status, "property, civil rights and liabilities and civil procedure " is specified as a central subject by item 16 of Part I. of the Rules, yet the Act was not one " regulating any central subject " within the meaning of cl. (e) of sub-s. 3 of s. 8oa of the Government of India Act. Their Lordships are in agreement with both courts in India in holding on the first point that the fact that the subject-matter of the Assam Act was not made a provincial subject by declaration of the Governor-General in Council under item 51 of Part II. (e) of sub-s. 3 of s. 8oa of the Government of India Act. Their Lordships are in agreement with both courts in India in holding on the first point that the fact that the subject-matter of the Assam Act was not made a provincial subject by declaration of the Governor-General in Council under item 51 of Part II. did not render the Assam legislature incompetent to deal with it as a central subject provided the sanction of the Governor-General in Council was duly obtained. They agree also with the courts in India upon the second point, and have no difficulty in deciding that the Act was one which regulated a central subject, and as such came within the competence of the provincial legislature when the necessary sanction had been given. By sub-s. 2 of s. 84 of the Government of India Act the validity of any Act of any local legislature is not open to question in any legal proceedings on the ground that the Act affects a central subject. Apart from any question of extra-territorial effect, their Lordships can find no ground for impugning the validity of the Assam Act as a law made "for the peace and good government" of Assam—a phrase which in sub-s. 1 of s. 8oa has reference to the scope and not to the merits of the legislation. The question next in order is whether the Act purports to have effect outside Assam, and if so, whether it must be held to be invalid in part or in whole on this account. The question of construction Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 14 comes logically first, and is of importance by reason that items 8 and 9 of Schedule B to the plaint consist of a house in Calcutta and a rajbati at Benares. All the lands mentioned in the Schedule to the Act lie in Assam. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 14 comes logically first, and is of importance by reason that items 8 and 9 of Schedule B to the plaint consist of a house in Calcutta and a rajbati at Benares. All the lands mentioned in the Schedule to the Act lie in Assam. The preamble refers to M the group of estates known as the " Bijni Raj in Assam." The only words by which the Act could be given effect on immovables outside the province would seem to be those occurring in the first clause of s. 2 whereby " the Raj " is defined—" together with all additions "and accretions to the property comprised therein." These words refer—though perhaps not exclusively—to the doctrine of law whereby the holder of an impartible estate may incorporate immovable property acquired by him with the impartible estate. An exposition of this doctrine is to be found in the judgment of the Board in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Prayag Kumari Debt (L. R. 59 I. A. 331.), which clearly shows that it is not applicable to movables. While there may be force in the consideration that the Assam legislature would little like to see the house in Calcutta or the raj bat at Benares descend in a different line of succession from that provided in the Act for the Assam estates, it may not have been thought wise to attempt to bring within the Act lands in another province. Much depends on the extent and the manner in which the Act was intended to have effect on the lands of the Raj. The Act must be carefully scanned to see whether the adjectival clause as to additions and accretions was intended to be controlled by no territorial limit. Their Lordships think that a consideration of the scheme of the Act, and in particular of the provisions of sub-s. 4 of s. 10, shows that the phrase as to additions and accretions is not intended to apply to land in other provinces. It can hardly have been anticipated that a holder of this estate should be able in the future to acquire land in any part of India and, by incorporating it with his impartible estate, should be able to make it free from attachment by legal process without the previous sanction of the Governor of Assam. It can hardly have been anticipated that a holder of this estate should be able in the future to acquire land in any part of India and, by incorporating it with his impartible estate, should be able to make it free from attachment by legal process without the previous sanction of the Governor of Assam. Their Lordships think that the learned trial judge was right therefore in permitting the suit to proceed as regards the house in Calcutta and the rajbati at Benares. Had the Assam Act extended to these immovables, no doubt an important constitutional question as to the competence of the Assam legislature would have arisen. But on a true construction of the Act it does not arise, and though it was the subject of considerable debate at the hearing their Lordships do not think fit to discuss it. It remains to consider whether the Act bars the plaintiffs claim to the other immovable properties of the Raj. These are all situated in Assam. Their Lordships cannot on this point accept the conclusions of the High Court. They see in the Act no intention to deal separately or differently with (a) ownership of the estate and (b) the status of holder of the Raj, or to give title to Jogendra and Bhairabendra, but only as against other claimants by succession and not so as to quiet their right to the estate. By its terms the Act makes Jogendra holder with effect from September 28, 1895, and " holder " is stated to mean owner. This result was effected on the passing of the Act, and it is not consistent with the Act that the title of Jogendra should have come to an end at some time before 1918. The Act contains provisions regulating the succession after Jogendras life and after Bhairabendras life, but its provisions as to succession in the future are not left hypothetical or in the air as regulations for succession to an estate which may no longer exist as such on the contrary, they are given basis in reality by the enactment that Jogendra shall be owner for his life and Bhairabendra after him. To what extent adverse possession after 1931 might defeat the scheme of the Act is doubtless a question. To what extent adverse possession after 1931 might defeat the scheme of the Act is doubtless a question. But no adverse possession before 1931 has any effect to prevent Jogendra taking the estate which the Act on its coming into force vested in him. That his title is made not only a title in the present but also to relate back to 1895 is not intended to give it infirmity or to expose it to attack, but to give it validity ex post facto. Hence, with all due respect to the High Court, whose judgment in this case is most careful and elaborate, their Lordships find themselves in agreement on this point also with the learned trial judge. The result is that in their Lordships opinion the decree of the trial court was correct. Mr. Page, for the respondents, asked that since it has been held by the Board in the case already cited Law. Rep. 69 Ind. App. 76 ( 1941- 1942) Raja Jogendra Narayan Deb V. Debendra Narayan Roy 15 that movable property cannot be incorporated with an impartible estate so as to form an accretion thereto, and since it does not appear that any separate issue as to movables was asked for by the plaintiff or framed by the trial court, their Lordships should direct that the suit should continue notwithstanding the . provisions of the Assam Act as regards the items mentioned in the list of movables appearing in Schedule B to the plaint. But it appears to their Lordships that learned counsel for the plaintiff in India may well have had good reason to make no separate case as to movables, if only on the ground of limitation. They are not prepared to extend the area of the present dispute without clear necessity in the interests of justice, and they are not of opinion that the decree of the trial court should be modified as proposed. They will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, dated April 24, 1933, restored. The contesting respondents who have been sub stituted for Heramba, and the plaintiff Debendra, must pay to the appellant Bhairabendra one set of costs of this consolidated appeal and his costs of the appeal in the High Court.