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1942 DIGILAW 43 (ALL)

Bhagwana v. Gulab Kuer

1942-03-07

ALLSOP, GANGA NATH, VERMA

body1942
JUDGMENT Allsop, Ganga Nath and Verma, JJ. - This second appeal arises out of a suit instituted by sixteen residents of the whole village of Moghalpura on behalf of the residents of the village under the provisions of Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, The case for the plain, tiffs was that certain plots in the village had become property of all the residents by adverse possession and that a cause of action had arisen because the zamindar, who was the first Defendant, had sold certain trees growing upon these plots to the second Defendant who was proposing to cut them down. The plots were No. 401, which was the village site itself and 402, 403, 407, 408, 409, 410, 634 and 399. The Plaintiff sought an injunction against the Defendants that they were not at any time to cut down the trees in the plots and that they were not to interfere with the possession and user of the Plaintiffs and of other residents of the village over and in these plots. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit; found that the Plaintiffs end failed to establish any title to the plots by adverse possession, but he went on to hold that the residents of the village had been in the habit of using these plots in various ways for a considerable time and that they had established some kind of right by custom to prevent the zamindar from interfering with their user and consequently from cutting down the trees, the shade of which was necessary for the proper user of the plots The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court found that the cause of action alleged, namely the sale of the trees by the zamindar gave rise only to the question whether he was entitled to Section 1 the trees and to have them cut down. The learned Judge pointed out that there was no question, before the institution of the suit, of the zamindar's having prevented any of the residents of the village from making use of these plots in any way in which they might have been in the habit of using them. There were various types of user suggested. The learned Judge pointed out that there was no question, before the institution of the suit, of the zamindar's having prevented any of the residents of the village from making use of these plots in any way in which they might have been in the habit of using them. There were various types of user suggested. It was said that cattle were tethered on these plots, that threshing floors were established, that manure and cordage cakes and other things were stored on the plots and that on occasions when marriage parties visited the village these plots were used by them while they were in the village. The learned Judge said that it was not established that the trees were necessary for any of these kinds of user and he held that it had not been established that the Plaintiffs or residents of the village were entitled to prevent the zamindar from cutting down the trees. It seems to us that the learned Judge was right in his decision upon these points, but we would go farther then he has gone. On the pleadings of the Plaintiffs, the only I question was whether they had established j a title to the plots in suit by adverse post session and the finding of both the Courts below concurrently is that they hid failed to do so. In our judgment that was sufficient for the decision of the suit. The learned Munsif allowed the Plaintiffs to rely upon the alternative plea that they had acquired some customary right or customary easement in or over the plots in suit, but that contention of the Plaintiffs was not only beyond their pleadings but was also, strictly speaking inconsistent with them. If the Plaintiffs had become the proprietors of the land by adverse possession, they could have no other right by custom or by way of easement in or over the land. They did not plead that they had acquired any easement by custom or otherwise nor did they plead that they had acquired any other customary right. If the Plaintiffs had become the proprietors of the land by adverse possession, they could have no other right by custom or by way of easement in or over the land. They did not plead that they had acquired any easement by custom or otherwise nor did they plead that they had acquired any other customary right. We do not say that in some cases, where the facts proved justify it a Court may net give a relief which is not mentioned in the plaint or give the relief mentioned on grounds other than those upon which it is claimed, but in the case before us we think it was inadvisable on the part of the learned Munsif to allow this alternative case to be raised in the course of the trial. In the absence of any definite pleadings it is difficult to say exactly what the Plaintiffs' alternative case was. It may be that certain individual residents in the village may have acquired some right by user in particular parts of the plots in suit, but that is a very different thing from saying that the whole of the residents of the village had acquired joint rights in the whole of the land. The nature of the various kinds of user was also quite different. It members of marriage parties made use of the land when they were in the village, they my have done so under special license on each occasion and if any right accrued would it accrue to them or to the residents of the village? If a particular person stored crowding cakes or tethered his cattle or stored his manure on any particular part of the land that would not necessarily mean that other residents of the village were entitled to use that part of the land in the same way. We are satisfied that the case should have been decided upon the pleadings of the Plaintiffs and the finding of fact of the Courts below that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the whole of the residents of the village had acquired a proprietary title in the whole of the land concludes the case. 2. In our judgment the suit was rightly dismissed by the learned Judge of the Court below and consequently we dismiss the appeal with costs.