JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit in which the Plaintiff-appellant, Basdevanand Gir, sought the following relief, namely-- That it may be declared that the decree in suit No. 172 of 1921 was tainted and affected by the fraudulent conduct of the Defendant and is null, void and ineffectual against the present Plaintiff and thus the said suit has not been concluded by a valid decree and that the said suit is to be retried de novo from the stage at which fraud was perpetrated by the Defendant. 2. Suit No. 172 of 1921 was instituted by the Defendant-respondent, Shantanand, against the Plaintiff-Appellant, Basdevanand, in order to obtain, in his capacity as Mahant, possession over a Sanyasi Math in Allahabad called the Baghambari Gaddi. A decree for possession was passed in favour of Shantanand, that decree was maintained, after some difference of opinion, by this Court in the year 1927 and the decree of this Court was upheld by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 1929. I may mention that it is now admitted that Gyanand Gir became Mahant of this Math in 1916 and that he initiated Shantanand as his disciple at Soron on the banks of the Ganges in 19 7 or 1918 and that he relinquished the mahantship in favour of Shantanand and installed him as the mahant on August 16, 1918. A couple of months later, on October 9, 1918, Shantanand executed a document in which he recited that he was temporally unfitted to manage the math on account of want of experience and sufficient education and that he intended to go away for a time to pursue his studies. He then said that he reconveyed his powers as Mahant to Gyanand until such time as he had acquired sufficient literary and administrative ability. After executing this document Shantanand apparently left Allahabad and while he was away Gyanand appointed the Plaintiff-Appellant, Basdevanand, as the mahant on September 15, 1919. A little later there was apparently a dispute between Gyanand and Basdevanand because it was necessary for a Magistrate to take proceedings u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to prevent a breach of the peace. The result of these proceedings was that it was held on April 27, 1920, that Basdevanand was in possession of the math. The result of these proceedings was that it was held on April 27, 1920, that Basdevanand was in possession of the math. It was then that Shantanand filed suit No. 172 of 1521 in order to obtain possession over the math from Basdevanand. The defence put up by Basdevanand was that Shantanand could not be a disciple of Gyanand because he was already a disciple of another man and that the document executed by Shantanand on October 9, 1918, amounted to an absolute relinquishment of his rights as the mahant of the math The defence, as I have already said, failed and it was finally decided in the year 1929 that Shantanand was entitled to possession of the property. He had already been put into possession in 1927. Gyanand then made an attempt to acquire possession of the math himself. He issued a notice to all whom it might concern on October 1, 1929, in which he said that Shantanand had told him that he was a Brahman from the Azamgarh District and had afterwards said in the course of the suit No. 172 of 1921 that he was a pandey Brahman from the Gorakhpur District and that he has ascertained that both these statements were false. He also stated that he had discovered that Shantanand was already a disciple of one Munishanand of Jhusi when he became or purposed to become Gyanand's disciple. He stated fun her that Basdevanand had not been living in accordance with the traditions of the math and that consequently he was himself entitled to become the mahant again. He followed this notice up with a suit which he instituted against Shantanand in the beginning of the year 1930 In that suit he said that Shantanand had told him that he was a Brahman from the Azamgarh District, which was untrue and he reiterated the statement about his having been a disciple of Munishanand's, an allegation which had also been made by Basdevanand in his defence in suit No. 172 of 1921. This suit of Gyanand's was dismissed and it was held as a fact that it had not been proved that Shantanand was not a Brahman. The learned Judge remarked in the course of his judgment that no evidence had been produced upon the point and that the allegations that Shantanand had made false statements about his caste and residence had not been established. The learned Judge remarked in the course of his judgment that no evidence had been produced upon the point and that the allegations that Shantanand had made false statements about his caste and residence had not been established. When that suit was dismissed, Basdevanand instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal. In the plaint he said that Shantanand, with the object of substantiating his allegation that he was initiated as a Chela of the late Mahant Gyanand Gir according to the custom of the math, had stated before the Court in suit No. 172 of 1921 that on the eve of his initiation as Chela he had satisfied the said Gyanand Gir, the then mahant, on the question of his caste by telling him that he was a Brahman of Pandeypur, District Gorakhpur, that Gyanand had stated in his notice issued on October, 1, 1929, that he was extremely suspicious about Shantanand's true caste and that this notice had aroused Basdevanand's suspicions and set him on enquiry which resulted in his discovery in the last week of October 1930 that the Defendant was a Shudra and Kurmi by caste and was known by the name of Makho Mahto of village Narwara, District Muzaffarpur, that his father's name was Ram Lal Mahto deceased, the name of his elder brother was Daroga Mahto deceased and the names of his other two brothers were Jagdish Mahto and Pradip Mahto and that they were still living in their native village of Narwara. The plaint went on to say that the concealment of his true caste by the Defendant was done with a fraudulent intent to deceive and mislead the Plaintiff and the Court into a course of action which was injurious to the Plaintiff, that in fact they were actually deceived and misled, that the Defendant's fraudulent conduct in concealing his real caste was a premeditated and intentional contrivance to keep the then Defendant, that is, Basdevanand and the Court in ignorance of the real facts of the case and inasmuch as his imposition had succeeded upon the ex-Mahant Gyanand Gir at the time of his initiation as Chela, nobody could have doubted his caste and so the question of his caste was not in issue and not decided in the previous suit No. 172 of 1921 and that he obtained the decree in that suit by that contrivance. The plaint also alleged that the custom of the math was that only a Brahman by birth could be appointed a mahant and also according to Hindu law and Shudra by birth would always have the status of a householder and never of a Sanyasi. The Defendant-Respondent, Shantanand, in his written statement said that he was a Pandey Brahman before he became a Sanyasi and that he was not a Shudra but in answer to interrogatories at a later stage he said that his name before he became a Sanyasi was Satyanarain alias Sant Sewak and his father, was Har Sewak Sharma alias Bechan, that he was born at the village of Amla in the district of Azamgarh and that he was a Brahmar, by casts. He produced evidence in support of his allegation from which it became apparent that he was, if the statements were true, the son of Har Sewak Sharma a Bhumihar of the village of Amla. The Plaintiff-Appellant also produced evidence to prove that Shantanand was really Makho Mahto from the village of Narwara in the Muzaffarpur district. The learned Judge held that the Plaintiff-Appellant's evidence was, untrue, that the balance was in favour of the evidence of the Defendant-Respondent and that the Defendant-Respondent was really a Bhumihar Brahman from the village of Amla as he said he was. The learned Judge also went into the question whether it was only a Brahman who could be a Sanyasi and a Mahant of a Sanyasi math and he came to the conclusion that the allegation was not true and that any member of any of the twice-born castes could be a Sanyasi and a Mahant. Besides these findings, mainly of fact, in favour of the Defendant-Respondent, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the allegations of fraud made, even if true, were not such as would justify him in setting aside the decree in suit No. 172 of 1921. The first question which arises is whether (sic) findings of fact of the learned Judge are correct. The first five of the Plaintiff's witnesses were called to prove that Shantanand was not a Pandey Sarjupari Brahman from the district of Gorakhpur and as the contention of Shantanand himself wow is that he was a Bhumihar Brahman from the district of Azamgarh, their evidence is of no value. The first five of the Plaintiff's witnesses were called to prove that Shantanand was not a Pandey Sarjupari Brahman from the district of Gorakhpur and as the contention of Shantanand himself wow is that he was a Bhumihar Brahman from the district of Azamgarh, their evidence is of no value. There are seven witnesses to prove that Shantanand was really Makho Mahto, that is, a Kurmi by caste, before he became or pretended to become a Sanyasi. The first witness whose evidence may be considered is one Rama Kant. He set himself up as a learned man who had been appointed a preacher by the Sanatan Dharma Society of the Hindu University at Benares, but it does not appear that he is a person of such respectability as he would pretend. He admitted that a register was kept of preachers sent out by the Sanatan Dharma. Society and that his name was riot in the register. His explanation was that he was a preacher of many years standing and consequently it was not necessary for his name to be entered in the register. It is doubtful whether he is an accredited preacher, but, even if he is, I do not think that necessarily establishes that he is a truthful witness. His story is not by any means convincing. He said that he was at the Kumbh Mela at Allahabad one day with Shantanand when they casually met two men, one of whom greeted Shantanand as Makho Mahto. Shantanand is supposed to have acknowledged his acquaintance with this man and to have discussed the affairs of his family with him. It is extremely improbable, as the learned Judge says, that Shantanand, who had just been established is the Mahant of this math after a litigation extending over several years, would have acknowledged his acquaintanceship with a man who could prove that he was a Kurm, that is, a Shudra, by caste and would obviously be in a position to shake his claim to be the Mahant. Rama Kant says that he went and told Basdevanand about this incident and from the evidence it would appear that this was the occasion for an enquiry made by Basdevanand. Rama Kant says that he went and told Basdevanand about this incident and from the evidence it would appear that this was the occasion for an enquiry made by Basdevanand. I have already mentioned that it was stated in the plaint that Basdevanand was put upon enquiry by the notice issued by Gyanand in October, 1929 and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the evidence of Rama Kant was introduced afterwards because it was difficult to explain how Basdevanand in the course of his enquiries managed to discover that Shantanand had been born in the Muzaffarpur district in Bihar. I agree with the learned Judge that the statement of Rama Kant is so improbable that it is impossible to believe it. The next witness is one Sripat Singh of Pipra in the district of Muzaffarpur. He has been called to prove that he and his uncle, Daroga Singh, were the two men who met Shantanand at the Kumbh Mela and that it was Daroga Singh who recognised him as Makho The witness himself clearly does not suggest that he knew Makho himself and Daroga Singh was dead at the time when the evidence was recorded. He says that Makho asked Daroga Singh who he was and Daroga Singh said that he was his nephew. Another witness is Sripat Singh's father, Bhagwat Singh. He was employed as an Assistant Accountant in the Collector's office at Muzaffarpur. His story was that thirty years before one Gokul Singh from Narwata had been staying with him and his brother, Daroga Singh, at Muzaffarpur because he was studying there for a time and that Makho Mahto was Gokul Singh's servant. Makho is supposed to have run away after he had been working with Gokul Singh for sometime and the witness did not see him till several years later when he and Daroga Singh happened to meet him by chance at a religious fair at Benares. He did not see him again till a short time before the suit was instituted. The story is that Makho, that is, Shantanand, went to Muzaffarpur at that time to persuade witnesses not to give evidence against him. It seems to me extremely improbable that Shantanand, if he had been Makho, would have been so foolish as to go himself to Muzaffarpur and show himself to the witnesses so that they would be able to recognize him. It seems to me extremely improbable that Shantanand, if he had been Makho, would have been so foolish as to go himself to Muzaffarpur and show himself to the witnesses so that they would be able to recognize him. The story seems to me to be incredible. Singhashwar Singh, Ram Autar Kunwar and Bhujawan Singh all of Narwara have given similar evidence. They also say that they recognised Shantanand as Makho Mahto and that he had also been to see them to persuade them not to give evidence. It does not appear how Shantanand would have known thirty years after he left Narwara that these were the people who would be induced by Basdevanand to give evidence about his identity so that he found it necessary to go and dissuade them from doing so. The last witness, Sheo Dhari Mahto, said that he was the brother in-law of Makho Mahto and had seen him twice about thirty or more years before he gave evidence--once on the occasion when Makho married his sister and once at the time of gauna ceremoney, that is, the ceremony on the occasion when the wife goes to live with her husband. He admitted that he was only ten years of age at the time of his sister's marriage when Makho was also about ten and that he had some difficulty in recognising him when he came to see him in order to persuade him not to give evidence against him. It seems to me that the whole of this evidence is worthless and that it would be quite impossible for us to say that the learned Judge was wrong in his conclusion that it had not been established that Shantanand was really Makho Mahto of Narwara. 3. The second question is whether there is any custom or any rule of Hindu law by which nobody can become a Sanyasi unless he is a Brahman or be appointed a mahant of a Sanyasi math unless he was a Brahman before he became a Sanyasi. The Plaintiff-Appellant produced a number of witnesses but it seems to me that they have failed to establish either the custom or the rule of law. All except one are themselves Brahmans and they may very well be interested in setting up a rule which would give an advantage to men of their caste. The Plaintiff-Appellant produced a number of witnesses but it seems to me that they have failed to establish either the custom or the rule of law. All except one are themselves Brahmans and they may very well be interested in setting up a rule which would give an advantage to men of their caste. One of them, Inderdeo Prasad, is the Secretary of the All India Sarjupari Brahman conference and himself tried to eject the Defendant from this math by instituting a suit u/s 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sheo Chaitanya Bharti has based his allegation on the statement that he heard a talk between Ram Krishnaji and his own Guru that only a Brahman could become a mahant of the disputed math. He admitted that any member of a twice-born caste could become a Sanyasi though not a mahant. In the course of their evidence the witnesses were asked about the caste of previous mahants. The witness, Sheo Nandan Prasad, said that Gyanand was a Bengali Brahman. Inderdeo Prasad said that he was an Oriya Brahman and Shri Kant said that he was a Bengali Oriya Brahman, the fact being apparently that they had no knowledge about the matter. The witness, Ganpat Bharti, really gave away the Plaintiff's case because he said that a mahant should be a Brahman as far as possible, which seemed to indicate that persons other than Brahmans could be mahants although it was desirable that they should not be. The one non-Brahman witness was Mahadeo Prasad Kayastha. He was a witness in a criminal case on behalf of the Plaintiff against the Defendant and he admitted that he had never enquired about the caste of any of the Mahants of this math. 4. On the other side, there are a number of witnesses who said that any member of a twice-born caste could be a Sanyasi and a Mahant. One of them was Raghubar Methoo Lal Shastri, who is a lecturer in Sanskrit at the Allahabad University and is a person upon whose statement some reliance can be placed. Another is a man called Jungoo, who is certainly not a man of any great position because he is a servant of the math and says that he is holding some small area of land rent free besides getting a salary of Rs. Another is a man called Jungoo, who is certainly not a man of any great position because he is a servant of the math and says that he is holding some small area of land rent free besides getting a salary of Rs. 2 a month with food and clothes, but his statement seems to bear the stamp of truth because he has mentioned definite facts about one Nepal Gir who was the mahant of this math some years ago. He said that Nepal Gir was a Thakur before becoming a Sanyasi and he was a resident of Manda Bijaipur and that his brother. Bijai Bahadur Singh, used to visit him when he was mahant. There are two other witnesses, Nityanand Gir and Pocrnanand, who are themselves Sanyasis. I am satisfied that the decision of the learned Judge upon this point is correct and that any member of a twice-born caste can be a Sanyasi and a mahant. 5. The question is of importance only because there may be some doubt whether a Bhumihar is really a Brahman. There can be no doubt that Bhumihars generally regard themselves as Brahmans and I may mention that one of the witnesses for the Defendants, Poornanand, who said that he had been a Sanyasi for thirty-six years, admitted that he was a Bhumihar Brahman himself before he became a Sanyasi. It is admitted that Bhumihars are certainly members of a twice-born caste. 6. This brings us to the question whether it has been established by the Defendant's evidence that he is a Bhumihar Brahman. He was attacked very strongly upon the ground that he had himself made inconsistent statements upon this point. In suit No. 172 of 1921 the question of his caste was not raised in the pleadings, but questions were put to him in cross-examination when he appeared as a witness and he then undoubtedly said that he was a Pandey Sarjupari Brahman from the district of Gorakhpur. He made a similar statement when he contested the suit instituted by Gyanand in 1930 and he has now put up the case that he is really a Bhumihar Brahman from the district of Azamgarh. He made a similar statement when he contested the suit instituted by Gyanand in 1930 and he has now put up the case that he is really a Bhumihar Brahman from the district of Azamgarh. Undoubtedly these contradictory statements may give rise to some suspicion, as the learned Judge of the Court below has remarked, but it must be observed that these previous statements of Shantanand can be used only to contradict him and not to contradict the witnesses whom he has called in his defence. The learned Judge had the advantage of seeing these witnesses, although he did not see Plaintiff's witnesses who were examined on commission and he has said that their demeanour did not suggest to him that they were not speaking the truth. Some of them at least are men of some standing. One is a Deputy Superintendent of Police, that is, an officer of the Provincial Police Service, who has no apparent reason for supporting Shantanand's case, if it is not true. Then there are also a Sub-Inspector of Police, a postmaster and several landed proprietors. The strong point in the evidence of many of these witnesses, who are themselves Bhumihar Brahmans, is that they have stated that they are quite willing to have meals with Shantanand which they would not do if they had any reason for believing that he was not a Bhumihar Brahman. It has been argued, on the other hand, that there has been correspondence, which there undoubtedly has been, between Shantanand and one of the witnesses, Gajadhar, who has deposed that he is Shantanand's brother and the correspondence does not appear to be that between two brothers, but on an examination of the letters I do not think that there is anything in them to show positively that the men were not brothers. There is also a reference to the fact that the name of Sant Sewak continued to be recorded in the register of proprietors with the name of Gajadhar and this would not have happened if Sant Sewak had become a Sanyasi. I do not think, however, that this is a matter of any importance. Nobody might have taken the trouble to have Sant Sewak's name removed from the registers merely because he became a Sanyasi and would have no claim to the property in the village. I do not think, however, that this is a matter of any importance. Nobody might have taken the trouble to have Sant Sewak's name removed from the registers merely because he became a Sanyasi and would have no claim to the property in the village. It is true that Shantanand executed a deed of relinquishment of the property before the witness gave evidence and this may give rise to a certain suspicion that the witnesses were not willing to support him if he was likely to lay claim to any of the property, but this after all is t a mere matter of suspicion and does not necessarily establish that the allegations made by the witness are untrue. On a consideration of the evidence I have come to the conclusion that Shantanand may possibly have pretended that he was a Sarjupari Pandey Brahman when he was really a Bhumihar because he thought that a Sarjupari might have a higher position in the scale of castes but that he was afterwards faced with the prospect that his allegation might be proved to be untrue and he therefore ultimately told the real truth. It does not appear that his being a Bhumihar rather than a Sarjupari Pandey Brahman would have made any effect upon his eligibility as a Sanyasi or that Gyanand would not have accepted him as his disciple if he had known that he was a Bhumihar. In this connection I may point out that Gyanand's own allegation from the very beginning was not that Shantanand set himself up as a resident of Gorakhpur but that he stated that he was a resident of Azamgarh which he now alleges is true. I am satisfied that the findings of the learned Judge of the court below are correct and that the allegations upon which the plaint was based are not established On those findings the suit obviously failed and the appeal must be dismissed. 7. I may, however, discuss shortly the other point, whether the allegations, even if true, would justify a Court of law in setting aside the decree in suit No. 172 of 1921. 7. I may, however, discuss shortly the other point, whether the allegations, even if true, would justify a Court of law in setting aside the decree in suit No. 172 of 1921. The real allegation was that the Defendant-Respondent had made a false statement about his caste and had thereby deceived Gyanand Gir and Basdevanand about has eligibility to be accepted as a Sanyasi and to be appointed as a mahant, I think it would be very dangerous to hold that an allegation of this nature, even if it were true, would justify the setting aside of a decree between the parties in which it was decided that the Defendant-Respondent was the rightful mahant of this math. There must be some finality to litigation and the rule that a title once settled by a decision should not be questioned again between the same parties is intended not only to prevent a new decision but also to prevent a new investigation so that the same person cannot be harassed again and again in various proceedings upon the same question It is, I think, clear that a decree cannot be set aside merely because it is obtained by perjured evidence because, if the contrary were held, it would be necessary to hold new investigations again and again into the same question. The principle has been laid down quite clearly in the case of Mahomed Golab v. Mahomed Sulliman (1894) 21 Cal. 612. We have been referred to some cases on the other side. I may refer to the case of Hamida Rahaman and Another Vs. Jamila Khatun and Another, AIR 1921 Cal 298 , in which the learned Judges say that although a decree cannot be set aside upon the ground that it has b en obtained by perjured evidence, still it can be set aside if it is established that the plea sat up was false to the knowledge of the Plaintiff. With the greatest respect for the opinion of the Hon'ble Judges it seems to me that it would not be possible to discover whether a case was false or not unless a new investigation was made and the making of a new investigation would destroy the value of the rule that a question once decided cannot be reopened. With the greatest respect for the opinion of the Hon'ble Judges it seems to me that it would not be possible to discover whether a case was false or not unless a new investigation was made and the making of a new investigation would destroy the value of the rule that a question once decided cannot be reopened. It would also be quite valueless to say that a decree could be set aside on the ground that it was obtained by perjured evidence if at the same time it was the law that it could be set aside on the ground that the case of the Plaintiff was not a true case to his knowledge. It seems lo me that it would be most unsafe to hold that a decree can be set aside on the ground that the Defendant did not raise a plea which was open to him, but which he did not raise because he did not know all the necessary facts. It is, however, unnecessary to express any definite opinion in this case because it has been found as a fact that the Defendant-Respondent did not deceive either Gyanand Gir or the Court upon any essential point which could have affected the result of the previous suit. 8. My conclusion is that the appeal must fail and I would dismiss it with costs. Verma, J. 9. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which my learned brother has prepared. I am in complete agreement with all that he has said and have very little to add. 10. With regard to the first question of fact--whether the Plaintiffs' allegation, that the Defendant was, before he became a Sanyasi, a Kurmi by caste, has been established--I shall content myself by saying that it has seldom been my lot to go through the depositions of more worthless and more obviously tutored witnesses than those produced by the Plaintiff-Appellant. The allegation of fact that the Defendant was a Kurmi by caste before he became a Sanyasi is the real foundation on which the whole edifice of this suit rests and the decision on that point being against the Plaintiff it is really not necessary to go into any other question. The allegation of fact that the Defendant was a Kurmi by caste before he became a Sanyasi is the real foundation on which the whole edifice of this suit rests and the decision on that point being against the Plaintiff it is really not necessary to go into any other question. I may say, however, that I entirely agree with my learned brother in holding that the findings of the Court below on the other two questions of fact are also indubitably correct. When dealing with the second question, my learned brother has pointed out that the Plaintiff's witness, Ganpat Bharti, really gave away the Plaintiff's case when he stated that, as far as possible, that Sanyasi is installed as a mahanth who had been a Brahman before entering the order of Sanyasis. I would only add that Ganpat Bharti, being the Secretary of Nirvani Akhara, is about the most important witness produced by the Plaintiff. On the third question of fact I am at one with my learned brother in holding that the Defendant's case, that he was a Bhumihar before he became the chela of Gyanand and joined the order of Sanyasis, is true. 11. The evidence and the circumstances lead me to the conclusion that this is nothing more than a continuation of the attempt made by Gyanand to set at naught the decree passed in Shantanand's favour in suit No. 172 of 1921 and it is based on allegations which are not true. 12. As has been pointed out by my learned brother, in view of the findings on the questions of fact, no question of law need be considered. I consider it proper, however, to say a few words as the point has been argued at length by Learned Counsel for the Appellant and also because I am clearly of the opinion that this suit was not maintainable even if ill the allegations made in the plaint had been true and that it should never have gone to trial but the plaint should have been rejected on the ground that it did not disclose a cause of action. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed when it was put to him that his case as to fraud stated in plain language, amounted to this: Shantanand was guilty of fraud as he did not disclose to Gyanand when he became the latter's chela at Soron in 1917 or 1918 that he was a Shudra, being a Kurmi by caste and he committed a fraud upon the Court inasmuch as he did not, when he instituted his suit No. 172 of 1921, tell the Court that he had deceived Gyanand at the time of his initiation into Sanyas. 13. This to my mind is an untenable proposition. At its highest, the Plaintiff's case amounts to no more than this that Shantanand obtained the decree in suit No. 172 of 1921 by giving evidence which was not true. It is settled law that a suit to set aside a decree does not lie on such a ground. 14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has cited a number of rulings. I do not consider it necessary to refer to all of them. If I may say so with great respect, the true rule in my judgment was laid down by Sir Comer Petheram in Mahomed Golab v. Mahomed Sulliman (1894) 21 Cal. 612, to which my learned brother has referred. It would be sufficient to quote one passage from the judgment in that case. If I may say so with great respect, the true rule in my judgment was laid down by Sir Comer Petheram in Mahomed Golab v. Mahomed Sulliman (1894) 21 Cal. 612, to which my learned brother has referred. It would be sufficient to quote one passage from the judgment in that case. In considering the question whether a suit will lie to set aside a decree of a court of justice on the ground that it was obtained by fraud, the learned Chief Justice dealt with a number of cases bearing on the subject and observed: The principle upon which these decisions rest is that where a decree has been obtained by a fraud practised upon the other side by which he was prevented from placing his case before the tribunal which was called upon to adjudicate upon it in the way most to his advantage, the decree is not binding upon him and that the decree may be set aside by a Court of justice in a separate suit and not only by an application made in the suit in which the decree was passed to the court by which it was passed, but I am not aware that it has ever been suggested in any decided case and in my opinion it is not the law, that because a person against whom a decree has been passed alleges that it is wrong and that it was obtained by perjury committed by, or at the instance of, the other party--which is of course fraud of the worst kind--that he can obtain a re-hearing of the question in dispute in a fresh action by merely changing the form in which he placed it before the Court and alleging in his plaint that the first decree was obtained by the perjury of the person in whose favour it was given. To so hold would be to allow defeated litigants to avoid the operation, not only of the law which regulates appeals, but that of that which relates to res judicata as well. 15. It is true that, although this case was followed in a number of cases in the Calcutta High Court, the salutary principles there laid down were departed from in certain cases in that Court, for example, Lukshi Churan Saha v. Nur Ali (1911) 38 Cal. 936 and Kedar Nath Das v. Hemanta Kumari Devi (1914) 18 Cal. 15. It is true that, although this case was followed in a number of cases in the Calcutta High Court, the salutary principles there laid down were departed from in certain cases in that Court, for example, Lukshi Churan Saha v. Nur Ali (1911) 38 Cal. 936 and Kedar Nath Das v. Hemanta Kumari Devi (1914) 18 Cal. W.N. 447 : AIR 1915 Cal. 69. The principles laid down by Sir Comer Petheram were, however, reaffirmed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Nanda kumar howladar Vs. Ram jiban howladar, AIR 1914 Cal 232 and have since been consistently followed in that Court. Reference may usefully be made to the case of Muktamala Dasi Vs. Ram Chandra De and Others, AIR 1927 Cal 84 , in which most of the Calcutta cases have been dealt with. 16. So far as this Court is concerned, only two cases have been brought to our notice, namely Janki Kuar v. Lachmi Narain (1915) 37 All. 535 : AIR 1915 All. 400 and Narain Das and Others Vs. Harakh Narain Lal and Others, AIR 1915 All 396 . In both of them the principles laid down by Sir Comer Petheram and by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in the Calcutta cases mentioned above-- ILR 27 Cal. 612: (1894) 21 Cal. 612 and Nanda kumar howladar Vs. Ram jiban howladar, AIR 1914 Cal 232 were followed. It is not necessary to do more than refer to the judgment of the Bench in Janki Kuar v. Lachmi Narain (1915) 37 All. 535 : AIR 1915 All. 400 and to the judgment of the learned Chief Justice in Narain Das and Others Vs. Harakh Narain Lal and Others, AIR 1915 All 396 , the other member of the Bench--Rafiq J.--having found k unnecessary to deal with the question as in his opinion it did not arise on the facts. It may be pointed out, however, that Rafiq J. was a party to the decision in Janki Kuar v. Lachmi Narain. (1915) 37 All. 535 : AIR 1915 All. 400. 17. Lastly, I am in entire agreement with the observations made by James L. J., which were concurred in by Thesiger L.J., in Flower v. Lloyd. 10 Ch D. 327. It may be pointed out, however, that Rafiq J. was a party to the decision in Janki Kuar v. Lachmi Narain. (1915) 37 All. 535 : AIR 1915 All. 400. 17. Lastly, I am in entire agreement with the observations made by James L. J., which were concurred in by Thesiger L.J., in Flower v. Lloyd. 10 Ch D. 327. As those observations embody principles which in my judgment are of universal application and which in my opinion must ever be borne in mind by all Courts that have to deal with cases of this character, I consider it desirable to quote them: We have thought it right and due to the Defendants to go through the allegations made against them; and their counsel, in fact, scarcely asked for any judgment except one based on their acquittal of the fraud charged against them. But we must not forget that there is a very grave general question of far more importance than the question between the parties to these suits. Assuming all the alleged falsehood and fraud to have been substantiated, is such a suit as the present sustainable?. That question would require very grave consideration indeed before it is answered in the affirmative. Where is litigation to end if a judgment obtained in an action fought out adversely between two litigants sui juris and at arm's length co lid be set aside by a fresh action on the ground that perjury had been committed in the first action, or that false answers had been given to interrogatories, or a misleading production of documents, or of a machine, or of a process had been given? There are hundreds of actions tried every year in which the evidence is irreconcilably conflicting and must be on one side or other wilfully and corruptly perjured. In this case, if the Plaintiffs had sustained on this appeal the judgment in their favour, the present Defendants, in their turn, might bring a fresh action to set that judgment aside on the ground of perjury of the principal witness and subordination of perjury; and so the parties might go on alternately ad infinitum. In this case, if the Plaintiffs had sustained on this appeal the judgment in their favour, the present Defendants, in their turn, might bring a fresh action to set that judgment aside on the ground of perjury of the principal witness and subordination of perjury; and so the parties might go on alternately ad infinitum. There is no distinction in principle between the old common law action and the old Chancery suit and the Court ought to pause long before it establishes a precedent which would or might make in numberless cases judgments supposed to be final only the commencement of a new series of action. Perjuries, falsehoods, frauds, When detected, must be punished and punished severely; but, in their desire to prevent parties litigant from obtaining any benefit from such foul means, the Court must not forget the evils which may arise from opening such new sources of litigation, amongst such evils not the least being that it would be certain to multiply indefinitely the mass of those very perjuries, falsehoods and frauds. 18. The criticism, that, in view of the facts found in that case, these observations were obiter, appears to me to be pointless. The decisions of the, English Courts are not binding upon the Courts in India. The views expressed in the judgments of English Court? are referred to and adopted by the Courts in India only when it appears that those views are fundamentally sound and are based on immutable principles. It is on these grounds that I respectfully adopt the observations of the learned Lord Justices quoted above. 19. It only remains to mention one fact. The Appellant had at first sued in forma pauperis. The application for leave to sue in that manner was rejected by the trial Court on the 16th June, 1931, on the ground that "the allegations of fraud as made in the plaint show that the suit is not maintainable" and "there is thus no cause of action for the suit" (Ex. A-7). Against that order the Appellant came to this Court in re vision and his petition was dismissed on the 3rd May, 1932, by Sulaiman C.J. and Young J. with the following observations (Vide Ex. A-8): Allegations in a plaint are not meant to be a representation to a Defendant with a view that he may act upon them. A-7). Against that order the Appellant came to this Court in re vision and his petition was dismissed on the 3rd May, 1932, by Sulaiman C.J. and Young J. with the following observations (Vide Ex. A-8): Allegations in a plaint are not meant to be a representation to a Defendant with a view that he may act upon them. It is always open to a Defendant to dispute the correctness of the allegations contained in the plaint and to find out whether they are true or not and if untrue, to produce evidence to rebut the Plaintiff's case The mere fact that a Plaintiff makes false allegations in a plaint or that he produced perjured or false evidence before the Court on which the Court acted does not necessarily amount to a fraud perpetrated upon the Defendant. The fraud which would entitle the avoidance of a decree must be a fraud which was extraneous to the litigation and which the Court h id no opportunity to consider at all. If any fraud has been practised upon the Court itself by a concealment of true facts, it may be possible to apply to that Court for a review of its judgment on the discovery of new and important matter. 20. The Appellant thereupon made a few changes--which do not affect the real nature of the case---in the plaint, paid Court fee on it and instituted, on the 11th October, 1932, the suit which has given rise to this appeal. As I have already said, this plaint also should have been rejected on the ground that it did not disclose a cause of action. 21. I agree that the appeal has no merits and that it should be dismissed with costs. 22. The appeal is dismissed with cost.