JUDGMENT Allsop and Verma, JJ. - The Plaintiffs in the suit which has given rise to this appeal were Mrs. May Ida Rikh and Kunwar Kenneth Cyril Rikh, the widow and son respectively of Kunwar Madho Rikh, deceased. They asserted in their plaint that the Defendant, Kunwar Gajpati Rikh, was liable under an agreement dated June 9, 1922, to pay an allowance of Rs. 160 a month to Madho Rikh and after Madho Rikh's death to his widow and son, the Plaintiffs. Madho Rikh died in the year 1951 and the Plaintiffs asserted that no maintenance had been paid since that time. They claimed a sum of Rs. 4,793/4/0 on this account. They asserted also that the allowance had not been paid for some time before the death of Kunwar Madho Rikh, but, as they were not certain r f the exact amounts which had been paid and not paid, they asked for a decree for the settlement of accounts. The learned Judge of the court below found that a sum of Rs. 4,275 was due on account of maintenance for the period after Madho Rikh's death and a sum of Rs. 1,000, for the period prior to his death. He gave the Plaintiffs a decree against the Defendant for a sum of Rs. 5,275 as principal and Rs. 428--7--0 as interest with pending and future interest at six per cent, per annum. He further directed that the Defendant was not personally liable for the payment of the excretal amount and that his liability should be confined to the extent of the zamindari property situate in the village of Hansupura in his hands, on which there was a charge for the maintenance allowance. The Defendant has appealed. 2. The claim of the Plaintiffs-Respondents was based on a partition deed dated June 9, 1922 The parties to this deed were Raja Shiam Rikh and his four sons, Vishwa Nath Rikh, Jaswant Rikh, Tirloki Nath Rikh and Madho Rikh. From the recitals in the deed it would appear that Shiam Rikh was originally a Hindu and that his three elder sons, Vishwa Nath Rikh, Jaswant Rikh and Tirloki Nath Rikh were born to him by a Hindu wife to whom he was first married. He afterwards became a Christian and his Hindu wife having died, he married a Christian women by whom he had his fourth son, Madho Rikh. He afterwards became a Christian and his Hindu wife having died, he married a Christian women by whom he had his fourth son, Madho Rikh. It would also appear that it was admitted at the time by the parties that the property to be partitioned was ancestral property which had originally been part of the property of a joint Hindu family and that Shiam Rikh and his three elder sons were alone entitled to a share in it. The parties agreed, however, that a sum of Rs. 600 a month should be paid by way of maintenance to Madho Rikh and his widow and children after him. The property was divined into five lots. One lot was set apart for the maintenance of the dignity of the estate because Shiam Rikh had been given the hereditary title of Raja and the members of the family apparently desired that he and persons who succeeded him as Raja should be able to keep up the position which the title conferred upon them. The other four lots were assigned to Shiam Rikh and his three elder sons. Each of these agreed to pay one-fourth of the allowance of Rs. 600 a month to Madho Rikh and to his widow and children. The father and each of the sons was to pay Rs. 150 a month and a charge was created on various properties assigned to them at the partition. The village assigned to Tirloki Nath Rikh which was charged with the payment of the maintenance allowance was the village of Hansupura which has been mentioned in the decree of the court below. Triloki Nath Rikh died in the year 1927 and the Defendant-Appellant, Gajpati Rikh, is his son. 3. The decree of the learned Judge of the court below has been assailed on several grounds. The first of these is that the arrangement which the parties to the deed of partition reached offended against the rule of perpetuity set forth in Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge of the court below held that the provisions of this section did not apply because the creation of a charge was not a transfer of property within the meaning of Section 14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has argued that the finding of the learned Judge upon this point is incorrect. The learned Judge of the court below held that the provisions of this section did not apply because the creation of a charge was not a transfer of property within the meaning of Section 14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has argued that the finding of the learned Judge upon this point is incorrect. He has referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in the United Provinces Government v. Manmohan Das 1941 A.W.R. (HC) 269 (FB). We do not think it is necessary in this case to go into the question whether the contention is right or wrong. It seems to us that the provisions of Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot in any way apply to the facts of this case. If the creation of the charge was transfer of property, that transfer took place at the time when the partition deed was executed. A charge was created immediately in favour of Madho Rikh and was to be inherited by his widow and children. Even if the transaction is regarded as a transfer for life to Madho Rikh followed by a transfer to his wife and children the latter would obviously be alive at his death or within a few months thereafter. 4. Another argument addressed to us against the decision of the learned Judge of the court below is that the agreement was void u/s 23 of the Indian Contract Act because it offended against the principles of Hindu law, but that argument is really nothing more than a statement that the agreement is void under those principles. 5. This brings us to the main argument which has been addressed to us, namely, that Tirloki Nath Rikh was not entitled to alienate any part of the property (which came jointly to him and his son, the Appellant,) without legal necessity of some kind. It seams to us that this argument can be answered upon several grounds. In the first place, the deed of partition is itself the basis of the Defendant's exclusive title to this village of Hansupura. In our judgment he cannot claim the whole village which came to him by this deed and at the same time repudiate the charge which the deed created. In the first place, the deed of partition is itself the basis of the Defendant's exclusive title to this village of Hansupura. In our judgment he cannot claim the whole village which came to him by this deed and at the same time repudiate the charge which the deed created. It might be open to him to question the validity of the whole agreement and to say that there had been no valid partition of the property, but that is a contention which he has not advanced in the course of this suit or, as far as we are aware, at any other time. 6. In the second place, we consider that the deed of partition as between Shiarn Rikh and his elder sons of one part and Madho Rikh of the other part was based on a family arrangement by which Madho Rikh acknowledged that he had no right to a share in the property and the others acknowledged that he had a right to be maintained. It has been strenuously argued that Madho Rikh, on the facts stated in the document, had no claim at all to maintenance or to any share in the joint family property and there could not possibly have been any dispute about his rights. In our judgment, this argument is based upon the assumption that the recitals in the deed are correct, but we are not satisfied that they are necessarily so. It seems that those recitals themselves were embodied in the deed on the basis of the agreement between the parties and it may be that Madho Rikh made admissions not justified by the facts in consideration for receiving an allowance from the other members of the family. It is possible that the whole of the property was not ancestral property, for instance and that there might have been a claim by Madho Rikh to some of the properties on the ground that they had been acquired by his father personally. This is, of course, more assumption, but on the other hand, it is also a mere assumption that the recitals in the deed represent the true facts. The parties did not produce any extraneous evidence upon the point. This is, of course, more assumption, but on the other hand, it is also a mere assumption that the recitals in the deed represent the true facts. The parties did not produce any extraneous evidence upon the point. It seems to us that there may well have bean some dispute or at least a strong apprehension of a possible dispute between the father and his sons or between the brothers after the fathers death and that the members of the family came together and decided upon the course which it was bats to pursue in the interests of the family. If the arrangement it had destroyed some contingent interest which might have arisen in favour of the minor, Gajpati Rikh, he might perhaps have questioned its validity but in this case it did nothing of the kind. It result (sic) only in a partition by which Tirloki Nath Rikh and Ganpati Rikh got an exclusive right in certain property subject to a charge for maintenance. The interests of the father and son were the sains and it must be held that the former sufficiently represented the latter. We think that partitions of this kind would never result in any confidence by members of the family in their rights if minor members of the family, represented at the time by their fathers, could afterwards, question the provisions of the deed of partition upon the ground that their fathers might have made a better bargain or that they had received less at the time of partition than they should have received. The argument addressed to us is based upon the assumption that the Defendant Appellant and his father received the village of Hansu-pura as part of their share at the time of the partition and that there was a subsequent transfer by the father when he created this charge in favour of Madho Rikh, This is not correct. The argument addressed to us is based upon the assumption that the Defendant Appellant and his father received the village of Hansu-pura as part of their share at the time of the partition and that there was a subsequent transfer by the father when he created this charge in favour of Madho Rikh, This is not correct. A true statement of the facts is that the Appellant and his father received the village of Hansupura subject to the charge and we do not think that it is possible to allow the Defendant Appellant now after all these years to say that he should have received the village without any charge upon it just as it would be impossible to allow him to say that all the villages given to his father and himself did not constitute their fair share of the property which was being partitioned. 7. We are satisfied that the Defendant-Appellant cannot be allowed now to question the arrangements made at the time of the partition. We may add that he seems to have come of age about the year 1925 and that he did not at any time repudiate the partition. It appears in fact from a deed of sale which the Plaintiffs produced that he accepted his liability to pay maintenance to Madho Rikh and that he transferred certain property to him in Hsu of the arrears of maintenance which were at that time due. The document is exhibit 4. 8. It has lastly been argued on behalf of the Defendant-Appellant that the rate of maintenance should at least be reduced because the property in the hands of the Defendant-Appellant is considerably less than it was at the time when the partition took place. In the course of the trial in the Court below the Defendant-Appellant put in an application supported by an affidavit in which he stated that he had sold a number of villages partly to pay off a debt of Rs. 55,101--11--4 which was due from his father under the terms of the deed of partition and partly to pay off other debts incurred for legal necessity. We may point out that the affidavit was no evidence in the case. 55,101--11--4 which was due from his father under the terms of the deed of partition and partly to pay off other debts incurred for legal necessity. We may point out that the affidavit was no evidence in the case. If the Defendant-Appellant wished to prove the facts that he had asserted, he should have one into the witness-box, taken an oath and subjected himself to cross-examination at the hands of the other side. He has produced certain sale deeds, but these do not show that the property was transferred in order to pay off debts. The consideration was for the most part paid in cash and there is no evidence at all that it was necessary for the Defendant-appellant to dispose of these villages so that it may be inferred that his present condition is due to causes which were not within his control. In so far as the debt of Rs. 55,101-114 is concerned, that existed at the time when the agreement was made for the payment of the allowance and if this debt has been paid off by the transfer of part of the property which came to the share of the Defendant-Appellant, his position is really no worse than it was at the time when the agreement was made. We are satisfied that there is no sufficient reason for reducing the amount which has been found by the learned Judge of the Court below to be due to the Plaintiffs-Respondents. 9. The result is that this appeal must fail and we dismiss it with costs.