JUDGMENT Allsop and Kamalakant Verma, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a suit for the recovery of certain property sold on June 20, 1932, in execution of a decree for money. The decree was obtained on December 13, 1921 against Liaqat Singh, the father of the Plaintiff, Dharampal Singh. The decree was for Rs. 778. Liaqat Singh died in the year 1923 and his two sons, the Plaintiff, Dharampal Singh and Ompal Singh, were substituted in proceedings in execution for him as minors under the guardianship of their mother, Mst. Bhagwan Dei. After the substitution the proceedings continued. The property was sold for a sum of Rs. 54 and the auction purchaser, were put into possession on November 11, 1932. After this decree had been obtained, a suit for partition was instituted on December 17, 1921 by the Plaintiff, Dharampal Singh and his two uncles. Mannu and Lakhan, the brothers of Liaqat Singh against Liaqat Singh himself, his wife, Mst. Bhagwan Dei and his mother, Mst. Har Dei. A decree was passed in this suit on April 18, 1929. Dharampal Singh's brother, Ompal Singh, was born after the decree for partition was passed. 2. Dharampal Singh instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal originally on the allegation that he was of full age, but subsequently it was found that he was still a minor and that the suit proceeded through Dharampal Singh's next friend, Mst. Har Dei, his grandmother. It is necessary to mention that Mst. Har Dei had been appointed the guardian of Dharampal Singh by the District Judge under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act. The appointment was made on December 4, 1923- The main point raised in the suit was that Dharampal Singh was not properly represented in the execution proceedings because he was impleaded under the guardianship of Mst. Bhagwan Dei instead of being impleaded under the guardianship of Mst. Har Dei under the provisions of Order XXXII, Rule 4-A of the first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff's suit having been dismissed by the Court below it is argued before us in this appeal, in the first instance, that he was not properly represented in the execution proceedings and consequently that a sale made in the course of those proceedings was void in so far as he was concerned. The Plaintiff's suit having been dismissed by the Court below it is argued before us in this appeal, in the first instance, that he was not properly represented in the execution proceedings and consequently that a sale made in the course of those proceedings was void in so far as he was concerned. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied strongly upon the case of Nagappa v. Hussain Sahib (1920) 43 Mad. 808 : A.I.R 1920 Mad. 745 but, on the other hand, we have a clear authority of our own Court in the case of Dammar Singh v. pirbhu Singh (1907) 29 All. 290 in support of the proposition that it is a mare irregularity for a Court to appoint a person other than the guardian appointed by competent authority to represent a minor in the course of a suit or other proceeding. The learned Judges who decided the case of Nagappa v. Hussain Sahib (1920) 43 Mad. 808 : A.I.R 1920 Mad. 745 based their decision upon the case of Hanuman Prasad v Muhammad lshaq (1905) 28 All 137 which they considered to have been affirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Rashid-un-nisa v. Muhammad Ismail Khan (1909) 31 All 572. With the greatest respect we must say that it seems to us that the case of Hanuman Prasad v. Muhammad Ishaq (1905) 28 All 137 was not at all in point. That was a case where it was found as a fact that the person who was representing the minor had acted not only with gross negligence but also had been guilty of deliberate fraud against the minor. The decision did not turn upon the question that he was not the guardian appointed by competent authority within the meaning of the rule which corresponded with the present Rule 4-A of Order XXXII. In the Privy Council case to which reference was made by the learned judges is was held that of the two guardians one was not qualified and that the interest of the other was adverse. The guardian who was not qualified was a marred woman and there was a definite provision in the CPC of that time that no married woman could act as the guardian of a minor in the course of proceedings in a Court of law. Their Lordships did not discuss this question. The guardian who was not qualified was a marred woman and there was a definite provision in the CPC of that time that no married woman could act as the guardian of a minor in the course of proceedings in a Court of law. Their Lordships did not discuss this question. They merely mentioned, what was the fact, that the married woman who was appointed to represent the minor was absolutely disqualified from doing so. The case before us is entirely different. Mst. Bhagwan Dei was not absolutely disqualified from representing her minor son in the course of the proceedings in execution. It is true that the learned Judge presiding in the Court executing the decree should have appointed Mst. Har Dei to act on behalf of the minor unless, for reasons which he should have recorded in writing, he thought that Mst. Bhagwan Dai was the proper person to represent the minor but if the judge had so chosen ha could have appointed Mst. Bhagwan Dei in preference to Mst. Har Dai. We my mention that there is no evidence before us that the learned Judge of the executing Court did not consider this question and did not appoint Mst. Bhagwan Dei after giving reasons in writing for her appointment in preference to the appointment of Mst. Har Dei but, as it is not asserted in the within instatement that the appointment of Mst. Har Dai by the District Judge as guardian of Dharampal Singh under the Guardians and Wards Act was brought to the notice of the learned Judge executing the decree, we may assume for the purposes of this case that the learned Judge did not proceed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4A of Order XXXII. We have mentioned the authority of this Court in the case of Dammer Singh v. Pirbhu Singh (1907) 29 All. 290 in order to support the conclusion that the failure to observe that rule was a mere irregularity and did not vitiate the whole proceedings. We have mentioned the authority of this Court in the case of Dammer Singh v. Pirbhu Singh (1907) 29 All. 290 in order to support the conclusion that the failure to observe that rule was a mere irregularity and did not vitiate the whole proceedings. It is one thing to say that a minor is not represented at all if represented by a person who is absolutely disqualified from representing him and quite another to say that he is not represented at all if represented by a person whom the Court in its discretion could appoint to represent him but might not have appointed, if it had been aware of all the relevant facts. We consider that we should follow the decision of this Court in the case of Dammar Singh v. Pirbhu Singh (1907) 29 All. 290 especially as it seems to us that it would throw an impossible burden upon the parties to proceedings in which a minor was involved if those proceedings were to be regarded in certain circumstances as void if the person appointed to represent the minor was not the person appointed by competent authority to be the guardian of the minor under the Guardians and Wards Act The person proceeding against the minor might, as b alleged in this case, have no knowledge at all about the appointment of the guardian by competent authority and if that was so, it would be most unfair to hold that the proceedings were void if the minor was represented by a person who was able and thoroughly willing to represent him and who did not bring to the notice of the Court the fact that there was another person appointed by competent authority to be the guardian of the minor. In the case before us we see no reason to doubt that there was no intention on the part of the decree-holders executing the decree to act in any way which was unfair to the minor. Mst. Phagwan Dei was their mother and was their natural guardian. It is quite possible that the decree-holders had no knowledge of the appointment of Mst. Har Dei on December 4, 1923. There is no reason why they should have had knowledge of this fact It appears that Mst. Bhagwan Dei herself acted as next friend of the minors in certain proceedings for the mutation of names in the revenue Court. It is quite possible that the decree-holders had no knowledge of the appointment of Mst. Har Dei on December 4, 1923. There is no reason why they should have had knowledge of this fact It appears that Mst. Bhagwan Dei herself acted as next friend of the minors in certain proceedings for the mutation of names in the revenue Court. The notice of the proceedings in execution was served upon Mst. Bhagwan Dei by affixation on a building in which the process server had reason to think that she was at that time, In his affidavit he stated that a relation of Mst. Bhagwan Dei had appeared but had refused to take the notice and that Mst. Bhagwan Dei herself could not come out of the house because she was a pardanashin. It is probable that Mst. Bhagwan Dei and Mst. Har Dei and other members of the family were all living in the same house and that they all had full knowledge of the proceedings in execution of the decree. We are satisfied that the mere fact that Mst. Bhagwan Dei was appointed guardian instead of Mst. Har Dei would not be sufficient to avoid the proceedings against the Plaintiff-Appellant and that the sale could be treated by him as a nullity only if it could be shown that he was in fact not represented by a person who acted properly in his behalf or in other words unless it could be shown that Mst. Bhagwan Dai was guilty of gross negligence in these proceedings. 3. Certainly it seems that she did not appear to make any objections or take any steps to prevent the sale of the property but that in itself is no reason for regarding her as having been negligent. We have to see whether there was any thing which she could reasonably be expected to do in the interest of the minor to preserve his property Learned Counsel for the Appellant has raised two points in his argument that Mst. Bhagwan Dei did not properly represent Dharampal Singh in the execution proceedings. The first point is that the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price. He has referred to evidence produced by him to show that the revenue of the property in suit was about Rs. 175 a year and that the profits amounted to about Rs. 640 a year. The first point is that the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price. He has referred to evidence produced by him to show that the revenue of the property in suit was about Rs. 175 a year and that the profits amounted to about Rs. 640 a year. We may accept this evidence for the purposes of this case, although it does seem that the profits are rather large in relation to the revenue which usually represents about 40 per cant of the profits of the property. If we take the profits from the property to amount to Rs. 640 a year and calculate the value of the property at twenty-five years' purchase, we may say that the property is worth about Rs. 16,000, but, on the other hand, as the learned Judge of the Court below has mentioned, it was very, heavily encumbered. There were two mortgages one dated February 1, 1921 to secure a debt of Rs. 10.000 and the other dated August 16, 1921, to secure a debt of Rs. 3,000. In the first mortgage there was a stipulation for payment of interest at the rate of Rs. 7-8-0 per cent, per annum and in the second mortgage for payment of interest at the rate of 15 per cent, per annum. By the year 1931 it would appear that interest was due for a period of ten years on each of the mortgages. It has not been alleged that any interest had been paid. The amount due on the first mortgage would thus have been Rs. 17,500 and on the second mort gage, Rs. 7,500 or in all a charge of Rs. 25,000. It is true that there were other properties included in the deeds of mortgage besides the property in suit, but on the face of it there is no reason for thinking that the price obtained for the property was necessarily much to small. There is nothing to indicate that there was any irregularity in the sale or that the property was not auctioned in the ordinary way according to the rules. Learned Counsel has argued that the first mortgage was afterwards redeemed as the result of a suit for quite a small sum of money because a sum of Rs. There is nothing to indicate that there was any irregularity in the sale or that the property was not auctioned in the ordinary way according to the rules. Learned Counsel has argued that the first mortgage was afterwards redeemed as the result of a suit for quite a small sum of money because a sum of Rs. 5,600 which was left with the mortgagee for payment to certain creditors had not been paid and that part of the concede anion was found not to be for legal necessity or for the payment of antecedent debts, the mortgage having been executed by Liaqat Singh and the suit having proceeded against others. It may be that the charge was not quite so heavy as it appeared to be, but the charge undoubtedly existed and we do not see how Musammat Bhagwan Dei in the course of the execution proceedings could have done anything about this matter. It was open to the guardian appointed by competent authority, that is Musammat Har Dei, to take some steps, if it was legally possible to get a declaration or to redeem the mortgage on the payment of the smaller sum which might possibly have been due. It seams to us that there was no course open to Musammat Bhagwan Dei to increase the price which was obtained for the property. That disposes of the first argument which has been addressed to us by Learned Counsel for the Appellant. The second point he has urged is that the property sold was not liable to sale in the course of proceedings in execution of the decree. This property had come to the Plaintiff-Appellant by reason of a partition and Learned Counsel argues that it was not property which was liable to sale under the provisions of sections 50 and 53 of the CPC in execution of a decree passed against the father of the Plaintiff-Appellant. It is not necessary for a this case, to express any definite opinion upon the question which has been raised. It is sufficient for us to point out that it is at least very doubtful whether the guardian of the Plaintiff-Appellant could have succeeded if she had made an objection that the property was not liable to sale in execution of the decree. Learned Counsel has drawn our attention to a number of cases. It is sufficient for us to point out that it is at least very doubtful whether the guardian of the Plaintiff-Appellant could have succeeded if she had made an objection that the property was not liable to sale in execution of the decree. Learned Counsel has drawn our attention to a number of cases. The first is the case of AIR 1937 45 (Nagpur) . This case, however, is not strictly in point. It was a case in which the decree-holder had sought to sell the property of the sons in execution of a decree against the father while the father was still alive and it is obvious that the provisions of Sections 50 and 53 of the CPC did not apply. The next case to which Learned Counsel has referred us is the case of Atul Krishna Roy v. Lala Natidanji (1935) 54 Pat 732 : AIR 1935 Pat 275 but the learned Judges who decided that case would, have decided against the contention that the property in the case before us was not liable to sale. They ail agreed that the property of a son obtained by a partition after a decree had been passed against the father could be sold in execution of that decree. Learned Counsel has also referred us o certain cases of the Madras High Court, inanely, K.R. Subramania Aiyar and Others Vs. Sabapathi Aiyar and Another, AIR 1928 Mad 657 and Km. Kr. Km. Kuppan Chettiar and Others Vs. Masa Goundan and Others, AIR 1937 Mad 424 . The first case does not affect the question before us because in it the sons were impleaded in the suit which was instituted against the father. In the second case the decree against the father had been obtained after the partition and the father was still alive. On the other hand, we have been referred by Learned Counsel for Respondents to the case of Vadlamanati Venkatanarayana Rao Vs. Gottumukkule Venkata Somaraju, AIR 1937 Mad 610 which supports the contention that the property of the Appellant could have been sold in the execution proceedings on the decree against the father. On the plain wording of Sections 50 and 53 of the CPC we should ourselves be inclined to hold that the property of the son was liable to sale in the course of the execution proceedings. On the plain wording of Sections 50 and 53 of the CPC we should ourselves be inclined to hold that the property of the son was liable to sale in the course of the execution proceedings. Once the son was impleaded as the representative-in-interest of his father, the only question was whether the property in his hands was liable under the Hindu Law for the payment of the debt due from the father. The argument put forward by Learned Counsel for the Appellant is that Sections 50 and 53 refer only to the property which came to the sons by reason of the death of the father but there are no words to that effect in either of the two sections. Once the father is dead, the only question is what property is in the hands of the son and whether that property is liable for the payment of the father's debt under the Hindu Law. The terms of the sections are sufficiently wide to cover the case which we are considering. As we have said, however, it is not necessary for us to decide the question definitely. It is sufficient for us to say that it might well have appeared to a guardian representing the interest of the minor that it was not worth while to make an objection lo the sale of the property upon the ground that it was not liable for sale in the course of the execution proceedings. Such objection might well have failed and considerable costs might have been incurred. Even if the objection had prevailed ultimately, it would only have mean that a separate suit would have been instituted against the minor and the same question would have arisen whether the property was liable for the payment of the debt due from the father under the Hindu Law. Learned Counsel hay suggested that this particular property might not have been liable, but we think that there can be no question that it was liable in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Chotey Lal v. Ganpat Rat (1934) 3 A.W.R. 765 : 57 All 176. We are satisfied that there is nothing to establish that Mst. We are satisfied that there is nothing to establish that Mst. Bhagwan Dei was guilty of any negligence in looking after the interests of the minor or that there was anything that she could reasonably be expected to have done to protect his interest which she did not do. We are satisfied that there is nothing to establish that any substantial injury was caused to the Plaintiff-Appellant by any omission on the part of Mst. Bhagwan Dei. In these circumstances we hold that the learned Judge of the Court below was right in his conclusion that the sale in execution of the decree was binding upon the Plaintiff-Appellant. 4. The result is that the appeal must fail and we hereby dismiss it with costs.