JUDGMENT Verma, J. - This appeal is by the Collector of Bulandshahr in his capacity of the officer in charge of the estates in that district which are under the superintendence of the Court of Wards. The appellant was the defendant in the suit which was brought by the respondent for the recovery of Rupees 6000 on the basis of a promissory note, executed on 28th June 1926 by one Mt. Fatima Begam and her husband, Syed Aziz Uddin, in favour of the respondent, for Rs. 5000. The suit, which was instituted on 31st August 1934, has been decreed by the Court below. The material facts, which are not in controversy, are these; Mt. Fatima Begam is the owner of an estate in her own right and her husband has no interest in it. On 26th June 1926, she and her husband borrowed Rs. 5000 from the respondent and jointly executed in his favour the promissory note Ex. 20 and the receipt Ex. 21. The promise was to repay the loan on demand with interest at the rate of one rupee per cent. per mensem. On 23rd August 1927, the Court of Wards assumed the superintendence of the estate of Fatima Begam under the provisions of the U.P. Court of Wards Act (No. 4 of 1912) and under the Collector of Bulandshahr was put in charge. In accordance with the provisions of S. 17 of the Act, the Collector published the necessary notices calling upon all persons having claims for money against Fatima Begam to notify their claims. The respondent duly notified to the Collector his claim within the time prescribed. So did a number of other persons. The Collector thereupon proceeded to decide, under the provisions of S. 19(1) of the Act, which of the claims were to be allowed and which were to be disallowed, in whole or in part. He also took into consideration the question of the rate of interest in accordance with the succeeding sub-sections of the section. He, accordingly, prepared, on 20th May 1928, a statement headed "schedule of debts. Claims duly notified under Ss. 17/18 of Act 4 of 1912." The debt due to the respondent was shown in this statement at serial No. 5. 2. It may be pointed out that there is a misprint in column 3 of this statement which is Ex. He, accordingly, prepared, on 20th May 1928, a statement headed "schedule of debts. Claims duly notified under Ss. 17/18 of Act 4 of 1912." The debt due to the respondent was shown in this statement at serial No. 5. 2. It may be pointed out that there is a misprint in column 3 of this statement which is Ex. 1 on the record as printed in our paper book. The year should be 1926 and not "22." The entries in this document show that the Collector's decision was that this claim was to be allowed and that the rate of interest should be reduced to 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the submission by the respondent of his claim. This statement was signed by the Collector and was forwarded by him, through the Commissioner, to the Court of Wards which at that time was the Board of Revenue for confirmation of his decisions. For reasons which are not material to the present case no final orders have yet been passed by the Court of Wards, at any rate, so far as the claim of the respondent is concerned. It may however, be mentioned that the correspondence, some of which has been printed, indicates that the Commissioner, in all likelihood, expressed a doubt as to whether the respondent's claim should be allowed in view of the fact that Fatima Begam's husband admitted that the loan had in reality been taken by him alone for his own purposes. The Collector, accordingly, amended the statement (Ex. 1) on the footing that the respondent's claim along with certain others was to be disallowed and reduced the amount of the total of the claims against the estate from Rs. 1,47,461.0.6 to Rs. 1,05,632 'in round figures.' The Collector, by his letter dated 29th May 1928 (Ex. C) informed the Commissioner that the necessary corrections had been made in the statement previously submitted. It further appears that the Board of Revenue, evidently on receipt of the amended statement together with the Commissioner's recommendations, called for certain documents "before arriving at a final decision or sending the case to the Legal Remembrancer if necessary" (Ex. L). 3. C) informed the Commissioner that the necessary corrections had been made in the statement previously submitted. It further appears that the Board of Revenue, evidently on receipt of the amended statement together with the Commissioner's recommendations, called for certain documents "before arriving at a final decision or sending the case to the Legal Remembrancer if necessary" (Ex. L). 3. It is common ground that sometime later, the Court of Wards on the report of the Collector, came to the conclusion that the debts and liabilities with which Fatima Begam's estate was charged were such as to render their liquidation within a reasonable time impracticable, and consequently sought the sanction of the Government for the release of the estate from the superintendence of this Court of Wards (S. 44 of the Act). The Government are stated to have passed an order on 30th May 1929, sanctioning the release. It is further stated that 10th June 1929 was fixed as the date on which the estate would be released and action under S. 50 of the Act would be taken. The ward and the creditors were apparently informed that the Court of Wards intended to release the estate on 10th June 1929. On that very day, namely, 10th June 1929, the respondent filed a suit being Suit No. 48 of 1929 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bulandshahr, against Syed Aziz Uddin and Mt. Fatima Begam, for the recovery of Rs. 6000 principal and Rs. 1730 interest, total Rs. 6750, on the basis of the promissory note in question. Certain other creditors also brought suits on that day for the recovery of the amounts alleged by them to be due to them. It is not necessary for us to go into the reasons which impelled these creditors, including the respondent to institute their suits on the very day which had been fixed for the release of the estate. The Court of Wards was not made a defendant to these suits which were framed on the footing that the proposed release of Fatima Begam's estate had taken place. The Collector when he came to know of the institution of these suits intervened, and filed an application on 24th July 1929, alleging that the estate of Mt. The Court of Wards was not made a defendant to these suits which were framed on the footing that the proposed release of Fatima Begam's estate had taken place. The Collector when he came to know of the institution of these suits intervened, and filed an application on 24th July 1929, alleging that the estate of Mt. Fatima Begam had not been released but was still under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, and prayed that he be impleaded as a defendant to the suit as the person in charge of Fatima Begam's estate (Ex. A). He was so impleaded and became defendant 3 in the suit of the present respondent. The Collector thereupon filed a written statement and one of the pleas raised by him was that, as the notice required by S. 54, Court of Wards Act had not been given, the suit was not maintainable. Another plea was that the claim of the plaintiff had "not yet been confirmed by the Board and the Court of Wards has informed the plaintiff about it" and that the plaintiff was not "entitled to get any period counted from the publication of the notice to the effect that the estate was taken under the management of the Court of Wards and in no way S. 52, Act 4 of 1912, is applicable to this suit." 4. As the Collector was impleaded as a defendant to the suit after 26th June 1929, the plea of limitation was open to him. We have not been shown the judgment of suit No. 48 of 1929 - the suit instituted by Sagar Mal, the respondent before as. The judgment of another suit instituted on the same day by another creditor, one Gokul Chand-suit No. 47 of 1929 - is however, before us (Ex. 3). That judgment shows that of the issues framed in that suit, issues 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were as follows: 2. Is the suit barred by time against defendant 3? 3. Is the suit bad for want of notice under S. 54, Court of Wards Act, against defendant 3? 4. Does the application dated 10th January 1928, alleged to have been made to defendant 3 by the plaintiff, amount to a valid notice under S. 54, Court of Wards Act? 5. Is the suit barred by section 55, Court of Wards Act? 6. 4. Does the application dated 10th January 1928, alleged to have been made to defendant 3 by the plaintiff, amount to a valid notice under S. 54, Court of Wards Act? 5. Is the suit barred by section 55, Court of Wards Act? 6. Is the suit maintainable against defendant 2? 5. Defendant 2 was Mt. Fatima Begam as the plaint Ex. 2 shows. It is not denied that similar issues were framed in Sagar Mal's suit (No.48 of 1929) also. The Court of first instance found all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs of the various suits and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff in each suit. The Collector appealed to this Court against the decrees in all the suits. Here, again, we have before us the judgment of the appeal against Gokul Chand, but it is common ground that all the appeals were governed by the same judgment. By its order dated 10th October 1933, this Court adjourned the hearing of the appeals in order that certain documents might be produced (Ex. 5). These documents were produced and were admitted as additional evidence. One of the reasons given in the judgment of this Court, dated 31st October 1933 (Ex. 6), for the admission of the additional evidence was that these papers had been summoned by the plaintiffs themselves in the Court below and had been brought to the Court but, on an objection raised by the Court of Wards that they were confidential documents and that it should not be compelled to file them, the Court had decided against their production. It. was held by this Court that the estate of Fatima Begam had not in point of fact been released, but was still finder the superintendence of the Court of Wards, and that consequently the absence of the notice prescribed by S. 54, Court of Wards Act, was fatal to the maintainability of the suits against the Court of Wards. The suits were accordingly dismissed as against Fatitna Begam and the Court of Wards. As already stated, this judgment was pronounced on 31st October 1933. Thereafter, the respondent, Sagar Mal, complied with the requirements of S. 54 and brought the present suit against the Collector. It was, however, as already stated, not instituted until 31st August 1934. 6. The limitation applicable to the suit being that prescribed by Art. 73 of Sch. As already stated, this judgment was pronounced on 31st October 1933. Thereafter, the respondent, Sagar Mal, complied with the requirements of S. 54 and brought the present suit against the Collector. It was, however, as already stated, not instituted until 31st August 1934. 6. The limitation applicable to the suit being that prescribed by Art. 73 of Sch. 1, Limitation Act (No. 9 of 1908), the suit was on the face of it beyond time when it was instituted. The plaint had therefore, under O. 7, Rule 6, Civil P.C., to show the ground upon which exemption from the law of limitation was claimed. Such exemption was sought on the basis of the combined benefit of two sections of the Limitation Act to which the plaintiff claimed to be entitled on grounds to be presently stated. It was alleged that the entries, with regard to the plaintiff's debt, made in the schedule of debts, Ex.1 mentioned above, and signed by the Collector on 20th May 1928, amounted to an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the debt within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act, and that consequently a fresh period of limitation had to be computed from the time when Ex. 1 was signed by the Collector, that is, from 20th May 1928. It was next alleged that the plaintiff, when he instituted Suit No. 48 of 1929 on 10th June 1929, believed in good faith that Fatima Begam's estate had as a matter of fact been released from the superintendence of the Court of Wards, that the plaintiff continued to have that Relief in good faith throughout the pendency of the suit and of the appeal in the High Court, and that consequently the operation of the statute was interrupted and the entire period from 10th June 1929 to 31st October 1933 had, in accordance with the provisions of S. 14 of the Act, to be excluded. In other words, the contention was that the plaintiff had time for instituting the suit up to 11th October 1935 and that therefore the suit, instituted as it was on 31st August 1934, was well within time. The pleas raised by the defendant-appellant in answer to this claim of the plaintiff were embodied in paras. 16, 17 and 18 of the written statement which may be reproduced: 16. The pleas raised by the defendant-appellant in answer to this claim of the plaintiff were embodied in paras. 16, 17 and 18 of the written statement which may be reproduced: 16. That no acknowledgment of the plaintiff's claim was ever made by the Court of Wards. The Collector of Bulandshahr had no authority to admit to the plaintiff's claim. The Court of Wards never confirmed the decision of the Collector as required by S. 19, Court of Wards Act. 17. That the previous Suit No. 48 of 1929 was not prosecuted by the plaintiff in good faith. Soon after the institution of the suit the plaintiff was informed, on 24th July 1929, that the estate of Fatima Begam was under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, but he repudiated this fact. The plaintiff is not entitled to the exclusion of any time under S. 14, Limitation Act. 18. That the claim is barred by Art. 73, Limitation Act. 7. It is hardly necessary to point out that, if the contention of the plaintiff based on either of the two sections of the Limitation Act mentioned above is negetived, the suit has to be dismissed as being barred by time. On the questions thus raised the Court below framed issues 2, 3 and 4 which were as follows: 2. Whether the claim of the plaintiff was acknowledged by the Court of Wards, and if so, what was its result? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to the exclusion of any time under S. 14, Limitation Act? 4. Is the claim barred by Art. 73, Limitation Act?" 8. On issue 2 the learned Judge below recorded his finding thus: "I hold that the decision of the Collector under S. 19(1), Court of Wards Act, could be taken to be an acknowledgment so as to give the plaintiff a fresh start of limitation from 20th May 1928." The finding on issue 3 was this: "Under these circumstances the plaintiff must in fairness get the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act, and the period from which he filed the suit to the period that the High Court decided against him on 31st October 1933 must be excluded. I, therefore, hold that the claim is within time and is not barred by limitation," In view of these findings, issue 4 did not need separate treatment and was decided in favour of the plaintiff. I, therefore, hold that the claim is within time and is not barred by limitation," In view of these findings, issue 4 did not need separate treatment and was decided in favour of the plaintiff. The finding on the only remaining issue, which was concerned with the questions of fact whether Fatima Begam had borrowed any money from the plaintiff and, if so, how much and whether she had executed the promissory note in question after understanding its contents, being in favour of the plaintiff, the suit was decreed as prayed, The defendant has accordingly preferred this appeal. The only question that has been argued before us is the question of limitation. The first question that arises for consideration is whether there was, on 20th May 1928, an acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act, It will be convenient here to reproduce the relevant portions of that section: Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit....in respect of any....right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such....right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such....right is claimed...a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Explanation II.-For the purposes of this section, 'signed' means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf. 9. The contention of the plaintiff-respondent is that the entries in the schedule of debts, Ex. 1 amount to an acknowledgment within the meaning of the section and that the Collector, when he signed the schedule, was such "an agent duly authorised" of Fatima Begam as is contemplated by the section. The case of the defendant, on the other hand, is that, having regard to the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 19, Court of Wards Act (4 of 1912), the Collector when he is doing any of the things which S. 19, Court of Wards Act, requires him to do, is not an agent duly authorized to make an acknowledgment of liability so as to give a fresh start to limitation. Section 19 (1), Court of Wards Act, is as follows: The Collector shall decide which of the claims notified or deemed to have been notified under Ss. Section 19 (1), Court of Wards Act, is as follows: The Collector shall decide which of the claims notified or deemed to have been notified under Ss. 17 and 18 are to be allowed and which are to be disallowed, in whole or in part, and, on his decision being confirmed by the Court of Wards, shall give written notice of the same to the claimants. 10. The appellant's arguments, put shortly, are that the sub-section quoted above clearly shows that it is the Court of Wards alone which can, when it confirms the Collector's decision, bring into existence such an acknowledgment as it is required by S. 19, Limitation Act, and that the Collector's "decision" is no more than a proposal of an officer subordinate to the authority which is the duly authorised agent of the proprietor of the estate. It may be mentioned that sub-s.(6) of the section lays down that the Collector's action in the matter of interest, under sub-Ss. (2), (3) and (4) also shall be subject to the confirmation of the Court of Wards. It is important to bear in mind that the contention is that the Collector, when he prepares a statement or schedule while acting under S. 19, Court of Wards Act, is not a duly authorised agent of the proprietor within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act, and not that the Court of Wards is not such an agent. It has further been argued that the entries in the schedule of debts, Ex. 1 do not amount to "an acknowledgment of liability" within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. It will be convenient at this stage to examine those sections of the U.P. Court of Wards Act which are relevant to our present purpose. It may be pointed out that the amendments made in the Court of Wards Act of 1912 by the Act of 1933 do not affect the question which we have to decide. An examination of the relevant sections yields the following results. The Court of Wards is a statutory body to which has been entrusted the duty of the superintendence of the property of "disqualified" proprietors. The provisions relating to the superintendence of the person do not call for consideration in this case. An examination of the relevant sections yields the following results. The Court of Wards is a statutory body to which has been entrusted the duty of the superintendence of the property of "disqualified" proprietors. The provisions relating to the superintendence of the person do not call for consideration in this case. A proprietor may also apply to have his property placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards and the Court of Wards may, if it is satisfied that it is expedient to undertake the management of such property, make a declaration to that effect. 11. In certain cases the Court of Wards is bound to assume, and in certain other cases it has the discretion to assume or refrain from assuming, such superintendence. When the Court of Wards assumes the superintendence of the property of any such proprietor, the order of assumption is notified in the official Gazette and it has to specify the Collector or other person who is put in charge. The proprietor whose property thus comes under the superintendence of the Court of Wards becomes the ward of the Court of Wards, and the whole of his moveable and immovable properly is deemed to be under the superintendence of the Court of Wards from certain dates prescribed in S. 16, according to the nature of the case, and the Collector or other person appointed in that behalf takes possession and custody of the property of the ward and manages it in accordance with the rules made by the Court of Wards under S. 64 of the Act. Steps are then taken to ascertain the debts, if any, for which the ward is liable, and for this purpose the Collector specified in the order of assumption, or any other Collector whom the Court of Wards may appoint in this behalf, has to publish notices calling upon all persons having claims for money against the ward or his property to notify the same in writing to such Collector within a certain period. Any claim which is not notified within the prescribed period is deemed to have been duly discharged. This is subject to S. 20, which lays down that any claimant, who has submitted a claim but whose claim has been disallowed, is at liberty to institute or to continue any suit or proceeding in respect of such claim. Any claim which is not notified within the prescribed period is deemed to have been duly discharged. This is subject to S. 20, which lays down that any claimant, who has submitted a claim but whose claim has been disallowed, is at liberty to institute or to continue any suit or proceeding in respect of such claim. A claimant who submits his claim after the expiration of the prescribed period has to show sufficient cause for his failure to do so, and on such cause being shown his claim is received and is deemed to have been notified in accordance with the provisions of S. 17. The Collector is then directed by S. 19 to "decide" which of the claims notified or deemed to have been notified are to be allowed and which are to be disallowed, in whole or in part, and has to submit his "decisions" to the Court of Wards for confirmation. If, and when the Court of Wards confirms his "decisions," the Collector has to give written notice of the same to the claimants. We have already quoted sub-s. (1) of S. 19 which deals with this matter. Then follow provisions as to the appointment by the Court of Wards of guardians of the person in cases where superintendence of the person has been assumed, and of managers of the property. 12. Section 38 lays down the powers of the Court of Wards as to the property under its superintendence. The Court of Wards has the power to make such transfers, to make such remissions of rent or other dues and generally to pass such orders and do such acts as it may judge to be for the advantage of the ward or for the benefit of the property. Section 7 authorises the Court of Wards to exercise all or any of the powers conferred upon it by the Act through the Commissioners of the Divisions or the Collectors of the Districts in which any part of the property of its wards may be situated, or through any other person whom it may appoint for such purpose. It may also delegate from time to time any of its powers to such Commissioners or Collectors or other person as aforesaid, and may at any time revoke such delegation. The delegation as well as the revocation require the sanction of the Local Government. It may also delegate from time to time any of its powers to such Commissioners or Collectors or other person as aforesaid, and may at any time revoke such delegation. The delegation as well as the revocation require the sanction of the Local Government. The only other section which need be mentioned here is S. 55 which lays down that no ward shall sue or be sued nor shall any proceedings be taken in the civil Court otherwise than by and in the name of the Collector in charge of his property or such other persons as the Court of Wards may appoint in this behalf. 13. From what we have said above-and there is nothing in any other section showing anything to the contrary-it is clear, in our judgment, that the estate of a ward is under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, and of the Court of Wards alone, and it is the Court of Wards on whom plenary powers of management have been conferred. The Court of Wards may exercise all or any of these powers through the Commissioners or the Collectors or through any other person whom it selects for the purpose. The Court of Wards may also delegate to the Commissioners, or the Collectors or to such other persons as it chooses such of its powers as it likes, but it has to obtain the sanction of the Local Government for such delegation. If any such delegation is alleged in any case, it has to be established by the party that alleges it. 14. The scheme of the Act being as stated above, it seems to us that the contention of the learned Advocate-General, that the Collector when he does any of the things which he is required by S. 19, Court of Wards Act, to do cannot be considered to be "an agent duly authorized in this behalf" within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act, must be accepted. The use of the word "decide'' in sub-s. (1) of S. 19, Court of Wards Act, is in our opinion of no consequence. Any one who has to submit proposals or recommendations for consideration has to arrive at conclusions or decisions for himself before he can make any proposals or recommendations. The use of the word "decide'' in sub-s. (1) of S. 19, Court of Wards Act, is in our opinion of no consequence. Any one who has to submit proposals or recommendations for consideration has to arrive at conclusions or decisions for himself before he can make any proposals or recommendations. Nothing has been shown to us in the Court of Wards Act which can warrant the proposition that the Collector, when he frames his proposals for submission to the Court of Wards under S 19, Court of Wards Act. is "an agent duly authorized in this behalf" as contemplated by Expl. 2 to S. 19, Limitation Act. The matter does not, however, rest here, for learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has contended that there are rulings which support him. It becomes necessary therefore to examine the decisions which he has cited. 15. The first case relied upon is that in ('88) 1888 A.W.N. 187, Kamla Kuar v. Har Sahai. The appeal before the High Court had arisen out of a suit for the redemption of a mortgage of a 5 biswas share in a certain village on the allegation that the defendants were mortgagees of the property, the mortgage having been given by the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants. One of the pleas raised by the defendants had been that the suit was barred by time. It appeared that in certain settlement proceedings started in the year 1861, the predecessors-in-title of the plaintiffs had alleged that the 5 biswas were held by the person who was at that time the predecessor-in-title of the defendants under a lease. That predecessor-in-title of the defendants had through his mukhtar, one Durga Prasad, denied the existence of any lease and had alleged that he was in possession of the property under a mortgage the details of which were stated. The settlement authorities evidently decided against the claimants and thereupon they raised an action in the civil Court claiming the property on the ground that the defendant was their lessee and that they were entitled to resume possession. The estate of the alleged lessee was at that time under the superintendence of the Court of Wards and the action was consequently brought against the Collector of the district as the person in charge of the property. The estate of the alleged lessee was at that time under the superintendence of the Court of Wards and the action was consequently brought against the Collector of the district as the person in charge of the property. The Collector filed a written statement on 18th May 1866 and made the same allegations with regard to the properly being held under a mortgage as had been made in the settlement proceedings of 1861. The action was decided in 1866 and the claim was apparently dismissed presumably on the ground that the possession of the defendant was not under a lease which had determined but under a mortgage. The contention of the plaintiffs who were seeking redemption in the suit which gave rise to the appeal decided by the High Court in 1888 was that in view of the statements made by the mukhtar Durga Prasad in the settlement proceedings and by the Collector in the written statement in the action which was determined in the year 1866, the suit was within sixty years from the date which appeared from the statements of Durga Prasad and the Collector to have been the date of the mortgage. 16. It was further contended that, in any event, the statements of Durga Prasad in the settlement proceedings, and of the Collector in the written statement in the civil Court in 1866, amounted to acknowledgments within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act and that the suit was thus within limitation. The mortgage deed had been lost, but the statements of Durga Prasad, which had been made in 1862 in the course of the Settlement proceedings, were proved. So also was a letter written by one Rao Saheb Singh mukhtar of the mortgagee's estate, to Durga Prasad. It was found that this letter must have been written between 11th March and 11th June 1862. It was stated in this letter, and it was stated by Durga Prasad in the settlement proceedings, that the mortgage had been made forty years before that letter was written and before Durga Prasad made the statements, and it was for a term of ten years. Thus, the mortgage had been made about the year 1822 and limitation for a suit for redemption could not begin to run before the year 1832. Thus, the mortgage had been made about the year 1822 and limitation for a suit for redemption could not begin to run before the year 1832. The suit was thus well within time from the date when the cause of action first arose, and it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to seek the aid of any acknowledgment under S. 12, Limitation Act. That is what the High Court, Edge C.J. and Tyrrell J., held. The learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the Court, Tyrrell J. concurring, observed, "Holding that view of the case, it is immaterial to consider the question of whether there has been any acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act." Having made that observation, he went on to say: "However, as I have formed an opinion about that, it would probably be better that I should express it." He expressed that opinion thus: I have no doubt that the written statement of the Collector in the action of 1866 signed and verified by him was an acknowledgment which comes within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act, and that it is binding upon the defendants. He was the person who represented the minor defendant and the estate in that action. It appears to me that statement can only mean that the predecessors of the plaintiffs there had mortgaged the property in question to the predecessors of the defendants about forty years before that statement was filed. If it every necessary to rely on an acknowledgment to take this case out of the Limitation Act, I would be prepared to hold that that statement filed by the Collector was certainly an acknowledgment, I do not think it is necessary to go into the question of whether the signed statements made by Durga Prasad of Bulandshabr, the Mukhtar, amount to an acknowledgment within the meaning of the statute or whether he was an agent competent to make an acknowledgment of that kind. 17. As has already been indicated, the written statement, which had been filed by the Collector on 18th May 1866, in the action in the civil Court that was determined in 1866, contained allegations which were similar to the statements made by Durga Prasad and Saheb Singh in 1862 in the settlement proceedings. 17. As has already been indicated, the written statement, which had been filed by the Collector on 18th May 1866, in the action in the civil Court that was determined in 1866, contained allegations which were similar to the statements made by Durga Prasad and Saheb Singh in 1862 in the settlement proceedings. It is clear that whatever was said by the learned Chief Justice on the question of acknowledgment was obiter and wholly unnecessary for the purposes of that case. But, apart from that, the views expressed there cannot support the proposition that is contended for by the plaintiff respondent in the case before us. A written statement filed by the Collector in a suit stands on an entirely different footing from a schedule of debts prepared by him for submission with his own opinion as to which of the debts should be allowed and which should not be allowed to the Court of Wards. As was pointed out by the learned Chief Justice, the Collector was the person who represented the minor defendant and the estate in the action in 1866. Furthermore, the ward in that case being a minor, the Collector had apparently been appointed his guardian. Section 205, North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act (19 of 1873) which was the enactment at that time which in Chap. 6, contained the law relating to the Court of Wards as it stood after amendment by Act 8 of 1879, was as follows: All disqualified proprietors whose property is in charge of the Court of Wards and for whom guardians have been appointed, shall sue and be sued in civil Courts by and in the name of their guardians. Provided that no such suit shall be instituted, defended, compromised or otherwise dealt with by any such guardian without the previous sanction of the Court of Wards. Disqualified proprietors, whose property is in charge of the Court of Wards, and for whom guardians have not been appointed, shall sue and be sued in civil Courts by and in the name of the Collector of the District in which the suit is brought. 18. Thus, from whatever point of view the matter is looked at, the Collector, when he filed the written statement in 1866, was clearly "an agent duly authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of Expl. 2 to S. 19, Limitation Act. 18. Thus, from whatever point of view the matter is looked at, the Collector, when he filed the written statement in 1866, was clearly "an agent duly authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of Expl. 2 to S. 19, Limitation Act. He was not only representing the minor defendant and the estate, but was also acting with the sanction, and under the authority, of the Court of Wards. It may be pointed out that under the law now in force the Collector is the representative of the Court of Wards in all suits by virtue of S. 55, Court of Wards Act. 19. The next case relied upon is ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah. The facts, briefly, were these. One Laik Singh, who was the owner of an estate, borrowed a sum of Rupees 7000 from a firm called Gopalji Kishen Das and executed, on 20th June 1876, a bond for that sum in favour of the firm, The bond was registered. It declared that the debt would be payable on 1st November 1876. The firm also held a mortgage bond for Rs. 14,000 executed by Laik Singh in their favour on 25th January 1875. Laik Singh died and was succeeded by his widow and, on her death, the estate passed to Laik Singh's nephew, Pirthi Singh. Owing to unsoundness of mind, Pirthi Singh was found to be incompetent to manage his property, and the Collector of the district consequently appointed Pirthi Singh's wife, Raj Kuar, to be sarbarahkar of the estate. She was not appointed her husband's guardian under Act 35 of 1858. On 12th February 1880, she executed a power of attorney in favour of one Ajudhia Prasad, and three other persons, appointing them to be her am-mukhtars in connection with her husband's property, of which she was in possession as sarbarahkar as well as some property of which she was the owner in her own right. One Rani Kishori brought a suit against the firm of bond-holders, Gopalji Kishen Das, and in that suit, on 17th May 1881, a prohibitory order was issued to the bond-holders attaching the bond of 20th June 1876. One Rani Kishori brought a suit against the firm of bond-holders, Gopalji Kishen Das, and in that suit, on 17th May 1881, a prohibitory order was issued to the bond-holders attaching the bond of 20th June 1876. In the course of those proceedings, the Court, evidently with the object of obviating the risk of the debt due under the bond becoming barred by time, summoned Ajudhia Prasad, as mukhtar-am of Raj Kuar, and examined him on 14th October 1882. In his statement Ajudhia Prasad made a clear acknowledgment of the liability under the bond. Raj Kuar remained the sarbarahkar of her husband's estate till her husband's death in 1887 when she succeeded to the estate as his heir. She then petitioned, u/s 194(g) of Act 19 of 1873, that the estate be taken under the charge of the Court of Wards and this was done. On 7th March 1887, Beti Maharani purchased the bond of 20th June 1876 at a sale in execution of a decree against Gopalji Kishen Das and brought a suit on its basis on 6th November 1888. Laik Singh's estate being under the management of the Court of Wards, with Raj Kuar as the ward, the Collector of the district, as representing the Court of Wards, was impleaded as the defendant. The bond being a registered one, the term of limitation was six years. The suit had, however, been brought more than 12 years after the date fixed in the bond for payment. The Collector raised the plea of limitation. The plaintiff thus had to prove circumstances which interfered with the running of time. The bond being a registered one, the term of limitation was six years. The suit had, however, been brought more than 12 years after the date fixed in the bond for payment. The Collector raised the plea of limitation. The plaintiff thus had to prove circumstances which interfered with the running of time. She relied on three circumstances: (r) the prohibitory order passed by the Subordinate Judge on 17th May 1881, attaching the bond, which order remained in force till 7th March 1887, (2) the acknowledgment of the debt made by Ajudhia Prasad on 14th October 1882, and (3) a notice issued in April 1888 by the Collector, on behalf of the Court of Wards, to Kishen Das, which was in the following words: Whereas the riasat of Harchandpur, Tehsil Phaphund, is under the management of the Court of Wards, and it has been ascertained that money is due to you by the raises of Harchandpur, therefore notice is hereby given to you to attend either in person or through a mukhtar at the Collector's office at Etawah in my Court on 17th April 1888 at 10 A. M., together with the deeds relating to the accounts, and you will be questioned about the debt. 20. It was contended by the plaintiff, Beti Maharani that in this notice there was an acknowledgment of the existence of the liability under the bond within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. The Court of first instance decided against the plaintiff her plea based on the acknowledgment made by Ajodhia Prasad. It held on a construction of the power of attorney of 12th February 1880, that Ajudhia Prasad was not an "agent duly authorized in this behalf" within the meaning of S. 19, Explanation II, Limitation Act. It, however, held in favour of the plaintiff on the other two pleas raised by her. It, accordingly decreed the suit. The Court of Wards appealed, and this Court agreed with the first Court in holding that Ajodhia Prasad was not a duly authorized agent of the Sarbarahkar within the meaning of S. 19, Explanation II, Limitation Act, but differed on the other two questions. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was dismissed as being barred by time. The plaintiff, Beti Maharani, then appealed to His Majesty in Council. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was dismissed as being barred by time. The plaintiff, Beti Maharani, then appealed to His Majesty in Council. Their Lordship of the Privy Council pointed out that the plaintiff could not succeed by establishing only one of the circumstances relied upon by her, but had to prove at least two and observed: If there has been a valid acknowledgment by Ajudhia, and also by the Court of Wards, as contended, the right of suit is saved, or if the attachment prevented the running of time and there has been either acknowledgment by Ajudhia or by the Court of Wards, there is the same result. But, unless the plaintiff can establish one of those combinations of events, the suit is barred. 21. Their Lordships agreed with the decision of the Courts in India with regard to the acknowledgment of Ajudhia, and they agreed with the decision of the High Court on the other two points. The result was that the decree made by the High Court, dismissing the suit as time barred, was upheld. When dealing with the question arising out of Ajudhia's acknowledgment their Lordships observed that the authority of the sarbarahkar herself seemed very doubtful. They pointed out that the office of sarbarahkar appeared to have regard to the estate, and not to the person or the personal property of the landholder, and that, in these circumstances, it was difficult to see how a sarbarahkar, not being guardian could be considered to have authority to admit a personal liability, such as was created by the bond in question. Their Lordships, however, held that it was clear that, even if Raj Kuar had any such authority, she did not delegate it to Ajudhia. The portion of their Lordships judgment which is relied upon is that dealing with the acknowledgment contained according to the plaintiff Beti Maharani, in the notice issued by the Collector in April 1888. The actual decision was that it was impossible to hold that the words of the notice necessarily referred to the debt due under the bond in suit and so constituted an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the particular right sued for as was required by S. 19, Limitation Act. The actual decision was that it was impossible to hold that the words of the notice necessarily referred to the debt due under the bond in suit and so constituted an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the particular right sued for as was required by S. 19, Limitation Act. It was pointed out that the notice was addressed, not to the plaintiff, but to Kishen Das, and that there was the mortgage bond of 25th January 1875 executed by Laik Singh in favour of Kishen Das. It was held that, in this state of facts, it was impossible for the plaintiff to contend that the general words of the notice were not satisfied by reference to the mortgage bond. 22. Their Lordships, however, in the course of their judgment on this part of the case, observed that the statement in the notice that it had been ascertained that money was due from the Raises of Harchandpur would, if it could be applied to any particular debt, be an acknowledgment of liability to pay whatever might be found due on account of that debt. It is to be noted, however, that their Lordships, in the circumstances of that case, treated the notice as having been given by the Court of Wards, and observed "but it must be taken that the Court's act would bind the ward Raj Kuar and that the notice is the act of the Court." Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has contended that these observations of their Lordships establish the proposition that every act of the Collector, done on any occasion, in connexion with any work, in his capacity of the person immediately in charge of the estate, is necessarily an act of the Court of Wards. We are unable to agree that their Lordships intended to lay down any such broad rule. The notice in the case before their Lordships having been the act of the Court of Wards any acknowledgment contained therein would clearly have been within S. 19, Expln. 2, Limitation Act. We are unable to agree that their Lordships intended to lay down any such broad rule. The notice in the case before their Lordships having been the act of the Court of Wards any acknowledgment contained therein would clearly have been within S. 19, Expln. 2, Limitation Act. In the case before us, all that happened was that the Collector, in compliance with the provisions of S. 17, Court of Wards Act, issued notices calling upon persons having claims to notify such claim in accordance with the law, and, in obedience to S. 19 of the Act, had a list of the claims so notified prepared by his office and on that list recorded his own opinions as to which of the debts should be allowed, and which should be disallowed, by the Court of Wards, and submitted that list together with his opinions to the Court of Wards for such action as it thought fit. We are not able to see how this act of the Collector, the preparation of the list and the recording of his opinions thereon for the consideration of the Court of Wards can be regarded as an act of the Court of Wards. The argument, if accepted, would lead to the result that the Court of Wards, under S. 19, Court of Wards Act, submits proposals to itself for confirmation. In our judgment, what was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah was that an acknowledgment of liability made by the Collector, on an occasion when, in the circumstances of the particular case, he is found to have been acting as the representative and the agent of the Court of Wards, is an acknowledgment by an agent duly authotised in that behalf within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. 23. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has argued that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah has been interpreted in this Court in the sense in which he asks us to interpret it, and has cited the cases in ('08) 30 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah has been interpreted in this Court in the sense in which he asks us to interpret it, and has cited the cases in ('08) 30 All. 422 : 5 A.L.J. 375 : 1908 A.W.N. 175 (F.B.), Ram Charan Das v. Gaya Prasad and ('38) 25 AIR 1938 A11. 217 : 175 I.C. 556 : ILR (1938) All. 363 : 1938 A.L.J. 252 (F.B.), Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal Singh, both of which were heard by a Bench of three Judges. In the first of these cases the question was as to the effect of an acknowledgment that had been made by the mother and natural guardian of certain minors. Stanley C.J. held that the relation of guardian and ward resembled rather that of trustee and cestui que trust than that of principal and agent and that a guardian could not be considered the authorised agent of his ward for the purpose of making an acknowledgment of a debt on behalf of his ward within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. The other two members of the Bench, Banerji and Richards JJ. on the other hand, held that when a guardian acting within the scope of his authority and for the benefit of a minor makes an acknowledgment of a debt, such acknowledgment is by an agent duly authorised in this behalf and gives a fresh start for the computation of limitation, It is obvious that the point which has arisen before as or the point which arose in ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah did not even remotely arise in that case. ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah was mentioned only by way of analogy. The learned Chief Justice pointed out that the Court of Wards is the creature of the Legislature and derives its authority by statute, and that it acted under line authority of the Legislature and not under the authority of the ward of anybody else. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has relied on the following passages in the judgment of Banerji J. at p. 437 of the report: In ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has relied on the following passages in the judgment of Banerji J. at p. 437 of the report: In ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah their Lordships of the Privy Council were of opinion that an acknowledgment by the Court of Wards saves limitation. They observed: "If there has been a valid acknowledgment by Ajudhia and also by the Court of wards, as contended, the right of suit is saved...." They held that the act of the Court of Wards would bind the ward. The Court of Wards not being the party liable for the debt, an acknowledgment of debt by it such as saves limitation can only be an acknowledgment as agent of the ward. This Court has held in ('88) 1888 A.W.N. 187, Kamla Kuar v. Har Sahai that an acknowledgment by the Court of Wards gives a fresh start for the computation of limitation. 24. It seems to us to be clear that these observations of the learned Judge do not support the proposition contended for by the plaintiff-respondent before us The point raised by the appellant is not that an acknowledgment by the Court of Wards is not effective for the purposes of S. 19, Limitation Act. Richards J. made these observations at pp. 444-445 of the report: It clearly appears from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah that their Lordships were of opinion that the acknowledgment of the Collector acting on behalf of the Court of Wards would bind the minor whose estate was under the management of the Court, In such a case it seems to me that the Collector must be regarded as the agent appointed by law to act for the minor or (which is really the same thing), the act of the Collector must be looked upon as the act of the minor. 25. It is sufficient to say that the learned Judge recognises that the Collector, when making the acknowledgment, must be acting on behalf of the Court of Wards. 25. It is sufficient to say that the learned Judge recognises that the Collector, when making the acknowledgment, must be acting on behalf of the Court of Wards. In other words, the Collector must, when making the statement which is relied upon as an acknowledgment, be acting in circumstances which justify the conclusion that his act was the Act of the Court of Wards itself. In our opinion, the case is no authority for the proposition put forward on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent in the present case. In the second of the cases mentioned above L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal Singh, the question which arose for consideration, as stated in the judgment, was "whether an acknowledgment made after the expiry of the prescribed period, but during an excluded period, excluded by a special and local Act, can form an acknowledgment to extend limitation under S. 19, Limitation Act." It arose thus. A promissory note was executed in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants on 29th July 1927. In the ordinary course, therefore, the creditors had time to sue on the note up to 29th July 1930. The estate of the debtor was subsequently taken under the superintendence of the Court of Wards and the notices prescribed by S. 17, Court of Wards Act, were published on 3rd August 1929. The plaintiffs duly notified their claim and the Collector, on 13th October 1930, recommended that their claim should be allowed, and the Board of Revenue, on 30th October 1930, passed orders accepting the recommendation of the Collector. The debt due to the plaintiffs was, however, not paid and the estate was released on 21st December 1931. The plaintiffs thereafter brought the suit giving rise to the appeal on 3rd January 1933. The plaintiffs not only relied on the recommendation of the Collector and its acceptance by the Board of Revenue-which was the Court of Wards-in October 1930 as an acknowledgment, but further contended that, although the acknowledgment had been made more than three years after the date of the promissory note, it was a good acknowledgment as it had been made during a period which was, under S. 52, Court of Wards Act, to be excluded in computing the period of limitation applicable to the suit. The contention was not accepted and it was held that S. 19, Limitation Act, cannot apply to an acknowledgment made after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed but during the period excluded by S. 52, Court of Wards Act. In the course of the judgment, it was observed that the lower appellate Court had held that "the powers of a Collector in regard to claims are limited by S. 19, Court of Wards Act, where a Collector can only allow or reject a particular claim, but cannot acknowledge it as an agent or representative of his ward," and that the second ground of appeal contested that finding. It was then observed that the contrary had been held in ('88) 1888 A.W.N. 187, Kamla Kuar v. Har Sahai and in ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah and that "this was abundant authority for the proposition that the Collector in charge of the Court of Wards was the duly authorized agent of the defendants for the purpose of making such an acknowledgment. 26. Now, in the first place, these observations were obiter in view of the question which, according to the judgment, had arisen for decision. In the second place, as has been shown above, the decisions in ('88) 1888 A.W.N. 187, Kamla Kuar v. Har Sahai and in ('95) 17 All. 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. 551 (P.C.), Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah, do not lay down any such broad proposition as is stated in the observations quoted above. Attention seems to have been concentrated on the question whether an acknowledgment made after the expiry of the period prescribed for the suit, but during a period excluded by a special and local Act, can be treated as an acknowledgment extending limitation under S. 19, Limitation Act, and the Bench having arrived at a conclusion adverse to the plaintiffs-appellants on that question, the matter mentioned in the obiter dicta quoted above was, in all likelihood, not fully argued and did not call for careful consideration. In our judgment, the case cannot be considered to be an authority for the proposition which learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has asked us to accept. Learned counsel has next cited ('16) 3 AIR 1916 Cal. 107 : 34 I.C. 205 : 43 Cal. In our judgment, the case cannot be considered to be an authority for the proposition which learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has asked us to accept. Learned counsel has next cited ('16) 3 AIR 1916 Cal. 107 : 34 I.C. 205 : 43 Cal. 211, Rashbehary Lal v. Anand Ram. It was held in that case that the Bengal Court of Wards Act of 1879 did not contain any express power authorizing the Court to execute promissory notes. It was further held that there could be no doubt on the authorities that the Court bad power to give an acknowledgment so as to give a new period of limitation under S. 19, Limitation Act. This, again, does not help the plaintiff-respondent. 27. Lastly, reliance has been placed on ('10) 34 Mad. 221 : 6 I.C. 407 : 20 M.L.J. 808, Kondamodalu Linga Reddi v. Alluri Sarvarayudu. The facts of that case, so far as they are material for our present purpose, were these. The appellant, who was the minor proprietor of an estate, was sued - under the guardianship of the Court of Wards-for the recovery of a certain sum of money on the basis of certain promissory notes, which had been executed by the appellant's mother in 1897 and in 1898. The allegation of the plaintiff was that the moneys had been borrowed by the appellant's mother on behalf of the estate. Subsequently, the management of the estate was assumed by the Court of Wards. The plaintiff demanded payment of the money due to him and threatened to sue. Thereupon he received, from time to time down to 1903, acknowledgments in writing from the Collector "as agent of the Court of Wards." The debt was subsequently repudiated and the plaintiff instituted the suit on 3rd November 1903. The defendant pleaded limitation and contended that the acknowledgments relied upon by the plaintiff were not acknowledgments within S. 19, Limitation Act, and that they had been made without authority. The Court considered the enactments applicable to the territories within their jurisdiction and observed that the duties and obligation of the Court of Wards were not limited to the education of the minor and included the due preservation of the estate. The Court considered the enactments applicable to the territories within their jurisdiction and observed that the duties and obligation of the Court of Wards were not limited to the education of the minor and included the due preservation of the estate. It was further observed that, having regard to the preamble and the general scope of the Act, the Court of wards must be held to have the power to make an acknowledgment of a debt which would bind the ward and give a new starting point for limitation. Lower down, the learned Judges observed that an acknowledgment by a Collector, as agent of the Court of Wards, is equally binding. So far, if we may say so with great respect, no exception can be taken to the opinions expressed in that judgment, and they do not support the contention put forward on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent before us. Learned counsel, however, relies on a subsequent paragraph which is in these words. Section 32 of Regn. 5 of 1804 no doubt requires the confirmation of the Court of Wards of any decision of the Collector as to the allowance of claims, whilst S. 17 requires the permission of the Court of Wards in writing for the payment of any private debt. But we do not think these provisions restrict the power of the payment of any private debt. But we do not think these provisions restrict the power of the Collector to give an acknowledgment which would save limitation, a power which in our opinion, comes within the scope of his authority as agent of the Court of Wards. 28. No reasons are given for the wide proposition laid down in the second sentence of the paragraph quoted above and, with profound respect, we are unable to agree for the reasons which we have already given in this judgment. The result is that in our judgment the Collector, when he formulated his proposals and recorded them on the schedule of debts, Ex. 1, on 20th May 1928, for submission to the Court of Wards, was not "an agent duly authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. The suit is therefore not saved from limitation. The result is that in our judgment the Collector, when he formulated his proposals and recorded them on the schedule of debts, Ex. 1, on 20th May 1928, for submission to the Court of Wards, was not "an agent duly authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. The suit is therefore not saved from limitation. In view of the conclusion at which we have arrived on the first point raised on behalf of the defendant appellant, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the second question, namely whether the entries in the schedule Ex. 1 amount to an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. Our decision with regard to the contention based on S. 19, Limitation Act, being adverse to the plaintiff, the suit must be held to be barred by time. It is, therefore, not necessary to express any opinion on the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act, as has already been explained. If the plaintiff's contention based on either of the two sections is not accepted, the suit is barred. It only remains to make it clear that this judgment is confined to the facts as they existed at the time of the institution of the present suit and that we express no opinion as to whether or not the plaintiff would be entitled, in the event of the estate being released by the Court of Wards, to claim the exclusion of any period of time under S. 52, U.P. Court of Wards Act, for the purpose of any suit that he may be advised to bring after such release. For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and dismiss the suit with costs throughout.