JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the Defendants Nos. 19 to 55, and arises out of a suit for recovery of possession of certain fisheries or beels comprised in a number of plots within what is described as Kakunakhai Haor in Jaintia Pargana in the District of Sylhet on declaration of Plaintiff's title and status as a land-holder under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, (Regulation I of 1886). The suit was decreed by both Courts below and hence this appeal. There were numerous Defendants in the suit, and they were in fact sued in a representative capacity with leave duly obtained from the Court under Or. 1, r. 8 of the CPC as representing the inhabitants of certain villages, who, according to the Plaintiff, claimed a common interest in the fisheries. Of these, Defendants Nos. 1 to 12 are persons between whom or whose predecessors and the Plaintiff there had been a previous suit in respect of the same fisheries in which the Plaintiff had admittedly obtained a decree declaring his title and status. It is conceded on behalf of the Appellants that so far as these Defendants Nos. 1 to 12 are concerned, that decision is binding on them, and they have not joined in the appeal to this Court, which, as already stated, is on behalf of Defendants Nos. 19 to 55 who were not parties to the previous suit. The facts of the case may be shortly stated. It appears that these fisheries were the subject-matter of successive periodic settlements by Government since the year 1838. The first settlement was from that year to 1856, the second from 1856 to 1879 and the third from 1879 to 1896. In 1896, a fresh settlement was granted by patta No. 126 of that year for a period of 10 years to two persons, Mahtab and Umer Ali. As these pattadars defaulted in the payment of revenue, the fisheries were put up to sale for recovery of the arrears and were pur chased by two brothers Moharam Ali and Atar Ali. On Moharam's death his eight annas share devolved on his son Abdul Samad, the person from whom the present Plaintiff claims to derive his interest. As these pattadars defaulted in the payment of revenue, the fisheries were put up to sale for recovery of the arrears and were pur chased by two brothers Moharam Ali and Atar Ali. On Moharam's death his eight annas share devolved on his son Abdul Samad, the person from whom the present Plaintiff claims to derive his interest. It is said that in 1906 or 1907 there were certain breaches of the terms of the engagement with Government, and the matter was finally settled by Abdul Samad's name being allowed to be mutated in the jamabandi in respect of the disputed fisheries. The Appellants allege that this was in fact a re-settlement with Abdul Samad for the unexpired term of the patta of 1896. It is the Plaintiff's case, on the other hand, that the settlement of 1896 was with the pattadars as land-holders under sec. 8 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, and that as under sec. 9, a permanent, heritable and transferable interest was created thereby, neither the sale for arrears of revenue nor the subsequent arrangement with Abdul Samad alone, affected or could affect the title and status of the latter, and that Government were consequently not entitled to make a fresh settlement with any other party in supersession of the claims of Abdul Samad. 2. In 1918, however, it is alleged, Government purported to settle the fisheries with four other persons for a period of 20 years by patta No. 1 of 1918. These persons were Umed Ali, Defendant No. 1 in this suit, and three others, Sultan, Wuzir and Alim, predecessors of Defendants Nos. 2 to 12. After obtaining settlement, these persons dispossessed Abdul Samad, and while he was still out of possession, he sold his right, title and interest to the present Plaintiff, Mobarak Ali, on the 13th November, 1929. Shortly thereafter Mobarak Ali instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 1625 of 1929 against the said four persons for declaration of his title and recovery of possession. The suit was decreed on contest and the decree was confirmed in appeal, and on the 30th October, 1931, the Plaintiff obtained delivery of possession of the fisheries thereunder. Shortly thereafter Mobarak Ali instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 1625 of 1929 against the said four persons for declaration of his title and recovery of possession. The suit was decreed on contest and the decree was confirmed in appeal, and on the 30th October, 1931, the Plaintiff obtained delivery of possession of the fisheries thereunder. He continued to remain in possession until the 7th February, 1937, when it is alleged he was dispossessed by the Defendants in the present suit, and it is this dispossession which led him to commence this action on the 1st October, 1937. 3. The main defence was that the fisheries had been settled as such and not as land, and that, therefore, neither the Plaintiff nor any of his predecessors-in-interest could acquire the status of a land-holder in respect thereof under the Regulation. It was quite open, therefore, to Government to make a fresh settlement with another party on the expiry of a previous settlement, and the patta which was granted to Umed Ali and others in 1918 could consequently not be impeached. That patta, it was added, though it was in the name of only four persons, was really intended for the benefit of the whole body of villages concerned. Secondly, it was contended that the suit was barred by limitation, and that the Plaintiff's title had been extinguished under sec. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act by reason of the fact that he had been out of possession for more than 12 years since about the time when the patta was granted to Umed Ali and others. 4. Both these pleas were negatived by the Courts below. The same contentions have been urged before me in this appeal. Taking the point of limitation first, it is difficult to see how the suit may be said to be barred either under Art. 142 or under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, if the latter may be supposed to apply at all. Admittedly the Plaintiff got delivery of possession under the decree in Title Suit No. 1625 of 1929 on the 30th October, 1931, and this was not symbolical possession through Court, but actual physical khas possession, as found by both the learned Munsif and the learned Additional District Judge. Admittedly the Plaintiff got delivery of possession under the decree in Title Suit No. 1625 of 1929 on the 30th October, 1931, and this was not symbolical possession through Court, but actual physical khas possession, as found by both the learned Munsif and the learned Additional District Judge. The Plaintiff was subsequently dispossessed on the 7th of February, 1937, which was well within 12 years of the date of institution of the suit. Mr. Das on behalf of the Appellants relies on sec. 28 of the Limitation Act, but I do not see how this can avail his clients at all. The argument is that the Plaintiff was out of possession since sometime after the grant of the patta of 1918 till the 30th October, 1931, covering a period of more than 12 years, and that, therefore, his right to the disputed property had been extinguished by operation of sec. 28. The argument, in my opinion, is wholly misconceived. Sec. 28 provides: At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. 5. It cannot be said that in the present case the Plaintiff has allowed a period of 12 years to elapse since the date of his dispossession without bringing a suit for possession. As already pointed out, there was the suit of 1929, and it is not suggested that that suit was not within 12 years of the dispossession. In my opinion, the institution of that suit followed by a decree therein was sufficient to bar the operation of sec. 28. Mr. Das argues that as his clients were not parties to the suit of 1929 it cannot bar the operation of limitation as against them. In my opinion, there is no point whatever in this contention. So far as his clients are concerned, it is sufficient for the Plaintiff to show that he was in possession within 12 years of the commencement of the present suit, and it is not open to the Appellants to ignore the fact that the Plaintiff had actually obtained possession on declaration of his title in the previous suit. It is perfectly clear that on the facts found by both the Courts below it is not open to the Appellants to make the case that they had acquired title by themselves by adverse possession. It is perfectly clear that on the facts found by both the Courts below it is not open to the Appellants to make the case that they had acquired title by themselves by adverse possession. So far as they are concerned, the concurrent finding is that their possession did not commence at any time prior to the 7th February, 1937. The prior dispossession following on the grant of the patta of 1918 was only by the persons to whom that patta had been granted, and none of the other Defendants in the present suit had any hand in that dispossession. It seems to me that this one tact should be sufficient to put the other Defendants, among whom the present Appellants are included, out of Court. The first point raised on behalf of the Appellants must consequently be overruled. 6. As regards the question of title, it is contended that neither the Plaintiff nor his predecessors could acquire the status of land-holders under the terms of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. That argument is based on the ground that the fisheries had been settled as fisheries, and not as land, it being conceded that if they had been settled as land, secs. 8 and 9 would apply, and in that case, as I shall presently explain, there could be no answer to the Plaintiff's case in this behalf. In support of the contention that the disputed properties had been settled as fisheries, reliance is placed upon the rules which were in force under the Regulation at the time the patta of 1896 was granted. A reference to these rules, however, does not bear this out. It seems to me fairly clear from the rules that the ordinary rule was that fisheries could not be settled as land in the Brahmaputra Valley, but an exception was made for the Districts of Cachar and Sylhet. This exception was subsequently taken away or modified in the case of Cachar by later rules, but so far as Sylhet is concerned, no modification was made and as the present case is concerned with fisheries situated in the District of Sylhet, there is no reason to think that the exceptional provisions were not applicable or actually applied, in respect of the settlement, made since the year 1896. It is provided in the rules for Sylhet that small fishery mahals, the area of which is included within the limits of the mauza, should be entered in the jamabandi among the mahals which that mauza contains. They can be classed in the column for uncultivated land, a note being made in red ink to show that they are fisheries. The receipts from them will be treated as land revenue. 7. There can be no doubt that the intention was to treat these fisheries as land for the purposes of settlement. It is unfortunate that the original patta has not been produced. In that case the document itself might have set all controversy at rest. It may be that the Plaintiff, not being the original grantee, but a purchaser, was not in a position to produce the document, but in lieu of it, he produced the jamabandi of the mouza. concerned as well as the kabuliyat by which the grant was accepted. The jamabandi clearly negatives the contention of the Appellants and shows that the settlement was on the basis of the fishery being treated as land. As regards the kabuliyat, Mr. Das seeks to avoid the effect of it by saying that it was in a form which was common both in the case of settlements of land and settlements of interests other than land. That may be so, but still there is reference to the jamabandi in the kabuliyat, and that certainly carries the Plaintiff a long way. In these circumstances, I am not prepared to reverse the finding of the Courts below that the fisheries had been settled as land, and if that was so, it must attract the provisions of secs. 8 and 9 of the Regulation. 8. Mr. Das next contends that even if sec. 8 of the Regulation be held to apply, the case is one under cl. (6) and not cl. (a), and that the Plaintiff as a transferee from a grantee or the heir of a grantee cannot claim the benefit of sub-sec. (2), as, it is said, that he must, in order to be entitled to the status of a land-holder. Cl. (6) and not cl. (a), and that the Plaintiff as a transferee from a grantee or the heir of a grantee cannot claim the benefit of sub-sec. (2), as, it is said, that he must, in order to be entitled to the status of a land-holder. Cl. (a) provides that any person who has, before commencement of this Regulation, held immediately under the Government for ten years continuously any land not included either in a permanently settled estate or in a revenue-free estate, and who has during that period paid to Government the revenue due thereon, or held the same under an express exemption from revenue, shall be deemed to have acquired the status of a landholder in respect of the land. Cl. (b) confers a similar status on any person who has, whether before or after the commencement of this Regulation, acquired any such land under a lease granted by or on behalf of the Government the term of which is not less than ten years. Sub-sec. (2) then says that when land held by one person has come immediately by transfer or succession to be held by another, the holding shall, for the purposes of sub-sec. (1), cl. (a), be deemed to have been continuous, and the latter person may, in reckoning the length of his holding, add the holding of the former to his own. 9. Admittedly in the present case the Plaintiff acquired his title by transfer from Abdul Samad. Abdul Samad was, again, a person who was not one of the original grantees of the patta of 1896. But he was a successor and heir of Moharram Ali, who was one of the persons who had purchased the property at a revenue sale on the default of the original grantees. In order, therefore, that the Plaintiff may show that he has held the disputed land immediately under. Government for ten years continuously, he must be in a position to bring himself under sub-sec. (2) and tack on to the length of his own holding that of his predecessors. This sub-section, however, will not apply unless the case falls under cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1), but cl. (a) applies only in the case of settlements obtained before the commencement of the Regulation. 9. In answer to this argument, Mr. (2) and tack on to the length of his own holding that of his predecessors. This sub-section, however, will not apply unless the case falls under cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1), but cl. (a) applies only in the case of settlements obtained before the commencement of the Regulation. 9. In answer to this argument, Mr. Ghose points out that the patta No. 126 of 1896 was not a new settlement at all and that the grantees under this settlement were persons who had in fact already acquired the status of land-holders under the provisions of cl. (a). He refers to the jamabandi and points out that there is express reference in it to all the three earlier settlements beginning from 1838. In my opinion, this is a complete answer to the contention based on the terms of sec. 8. 10. The last point urged by Mr. Das was that notwithstanding the terms of the Regulation it was open to Government under the Crown Grants Act to make a settlement on any terms they liked. For this purpose it was not necessary for him to refer to the Crown Grants Act, because sec. 9 itself provides by cl. (c) that a land-holder shall have a permanent, heritable and transferable right for use and occupancy in his land, subject to the special conditions of any engagement into which the land-holder may have entered with the Government. No special incidents have been proved in this case, which would in any way derogate from the ordinary provisions of the Regulation. The result is that in my opinion the Plaintiff must be held to have established his status as a land-holder. No title could, therefore, vest in the grantees under the patta of 1918, and the Defendants are not entitled to oust the Plaintiff from the dispossessed fisheries. The appeal accordingly fails and must be dismissed with costs.