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1942 DIGILAW 55 (ALL)

Emperor v. Iqbal Krishna Kappor

1942-04-08

ISMAIL, MULLA

body1942
JUDGMENT Ismail and Mulla, JJ. - These two connected appeals were disposed off by one judgment by the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore, as they involved an identical point of law. There is no controversy about the facts. The Respondents Messrs. Iqbal Krishna Kapoor and Krishen Chandra Beri of Cawnpore were arrested and committed to jail custody under Sub-rules (1) and (2) respectively of Rule 129 of the Defence of India Rules. By an order dated August 1, 1941 the Respondents were released on the following conditions: (1) Shall reside and remain within the limits of police station Kotwali district Cawnpore and shall not leave those limits without the written permission of the Superintendent of Police Cawnpore, (2) shall report his presence in person lat police station Kotwali once a week until further orders, (3) Shall refrain from any activities in any way connected with the Congress Satyagraha campaign. 2. Although the order is dated August 1, the actual release of Mr. Beri was effected on August 26, 1941 and of Mr. Kapoor on September 7. It is conceded that the Respondents complied with the conditions Nos. 1 and 3. They however did not report their presence at the police station as provided by condition (2). The senior Superintendent of Police Cawnpore made two separate complaints against the Respondents on the allegation that they committed an offence punishable under Rule 26(6) of the Defence of India Rules inasmuch as they failed to report their presence at the Police station. The trial Court found them guilty and convicted them. The learned Sessions Judge on appeal took a contrary view and held that the Respondents had committed no offence. He accordingly acquitted them. The Provincial Government has now appealed to this Court against the two orders of acquittal. 3. The question for consideration is a simple one and its decision depends on (sic) interpretation of Rule 26(1) (a) and (h). 4. Rule 26 deals with restriction of movements of suspected persons and empowers the Government to pass restriction and detention orders. Sub-rule (e) of the aforesaid rule has conferred authority on the Government to make an order requiring le suspected person to "notify his movements" in such manner at such times and o such authority or person as may e specified in the order. It is (sic) by learned Government Advocate that condition (2) of the order is covered by Sub-rule (e). It is (sic) by learned Government Advocate that condition (2) of the order is covered by Sub-rule (e). In our opinion his convention is untenable. To notify is movements cannot be extended to (sic) "shall report his presence". The Respondents were directed to reside and remain within the limits of police station (sic). It follows therefore that they could move about freely within the specified limits without restriction of any kind. They could, if they so desired, visit different parts within the sanctioned area and were placed under no obligation to obtain previous permission of any officer for that purpose. If however they wanted to leave those limits, they were bound to obtain a written permission of the Superintendent of Police of Cawnpore district. Rule 26 does not empower the Government to call upon the suspected person to report his presence periodically. If the intention was to place such a restriction upon him, a clear provision to that effect would have been made in the rule. By a reference to Section 10 of the Criminal Tribes Act (Act 6 of 1924) we find the following provisions. 10. (i) The Provincial Government....may....issue....either or both of the following directions. (a) report himself at fixed interval. (b) notify his place of residence and any change or intended change of residence and any absence or intended absence from his residence. 5. The above rules are very comprehensive. Under those rules it would be the duty of the party concerned to report himself at stated intervals if he were directed to do so. In Rule 26 no such power has been conferred upon the Government and it would not be possible to interpret Rule (e) so as to cover direction (2). This will be imposing an additional burden upon the Respondents which in our judgment is not contemplated by that rule. It is not suggested that the Respondents intended to move out of the limits of Kotwali station. They admittedly remained within those limits during the period mentioned in the complaint. They had therefore nothing to notify at the police station. The dictionary meaning of the expression 'move" is to change place or posture, to stir; to pass or go in any manner or direction from one place or part of space to another. They admittedly remained within those limits during the period mentioned in the complaint. They had therefore nothing to notify at the police station. The dictionary meaning of the expression 'move" is to change place or posture, to stir; to pass or go in any manner or direction from one place or part of space to another. The order does not indicate that the Respondents were under an obligation to inform the authorities of the places visited by them during the week. Their report at the police station could not, therefore, be with the object of notifying their movements. The Respondents, in our judgment, have not contravened Sub-rule (a) by failing to report their presence at the police station. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further as we are in agreement with the learned Sessions Judge with respect to his interpretation of Sub-rule (e). 6. The learned Government Advocate has argued that in any event restriction (2) is covered by Sub-rule (h) which permits orders to be made on a person regulating his conduct in any such particular as may be specified in the order This sub-rule, in our opinion, does not confer any independent power. The order must be made within the limits of Sub-rules (a) to (g) and those orders may be regulated by virtue of Sub-rule (h). If an order does not come within the scope of Sub-rules (a) to (g), it cannot be supported by Sub-rule (h) alone. It cannot be seriously contended that any valid order may be made under Rule (h) which in terms is not covered by any of the preceding sub-rules. 7. We have carefully perused the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and have given our serious consideration to the argument of Learned Counsel for the Crown. We have not overlooked the fact that the Defence of India Rules have been promulgated with a view to conferring exceptional powers upon the executive authorities. In interpreting the rules, however, we would not be justified in extending those powers. Ii other words the rules must be interpreted strictly and the orders made thereunder must be confined within the limits of the rules from which they derive their authority. 8. For the reasons given above we are not prepared to interfere with the orders of the Court below. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The Respondents are on bail. They need not surrender. 8. For the reasons given above we are not prepared to interfere with the orders of the Court below. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The Respondents are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds are discharged.