JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, C.J. and Dar, J. - This is an appeal against a judgment and decree, dated July 6, 1938, of the District Judge of Benares by which he reversed a judgment and decree, dated December 7, 1937, of the City Munsif of Benares in a suit for declaration of certain rights and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with those rights 2. Krishna Lal and his two sons Baldeo Lal and Girdhar Lal lived many years ago as members of a joint Hindu family at Benares. This family worked as Gangaputras of Hindu priests who minister to pilgrims visiting Benares and help them in performance of certain religious ceremonies and in lieu thereof receive offerings from them This family had an extensile and ancestral Birt Jijmani of pilgrims from Nepal, Rajgarh, and Koti and had also held an appointment from the Maharaja of Nepal who used to appoint one of its members by a sanad called Lal Mohar. In addition to this exclusive Birt Jajmani in Nepal, Rajgarh and Koti, the family also held in partnership a Birt Jajmnni with Gatai Dube relating to Kumaun, Almora and Nainital. Girdhar Lal was the last survivor in the family and on December 5, 1907, an agreement was made between him and the ancestors of Defendants Nos. 3 to 10 by which 6/16 share in the Birt Jajmani of Naini Tal, Kumaun and Almora was allotted to Girdhar Lal and 10/16 share to the ancestors of the Defendants Nos. 3 to 10. Girdhar Lal died about the year 1910 and he was succeeded in this Birt Jajmani by his widow Mst. Sarda Kunwar, who was at that time young, inexperienced and a pardanashin widow. Mst. Sarda Kunwar appointed one of her relations Deonath Dube to manage and work the Birt Jajmani for her. Deonath Dube died about the year 1935, leaving a widow Mst. Basanti and three nephews, one of them was Gajanand, After the death of Deo Nath, Gajanand managed and worked the above Birt Jajmani when disputes arose between him and Mst. Sarda Kunwar and as a result Mst. Deonath Dube died about the year 1935, leaving a widow Mst. Basanti and three nephews, one of them was Gajanand, After the death of Deo Nath, Gajanand managed and worked the above Birt Jajmani when disputes arose between him and Mst. Sarda Kunwar and as a result Mst. Sarda Kunwar raised an action in the Court of the City Munsif of Benares on January 9, 1937, for a declaration that she was entitled to the entire Birt Jajmani of Nepal, Rajgarh and Koi and of 6/16 share in the Birt Jajmani of Kumaun, Nainital and Almora for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with her rights in the said Birt Jajmani and for delivery of possession of the Lal Mohar given by the Maharaja of Nepal and of the Bahis in which pilgrims' names, signatures and addresses were recorded. In this suit she made the widow of Deonath and his nephew Gajanand as Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and she made Defendants Nos. 3 to 10 those persons who under the agreement of 1907 held 10/16 share in the Birt Jajmani of Kumaun, Nainital and Almora. The widow of Deo Nath did not make any appearance in this suit and the Defendants Nos. 3 to 10. the holders of 10/16 share in the Birt Jajmani of Kumaun, Almora and Nainital admitted the Plaintiff's claim and the suit was mainly contested by Defendant No. 2, Deo Nath's brother's son A number of pleas were raised by him and among them one was that the right of Birt Jajmani was not a right to any property or to any office and as such the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court. He had also raised other questions of law and fact but they have all been concluded by findings against him and it is not necessary to particularize for the purpose of this appeal. 3. He had also raised other questions of law and fact but they have all been concluded by findings against him and it is not necessary to particularize for the purpose of this appeal. 3. The trial Court found that the Birt Jajmani of Nepal depended upon the will of the Maharaja of Nepal and though as a fact the Maharaja of Nepal had appointed Plaintiff's husband, Girdhar Lal as his priest and though as a fact the Birt Jajmani of Nepal had been in Plaintiff's family for a long time, yet after the death of Girdhar Lal there being no male members in the family and the Plaintiff being a widow, the Maharaja had appointed Deonath as his priest and had given Lal Mohar to him. Consequently the Civil Court could not force the Maharaja of Nepal to accept any one as his priest and the Plaintiff was not entitled to any relief with regard to delivery of Lal Mohar or with raised to the Birt Jajmani of Nepal, Rajgarh, and Koti But the Plaintiff was entitled to the relief which she claimed with regard to the Birt Jajmani of Kumaun, Almora and Nainital, Accordingly the trial Court partly decreed and partly dismissed the claim in the above terms. 4. Against the decision the Defendant No. 2 Gajanand made an appeal to the District Judge of Benares and the Plaintiff Mst. sarda Kunwar filed cross-objections. The learned District Judge agreed with the trial Court that the Plaintiff was not entitled to recover possession of the Lal Mohar of the Maharaja of Nepal which depended upon the wish of the Maharaja of Nepal but disagreeing with the trial Court he expressed the view that if the Plaintiff's action was maintainable she would be entitled to the Birt Jajmani of Rajgarh and Koti and agreeing with the trial Court he held that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the Birt Jajmani of Kumaun, Almora and Nainital But he held that the Plaintiff's claim was not maintainable in law as the right to Birt Jajmani was not a right to any property or office and the Plaintiff's suit was not of the Civil nature which could be enforced in a Civil Court. In arriving at this conclusion he relied upon Baharee Lall v. Baboo, (1867) 2 Agra 80 Durga Prasad v. Genda 1889 A.W.N. 169 Durga Prasad v, Shambhu (1919) 17 A.L.J. 842 Bansi and Others Vs. Kanhaiya and Others, AIR 1921 All 374 and Hanso Pathak v. Hartnan-dil Pathak 1935 A.W.R. 1558 In this view of the matter he dismissed the Plaintiff's claim. 5. The Plaintiff has made this Second Appeal and it is contended before us that the learned District Judge of Benares has entirely misconceived the law which applies to this case and the suit brought by the Plaintiff was a Civil nature and should have been decreed. 6. This is not an action by a priest, Panda or Purohit against a Jajman or client for forcing his services on the client or for recovery of any fee which the client does not wish to pay nor this is an action by a priest against another priest for recovery of any fee which had been paid to the Defendant by some client on personal consideration. This is an action by a legal heir of a Gangaputra or a Panda at Benares for declaration of his right to inheritance and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the Plaintiff's rights and for recovery of possession of the pilgrims' Bahis. 7. It has been found by both the Courts below that the Plaintiff's husband and husband's ancestors had been carrying on from a long time past the work of a hereditary priest at Benares on an expensive scale and they had a large clientele of the usual type which is associated with Birt Jajmani and the Birt Jajmani had descended from father to son in the family. Birt Jajmani is a well known institution in these provinces and has been the subject of consideration in several cases in these provinces as well as in the provinces of Bengal and Bihar. In Lokya and Another Vs. Sulli and Others, AIR 1921 All 286 which was a case of partition of a Birt Jajmani of Mathura Pandas and in which the daughters of the family claimed their share of inheritance by partition, Tudball and Kanhaiya Lal JJ. thus described the nature of Birt Jajmani rights. In Lokya and Another Vs. Sulli and Others, AIR 1921 All 286 which was a case of partition of a Birt Jajmani of Mathura Pandas and in which the daughters of the family claimed their share of inheritance by partition, Tudball and Kanhaiya Lal JJ. thus described the nature of Birt Jajmani rights. This class of property has repeatedly been the, subject matter of decisions by the various Courts in India and the rights of the heirs of these Chaubas and other persons, the owners of a birt jajmani have repeatedly been upheld. In the case of Sukhla v. Bishambhar ILR 39. All. 196, a mortgage of such rights was upheld and in the case of Narayan Lal Gupta v. Chuthan Lal Gupta 15 CLJ 376, the whole subject of these rights was discussed at considerable length by Mr. Justice Mukerji. There is also an unreported decision of a single Judge of this Court in Second Appeal No. 569 of 1903. There can be no doubt that the right of birt jajmani has been held by Courts to be heritable and sometimes transferable 8. In Beni Madho Pragwal Vs. Hira Lal, AIR 1921 All 316 which was a case brought by a Panda at Allahabad who had inherited with the Birt Jajmani a particular kind of flag, to restrain another Panda from using the said flag, at p. 23, Piggot and Kanhaiya Lal JJ. thus explained the nature of a Birt Jajmani right: The right in virtue of which the Plaintiff brings this suit is one of a kind generally described by the expression 'birt jajmani.' It would be easy to cite cases in which a right so described, to receive offerings from pilgrims visiting a particular 'shrine, has been recognised by the Courts in this Province and by this Court, as of the nature of property as being enforceable by suit, as being generally heritable and sometimes as being transferable. We have to consider what the particular right of birt jajmani means in connection with the ceremonial bathing at the confluence of the rivers at Allahabad. Obviously no particular pilgrim can be compelled to seek the ministrations of any particular priest. It has been suggested also that no suit would lie by any particular priest against a pilgrim who had accepted his ministrations for the recovery of any particular fee. Obviously no particular pilgrim can be compelled to seek the ministrations of any particular priest. It has been suggested also that no suit would lie by any particular priest against a pilgrim who had accepted his ministrations for the recovery of any particular fee. This latter argument, whether well founded or not, is of no practical consequence. As a matter of established custom the pilgrims who accept the ministrations of a particular priest in connection with their ceremonial bathing do pay him some remuneration for his services. Probably they would be too much afraid of the possibility of his calling down upon them the divine displeasure if they refused payment of whatever the customary fee may be. Now it is beyond question, that is to say, it is apparent from the evidence on his record, it does not seem to have been seriously denied in the pleadings and it would not be difficult to quote decisions of this Court which proceed on the assumption, hat particular pilgrims are in the habit of seeking out particular priests, or the descendants or representatives of some particular priest with whom they know that their family has dealt for generations. It may be that a pilgrim has greater faith in the due performance of all necessary ceremonies and therefore in the religious benefit derivable from the ceremonial bathing, if he knows that it has been performed under the guidance and with the help of the prayers and ministrations of the representative of the priest with whom his family has been in the habit of dealing The question then is simply whether the Plaintiff is entitled to restrain Beni Madho from making use of an emblem when such use in effect serves as a notice to the illiterate pilgrims that Beni Madho is the representative and successor of Sri Kishan, whereas such representative capacity belongs in law to the Plaintiff Hira Lal. The nearest case to the present, that of Ganesh v. Babu Ram, ILR All. 200 decided by a Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member, proceeds on the assumption that the Birt Jajmani right of pragwala at the sacred confluence of the rivers at Allahabad is a right both heritable and enforceable at law. The nearest case to the present, that of Ganesh v. Babu Ram, ILR All. 200 decided by a Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member, proceeds on the assumption that the Birt Jajmani right of pragwala at the sacred confluence of the rivers at Allahabad is a right both heritable and enforceable at law. It is quite true that this point was not specifically argued in that case but the decision proceeds on the assumption that this was so. 9. In Ram Chander v. Chabbu Lal 1923 A.L.J. 358 which was a case of partition of a Birt Jajmani in a Panda family at Allahabad, Ryees and Daniels, JJ. observed as follows : There can be no doubt that in Beni Madho Pragwal v. Hira Lal 18 A.L.J.R. 679 and in Lokya v. Sulli ILR 43 All. 35 it has been held by a Divisional Bench of this Court that this class of property namely birt jajmani has been the subject-matter of decisions by the various Courts in India, that the rights of owners of birt jajmani have repeatedly been up held and that such rights are heritable and sometimes transferable. 10. And in Lachman Lal Pathak v. Baldeo Lal Thathwar (1917) 42 I.C. 478 which was a case relating to inheritance of Birt Jajmani at Gaya and in which the claim of the heir was recognised and decreed, Chamier C.J. observed as follows: A Gayawal is born a Gayawal but apparently may never have a gaddi. He has no duties which any one can compel him to perform. He is attached to no temple or other building or to any particular place. He has no right to compel any one to accept his ministrations and he cannot be removed from his position. His position appears to me to be not unlike that of a Pragwal at Allahabad or a priest at any other place of pilgrimage, who keeps books in which he enters the names and addresses of those who come to him and has a hereditary connation with different families but cannot compel members of those families to accept his ministrations or prevent them from reporting to other priests at the same place. A somewhat similar case is that of a prohit or Mahabrahman. A somewhat similar case is that of a prohit or Mahabrahman. There seems to be some difference of opinion in Bombay on the subject but it has been held by the Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad High Courts for many years, that in the absence of a deft the contract a prohit or Mahabrahman is not entitled to a decree against a rival prohit or mahabrahman for a shire in the offerings received by him from persons alleged to be jajmanis of the Plaintiff--the ground of the decision being that voluntary offerings may be given to any one to whom the jajmans choose to give them--See Gourmani Debt v. Chairman of the Panihati Municipality (1910) 6 I.C. 864, Dwarka Misir v. Ram Protap Missier (1911) 10 I.C. 41, Oochi v. Ulfat (1898) 20 All. 234 and Saripaka China Mahadeva Vazulu v. Mathura Suryapra Kasam 24 I.C. 204. One result of this view seems to be that the prohitior Mahabrahman holds no 'office'. There appear to me to be many difficulties in the way of holding that the occupant of a Gayawal gaddi has an office hereditary or otherwise, but it is an indisputable fact that for centuries past the gaddi of a Gayawal has been treated either as an office or as property devolving according to the Hindu law of inheritance and it is said that a curious custom of adoption has sprung up according to which a gaddi may pass to an adopted son. It appears to me that if the occupant of a Gayawal's gaddi has not an hereditary office he has a business and that his business is properly capable of being inherited on his death. It is well known that Gayawals send out agents to collect pilgrims and bring them to Gaya. A Gayawal may do a good deal in the way of increasing the number of his clients and improving his 'connection'. Attached to his business is what would be called a good will with reference to an ordinary trade or business. His books are an important part of his stock in trade and are a valuable asset. The result appears to be the same whether a gaddi is an hereditary office or a business. 11. A great deal of controversy exists with regard to some of the incidents connected with Birt Jajmini rights. His books are an important part of his stock in trade and are a valuable asset. The result appears to be the same whether a gaddi is an hereditary office or a business. 11. A great deal of controversy exists with regard to some of the incidents connected with Birt Jajmini rights. Opinions differ this kind of right should be regarded as immoveable property or may be regarded only as a personal property Opinions also differ as to whether the birt jijmani is susceptible of any transfer or of a partial transfer in favour of a person who is otherwise eligible or of no transfer at all. There seems to be a general agreement as we have stated above that this right cannot be enforced against the jajmani nor can it be enforced against any priest, who has received voluntarily a fee from a jijman. But the general statement of law in the cases quoted above namely that Birt Jijmani right is a heritable property and is in some cases transferable is not open to doubt and cannot be seriously challenged. 12. It remains now to consider the cases relied upon by the learned Judge in support of his view. Durga Prasad v, Gettda 1889 A.W.N. 169 and Durga Prasad v. Shambhu (1919) 17 A.L.J. 842 were cases of an auction sale of a Birt Jijmani right and it was held u/s 60, Clause (f) of the CPC this right was not capable of a forced sale which might entail the transfer of right in favour of a person who could not possibly exercise that right. 13. Bansi and Others Vs. Kanhaiya and Others, AIR 1921 All 374 , was a case of Manbirt and not of Birt Jijmani and it related to a dispute as to the division of a voluntary offering made by a client. The judgment in this case was delivered by Tudball J. who also delivered the judgment in Lokya and Another Vs. Sulli and Others, AIR 1921 All 286 and it is obvious from the fact that the same learned Judge was party to both cases that they referred to two different kinds of rights. 14. A Manbrit essentially differs from a Birt Jijmani. In the Manbrit the relation between Jijman and Purohit is a temporary one and there is no fixity or hereditary character about it. 14. A Manbrit essentially differs from a Birt Jijmani. In the Manbrit the relation between Jijman and Purohit is a temporary one and there is no fixity or hereditary character about it. But in Birt Jijmani, especially those relating to Hindu pilgrimages like Muttra, Benares and Allahabad, though it is open to parties to break away the old connection and establish a new one by custom and usage of the country as a matter of practice and as a general rule the connection between Purohit and Jijman is both permanent and hereditary. 15. In Hanso Pathak v. Harmandil Pathak 1935 A.W.R. 1558, which was a suit brought by a son of a Hindu priest at Azamgarh against his father for partition of a joint family property, a question arose whether the two items of property which were purchased by the father from his income as priest should be regarded as an ancestral property or personal property of the father and it was held that they were I he personal property of the father. This was also a case of Manbrit and Sir Shah Sulaiman expressly states that the property in dispute would be the personal property of the father. 16. In our opinion, the right claimed by the Plaintiff is a right in property and the Plaintiff s suit is one of a civil nature and her suit was wrongly dismissed by the learned District Judge and on the findings arrived at by the court below she is entitled to a decree for declaration of her rights and to an injunction against the Defendants and for recovery of possession of the pilgrims' Bahis. 17. But, though the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are to be restrained by an injunction, it is necessary to specify the correct scope of this injunction. The Defendants cannot be prohibited from working as Purohits nor can they be restrained from accepting any pilgrim coming from Rajgir, Koli, Almora, Kumaun and Nainital as their jijman, provided the jijman of his own free will with full knowledge of the facts chooses to accept the Defendants as their Panda. But the Defendants cannot be permitted to work under name and colour of the Plaintiff's Birt Jijmani nor can they be permitted to use Bahis, marks and other paraphernalia associated with the Plaintiff's Birt Jijmani. 18. But the Defendants cannot be permitted to work under name and colour of the Plaintiff's Birt Jijmani nor can they be permitted to use Bahis, marks and other paraphernalia associated with the Plaintiff's Birt Jijmani. 18. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decree of both the courts below and in lieu thereof grant to the Plaintiff the following decree : (1) It is declared that by right of inheritance to Girdhar Lal Gangaputra the Plaintiff is owner and in possession of the Birt Jijmani of Hindu (sic) of Rajgarh and koti and of 6/16 share in the Birt Jijmani of Nainital, Almora and Kumaun and she is entitled to receive offerings from the pilgrims of the said places as a gangaputra and the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have no right or interest in the said Birt Jijmani or its offerings. (2) A permanent injunction is hereby issued to the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 restraining them from interfering with the Plaintiff's right as mentioned above. (3) The Plaintiff is entitled to possession of the Bahis relating to Plaintiff's Birt Jijmani and an enquiry will be made about these books in execution of this decree and if discovered possession will be awarded to her. (4) The Defendants will bear their own costs in all the courts and the Defendant No. 2 Gajanand, shall pay 3/4th of the plaintiff's costs in all the courts.