JUDGMENT Ismail and Mulla, JJ. - This is an application in revision u/s 115 CPC by one Mst. Chanda Begum whose application for leave to sue in forma pauperis has been rejected by the learned Civil Judge of Budaun. 2. The learned Civil Judge has given two reasons for rejecting the application : firstly, that the Applicants' husband possesses sufficient means to pay the Court-fee which is payable by the Applicant herself; secondly, that the Applicant admittedly has a claim of dower against her husband to the extent of Rs. 51,000 and the dower being unspecified at least one third of it, that is, a sum of Rs. 17,000 is major or prompt and it is open to the Applicant to sell a portion of that part of her dower in order to provide the necessary Court-fee for her suit. 3. A preliminary objection was taken by Learned Counsel for the opposite party that the order passed by the learned Civil Judge was not open to revision at all. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on the case of Shanker Ban Vs. Ram Deo and Others . That case has, however, been discussed and dissented from in a later decision of this Court in the case of Sumatra Devi, Mt. Vs. Hazari Lal and Another . It was held by a Bench of this Court in the case of Malik Muhammad Ayub v. Malik Muhammad Mahmood (1909) 7 ALJ 741 that there was a clear distinction between a case in which an application to sue in forma pauperis is rejected and one in which it is allowed. That distinction was proved in the case of Sumatra Devi v. Hazari Lal 1930 ALJ : 901 1930 All 758 in which the whole case law was fully discussed by Sulaiman C.J. It appears that the decision in Sumatra Devi v. Hazari Lal 1930 ALJ : 901 1930 All 758 has subsequently been approved and followed in two other cases of this Court, one being Piare Lal v. Bhagwan Dass (1933) 1 AWR 576 and the other being Secretary of State for India in Council v. Soukali (1934) 3 AWR 539. In view of these cases Learned Counsel for the opposite party had to concede that he could not press this preliminary objection. We accordingly overrule the objection. 4. In view of these cases Learned Counsel for the opposite party had to concede that he could not press this preliminary objection. We accordingly overrule the objection. 4. The only point which remains for consideration is whether the learned Civil Judge has or has not acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his discretion. We need only say that both the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge are wholly wrong and it must, therefore, be held that he has acted irregularly in the exercise of his discretion. So far as the first point is concerned Learned Counsel for the opposite party had to concede that he was not prepared to press it. In fact he said that the point had been referred to by the learned Civil Judge only with a view to showing that the husband of the Applicant was in a position to pay the dower. As regards the other point, it is enough to state that what has to be decided in an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis is whether the person making the application is or is not pauper within the meaning of Order XXXIII Rule 1, that is, a person possessed of sufficient means to pay the court-fee. The simple question is whether a claim which a Muhammadan lady might have against her husband to realise her dower is "means" within the meaning of Order XXXIII Rule 1. We have not the slightest hesitation in holding that the answer must be in the negative. It depends entirely upon the option of the lady to prefer a claim for her dower or to surrender it. She cannot by any means be forced to exercise that option. It is evident, therefore, that her claim for dower cannot be deemed to be 'means' within the meaning of Order XXXIII Rule 1. 5. The result, therefore, is that we allow this application and setting aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge we grant the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. The opposite party will pay the costs of both the courts.