JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This appeal is on behalf of Defendants Nos. 3 and 4, and arises out of a suit for recovery of money due on a mortgage bond. The Courts below passed a preliminary decree in favour of the Plaintiffs for the amount claimed with interest and costs. The mortgagor did not resist the suit, but it was contested Virtually by Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 only. They were the admitted landlords of the mortgagor, and their case was that subsequent to the mortgage, Defendant No. 2, as Receiver of their estate, obtained a rent-decree against the mortgagor, and purchased the mortgaged properties at the sale in execution of such decree. After the sale, the mortgage was duly annulled under sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Defendant No. 2 was afterwards discharged from his office as Receiver, and whatever right he had acquired by his purchase at the said sale thereupon vested in Defendants Nos. 3 and 4. This is not disputed, and Defendant No. 2, afer he had filed his written statement, was in fact struck off from the suit. The main question in the case is whether the decree obtained by Defendant No. 2 was a rent-decree or a mere decree for money. The Plaintiffs contended that it was a money decree, and that by the sale, Defendant No. 2 as auction-purchaser, and through him the contesting Defendants, merely acquired the equity of redemption in the mortgaged properties. It was further their case that even if the sale was a rent sale under Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the mortgage was not duly annulled, as the application under sec. 167 was made long after the prescribed period of limitation. 2. On both points, the lower Appellate Court as well as the Court of first instance held against the Defendants, and hence this appeal, which Mr. Sanyal has strenuously pressed before me on their behalf. 3. In support of their decision on the first question, the Courts below pointed out that the disputed properties were comprised in 4 different jamas recorded under 4 different C. S. khatians, but Defendant No. 2 still included them in one suit for rent, and the decree passed therein could not consequently be a decree for rent under Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Sanyal's first answer to this was that the jamas were subsequently amalgamated into one by a kabuliyat (Exhibit 3) executed by Defendant No. 1 in 1335 B. S., and that the suit was based on this kabuliyat. Both Courts have, however, found as a fact by a comparison of the kabuliyat with the sale certificate issued to Defendant No. 2 that neither the areas nor the boundaries of the lands in the two documents tally, and further, that the kabuliyat mentions only one khatian, whereas the sale certificate mentions four. Clearly, therefore, the kabuliyat could not have been the basis of the suit or of the decree which was passed. Mr. Sanyal's next attempt was to invoke sec. 144 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which provides that a landlord may institute one suit for rent of more than one tenancy, if the tenancies are held in similar right and equal status by the same tenant under him, and he laid particular stress on the fact that the claim in respect of each of the 4 jamas had been separately stated in the plaint, as required by proviso (i) to the sub-section. It will be seen, however, that the other provisos require that in such a suit separate decrees shall be made in respect of each tenancy, and the costs shall also be apportioned, but that was not the case here. Sec. 144 (2) can, therefore, be of no avail to the Appellants. 5. It was next contended that the question as to whether the decree was a rent decree or not must be deemed to have been concluded by the result of two previous proceedings, one under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the other under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 6. What had happened was that on Defendant No. 2 applying for execution of the decree which he had obtained, Defendant No. 1 as judgment-debtor filed an objection under sec. 47 of the Code, stating that the decree could not be enforced as a rent decree by sale of the defaulting jamas. The executing Court overruled the objection, holding that the judgment-debtor had really taken settlement of the lands at a consolidated jama, and that, therefore, the decree had the effect of a decree for rent proper. 47 of the Code, stating that the decree could not be enforced as a rent decree by sale of the defaulting jamas. The executing Court overruled the objection, holding that the judgment-debtor had really taken settlement of the lands at a consolidated jama, and that, therefore, the decree had the effect of a decree for rent proper. It is difficult to see, however, how this decision may be regarded as binding on the present Plaintiffs. Assuming that the question as to the true character of the decree could be properly raised under sec. 47, it still remains a fact that the present Plaintiffs were not parties to that proceeding, and neither could they be held to have been represented by the judgment-debtor. They are in fact claiming under a title acquired long before the passing of the decree which was under execution in that case. In my opinion, the decision in, Soshi Bhusan Guha v. Gagan Chunder Shaha I. L. R. 22 Cal. 364 (1894) is a sufficient answer to Mr. Sanyal's contention. 7. As regards the other proceeding, it appears that after the sale, the present Plaintiffs did make an application under sec. 174 (8) of the Bengal Tenancy Act for setting it aside, which meant that they treated themselves as persons whose interests were affected by the sale, and it is said, this also involved an admission on their part that the sale was one held under Chapter XIV of the Act. Apart from the fact that the Plaintiffs actually filed an affidavit later, stating that the application should be treated as one under Or. 21, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and further, that the application was dismissed by the Munsif, and finally by the High Court in revision, I fail to see how the Plaintiffs are thereby precluded from now showing that the decree was not a rent decree, but had the effect of a mere decree for money. It might have been a different matter, if there had been an adverse decision on the point in that proceeding, but that was far from being the case. This point, therefore, also fails. 8. I must hold accordingly that the Courts below were right in the view they took that the sale at which Defendant No. 2 made his purchase was not a rent sale at all. This point, therefore, also fails. 8. I must hold accordingly that the Courts below were right in the view they took that the sale at which Defendant No. 2 made his purchase was not a rent sale at all. It follows that the Appellants merely acquired the right, title and interest of Defendant No. 1 in the properties; in other words, they took the properties subject to the mortgage in favour of the Plaintiffs. 9. In view of this decision, the other question as to whether the mortgage had or had not been annulled within time under sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not really arise. Moreover, on the merits, the Appellants do not appear to have the vestige of a case on the point. Out of deference to Mr. Sanyal, however, I might advert to his arguments on this head, if only to show how utterly untenable they are. 10. Sec. 167 distinctly requires that an application there under shall be presented within one year from the date of the confirmation of the sale or the date on which the purchaser has notice of the incumbrance which he desires to annul. The sale here was held on the 5th May, 1936. There was then the application under sec. 174 (3) filed by the mortgagees on the 25th May, 1936, to set aside the sale, which was dismissed by the Munsif on the 29th June following, and the sale was thereupon confirmed on the same date. Limitation would accordingly run from this date for an application for annulment of the Plaintiffs' mortgage. Such application for annulment was not, however, made until the 30th March, 1938, that is to say, until more than one year thereafter, and on the face of it, therefore, it was time-barred. The question is whether there were any special facts or circumstances, as Mr. Sanyal contended there were, which had the effect of saving limitation. 11. It appears that though the Munsif refused to set aside the sale, there was an appeal against his order, and on this appeal, the sale was set aside by the District Judge on the 26th November, 1936. The order of the District Judge was subsequently reversed by this Court in revision on the 6th July, 1937, and the sale restored. 12. Relying on these facts, the first point which Mr. The order of the District Judge was subsequently reversed by this Court in revision on the 6th July, 1937, and the sale restored. 12. Relying on these facts, the first point which Mr. Sanyal sought to make was that as an application had been made under sec. 174 for setting aside the sale, the sale could not be confirmed until such application was finally disallowed. It was said that the order which the Munsif made on the 29th June, 1936, confirming the sale was accordingly of no legal effect and could not be a valid starting point of limitation. 13. Mr. Sanyal, however, overlooked an important fact, and it was that the application for setting aside the sale here was one under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 174, and he further overlooked the clear provisions of sec. 174A, as it now stood after its amendment by Bengal Act II of 1930. An important alteration was in fact made by this amendment as to the stage at which a sale under Chapter XIV was to be confirmed. Previously, it was enacted as follows:- 174A. (1) Where no application is madel under sec. 174, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and there upon the sale shall become absolute. 14. This took no account of the distinction recognised in sec. 174 between one kind of application and another for setting aside a sale, that under sub-sec. (1) on making a deposit and that under sub-sec. (3) on the ground of material irregularity or fraud, the limitation being different in either case, 30 days from the date of sale in the former, and six months from the date of sale in the latter. The result was that in every case the Court was bound to wait till the expiry of the longer period of limitation prescribed for an application under sub-sec. (3) before it could confirm the sale, and where such an application was made, it had to wait till the same was disposed of. All this was changed by the amendment of 1930. In sub-sec. (i) of sec. 174A, "sec. 174" was altered to "sub-sec. (1) of sec. 174," with the words "within 30 days from the date of sale" added there-after, and a new sub-section, sub-sec. (5), was added in these terms:- (5). All this was changed by the amendment of 1930. In sub-sec. (i) of sec. 174A, "sec. 174" was altered to "sub-sec. (1) of sec. 174," with the words "within 30 days from the date of sale" added there-after, and a new sub-section, sub-sec. (5), was added in these terms:- (5). Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, an application may be made under sub sec. (3), of sec. 174, to set aside the sale, and where such application is allowed the order made under sub-sec (1), confirming the sale shall be deemed to be cancelled. 15. It is therefore, now made clear that if, as. in the present case, no application is made under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 174 to set aside the sale, it is not only open to the Court, but its statutory duty, to confirm the sale at the end of 30 days, and the new sub-section in fact expressly recognises that the sale may be confirmed before an application is made under sub-sec. (3). 16. In my opinion, therefore, in the absence of any application to set aside the sale under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 174, the order passed by the learned Munsif on the 29th June, 1936, confirming the sale was a perfectly proper and valid order, and I see no reason why limitation should not be reckoned from this date for the purposes of an application under sec. 167. 17. Mr. Sanyal dilated in this connection on the effect of the appeal to the District Judge against the Munsif's order of the same date refusing to set aside the sale. As already stated, the District Judge reversed the order on the 26th November, 1936, which doubtless meant that the sale stood cancelled. Mr. Sanyal argued that as a consequence of this, there was no longer any occasion for, or right in, the purchaser to make an application under sec. 167. If an application had in fact been already made, he would probably say, it would automatically lapse. The learned Advocate might have also referred to sub-sec. (5) of sec. 174A, which now expressly provides that if after a sale is confirmed, an application to set it aside is allowed, or in other words, the sale is set aside, the order confirming the sale shall be deemed to be cancelled. 18. The learned Advocate might have also referred to sub-sec. (5) of sec. 174A, which now expressly provides that if after a sale is confirmed, an application to set it aside is allowed, or in other words, the sale is set aside, the order confirming the sale shall be deemed to be cancelled. 18. All this may be sound doctrine, and need not be disputed, but it seems to me that in order that it might have the application which Mr. Sanyal contends for to the facts of this case, the order of the District Judge setting aside the sale should have been the final order in the matter. The fact remains that that order was set aside in revision by the High Court, and that of the Munsif restored. What was the effect of that? In my opinion, it wiped out the consequences which might otherwise have flowed from the order of the District Judge. In view of the ultimate order passed by the High Court, it could not be said that the application to set aside the sale had been "allowed" within the meaning of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 174A, because of the order of the District Judge. "Allowed" must mean "finally allowed," that is to say, allowed as the result of the decision of the ultimate Court. 19. Apart from the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 174A, it may be conceded that if a sale has been already confirmed before an application is made to set it aside, the confirmation must be subject to the result of that proceeding, which implies that if upon such application the sale is set aside, the order confirming the sale is rendered nugatory, but if, on the other hand, the sale is upheld., the order of confirmation will also stand. This will, however, in my opinion, depend on the result of the proceeding as finally ascertained. Sec. 174 (5) expressly provides for an appeal against an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale, and whether there is a right of second appeal or not, there can be no doubt that the High Court may also interfere in a proper case in its revisional jurisdiction. Sec. 174 (5) expressly provides for an appeal against an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale, and whether there is a right of second appeal or not, there can be no doubt that the High Court may also interfere in a proper case in its revisional jurisdiction. That being so, it must, I think, be the decision of the Court finally disposing of the matter that must determine whether the sale is or is not to be set aside, and this will also necessarily determine whether the order confirming the sale should or should not stand. If at one stage in the proceeding the sale is set aside, the order confirming the sale may no doubt be deemed to stand cancelled at the same time, but it cannot be that if the order setting aside the sale is reversed by a higher Court, there will have to be a fresh order of confirmation. The better and the correct view would be to hold that with the order of the higher Court restoring the sale, the original order confirming the sale will also be deemed to be restored. 20. I must hold accordingly in the present case that in view of the ultimate order of the High Court setting aside that of the District Judge, the Appellants could not derive any advantage from the fact that the District Judge had set aside the sale. The effect of the High Court decision was to restore the original order confirming the sale with effect from the date on which it had been passed, and limitation for the application under sec. 167 must, therefore, be held to have commenced running from that date. 21. Mr. Sanyal's next attempt to save limitation was by invoking sec. 14 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, which he said would entitle his clients to deduct the period spent in resisting the proceedings for setting aside the sale. These proceedings, as already shown, covered the period from the 25th May, 1936, when the Plaintiffs made their application under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, to the 6th July, 1937, when the application was finally rejected by the High Court. This was a period of over 13 months, and as the application under sec. These proceedings, as already shown, covered the period from the 25th May, 1936, when the Plaintiffs made their application under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, to the 6th July, 1937, when the application was finally rejected by the High Court. This was a period of over 13 months, and as the application under sec. 167 was out by a little over 8 months, it was not disputed that if the deduction claimed was allowed, the bar of limitation would be successfully met. 22. It may be assumed that by virtue of sec. 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, sec. 14 (2) would apply to an application under sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. There would still be two insuperable, difficulties which Mr. Sanyal could not get out of his way. In the first place, the proceeding which his clients were said to have been "prosecuting" "with clue diligence" and "in good faith" was against the same party, but not "for the same reliefs" as the application under sec. 167. By this application they were seeking to annul the Plaintiffs' mortgage, whereas in the other proceeding their part in "prosecuting" the same was merely by way of resisting the Plaintiffs' attempt to set aside the sale. Their success in the earlier proceeding could not give them what they wanted by the later. If as a result of their opposition, the application under sec. 174 (3) was rejected, as in fact it was, that did not mean an annulment of the mortgage, but only made it necessary for them to seek this other relief in another proceeding. This would by itself exclude the application of sec. 14 (2). Secondly, this v. as not a case of the Court not having been able to entertain the previous proceeding from defect of jurisdiction or any cause whatever. Not only did the Court entertain the application under sec. 174 (3), but in point of fact it was carried up to the High Court and finally disposed of in favour of Mr. Sanyal's clients. 23. For all the reasons aforesaid, there is thus in my opinion no escape from the conclusion that the application for annulment of the mortgage was barred by limitation. 24. A final argument was put forward by Mr. Sanyal that as rent was a first charge under sec. Sanyal's clients. 23. For all the reasons aforesaid, there is thus in my opinion no escape from the conclusion that the application for annulment of the mortgage was barred by limitation. 24. A final argument was put forward by Mr. Sanyal that as rent was a first charge under sec. 65 of the Bengal Ten-any Act, the Plaintiffs must be deemed to have been in the position of second mortgagee, and his clients, the landlords, as purchasers of the holding in execution of their rent decree, were accordingly entitled to hold the property free of the mortgage, without having to annul the same under sec. 167. In support of this contention, the learned Advocate relied on the decision of this Court in S. M. Meherunnessa v. Sham Sundar Bhuiya 6 C W. N. 831 (1902). 25. It was held in that case that where in execution of a rent decree a raiyati holding was sold and purchased by the landlord, and a mortgagee of the holding, whose mortgage was not duly annulled under sec. 167, brought a suit on the mortgage, the mortgagee would be entitled to enforce it on payment to the landlord of the amount decreed on account of arrears of rent. This was said to follow from the combined effect of sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and sec. 101 of the Transfer of Property Act. The case is however, no authority for the proposition that a sale for arrears of rent will ipso facto cancel an incumbrance on the holding. It was in fact expressly recognised that notwithstanding the sale in execution of the rent-decree, the Plaintiff's mortgage still subsisted, and he was held entitled to bring the holding to sale in satisfaction of his mortgage. As was pointed out by Mookerjee, J., in Sital v. Parbati 35 C.L.J. 1 (1921), following earlier decisions referred to in his judgment, the procedure provided by sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is the only mode of annulling an incumbrance, and the purchaser must have recourse to it within the specified period for the purpose. If that is not done, the landlord purchaser must hold the property subject to the mortgage, and will be entitled to redeem. In this respect the statute recognises no distinction between a landlord purchaser and a stranger purchaser under a rent decree. I must consequently overrule this contention of Mr. Sanyal. 26. If that is not done, the landlord purchaser must hold the property subject to the mortgage, and will be entitled to redeem. In this respect the statute recognises no distinction between a landlord purchaser and a stranger purchaser under a rent decree. I must consequently overrule this contention of Mr. Sanyal. 26. The result is that the appeal must fail, and be dismissed with costs, subject, however, to the following direction. Mr. Sanyal did not ask for any relief under the provisions of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940, but in declaring the amount due under the preliminary decree I think the Court is bound to give effect to the limitation contained in sees. 30 and 31 of the Act as regards the rate of interest and interest on the decretal amount. The decree must accordingly be varied, and I direct that the learned Munsif should make the necessary calculation and draw up a fresh preliminary decree on that basis. Leave to appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.