JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of Lort-Williams, J., delivered on May 21st, 1941, whereby he found for the Plaintiff and gave judgment against the Defendants in the Plaintiff's favour for a sum of Rs. 5,000 and costs. The claim arose under a policy of insurance which the wife of the Plaintiff, Sm. Parulbala Kundu, took out with the Defendants on December 9th, 1937. On November 21st, 1938, the deceased lady assigned the policy to the Plaintiff and she died later, on August 12th, 1939. The policy was in a form well known, and it was stated in the policy that the proposal and the relative personal declaration made by the assured before the medical examiner of the Company should be the basis of the contract between the assured and the Company. 2. In the personal statement of the assured made to the medical examiner, Dr. Bhattacharjee, on September 16th, 1937, there was in question No. 5, a number of separate questions relating to various ailments and diseases. To each of those the assured replied that she had not suffered from any of them. The questions and the answers thereto are as follows: Q. 5. Have yon suffered, if so, how often and when, from: (a) Giddiness, fits, paralysis, insanity, or any other disease of the brain or nerves ? A. No. (b) Cough, asthma, pneumonia, spitting of blood or any other affection of lungs? A. No. (j) Malaria, Typhoid, Influenza, Kala-Azar or any other illness within the last five year?, requiring medical treatment for more than a week? If so, give particulars. A. No. 3. The Defendants repudiated liability on a number of grounds connected with those answers, set out in paragraph 7 of their written statement. They amount to this: that the assured had suffered from fits, palpitation of the heart, tuberculosis and other illnesses within five years prior to the making of the said personal statement requiring medical treatment for more than a week in each case, and was suffering from tuberculosis at the time of making the said proposal and statement. 4. They amount to this: that the assured had suffered from fits, palpitation of the heart, tuberculosis and other illnesses within five years prior to the making of the said personal statement requiring medical treatment for more than a week in each case, and was suffering from tuberculosis at the time of making the said proposal and statement. 4. During the course of the trial various grounds of repudiation disappeared, namely, palpitation of the heart and tuberculosis, and substantially the question at the trial was whether the deceased had, within five years from the time of making the declaration, suffered from fits or any other illness within five years prior to the making of the personal statement requiring medical treatment for more than a week in each case. 5. It may be noted that the deceased died from tuberculosis, but the evidence at the trial as to that tuberculosis indicated that it was of a kind that comes on rapidly and in all probability it had come on between the taking out of the policy and the death of the deceased. The Defendants, therefore, have dropped the defence that she was suffering from tuberculosis at the time of taking out the policy. 6. The only question that was agitated before the learned Judge and which was agitated before us was whether the deceased had suffered from fits or any other illness requiring medical attention for more than a week. It was not suggested that tuberculosis had anything to do with her death. 7. The evidence produced by the Defendants, the Appellant Insurance Company, was that of Dr. Sett, who attended the deceased woman on three occasions in 1936. Each of those occasions was spread over a period of more than a week. [His Lordship after considering the evidence proceeded.] 8. It is not easy to decide this question on the medical evidence. The learned Judge has decided it against the Insurance Company and I, for my part, should not feel it right to decide it in a contrary sense unless I was satisfied that the learned Judge was wrong. I am not satisfied that the learned Judge was wrong, and I am not satisfied that the prescriptions upon which the doctors, called by the Defendants, relied were prescriptions given for anything more than nervous excitability-it may be consider able excitability. 9. I am not satisfied that the learned Judge was wrong, and I am not satisfied that the prescriptions upon which the doctors, called by the Defendants, relied were prescriptions given for anything more than nervous excitability-it may be consider able excitability. 9. But there is one fact which weighs with me and it is this, though it is alleged by the Defendants, on Dr. Sett's evidence, that she had fits in 1936 when Dr. Sett attended her, there is no evidence at all from anywhere of fits after 1936 although the deceased lady lived for another three years. I should have expected that if the deceased lady had fits she would have had them after 1936. There is no evidence and it leads me to the conclusion that what the deceased lady really suffered from was not fits but nervous excitability for which there was no cause to any great extent after 1936, although she was treated for it by Dr. Bhattacharjee in 1937. 10. A Kaviraj, who attended the deceased lady in 1936 said that he treated her for wind and hysteria and that he cured her. It may be that the Kaviraj was right. In this case the burden is upon the Defendants, the Insurance Company, to prove that the statements made by the deceased which were the basis of the contract were untrue, and that contrary to her statements she did suffer from fits or some other illness which lasted for more than a week and for which she was treated for more than a week by a doctor. I am unable to say that the nervous excitement which she suffered from on those three occasions in 1936 was anything more than a transient nervous excitement which did not amount to fits. 11. In my view there must have to be something more than that, something in the nature of a definite illness of a nature and degree corresponding to the illnesses mentioned, namely, malaria, typhoid, influenza, kala-azar-something of that kind with a similar degree of seriousness for one to say that she had an illness in 1936 which made her statements untrue. 12. I have come to the conclusion that the learned Judge was right in his decision and finding in this case and I am of the opinion that this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel. The stay will be removed. 12. I have come to the conclusion that the learned Judge was right in his decision and finding in this case and I am of the opinion that this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel. The stay will be removed. Gentle, J. 13. I agree with the conclusion and the reasons expressed by my Lord the Chief Justice. I desire, however, to add a few observations in regard to the answer given by the assured to question No. 5 in the personal statement. Question No. 5 is as follows: "Have you suffered, if so, how often and when, from." Then follows a list of ten classes-each containing the name of one or more-of illnesses or diseases, and it would seem that the illnesses or diseases have been grouped together; for instance. (b) "Cough, asthma, pneumonia, spitting of blood or any other affection of lungs"; (c) diseases of the heart; and (e) skin diseases; (j) is as follows: " Malaria Typhoid, Influenza, Kala-Azar or any other illness within last five years, requiring medical treatment for more than a week. If so, give particulars." 14. The assured gave the answer "No" to each of the ten sub-questions. 15. Mr. Banerji on behalf of the Defendant Insurance Company contended that the words in question No. 5 (j) "or any other illness " required the assured to state any ailment or indisposition from which she suffered within the period of five years preceding the date of the declaration and for which she was attended by a medical gentleman for more than a week. On the other hand it was argued that the words to which I have referred must be construed by mean of the ejusdem generis rule, and the words " any other illness " are applicable only the four specified diseases mentioned in Question No. 5 (j). 16. The ejusdem generis rule shortly is that when general words follow particular words the general words are to be construed only as applicable to the specified words. This rule is confined to cases where the general words accompany a context containing a category of specific words which can be grouped together under a genus. The four specified illnesses or diseases in Question No. 5 (j) are all infectious and in my view they are four species of the genus of infectious diseases. This rule is confined to cases where the general words accompany a context containing a category of specific words which can be grouped together under a genus. The four specified illnesses or diseases in Question No. 5 (j) are all infectious and in my view they are four species of the genus of infectious diseases. There being a common genus the general words which follow must be construed in my view according to the ejusdem generis rule. Consequently, the illnesses about which the assured was asked in the words " any other illness " must be in some way connected with or attributable to the diseases of Malaria, Typhoid, Influenza and Kala-Azar. Whatever the indisposition may have been from which the assured was afflicted when she was attended by Dr. Sett in 1936, it was not contended, indeed it cannot be suggested, that it was one or other of the four specified diseases or a disease connected with it. Consequently, the answer which the assured gave to Question No. 5 (j) was true. 17. The only other answer to the questions which consequently arises with regard to this is the answer to Question No. 5 (a), the question being whether the assured suffered from giddiness, fits, paralysis, insanity, or any other disease of the brain or nerves. 18. The burden is upon the Defendant insurance company to show that the answers given by the assured were untrue. It follows that it is for the Insurance Company to establish that the ailment for which Dr. Sett had attended her in 1936 was one of those mentioned in Question No. 5 (a) or any other disease of the brain or nerves. In my view the evidence which has been given has failed to establish that she was suffering from any indisposition which can be said to be included in Question No. 5 (a). Since it is for the Insurance Company to show that the question was untruthfully answered and they have failed to do so, it follows that the defence which they have set up must fail. Consequently, I agree with my Lord that this appeal should be dismissed.