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1942 DIGILAW 85 (ALL)

Man Singh alias Priya Varat Singh v. Emperor

1942-06-05

YORKE

body1942
JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is an appeal by one Man Singh alias Priya Varat Singh who has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Agra of an offence u/s 20 read with Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act and sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment. 2. The facts are quite clear and after hearing arguments of the Learned Counsel I am satisfied that the finding of fact recorded by the Court below is quite correct. On the 17th October, 1941 H.B. Joshi, Excise Inspector, Tundla, was on duty at Tundla junction on the East Indian Railway in connection with his duties to prevent smuggling of excisable articles. After the train had come in from Agra Cantonment, he saw the Appellant sitting on the platform with a johla or haversack. There was something about the way in which the Appellant was looking after the haversack which made the Excise Inspector suspicious and he sent his excise peon Dildar Ahmad to find out where the Appellant was going. In answer to Dildar Ahmad's enquiry the Appellant replied that it was no business of Dildar Ahmad's. This naturally increased the suspicions of the Excise Inspector who thereupon called up two ticket collectors and others and searched the person and the haversack of the Appellant Inside the haversack there were found some clothes and also a six-chambered muzzle loading Colt revolver in a leather case, some pieces of lead, 11 fog signals, a box containing percussion caps, a cigarette tin containing gunpowder and pieces of lead, a false moustache and whiskers and axe blade and other at tides. The statement of the Excise Inspector was corroborated by a number of witnesses and the only serious criticism that Mr. David has been able to put forward is that one of these witnesses, Bishambhar Nath, was at that date unemployed and has since the occurrence been taken on in the Excise Department. 3. The story told by the Appellant in the Court below was itself unsatisfactory. David has been able to put forward is that one of these witnesses, Bishambhar Nath, was at that date unemployed and has since the occurrence been taken on in the Excise Department. 3. The story told by the Appellant in the Court below was itself unsatisfactory. He said that having got down from the Agra Cantonment train and intending to go to Etawah he got into the 14 down Upper India Express, that after a little while Dildar Ahmad, Excise peon, came to him and quarrelled with him about his ticket, that Dildar Ahmad hauled him out of the carriage and that afterwards he brought out from the train the haversack in question which the Appellant suggested was not his property. It is obvious that, had the Appellant taken his seat in the train for Etawah, it could not have been about his ticket that Dildar Ahmad could have any dispute with him, as Dildar Ahmad is an Excise peon and not a ticket collector or ticket Inspector. In my judgment, the story told by the prosecution witnesses is entirely free from doubt. 4. Mr. David has devoted the bulk of his argument to an attempt to show that the case of the Appellant did not fall u/s 20 but u/s 19 of the Act. The first paragraph of Section 20--and it is with the first paragraph alone that we are concerned in this case--provides: Whoever does any act mentioned in Clause (a), (c), (d) or (f) of Section 19 in such manner as to indicate an intention that such act may not be known to any public servant as denned in the Indian Penal Code, or to any person employed upon a railway or to the servant of any public carrier...shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or both. 5. Mr. David suggests that the carrying of firearms of which a man is not lawfully in possession inside a haversack or a suit case when travelling by rail does not bring the person concerned within the mischief of Section 20. 5. Mr. David suggests that the carrying of firearms of which a man is not lawfully in possession inside a haversack or a suit case when travelling by rail does not bring the person concerned within the mischief of Section 20. He suggests that something further is needed, as for example in case a person whose haversack or suit case containing unlicensed arms was being searched and the person concerned surreptitiously removed the unlawful arms from the haversack or the suit case in order to conceal them from the view of the searching officer or from the view of a railway servant. Some reliance was sought to be placed on a decision of a single Judge of this Court. Ram Sarup v. Emperor, but that was a case under the second paragraph of Section 20 and not the first and therefore is no guide to the proper interpretation of the first paragraph. A number of cases have been put before me in regard to the proper interpolation of the first paragraph of the section. Mr. C.S. Saran, holding the brief of the Assistant Government Advocate, has referred to two Calcutta cases, Jogendra Mohan Guha Vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 516 and Ananta Kumar Mukherji Vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 679 . The latter was a case of a man who was carrying a revolver tucked up in the top part of his dhoti and it was held that Section 20 was applicable. The former was a case of a man who had an unlicensed revolver concealed inside a locked trunk in a house and this was also held to come within the scope of the section. Patterson J. who pronounced the judgment of the Court remarked: The position, as I understand it, is this mere possession of an unlicensed weapon is ordinarily punishable u/s 19(f), but, if the circumstances are such as to indicate an intention that the possession may not be known to the police, the offence is punishable u/s 20. Whether the intention referred to above exists or not is a pure question of fact and this question must therefore be determined in each particular case with reference to the facts proved in that case. 6. As one might expect cases of this kind are more common in the Punjab than anywhere else and I have been referred to a number of cases of the Punjab, High Court. 6. As one might expect cases of this kind are more common in the Punjab than anywhere else and I have been referred to a number of cases of the Punjab, High Court. I need not however quote all of then, except one which has been referred to in the later cases and relied upon. This is the case of AIR 1926 262 (Lahore) decided by Addison J. The learned Judge summed up the point as follows: In my judgment the general principle laid down in Khem Singh v. Crown 76 P.L.R. 1915 which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court, is correct, namely, that each case of concealment of arms must be decided on its own facts as to whether it falls u/s 19 or Section 20 of the Arms Act. If, however, arms were merely concealed in a house, which it could not be anticipated, the police would come and search, Section 20 would not apply. For a conviction to fall u/s 20 there must be some special indication of an intention that the possession of the arms was being concealed from a public servant or from a railway official. For example, if arms were carried hidden on a railway journey this special intention might be easy to infer. 7. In effect the learned Judge held that where a man was carrying arms not exposed and therefore in a sense concealed through a place where there was no expectation of his meeting the police then Section 20 could hardly be held to be applicable. On the other hand, if a man carries an unlicensed weapon through a town concealed in a bag or in a suit case or does the same thing when travelling by train, it must be conceived that it is his intention that his possession of an unlicensed weapon may not be known to a public servant, as for example the police or to any person employed upon a railway. In my judgment there is not the slightest doubt that the present case falls within the mischief of Section 20 of the Indian Arms Act. 8. Mr. David has also put forward a suggestion which was not apparently made in the Court below nor in the grounds of appeal in this Court, namely, that the conviction is bad for the absence of sanction to the prosecution. 8. Mr. David has also put forward a suggestion which was not apparently made in the Court below nor in the grounds of appeal in this Court, namely, that the conviction is bad for the absence of sanction to the prosecution. The contention is based | upon Section 29 of the Act; but in my judgment there is no force in this contention The place where the Appellant was found in possession of the arms in the present case is on the north side of the river Jumna. It was held by Daniels J. in Amir Ahmad Vs. Emperor, AIR 1926 All 143 , that "in the Bijnor district and other parts of the United Provinces to the north of the rivers, Jumna and Ganges, the sanction of the District Magistrate for a prosecution u/s 19 of the Arms Act, is not necessary." The fact of the matter is that Section 32(2) of the old Act (Act XXXI of 1860) was applicable to all those districts which had been disarmed and Section 29 required sanction only in the case of offences committed within three months of the date on which the present Act of 1878 came into force. Mr. C.S. Saran has further pointed out that it has been held by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court that for a prosecution u/s 20 of the Indian Arms Act no sanction would be necessary even in parts of India where such sanction might be necessary for a prosecution u/s 19. 9. The only question which remains is the question of sentence. In my judgment a man who is found travelling on the railway in possession of a six-chambered revolver even if it not be of the most modern type cannot complain that his sentence is severe when he is given a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment, the maximum sentence being one of seven years. 10. I find no force in this appeal which accordingly fails and is dismissed.