Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No. 41 of 1941) from a judgment and two orders of the High Court (June 1, 1939) which reversed a judgment and order of the First Subordinate Judge at Hooghly (April 30, 1938). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The question in this appeal was as to the right of one Jitendra, deceased, whom the appellants represented, to execute a decree of which he was an assignee from the then existing decree-holder. The matter arose in a suit brought in 1923 by the three surviving grandsons of Ishan Chandra Mitter against Tarubala Dassi, the widow of their deceased uncle for the partition of the joint ancestral property. In 1924, by a decree confirming a compromise agreement, it was provided that the immovables should be divided, the widow to receive one-third share, and until partition to be paid Rs.1400 per month. Difficulties seemed to have arisen in the course of the partition ; the monthly payments were not duly paid, and the widow on several occasions had obtained leave to execute the decree, but without much success. In February, 1936, the widow by registered deed of surrender surrendered to the first two appellants, the infant sons of her daughter Umarani, all her interest in the estate, including arrears of the monthly payments. On June 20, 1936, the widow died, and on June 24, 1936, the two infants were substituted in the record for the widow, their father, Anath, being appointed their guardian ad litem. In September he died, and in November, 1936, his widow Umarani, the mother of the infants, was appointed guardian ad litem in his place. On August 9, 1937, by a registered deed of sale, Umarani as next friend and natural guardian of the infants sold to her father-in-law, Jitendra, for Rs.1,28,000 certain immovable properties, including some of the properties of the estate under partition, the decrees in the suit, and certain surplus sale proceeds then in court. The deed recited that Jitendra had financed Tarubala Dassi in the litigation to the extent of Rs.3,11,969, of which Rs.1,78,868 remained unpaid. He made an allowance of Rs.65,868, leaving a net balance of Rs.15,000 due to the transferor which was duly paid. On February 8, 1938, the Subordinate Judge, on the application of Jitendra, added him as a defendant to the suit. He made an allowance of Rs.65,868, leaving a net balance of Rs.15,000 due to the transferor which was duly paid. On February 8, 1938, the Subordinate Judge, on the application of Jitendra, added him as a defendant to the suit. The application was supported by the pleaders for the infants and not opposed by the plaintiffs. On February 10 and February 25, 1938, Jitendra made the two applications the subject of the consolidated appeals now before the Board. The application of February 25, which should have been made first, was for leave to execute the decree for payment in respect of the execution applications then pending, and that of February 10 was to transfer the decree for execution so far as payments from May 1, 1937, to January 31, 1938, were concerned to the court of the District Judge Twenty-four Pargannas. The application was opposed by the respondents on various grounds which were disposed of by the Subordinate Judge, who passed an order on both applications together and allowed them. The only ground with which this appeal was concerned was that no leave of the court to make the transfer had been obtained from the court, and that therefore the provisions of Or. xxxii., rr. 6 and 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, were an answer to the application. Before the Subordinate Judge reliance was placed on r. 7 of Or. xxxii., but he was of opinion that that rule could not be applicable to an assignment, which was not an agreement or compromise relating to the suit. On appeal, the High Court (Mitter and Rau JJ.), in a judgment delivered by Mitter J., held that the case was not covered by r. 7 of Or. xxxii., but fell under r. 6, sub-r. 1 (b)t of Or. xxxii. The court was of the opinion that in principle the widest meaning of which the words were capable should be attributed to the words of the rule, and that " receive " therein should be taken to mean " receive either directly or " indirectly." They allowed the appeal and orders were passed accordingly on June 1, 1939. The rules in question were as follows "Or. The rules in question were as follows "Or. xxxii., r. 6.—(1.) A next "friend or guardian for the "suit shall not, without the leave of the court, receive any "money or other movable property on behalf of a minor "either—(a) by way of compromise before decree or order, " or (b) under a decree or order in favour of the minor.” "Or. xxxii., r. 7.—(1.) No next friend or guardian for the "suit shall, without the leave of the court, expressly recorded "in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise "on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he "acts as next friend or guardian. "(2.) Any such agreement or compromise entered into "without the leave of the court so recorded, shall be voidable "against all parties other than the minor." On November 19, 1940, after admission of the appeal to the Privy Council, Jitendra died, and the substituted appellants were brought on the Record as his heirs. 1943. Feb. 3, 4. J. M. Pringle for the appellants. The question is whether the sale proceeds of the decree paid to the guardian ad litem is money received under a decree within the meaning of the prohibition in Or. xxxn., r. 6, sub-r. 1 (b), of the Code of Civil Procedure, and secondly, where there is such a money payment to an unauthorized person, what effect it would have on the transaction! The High Court here have held that the unauthorized receipt of the money by the guardian ad litem destroys the whole title of the assignee, which means that they impliedly held that no title passed. The consideration for the sale of the decree was not money received "under a decree," but even if it was, it does not necessarily follow that title has not passed ; it simply means that there is a conveyance which passes the property, but that the payment is defective. As regards r. 7 of Or, xxxn. of the code, both courts below were in the appellants favour. That point is whether this conveyance is within the meaning of r. 7 "an agreement .... on behalf of the minor with "reference to the suit," and secondly, if that is so, whether it can be avoided as against the minor. As regards r. 7 of Or, xxxn. of the code, both courts below were in the appellants favour. That point is whether this conveyance is within the meaning of r. 7 "an agreement .... on behalf of the minor with "reference to the suit," and secondly, if that is so, whether it can be avoided as against the minor. The word " agreement " occurring there means, as the High Court rightly said, "an "agreement with a party to the suit, and must be in reference "to the proceedings of the suit. An agreement with a third "party, as also an agreement outside the scope of the suit, "does not .... come within the scope of the said rule, and "a natural guardian is not bound to take the leave of the "court with regard to such an agreement, though he or she "be the next friend or guardian ad litem of the minor." In short, this was not money paid "under a decree," and "agreement " means an agreement by parties to the suit. The respondents did not appear. Feb. 25. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Atkin, who stated the facts, and continued The learned judges in the High Court have expressed a doubt whether this agreement was for the benefit of the infants, but naturally made no pronouncement about it as the question was not before the court. Their Lordships for the same reason abstain from expressing any opinion on this topic. The learned Subordinate Judge appears only to have had r. 7 argued before him. He came to the conclusion that the transfer in question was not within the meaning of the rule "an agreement .... with reference to the suit," and, being satisfied that there was no other valid objection, granted the application. Appeals were taken on both applications to the High Court (Mitter and Rau JJ.). The learned judges were of the same opinion as the Subordinate Judge on r. 7, and their Lordships agree with them. They took the view that in the rule in the phrase "agreement or compromise .... with "reference to the suit" the words mean agreement with a party to the suit, and do not cover a transfer of a decree to someone then unconnected with the suit, even assuming that such transfer could properly be described as an agreement. They took the view that in the rule in the phrase "agreement or compromise .... with "reference to the suit" the words mean agreement with a party to the suit, and do not cover a transfer of a decree to someone then unconnected with the suit, even assuming that such transfer could properly be described as an agreement. They expressed their agreement on this point with a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Katneni Venkata-krishnayya v. Garapati China Kanakayya (I. L. R. [ 1938] Mad. 819.), which is precisely in point. It appears to their Lordships that it cannot have been intended to require the leave of the court to an agreement, for example, made with a non-party to finance a suit, whether with a stipulation to receive part of the proceeds or not. The conjunction of the word "agreement" with the word "compromise" appears to indicate the kind of agreement intended. On this part of the case the applicant succeeded, but as there was no appearance for the respondents in the present appeal their Lordships have thought it proper to consider a ground on which they might have relied to support the decision in their favour. Their Lordships, however, agree with the two Indian courts on this point. But the High Court were in favour of the present respondents on r. 6. They considered that "received by the guardian" meant received either directly or indirectly, and that the object of the rule would be defeated if the guardian could assign a decree to a third party and as consideration receive money from the third party which might form part of the sum to be received by him from the judgment-debtor. Their Lordships cannot agree with this view. In fact, in the present case it seems to have been overlooked that the consideration given is only in part given for the assignment of the decree and the arrears under it. But the plain position seems to be that the guardian neither received from Jitendra any money by way of compromise nor under a decree in favour of the minor. Jitendra was to receive money under the decree if he could; and the guardian only received the price of the assignment of the decree. The plain words must prevail. But the plain position seems to be that the guardian neither received from Jitendra any money by way of compromise nor under a decree in favour of the minor. Jitendra was to receive money under the decree if he could; and the guardian only received the price of the assignment of the decree. The plain words must prevail. The learned judges of the High Court in their judgment stated that "most of the grounds specified in the two objection "petitions would only be relevant at a later stage of the "execution proceedings." There can be no doubt that they did not thereby mean to preclude the appellants from contending, as they do, that the grounds in question have already been determined between the parties and are res judicata. As appellants counsel expressed some anxiety on this matter it may be as well to make it clear that the contention of res judicata is open to them in any, future hearing. For the reasons above given the appeals must be allowed, the orders of the High Court set aside, and the order of the Subordinate Judge restored, and their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondents must pay the costs of the appeals to the High Court and of the present appeals.