JUDGMENT Das, J. - In this suit the Plaintiff prays" for a declaration that a decree and order made in Suit No. 18890 of 1938 of the Presidency Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, on June 7th, 1939, and on November 25th, 1942, respectively are void and without any jurisdiction and the same are not binding on the Plaintiff and for certain other consequential reliefs by way of injunction. The decree and the order mentioned above came to be passed in the following circumstances:-- The present Defendant filed a proceeding against the present Plaintiff on December 19th. 1938, being Suit No. 18890 of 1938 in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, for ejectment of the present Plaintiff. The decree was passed in that suit on June 7th 1939, and the Plaintiff was directed to make over possession of the premises to the Defendant on June 30th, 1939. Then there was an application for a new trial which was dismissed. The present Plaintiff then moved this Court under sec. 115 of the CPC but that application was also dismissed. It appears that the proceedings in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, were further held up by certain other proceedings instituted in this suit by a lady for declaration of her title to the properties in question. After those proceedings were concluded in July, 1942. the record of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, which had come to this Court were returned to the said Court and on August 29th, 1942, the present Defendant, as the decree-holder in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, applied for execution of the decree. It was an application on a tabular statement headed: Application for execution of decree under Or. 21, r. 11. 2. In the 5th column of this tabular statement the history of the application for execution is mentioned. 3. It appears that on June 29th, 1939, an application was made by the Defendant (now Plaintiff before me) for a stay of execution till July 4th, 1939. 4. In the last column of this tabular statement it is stated as follows:-- Notice do issue upon the Defendant to shew cause why the date of possession should not be fixed on September 10th, 1942, and a bailiff be appointed to execute the writ of possession. 5. 4. In the last column of this tabular statement it is stated as follows:-- Notice do issue upon the Defendant to shew cause why the date of possession should not be fixed on September 10th, 1942, and a bailiff be appointed to execute the writ of possession. 5. On this application the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, made an order on November 25th, 1942:-- application heard and granted-- let the date of possession be extended to 18th January, 1943. 6. After this order was made the present Plaintiff again came up on an application under sec. 115 for vacating this order. That application was heard fry me on February 3rd, 1943. On that occasion the present Plaintiff relied on two cases, namely, the case of Jamshedji Hurmusji v. Gordhandas Gokuldas 45 (Bom. p. 1048 (1920) and the ease of The Official Trustee of Bengal v. Taj Mahommad 46.C W. N. P. l1 (1911). 7. On that occasion I did not find it necessary to express any opinion on these two decisions but I dismissed the application in the exercise of my discretion as I felt that no injustice had been done to the applicant. The present suit is the result of the dismissal of that application under sec. 115. The only point urged before me now by Mr. Chose is that under sec. 43 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act the Court had no jurisdiction to subsequently extend the time appointed by the order passed by the Small Causes Court and he has again relied on the two cases I have mentioned. Those cases appear to be dearly distinguishable. In the Calcutta case the Small Cause Court Judge passed an order under sec. 43 of the Act directing the bailiff to give possession of the premises to the plaintiff on June 1st, 1941. 8. Before the date of possession had expired the Opposite Party, that is to say, the Defendant, on April 23rd, 1941, made an application to the Judge of Small Causes Court for extension of time beyond June 1st, 1941. This application was granted by the learned Judge and an extension of time was given until March 31st, 1942. This Court was thereupon moved under sec. 115 and Mr. This application was granted by the learned Judge and an extension of time was given until March 31st, 1942. This Court was thereupon moved under sec. 115 and Mr. Justice Sen held that the Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, had no jurisdiction to extend the time which had been fixed by the original order directing delivery of possession. I entirely agree with the decision in that case and the decision in the Bombay case referred to therein. The position before me, however, is entirely different. Here the Plaintiff had made an application for execution of the decree and a writ for delivery of possession had been issued by the Court of Small Causes but the execution of that writ had been stayed by reason of various proceedings to some of which I have referred. After all these proceedings were over the Plaintiff made an application for execution. Under Or. 21, r. 24 of the CPC to which 1 have been referred by Mr. P. C. Ghose, every process is to specify a day on or before which it is to be executed. Rule 91 of the Rules and Practice of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes provides that a warrant issued under Or. 21, rr. 24 and 25 should be returned within one month from the date thereof. In this case the original date (which?) had been fixed in the writ having expired, the Plaintiff had to apply for an extension of that date and that is what he wanted in the last column of the Tabular Statement and the extension of time ordered by the learned Judge is extension of time for the execution of the writ of possession. It had in no manner extended the time of the original order for possession. I regard this order as entirely an order made in execution and for the purpose that the writ of ejectment which was issued before may be effective and may be acted upon by the bailiff. The cases cited before me have no application to the facts of the present case. This being so it appears to me that the order made by the Court of Small Causes was perfectly a good order and this suit must be dismissed with costs.