Judgement Appeal (No. 23 of 1941) from an order of the High Court (November 11, 1938) which affirmed an order of the Additional District Judge, Raipur (August 20, 1935). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. This appeal arose out of an execution proceeding, and the question for determination was whether the. application made by the decree-holder, the present respondent, for the execution of a decree which he had obtained against the appellants—the judgment-debtors—was barred by time. The District Judge and, on appeal, the High Court (Stone C.J. and Bose J.) held that it was not barred. The material facts were as follows One Madanlal Sao, the father of the respondent, obtained a decree against the appellants on February 1, 1932, in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Raipur, for Rs.32,185-5-3 with interest and costs. Before judgment, he had the immovable properties of the appellants attached under the Code of Civil Procedure. On June 27, 1932, which was within the period of three years prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, Madanlal Sao applied for execution of his decree by the sale of the villages which had already been attached. On July 5 the court registered the application, making the following order "Application is corrected. It is reported to be correct. It "be registered. In this case the judgment-debtors seven "villages have been attached by the decree-holder before "judgment, and he prays for the issue of C form to the "collector. The decree-holder should file copies of mutation "registers and decrees by August 13, 1932, and C form be "prepared and put up on August 20, 1932." The order to obtain copies of the mutation registers was apparently passed under Or. xxi., r. 14, Civil Procedure Code, which provides that " Where an application is made for the attachment "of any land which is registered in the office of the collector, "the court may require the applicant to produce a certified "extract from the register of such office, specifying the persons "registered as proprietors of, or as possessing any transferable "interest in, the land, or its revenue, or as liable to pay revenue "for the land, and the shares of the registered proprietors.” The time for filing those copies was extended from time to time till November 5, 1932, when the court passed the following order " Decree-holder absent. Time 4.8 p.m. No copies "filed as it is understood that the judgment-debtors have "been adjudged insolvent. Dismissed for default." While the execution was pending, on July 5, 1932, the Additional Subordinate Judge, Raipur, adjudged the appellants insolvents. On August 19, 1932, Madanlal, the decree-holder, put in a claim in the Insolvency Court supported by an affidavit giving the particulars of his debt as required by s. 49 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which is as follows Sect. 49, sub-s. 1 " A debt may be proved under this Act by delivering, "or sending by post in a registered letter, to the court an "affidavit verifying the debt." Sub-s. 2 "The affidavit "shall contain or refer to a statement of account showing the "particulars of the debt, and shall specify the vouchers (if any) "by which the same can be substantiated. The court may "at any time call for the production of the vouchers." On August 20, a list of debts was prepared, in which Madanlals name was entered as a creditor. On September 10, 1932, the Additional Subordinate Judge passed the following order ". . . . No other debts have been proved. HagiWalli "Mohamad, Madanlal Sao, Ambalal Ranchason and Kampta "Prasad are suspended from the Schedule, since the receiver "alleges that they are not fully binding on him; they must "therefore prove on what grounds they got their decrees." On February 28, 1934, the adjudication of the insolvents was set aside by the Appellate Court. On July 23, 1935, the decree-holder, who had since died and was now represented by his son, the respondent, presented the second application for the execution of his decree, which had given rise to this appeal. By s. 78, sub-s. 2, of the Provincial Insolvency Act “Where "an order of adjudication has been annulled under this Act, "in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any "suit or application for the execution of a decree .... "which might have been brought or made but for the making "of an order of adjudication under this Act, the period from "the date of the order of adjudication to the date of the order "of annulment shall be excluded "Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a suit "or application in respect of a debt provable but not proved "under this Act." 1943. Feb. 8. SIR ALFRED WORT for the appellants. Feb. 8. SIR ALFRED WORT for the appellants. Prima facie the application is barred by time since it was instituted more than three years after the date of the decree. That does not conclude the matter, however, since if the first application was in accordance with law within the meaning of art. 182, cl. 5, of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the respondent would have a fresh start for limitation purposes from the date of the final order on the first application. There are authorities in India to the effect that if an application is made in execution and the particulars required by rr. 11 to 14 of Or. xxi. of the Code of Civil Procedure are not supplied, and those defects have not been remedied though time has been given to do so, the application can be rejected and is therefore not one in accordance with law. If it is not in accordance with law it is not a step in aid. The application for execution of June 27, 1932, was not in accordance with law nor a step in aid of execution within the meaning of art. 182, cl. 5, of the Indian Limitation Act, and therefore limitation did not begin to run afresh from the date of the final order on that application. The second point arises under s. 78 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The words " under this Act" in that section are not surplusage, and " annulment " there means an annulment for which provision is made in the Act, and does not include an annulment made by the Appellate Court, as here. On a proper construction of s. 78 it did not apply to the facts of this case. Even if it does apply, however, the respondent has not " proved M his debt within the meaning of the proviso to that section. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that" proved " in the proviso has any other meaning than its ordinary grammatical one ss. 29, 33, which latter distinguishes between a tender of proof and proof. " Proved " means actually established in the sense that the judge has placed the debt on the schedule, and that it has not been rejected, as in this case. If the judge rejects it, it has not been proved within the meaning of s. 78. 29, 33, which latter distinguishes between a tender of proof and proof. " Proved " means actually established in the sense that the judge has placed the debt on the schedule, and that it has not been rejected, as in this case. If the judge rejects it, it has not been proved within the meaning of s. 78. This case is sronger than Lakshmi Bai v. Rukmaji Rao (( 1934) I. L. R. 57 M. 767.), because there the judge was considering whether the creditor should go on the schedule, while here, having once been placed on it and then removed, it can be said that the claim had been rejected, and that places the respondent in the position of a person with a rejected proof. Rewcastle K.C. and J. M. Parikh for the respondent, were not called upon. Mar. 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR MADHAVAN NAIR, who stated the facts set out above, and continued Inasmuch as the second application was not filed within three years of the decree, as required by the Limitation Act, it was prima facie time-barred, but, the respondent claimed exemption from limitation on two grounds, either of which, if accepted, would suffice to secure him such exemption. These grounds, and the contentions of the appellants with reference to each, may be summarized as follows (1.) That the previous application, dated June 27, 1932, was a step in aid of execution “made in accordance "with law " within the meaning of art. 182, cl. 5,col. 3, of the Limitation Act—Act IX. of 1908, as amended by Act IX. of 1927—and the period of three years began to run from November 5, the date of the " final order thereon." Art. 182, cl. 5, prescribes the time for the execution of a decree or order of any civil court not provided for by art. 183 or by s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—namely, three years (where the application next hereinafter has been made) from the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution, or to take a step in aid of execution, of the decree or order. To this, the appellants replied that since the decree-holder had failed to furnish copies of the mutation register of the attached villages as required by the court under Or. To this, the appellants replied that since the decree-holder had failed to furnish copies of the mutation register of the attached villages as required by the court under Or. xxi., r. 14, C. P. C, the application was not one " made in accordance with law," and it did not therefore give him a fresh starting point for the limitation period of three years. (2.) That, inasmuch as the adjudication of the insolvents had been set aside on appeal, he was entitled under s. 78, sub-s. 2, of the Provincial Insolvency Act (Act V. of 1920), in computing the period of limitation prescribed for his application for execution, to exclude the period from the date of the order of adjudication to the date when that order was set aside by the Appellate Court. To this, the appellants replied that the annulment in this case was not made " under the Act " within the meaning of s. 78, sub-s. 2, and, further, even if it was so made, the debt due to the decree-holder was not " proved " under the Act; and therefore s. 78, sub-s. 2, was inapplicable. Both courts upheld the contentions of the respondent, and held that the execution application was not time-barred. Their Lordships will now consider the various arguments in order. It is clear, both from the Code itself and from the provisions of the Limitation Act, that the legislature contemplated that there might be a succession of applications for execution see Thakur Pershad v. Sheikh Fakir-Ullah (( 1894) L. R. 22 I. A. 44.). Under the Act, the first application for the execution of a decree must be made within three years from the date of the decree, and successive applications must be made within three years from the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law, to the proper court for execution or to take some step in aid of the execution of the decree or order (see art. 182, cl. 5.) It must be observed that under the terms of the clause the previous application, to be effective, must be one " made in accordance with law” otherwise the date of the final order passed on it cannot constitute a fresh starting point of limitation. 182, cl. 5.) It must be observed that under the terms of the clause the previous application, to be effective, must be one " made in accordance with law” otherwise the date of the final order passed on it cannot constitute a fresh starting point of limitation. On the first contention, the question for determination is whether the previous application made on June 27, 1932, and dismissed on November 5, 1932, was one made " in accordance with law " within the meaning of art. 182, cl. 5, of the Limitation Act. It is well settled that the words " in accordance with law " mean in accordance with the law relating to the execution of the decrees. In support of their argument that the application is one not in accordance with law, reliance is placed by the appellants on Or. xxi., rr. 14 and 17, C. P. C. A few of the relevant provisions of Or. xxi., relating to application for execution, may be briefly noticed. Or. xxi., r. 11, sub-r. 2, specifies the particulars which a written application for execution should contain. Rule 12 is inapplicable to the present case, as it deals with movable property. Rule 13 declares that an application for attachment of immovable property should contain a description of the property, sufficient to identify the same, boundaries, etc., and a specification of the judgment-debtors interest in such property. Rule 14, already quoted, states that the court " may require the applicant to "produce certified extracts from the collectors register in "certain cases." Rule 17, as amended by the High Court of Nagpur, so far as it is material is as follows (1.) " On receiving " an application for the execution of a decree as provided by "r. 11, sub-r. 2, the court shall ascertain whether such of the "requirements of rr. 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case "have been complied with and, if they have not been com-" plied with, the court may allow the defect to be remedied "then and there, or may fix a time within which it should be "remedied and in "case the decree-holder fails to remedy the "defect within such time the court may reject the application.” It is common ground that in this case there was an attachment before judgment, and that there was no need for a further attachment of the property before sale, and all that the applicant was seeking by his execution application was to get it sold through the collector. The fact that the property had been attached before judgment was specifically mentioned in col. 10 of the execution application, headed " Mode in which "the assistance of the court is required.1 It was also mentioned therein that " the schedule of the property is filed "in the suit." Further, after some corrections had been made the application was reported to be correct and was registered. The court may well have abstained from requiring the applicant to produce the certified extracts, and have proceeded with the execution of the decree, seeing that the property had been under attachment and the necessary particulars about it were already known. However, though the application was correct in form, and was admitted, the court thought that the certified extracts would be helpful, probably, for a further clarification of the details. It will be noticed that the provision in r. 14 is permissive, unlike that in r. 13, which is mandatory. Under the old provision—see s. 238 of the Code of 1882—it was necessary when an application was made for the attachment of land registered in the collectors office that it should be accompanied by a certified extract from the register of such office, whereas, under the present rule the court may at its discretion require the applicant to produce the required extract. The copies might have been filed had it not been for the insolvency of the appellants. The copies might have been filed had it not been for the insolvency of the appellants. In the circumstances, their Lordships are not prepared to hold that the order made by the court dismissing the application would render it one not "made "in accordance with law." It follows that the application dated July 23, 1935, which has given rise to this appeal, being within three years from November 5, 1932, the date of the final order on the previous application, is not time-barred. This ground by itself is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. The next question is whether, in computing the period of limitation, the respondent is entitled to exclude the period between the adjudication of the appellants as insolvents and the setting aside of that adjudication by the Appellate Court. It is conceded that if s. 78, sub-s. 2, is applicable then the respondents application would be in time. But counsel for the appellants, stressing the words " under the Act " which follow the word " annulled " in the section, seeks to draw a distinction between annulment under the express provisions of the Act and the annulment resulting from the setting aside of the adjudication by the Appellate Court. The latter class of annulments, according to him, will not fall within the meaning of the words " annulled under this Act " used in s. 78, sub-s. 2. No authority was cited in support of this contention, but counsel drew their Lordships attention to s. 35 of the Act which follows the sub-title " annulment of "adjudication." Their Lordships are unable to see any force in the argument. The opening words of the section " where, "in the opinion of the court, a debtor ought not to have "been adjudged insolvent " are wide enough to include an annulment resulting from the setting aside of adjudication by the Appellate Court. In their Lordships view, the words "annulled under this Act " in s. 78, sub-s. 2, would include an annulment resulting from the setting aside of the adjudication by the Appellate Court, as in the present case. In their Lordships view, the words "annulled under this Act " in s. 78, sub-s. 2, would include an annulment resulting from the setting aside of the adjudication by the Appellate Court, as in the present case. The next branch of the argument has reference to the proviso to s. 78, sub-s. 2, which declares that the privilege of exemption from limitation conferred by the section will not apply " in respect of a debt provable but not proved." To avoid the operation of the proviso two conditions have to be satisfied, namely, (1.) there must be a debt " provable," and (2.) that debt must have been " proved under this Act." That the debt in the present case is " provable " is not disputed. How is the debt to be " proved " under the Act is the question ? Counsel answers that the debt can be said to be " proved " only if the proof has been accepted by the court. He goes further, and says that in this case the proof has been definitely rejected by the court. In support of the latter statement attention was drawn to the order of the court dated September 10, 1932, wherein it was stated that Madanlal is "suspended" from the schedule along with two others, since the receiver alleges that the debts are not fully binding on him and they must therefore prove how they got their decrees. It is clear to their Lordships that this order does not mean that Madanlals claims were either finally rejected or that he was finally excluded from the schedule in the insolvency proceedings. It is also clear that the order is not one which can be taken in appeal. The word " suspended " used in the order can have no special significance, and it is not used in the Act anywhere in connexion with this stage of the proceedings in insolvency. It imports that no decision to accept or reject the proof has been come to—in other words, that the court has not yet discharged its duty, to frame the schedule referred to in s. 33 of the Act. The question remains, has the debt been " proved." Sect. 49 provides the mode of proof under the Act. It is not denied that the requirements of that section have been complied with by the respondent. The question remains, has the debt been " proved." Sect. 49 provides the mode of proof under the Act. It is not denied that the requirements of that section have been complied with by the respondent. Their Lordships have been shown no authority in support of the proposition that a debt can be said to be proved under the Act only if it is accepted or admitted by the court. "Provable" and " proof" are words of technical import in the language of the law of insolvency. A creditor proves his debt when he lodges a proof in the mode prescribed by the statute, i.e., by fulfilling the requirements laid down in s. 49 of the Act; and when he has done that he has proved his debt within the meaning of the proviso to s. 78, sub-s. 2. Under s. 33 of the Act the proof so tendered may be accepted or rejected by the court, or it may require further evidence—as under the rules of the English bankruptcy law. If the effect of an adjudication is to prevent the creditors from taking proceedings in the ordinary courts of law for the realization of their debts, it is only just to exclude from the period of limitation the space of time that elapses between adjudication and its annulment. This is the just privilege accorded to the creditors under s. 78, sub-s. 2, of the Act. If the meaning sought to be put on the word " proved " by counsel is accepted, it is easy to see that the principle underlying the exemption thus granted may often be frustrated. Thus, as pointed out by the learned Chief Justice, in a case where there has been an adjudication which would prevent a creditor from following his remedy in a court to realize his debt, and he lodges proof of his claim as required by the statute, proof which, it may be assumed, will be accepted by the court, if the adjudication is annulled before such acceptance, as may well happen, the creditor would lose his debt altogether. Their Lordships cannot accept an interpretation of the word " proved " in the proviso which will lead to such a result. Their Lordships cannot accept an interpretation of the word " proved " in the proviso which will lead to such a result. They hold, agreeing with the High Court, that the respondent has " proved " his debt, and that his application for execution is not time-barred under s. 78, Sub-s. 2, of the Provisional Insolvency Act also. In this connexion reference may be made to Lakshmi Bat v. Rukmaji Rao (I. L. R. 57 M. 767.), where it was held that " a debt proved under the " Provincial Insolvency Act in the proviso to s. 78, sub-s. 2, "means a debt in respect of which a proof has been lodged and " all the requirements of s. 49 of the Act fulfilled " ; and that "it is not also necessary that the debt must have been admitted "by the official receiver under the provisions of the Act.1 In their Lordships opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the learned judges is right. In the result, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal fails and should be dismissed, with costs incurred by the respondent here and before the High Court.