JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of possession and for mesne profits. Both the Courts below have dismissed the suit, and hence this appeal by the plaintiff. The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff is the landlord of an occupancy holding, and the defendants were tenants under him. He recovered a rent decree against them, and in execution of the decree, purchased the holding himself. The sale was held on 22nd June 1932, and confirmed on 26th July following. On 8th February next year, he obtained the sale certificate. It appears that he did not thereafter obtain possession of the holding. Instead, however, of applying to the Court for delivery of possession under O. 21, R. 95, Civil P.C., within three years of the date of confirmation of the sale (as provided in Art. 180 of Sch. 1, Limitation Act), the plaintiff commenced the present suit on 15th September 1938, in which he asked for recovery of possession on declaration of his title and for mesne profits. 2. Both the Courts below have held that the case comes within the Full Bench ruling in ('26) 13 Kailash Chandra Tarafdar Vs. Gopal Chandra Poddar, AIR 1926 Cal 798 , and in that view, dismissed the suit as barred under S. 47, Civil P.C. It is the propriety of this view which is challenged in this appeal, In the Full Bench case the question was whether an appeal lay from an order passed on an application under O. 21, R. 95 by an auction purchaser who was the decree-holder himself. This was held to depend on whether the case came under S. 47 of the Code, and this in turn was held to depend on: (1) whether the decree-holder auction-purchaser was a party to the suit, and (2) whether the question of delivery of possession was a question relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of S. 47. Both questions were answered in the affirmative. 3. It must follow accordingly that where a decree-holder auction-purchaser seeks to recover possession of any immovable property purchased by him, he 'must proceed by way of an application, and not by a;separate suit; in other words, if he wants khas possession, he is limited to the remedy provided by O. 21 R. 95 of the Code. 3. It must follow accordingly that where a decree-holder auction-purchaser seeks to recover possession of any immovable property purchased by him, he 'must proceed by way of an application, and not by a;separate suit; in other words, if he wants khas possession, he is limited to the remedy provided by O. 21 R. 95 of the Code. The learned advocate for the appellant has sought to avoid this effect of the Full Bench decision by an ingenious argument which he rests on the fact that the decree-holder purchaser here was the landlord. He admits that it was open to his client, though a landlord, to proceed under O. 21 R. 95, and he concedes further that a separate suit by his client for the same relief would be barred by S. 47, but his contention is that qua landlord, the plaintiff had an independent right, namely, a right to enter into possession as upon determination of the tenancy, and that it was this right which he was seeking to assert in the present suit. The bar of S. 47, it is said, could not, therefore, apply. In support of his argument, the learned advocate relies on Art. 139 of Sch. I, Limitation Act, to show that such a suit is maintainable. Suffice it, however, to say that the Limitation Act does not create a right of suit, but merely recognizes it. If the suit is barred by a specific statutory provision, such as S. 47, Civil P.C. it is no answer to say that the Limitation Act provides for such a suit Thus, Art. 138 expressly provides for a suit for recovery of possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree nevertheless, on the authority of the Full Bench decision, such a suit could not escape the bar of S. 47 of the Code, where the purchaser was the decree-holder It may be pointed out that in this case apart from S 47 of the Code, the plaintiff's right of suit is not and can not be challenged. On the facts it cannot be contended, for instance, that merely because the plaintiff failed to apply for delivery of possession under O. 21 R. 95 within the statutory period of limitation, he lost his title to the property. On the facts it cannot be contended, for instance, that merely because the plaintiff failed to apply for delivery of possession under O. 21 R. 95 within the statutory period of limitation, he lost his title to the property. Section 28, Limitation Act, it will be observed, applies only to suits and not to applications, so that it is only on the expiry of the period of limitation for instituting a suit for possession of any property, and not for making an application for possession, that the right to the property is extinguished The only question, therefore, that arises is whether the suit is hit by S. 47. 4. We find it difficult to hold that the mere fact that the auction-purchaser is landlord decree-holder will make any deference in the applicability of the Full Bench ruling to this case A landlord decree-holder is a decree-holder all the same, and he will accordingly come within the terms of the decision. As landlord, the plaintiff might have the right of re-entry on determination of the tenancy, but there is no getting away from the fact that the determination of the tenancy here was the direct result of his auction-purchase as decree-holder, causing a merger of the interests of landlord and tenant in the same person. It is the auction-purchase, therefore, which constituted his cause of action, and one does not see how a suit by him to recover possession could be referred to his character as landlord, and not as decree-holder auction-purchaser. A further argument was raised on behalf of the appellant on the ground that the plaintiff here had asked for mesne profits besides praying for possession. It was said that as a claim for mesne profits was not within the scope of an application under O. 21, R. 95, the suit could not be held to be barred by S. 47. S. 47 could only bar a suit when the same relief could be obtained by application. The short answer is that a claim to mesne profits can arise only when the plaintiff has established his title to recover possession. The effect of the Full Bench decision is that so far as possession is concerned, his only remedy is by way of application under O. 21, R. 951 and then if he seeks mesne profits, he must bring a separate suit for the purpose. The effect of the Full Bench decision is that so far as possession is concerned, his only remedy is by way of application under O. 21, R. 951 and then if he seeks mesne profits, he must bring a separate suit for the purpose. This doubtless may seem to involve a needless multiplicity of proceedings, but whether this is a consideration which might or should have weighed with the Full Bench, it is not for us to say. It does not appear that this aspect of the matter was at all presented to, or considered by, the Full Bench but the decision is there, and so long as it stands, we are bound by it. The result is that the view taken by the Courts below must be affirmed, and the appeal dismissed with costs. Rau, J. 5. I agree.