JUDGMENT Akram, J. - This appeal by the Defendants arises out of a suit for the recovery of Rs. 3,321-8 annas on the basis of a hand-note. The Defendants admitted the claim, and prayed for installments. The suit was accordingly decreed with costs on the 21st March, 1940. The costs were to be paid within two months and the sum of Rs. 3,321-8 by installments of Rs. 200 each, on default of payment of one installment, all the installments were to become due at once. The Plaintiff preferred an appeal against this decree in respect only of the installments; during the pendency of the appeal, the Bengal MoneyLenders Act (Act X of 1940) came into force, (1st September, 1940). The Defendant thereafter filed an application under sec. 36 of the Act, for a reduction of the amount decreed in terms of the Act. The lower Appellate Court accordingly reduced the amount to Rs. 1,958-8 as., keeping intact of course the costs given by the trial Court, amounting to Rs. 383-7-6 pies. The new decree that was passed provided the costs to be paid in two months, and the balance of Rs. 1,958 and odd in 8 installments. In case of default of one installment, the whole of the decretal amount was to become due and recoverable. The Defendants have now filed the present appeal against this decree, but the appeal is confined only to the direction given by the lower Appellate Court that, in default of payment of one installment, the whole decretal amount is to become due and recoverable. 2. It has been urged before us by the Appellant that this part of the decree cannot be sustained, having regard to the provisions of sec. 34(1)(b) and sea 36 (2) (a) of the Bengal MoneyLenders Act. Sec. 34 (1) (6) lays down that "in respect of loans advanced before the commencement of this Act other than those referred to in cl. (a) on the application of a Defendant and after hearing the Plaintiff, order at the time of the passing of the decree,.... that the amount of the decree shall, subject to such conditions as the Court may impose, be payable without interest in such number of annual installments, etc., etc.,.............. and that, if default is made in making payment of any installment, that installment and not the whole of the decretal amount shall be recoverable. 3. that the amount of the decree shall, subject to such conditions as the Court may impose, be payable without interest in such number of annual installments, etc., etc.,.............. and that, if default is made in making payment of any installment, that installment and not the whole of the decretal amount shall be recoverable. 3. Sec. 36 (2) (a) sets forth that where the Court re-opens a decree the Court "shall, after affording the parties an opportunity of being heard, pass a new decree in accordance with the provisions of this Act..............." It was argued by the learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant that the order of the Court of Appeal below, directing that in default of one installment, the whole of the decretal amount would be recoverable was in contravention of the Act. Reference in this connection was made to the case of Promode Kumar Roy v. Benoy Krishna Chakravarty 45 C.W.N. 581 (1941), where it was held that when a decree is re-opened under sec. 36 (1), the new decree under sub-sec. (2) (a) must be passed in terms of sec. 34, and not simply as directed by sec. 36 (2) (d). It was further pointed out that, in this case, it was really not re-opening a decree, but disposing of the suit itself, as the matter came up before the lower Appellate Court on appeal, and the application was made in the pending case itself, under sec. 34 (1) (b) (i) 4. It has been urged, on the other hand, by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent that only sec. 5. 36(1)(c) could be applied, and that on the re-opening of the decree under sec. 36 (2), merely sec. 36 (2) (d) came into operation, and not cl. (a). 6. We think however that the contention put forward by the Respondent is not sound. Whether sec. 34 (1) (b) (i) was applicable or sec. 36 (2), in either event, it seems to us that in case of default in making payment of any installment, that installment and not the whole of the decretal amount could be made recoverable. Sec. 34 (1) (6) specifically provides it, while sec. 36 (2) (a) by laying down "pass a new decree in accordance with the provisions of this Act" brings sec. 34 (1) (b) into operation. Sec. 34 (1) (6) specifically provides it, while sec. 36 (2) (a) by laying down "pass a new decree in accordance with the provisions of this Act" brings sec. 34 (1) (b) into operation. Relying upon the decision referred to above, and upon the terms of the sections mentioned herein, we give effect to the Defendant-Appellant's contention. 7. The order directing that in default of one installment, the whole of the decretal amount would be recoverable is accordingly set aside, and in place thereof the order substituted is that if default is made in making payment of any installment, that installment only shall be recoverable. The decree of the lower Appellate Court is modified only to this extent and the appeal is allowed only as indicated above with costs. Pal, J. 8. I agree. 9. This appeal relates only to the order made by the decree of the Court of Appeal below that "in default of one kist, the whole of the decretal amount would become due and recoverable in execution." The Appellant contends that the order should have been in terms of sec. 34 (1) (b) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act (Bengal Act X of 1940), and should have been that if default is made in making payment of any installment, that installment, and not the whole of the decretal amount shall be recoverable. 10. Mr. Das, appearing in support of the appeal, contends that as the suit was pending in appeal, his application was one under sec. 34 (1) (b) (i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, and, that, therefore, the Defendant was entitled to have an order in terms of that section. His next contention is that even if his application be treated as one under sec. 36 for re-opening of a decree, then again in terms of sec. 36 (2) (a), after the re-opening of the decree, when the new decree was to be made, that decree was to be made in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and that referred back to sec. 34 (1) (b) (i), and again he would be entitled to have the order in terms of that section. 11. Mr. Sanyal appearing on behalf of the Respondent contends that sec. 36 (2) is self-contained, and that its cl. 34 (1) (b) (i), and again he would be entitled to have the order in terms of that section. 11. Mr. Sanyal appearing on behalf of the Respondent contends that sec. 36 (2) is self-contained, and that its cl. (d) makes provision for installments, and sets no limit to the power of the Court, and that, therefore, it was within the competence of the Court in making a new decree after re-opening the decree to make the order in the terms in which it was made. Mr. Sanyal further contends that sec. 36 (2) (a), when it lays down that a new decree should be passed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, cannot refer back to sec. 34, because sec. 34 (1) (b) only provides for the passing of a decree where there has been no decree at all. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. Das that his application was one under sec. 34 (1) (b) must prevail. No doubt, a decree was made by the trial Court in this case, but then that decree was assailed in appeal and whatever decree would be ultimately made by the Appellate Court would be the decree in suit. Therefore, it was not a case for re-opening any decree, and the Appellate Court, while making the decree, would be bound to proceed under sec. 34 (1) (b) (i). In my opinion, there is substance in the second contention of Mr. Das also. Sec. 36 (2) (a) lays down that when a new decree should be passed after re-opening a decree, the new decree must be passed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. In its terms, certainly, it refers back to sec. 34 as well, and there is nothing in sec. 34 to limit its operation only to the passing of a decree where there has been no decree at any previous stage. Sec. 34 (1) (b) simply says that when a Court is making a decree, the Court at the time of passing the decree must make an order as is contemplated in that section. Even when the Court makes a new decree after re-opening a decree it is passing a decree, and if it is passing that decree in suits in respect of loans advanced before the commencement of this Act other than those referred to in cl. (a) of that section, all the requirements of sec. Even when the Court makes a new decree after re-opening a decree it is passing a decree, and if it is passing that decree in suits in respect of loans advanced before the commencement of this Act other than those referred to in cl. (a) of that section, all the requirements of sec. 34 (1) (6) will be present, and therefore, the Court's power to make the order while granting installments will be limited by the provisions of that section. It appears that this question already came before this Court in Promode Kumar Roy v. Benoy Krishna Chakravarty 45 C.W.N. 581 (1941) and there my learned brother Mr. Justice Nasim Ali took the same view as I am taking of secs. 36 (2) (a) and 34