JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This appeal is by the Plaintiff. The facts which need be stated for the purposes of this appeal briefly are as follows:-The Plaintiff instituted a suit against the Defendant for the recovery of a sum of money due on a security bond and obtained a decree. In execution of that decree the Plaintiff on 18th April, 1925, purchased a certain piece of land belonging to the Defendant. On the 7th October, 1926, delivery of possession was given to the Plaintiff. The peon adopted the mode of delivery of possession prescribed in Or. 21, r. 96 although the proper mode to have been adopted was that prescribed in Or. 21, r. 95. The Plaintiff himself describes this possession as being " symbolical " possession and says that after taking this " symbolical" possession he went to take actual possession sometime in July, 1927, by ploughing the land. The Defendant and his party prevented the Plain tiff from ploughing the land. Thereupon the Plaintiff instituted the present suit for declaration of title to this land and for recovery of possession thereof. He valued the suit at Rs. 300 and presented the plaint in the Munsif's Court at Cox's Bazar on the 26th October, 1938, which was the day on which the Courts re-opened after the Puja vacation. The Defendant objected to the valuation of the suit and that objection was allowed and the plaint was returned to be filed to the proper Court. An appeal against this order was taken but it was dismissed on the 28th June, 1939. On that date the Plaintiff presented his plaint in the Court of the Sadar Munsif of Chittagong valuing the suit at Rs. 1,260. The defence taken was that the land did not belong to the Defendant and that he had transferred it to his wife in lieu of dower before the purchase by the Plaintiff. It was contended that the Plaintiff acquired nothing by his purchase. The next objection taken was that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court held that the alleged transfer by the Defendant to his wife was a colourable transaction and was of no effect. The Court also held that the suit was not barred by limitation and gave the Plaintiff a decree. The next objection taken was that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court held that the alleged transfer by the Defendant to his wife was a colourable transaction and was of no effect. The Court also held that the suit was not barred by limitation and gave the Plaintiff a decree. On appeal the learned District Judge has agreed with the learned Munsif regarding the invalidity of the transfer made by the Defendant to the Defendant's wife but he has held that the suit is barred by limitation and has dismissed the suit. 2. The only point argued on appeal by the Plaintiff in this Court is that the suit is not barred by limitation. It will now be necessary to consider this point. I must first decide which Article of the Limitation Act applies to this suit. On behalf of the Appellant it is contended that Article 144 applies whereas the Respondent contends that Article 142 is the proper one. In my opinion there can be no doubt that Article 142 is the proper Article which applies in this case. The Plaintiff has brought the suit for possession of immovable property on the ground of being dispossessed. Article 142 of the Limitation Act in terms applies to such a suit and I am unable to appreciate how any other Article can be made applicable. Now in order to succeed in such a suit the Plaintiff must show that he was in possession of the property in suit within 12 years of the suit. In deciding the question of limitation one point must first be decided and it is this:-Is the Plaintiff entitled to have the benefit of the period covered by the Puja vacation in calculating the period of limitation for the suit? The suit was instituted on the re-opening day of the Courts but it was instituted not in the proper Court but in the Court of Munsif at Cox's Bazar. In these circumstances it has to be decided whether the Plaintiff can avail himself of the provisions of sec. The suit was instituted on the re-opening day of the Courts but it was instituted not in the proper Court but in the Court of Munsif at Cox's Bazar. In these circumstances it has to be decided whether the Plaintiff can avail himself of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Indian Limitation Act which says " Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court re-opens." On behalf of the Respondent it was contended that in order to avail himself of the provisions of sec. 4 the Plaintiff must institute the suit in the proper Court on the day that the proper Court re-opens. In the present case, it is pointed out, that the suit was instituted in a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it and it is argued that the Plaintiff cannot therefore take advantage of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Indian Limitation Act. In support of this contention my attention was drawn to the case of Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh (1). The learned Advocate on behalf of the Appellant contends that the Court of the Munsif at Cox's Bazar had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the form in which it was instituted. He contends that the property was valued at Rs. 300 in accordance with the valuation which was given in the sale certificate. He pointed out that it was only after investigation that it was discovered that the property was worth more. He argued that it must be held that the suit was instituted in the proper Court on the 26th October, 1938, and that the case referred to above has no application. I am not able to agree with this view. In my opinion the decision of the Privy Council is on all fours with the present case. The value of the property being Rs. 1,260 at the time when the suit was instituted it must be held that the Munsif's Court at Cox's Bazar had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit on the 26th October, 1938. The suit was therefore not instituted in the proper Court. The value of the property being Rs. 1,260 at the time when the suit was instituted it must be held that the Munsif's Court at Cox's Bazar had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit on the 26th October, 1938. The suit was therefore not instituted in the proper Court. In the case of Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh L. R. 62 I. A. 80: S. C. 39 C. W. N. 640 (1935) referred to above the position was very similar as will appear from the facts which I shall now relate. In that case the decree-holder obtained a preliminary mortgage decree in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge. After the decree was made that Court was abolished and the jurisdiction of the Court was transferred to the Subordinate Judge of Basti. At a later stage another Additional Judge was appointed with specified jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which was transferred to the Subordinate Judge of Basti remained with that Judge. The decree-holder applied before the newly appointed Additional Judge for a final decree on June 20th, 1923, i.e., on the re-opening date after the end of the long vacation. The petition was returned on the ground that the Additional Judge had no jurisdiction to grant the final decree and it was held that the Subordinate Judge at Basti was the proper Court in which to proceed. This was decided on the 6th August, 1922. On that very day the decree-holder applied for a final decree in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Basti. It was objected that the application was barred by limitation inasmuch as the applicant could not claim the benefit of sec. 4 as the application for the final decree was not made in the proper Court on the re-opening date. The Judicial Committee upheld this decision. In the present case the position seems to be very similar and I can see no such difference between the two cases which would justify me in holding that the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee would not apply to a case of the present type where the Court in which the suit was first instituted had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. There is nothing in the decision of the Privy Council which would justify me in holding that the principle would not apply unless the Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the suit. I may refer in this connection to a case decided by this Court, viz.. Anil Prakash Chatterji v. Dhirendra Nath Mukherji 41 C. W. N. 956 (1937) where the decision of the Judicial Committee is followed. In that case the Court in which the suit was instituted after the re-opening day was a Court which had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and it was held that in such a case sec. 4 of the Indian Limitation Act had no application; I cannot see why I should make any distinction between territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. In order to enable a party to avail himself of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Indian Limitation Act it must be shown that the suit is instituted in a Court which had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I hold therefore that the Plaintiff is not entitled to deduct the period of the vacation in calculating the period of limitation. 3. The next thing which is to be decided is the date from which the period of limitation would run. On behalf of the Respondent it was contended that the period of limitation must commence from the 7th October, 1926, when the Plaintiff was given formal possession by the Court. If that is the date from which limitation commences then undoubtedly the suit is barred by limitation. The Appellant however contends that the period of limitation should be taken to commence from some day between the 15th May-15th June, 1927, when the Defendant dispossessed the Plaintiff; he contends that if limitation commences from such a day the suit is within the period of limitation. Now the story of dispossession has been disbelieved by the learned District Judge. He says that the evidence on the point is so discrepant that he cannot believe it. I have been through the evidence and have allowed the parties to argue on the evidence and I am of the opinion that there is no error of law committed by the learned Judge in coming to the conclusion that the Plaintiff had failed to prove dispossession in May-June, 1927. That being so, this finding cannot be set aside on second appeal. That being so, this finding cannot be set aside on second appeal. The Plaintiff's case is that he never got physical possession of the land. On the 7th October, 1926, he got what he himself described as " symbolical " possession. He then goes on to say " After symbolical possession I tried to take actual possession towards the end of Jaistha, 1289, M. E. (May-June, 1927), but failed. We were dispossessed by the Defendant." It is quite clear from this statement and from the rest of the evident that at no time did the Plaintiff take physical possession of the land. The peon's report shows that possession was given by beat of drum and by posting a bamboo on the land in accordance with the terms of Or. 21, r. 96. This, it is true, amounts in law to actual possession so far as the judgment-debtor is concerned, that is to say, so far as the Defendant is concerned. But it is quite clear from the evidence and from the manner in which possession was given that the Plaintiff never entered upon the land after the 7th October, 1926. His story that he was dispossessed in May-June, 1927, has been disbelieved and on the Plaintiff's own evidence there was really no dispossession on that date inasmuch as the Plaintiff has stated that from before that date the Defendant was in possession. The Plaintiff says that he never took any paddy from the land since his auction-purchase. From this it is quite clear that apart from the fictional actual possession which the Plaintiff got on the 7th October, 1926, the Plaintiff did not take any other kind of possession of the land. The Defendant continued to be in possession of the land. That being so, the period of limitation would run from the 7th October, 1926. The suit must accordingly be held to be barred by limitation. The appeal therefore fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.