JUDGMENT Khundkar, J. - This appeal which is by the Defendants arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The facts briefly stated, are as follows: A certain revenue-paying property was mortgaged to one Sasanka Sekhar Choudhury, father of the Plaintiff. After his death, his executors instituted a suit for enforcement of the mortgage, obtained a decree, purchased the property in execution sale, and were given what is called symbolical possession. The judgment-debtors who are the Defendants launched proceedings under Or. 21, r. 90 of the CPC to set aside the sale. During the pendency of these proceedings, there were some negotiations for a compromise which, however, fell through. Though the parties did not come to terms, a document was somehow filed with the record of the execution proceedings, which contained certain conditions which had been discussed but not agreed to by the parties. The signature of one of the executors who were the Plaintiffs in the mortgage suit found a place in this document which is Exhibit E in the present case. Exhibit E contained a statement which is sought to be interpreted as meaning that the Defendants' kutchery bari and the jote appurtenant thereto were the property of the Defendants' mother and not the property of their father. The application to set aside the sale was rejected. The Defendants appealed and this Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statement in Exhibit E could not be utilised for the purpose of showing that the land on which the kutchery bari stood was not the property of the Defendants' father. The land in dispute is plot No. 420 and the Defendants being still in possession, the Plaintiff filed the present suit on the 17th April, 1939. One contention of the defence was that plot No. 420 was a jote of the Defendants' mother held under the superior zemindary interest of the Defendants' father and that, therefore, it was property which did not pass in the mortgage sale of the superior interest. This contention was negatived by both the Courts below. 2. Two points only have been taken in this appeal. This contention was negatived by both the Courts below. 2. Two points only have been taken in this appeal. It is argued, firstly, that on a proper construction of Exhibit E, there is an admission by one of the executors of the Plaintiffs' father's estate which is binding on the Plaintiff to the effect that the land in dispute is the property of the Defendants' mother. 3. It is next urged that the Plaintiff's remedy for recovery of possession was by a proceeding under sec. 47 of the CPC and that this remedy was time-barred, the mortgage sale having taken place on the 17th April, 1930, in execution of which symbolical possession was delivered on the 3rd December, 1933, and was never followed by actual possession. 4. As regards the first of these contentions, it is clear from a reading of the judgments of the Courts below that no question of the construction of the document, Exhibit E, arises. The particular statement in this document upon which the Defendants sought to rely was said to have this effect that it showed that the kutchery bari stood on land which did not belong to the Defendants' father. The Courts below have considered with care all the material evidence which had any bearing upon this question. In so doing they have come to the conclusion that the presumption of correctness which attaches. to the record-of-rights has not been rebutted by the statement in question. The evidentiary value of this statement,-if indeed it was ever made,-is a question of fact, and it cannot be re-agitated now. 5. But Mr. Sanyal who appears for the Appellants has contended that the statement is binding on the Plaintiff as a promise would be, since it was made by one of the executors of his father's estate, and, because, it is contained in a draft of a compromise deed. With regard to this contention, it is sufficient to say that there is nothing to show how the name of the executor came to be written in this document. But there is also a further answer: Clause 7 in this document is to the effect that the parties would be free to proceed in spite of the filing of petitions which would put them to loss in respect of the case. But there is also a further answer: Clause 7 in this document is to the effect that the parties would be free to proceed in spite of the filing of petitions which would put them to loss in respect of the case. In the context in which this statement appears, it manifestly means that the parties to this document would be free to repudiate any condition of the proposed compromise by which, in their opinion, their rights were prejudicially affected. This being the meaning of the clause, there can be little doubt that it would have to be excluded under sec. 23 of the Evidence Act. Mr. Chakravartti who appears for the Respondent has raised a further objection to any use being made of the statement in question. He has urged that even if this statement can be considered to be an admission by a party, it is of no value if it can be shown that in some proceeding, a decree opposed to it was passed. This objection, I think, must prevail because the execution proceedings in which this document was filed were decided against the present Appellants. See in this connection Janan Choudhry v. Doolar Choudhry 18 W. R. 347 (1872). In any case, it is abundantly clear that if there ever was any compromise, it was never acted upon. It would appear that there was an attempt to arrive at a compromise between the parties, but that the negotiations eventually fell through, and there never was a completed agreement. This being so, it cannot be said that Exhibit E is binding upon the Plaintiff in any way. 6. As regards the second contention on behalf of the Appellants, Mr. Sanyal has argued that though the Plaintiff may not be barred from seeking his remedy by a suit, the substantial question between himself and the Defendants is one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, and that, therefore, limitation would run from the date of the mortgage execution sale, and that it would be covered by Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act. If this view is correct, then the present suit to enforce such a remedy is clearly time-barred. 7. Mr. Sanyal has relied in support of his contention on the Full Bench case of Kailash Chandra Tarafdar. If this view is correct, then the present suit to enforce such a remedy is clearly time-barred. 7. Mr. Sanyal has relied in support of his contention on the Full Bench case of Kailash Chandra Tarafdar. v. Gopal Chandra Poddar 30 C. W. N. 649 : S. C. 43 C. L. J. 345 (F. B.) (1926) In that judgment there are observations that proceedings for delivery of possession must be regarded as proceeding which relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, but the questions which were raised and decided in the case were clearly different from the question which arises here, and I am satisfied that the case relied upon by Mr. Sanyal has no application to the present question. 8. Regarding this contention, Mr. Chakravartti who appears for the Respondent has contended that sec. 47 of the CPC has no application because the relief which the Plaintiff is seeking is one which he can no longer obtain in execution proceedings. He has argued that as the executors of the Plaintiff's father were given delivery of symbolical possession after purchasing the property in mortgage execution sale, it is not open to them to apply to the executing Court again under the provisions of Or. 21 for the purpose of obtaining actual possession. Mr. Chakravartti has relied upon the following cases: Juggobundhu Mukherjee v. Ram Chunder Bysak I. L. R. 5 Cal. 584 (1880), Juggobundhu Mitter v. Purnanund Gossami I. L. R. 16 Cal. 530 (P. B.) (1889), Hari Mohan Shaha v. Baburali I. L. R. 24 Cal. 715 (1897), Girija Kanta Chakrabarty v. Mohim Chandra Acharjya 20 C. W. N. 675 (1915), Thakur Sri Sri Radha Krishna Chanderji v. Ram Bahadur 22 C. W. N. 330 (P. C.) (1917) and Maharaja Jagadish Nath Roy Bahadur v. Nafar Chandra. Paramanik 35 C. W. N. 12 (1930). 9. In the case of Thakur Sri Sri Radha Krishna Chanderji v. Ram Bahadur 22 C. W. N. 330 (P. C) (1917), the Privy Council laid it down that adverse possession by a party could be interrupted as well by delivery of symbolical possession to another as by actual dispossession of the party in possession. 9. In the case of Thakur Sri Sri Radha Krishna Chanderji v. Ram Bahadur 22 C. W. N. 330 (P. C) (1917), the Privy Council laid it down that adverse possession by a party could be interrupted as well by delivery of symbolical possession to another as by actual dispossession of the party in possession. In the case of Girija Kanta Chakravarty v. Mohim Chandra Acharjya 20 C. W. N. 675 (1915) a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mookerjee and Roe, JJ., were considering a case where the Plaintiff as auction-purchaser had obtained symbolical delivery of the property but not actual possession. It was contended that the remedy of the Plaintiff was by way of an application to the executing Court to be placed in actual possession of the purchased property. It was held that the Plaintiff having obtained delivery of symbolical possession after the sale had been confirmed, that delivery was operative against the judgment-debtors who from the date thereof became trespassers, and that it was open to the Plaintiff to sue to recover actual possession from them. In the case of Maharaja Jagadish Nath Roy Bahadur v. Nafar Chandra Paramanik 35 C. W. N. 12 (1930), the decree-holder who obtained a decree for khas possession and who also obtained symbolical possession against the judgment-debtors sought, by a subsequent application under Or. 21, r. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to be placed in actual possession of the property in dispute. It was held that a second application for delivery of possession would not lie and that the decree-holder's only remedy in respect of actual possession was by way of a properly constituted suit. 10. It seems to me that upon the authority of the two last cases referred to, I am bound to hold that once delivery of possession whether actual or symbolical has been obtained in execution proceedings, any further question regarding actual possession or dispossession is not a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my judgment, both the points taken fail, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.