JUDGMENT Roxburgh, J. - This Rule has been obtained by the Defendant No. 1 in a suit before the Special Subordinate Judge, Assam Valley Districts, and is against an order passed by him restoring a case against the Defendants which was dismissed for default under Or. 9, r. 8 of the CPC on the 9th January, 1943. In restoring the case, the learned Judge remarked,- So far as I have seen, the Plaintiffs had no sufficient cause that prevented them from appearing in Court on the 9th January, 1943, but the statement in para 8 of the w. s. of the Defendant No. 1 is 'that the Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover only this Defendant's share of liability under the mortgage, and not the whole amount as claimed. 2. He then further discusses some points in the written statement of Defendant No. 1, and mentions that the claim of Rs. 70,000 was based on a mortgage bond executed by Defendant No. 1 and two others whose heirs were co-Defendants with Defendant No. 1. He remarks that the execution of the mortgage deed was not denied by Defendant No. 1, and the receipt of the consideration therein was also not denied, and notes that the right to sue on the mortgage deed on the face of it concerned the Plaintiff No. 1 at least, on the death of his father, and the question of the right of the remaining three Plaintiffs to sue was to be decided on the merits. He then concludes, In view of the said statements of the Defendant No. 1 in the para 8 of his w. s. and for the ends of justice I grant the revival petition. The dismissal order is set aside and the suit is restored to the file. 3. In the order of dismissal passed on the 9th January, 1943, it was stated: There was an issue as regards the Plaintiffs' right to sue as to whom (sic) has the right to realise the mortgage dues accrued. The Plaintiffs have not charged that burden in this respect. The defence denies the claim of the suit which in therefore dismissed with costs. 4. Dr. Basak. The Plaintiffs have not charged that burden in this respect. The defence denies the claim of the suit which in therefore dismissed with costs. 4. Dr. Basak. appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, contends on the authority of three cases of this Court, Haridas Mukherjee v. Bejoy Krishna Das 34 C. W. N. 222 (1929), K.B. Dutt v. Shamsuddin Shah Shaheb 34 C. W. N. 419 (1930) and Serajul Haque v. Kashim Ali Khairati 39 C. W. N. 894 (1935), (all cases under Or. 9, r. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure) that the Court in exercising powers under Or. 9, r. 9 of the CPC cannot restore a case if it does not find that the Plaintiff has, within the terms of that rule, shown that "there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing." It is to be noticed that the learned Judge has not clearly and specifically found that the Plaintiffs in the present case had not sufficient cause. In one sentence, the learned Judge has remarked that so far as he has seen, there was no such cause and then he continues to deal with the merits of the case itself and the matter of the Defendant's written statement. The learned Judge appears to have allowed the Plaintiffs' prayer on somewhat rather general and vague grounds, including the view that the cause shown was possibly inadequate and without clearly finding whether this was so or not. On the other hand, it is not very clear as to what the learned Judge intended by his discussion of the written statement of the Defendant No. 1. Under Or. 9, r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court shall, if there is an admission by the Defendant of the Plaintiff's claim make a decree upon such admission. We do not think that in the present case, the learned Judge really intended to take the written statement as amounting to an admission of the kind which should have properly compelled him to pass a decree, but the matter is certainly somewhat obscure, and it may be that it was the learned Judge's view that there was such an admission, and if that be the case, his procedure in restoring the case was obviously incorrect. If he clearly found that the Plaintiffs had no sufficient cause for non-appearance, he should have rejected the application for restoration and have left it to the Plaintiffs to apply to him to review the order passed by him on the 9th January, 1943, which subsequent investigation showed to have been incorrect. 5. In so far as the order of restoration is passed under a vague mixture of reasons,- partly for reasons which are for consideration under Or. 9, r. 9 of the Code, and partly for reasons which would justify action under sec. 151,-the parties have both been put into some difficulties. If the learned Judge had clearly found that the Plaintiffs had failed to show sufficient cause and had rejected their prayer on that ground, the Plaintiffs would have had a right of appeal to this Court which could consider the case on the merits and itself decide whether the cause shown was sufficient or not. If we are now under our powers under sec. 115 of the CPC to set aside the order of restoration merely on the ground that the Court below had no jurisdiction to exercise its powers under sec. 151 of the Code in a case like the present, we shall in effect be passing the proper order which the Court should have passed under Or. 9, r. 9, on a finding that there was no sufficient cause, but without ourselves going into the case on the merits. It is true that our powers under sec. 115 of the Code are wide enough to allow us even to decide the matter on the merits, but we think that it is more suitable that the case should go back for a proper order to be passed by the Court below. Then the parties may take their remedy according to law as arising out of the order actually passed. In the event of the trial Court refusing to restore the case, it will be open to the Plaintiffs if they think fit and if they consider that the proper order that should have been passed on the 9th January, 1943, was to pass a decree on the admission of the Defendant, to move the Court for a review of the order, subject to such objections as the judgment-debtor may make. 6. As regards the question of the Court's power under Or. 6. As regards the question of the Court's power under Or. 9, r. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we respectfully agree with the views expressed in the cases cited and quoted above. It is true that these arc all cases under Or. 9, r. 13 of the Code, but the reasons given therein for holding that the Courts should not restore cases under their alleged inherent powers in that matter under sec. 151 of the Code where they find that the facts do not justify interference under r. 13 equally apply in cases under r. 9. We may point out that the facts in the present case are a good illustration of the difficulties arising where what may be called a hazy order is passed in restoring a case without a clear decision as to whether the case is restored under r. 9 or r. 13 as the case may be, or in the exercise of the inherent powers of the Court. In both the cases referred to before us in which the Allahabad High Court has taken a different view from this Court and in which the Bombay High Court has followed the Allahabad High Court, orders of this character were passed. We refer to Lalta Prasad v. Ram Karan I. L. R. 34 All. 426 (1912) and Bilasrai Laxminarayan v. Cursondas Damodardas I. L. R. 44 Bom. 82. Incidentally it may be pointed out that the Allahabad High Court case follows a Madras case, Somayya v. Subbamma I. L. R. 26 Mad. 599 (1903) which was subsequently overruled by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Neetaveni v. Narayana Reddi I. L. R. 43 Mad. 94 (1919). We may also note that in K. B. Butt v. Shamsuddin Shah Shaheb 34 C. W. N. 419 (1930), Rankin, C. J. (as he then was) pointed out that the Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in that case, would not go into the question whether or not a certain cause was sufficient. That case arose out of an order of a lower Appellate Court setting aside an order of the trial Court refusing restoration, and no question of an appeal in the matter to the High Court could arise as in the present case. 7. That case arose out of an order of a lower Appellate Court setting aside an order of the trial Court refusing restoration, and no question of an appeal in the matter to the High Court could arise as in the present case. 7. The result is that this Rule is made absolute and the case is remanded to the lower Court for disposal of the application under Or. 9, r. 9 of the CPC on the merits on the evidence already on the record. The Court will come to a clear finding one way or the other whether it considers or does not consider that there was a sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the Plaintiffs on the 9th January, 1943, and will restore the case or reject the application accordingly. The Petitioners are entitled to their costs in this Court, hearing fee, two gold mohurs. Let the records be sent down without delay. Blank, J. I agree.