Judgement Appeal (No. 59 of 1940) from a decree of the High Court (December 16, 1937) varying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Dharwar (November 22, 1933). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee The appellant, Anant, brought the suit out of which this appeal arose in 1932 to recover certain watan properties from the respondent, Shankar. to whom possession had been given in 1928 by order of a Revenue Court. The properties in suit were the patilki right and the patilki watan lands of the village of Alnavar in the district of Dharwar, in the Province of Bombay. Those properties were governed by the Bombay Hereditary Office Act (Bom. Act III. of 1874) as amended by Bom. Act V. of 1886, which imposed on them a special rule of succession whereby every female, other than the widow of the last male owner, was postponed to every male member of the watan family qualified to inherit. No other feature special to watan property was relied on or discussed in the courts in India or mentioned in the printed cases lodged by the parties on this appeal; and their Lordships were not called- upon to consider whether on other grounds the law applicable to watandars or watan property varied from the ordinary Hindu law. The family were governed by the Mitakshara, and the pedigree table hereunder given represented it sufficiently for the purposes of the case Dhulappa | | | Punnappa d. 1901 Hanamantappa | | | Gundappa d. 1902 | Narayan d. 1908 | Ramchandra | | Bhikappa d. 1905 = Gangabai | | Shankar defendant | Hanamant | Babu | Keshav d. 1917 | Anant adopted 19030 plaintiff Dhulappas sons, Punnappa and Hanamantappa, separated long ago—in 1857, and the Alnavar watan with its lands went to Punnappa. Narayan, one of his three sons, separated from him in his lifetime, taking as his separate share two plots or parcels of land represented by revenue survey numbers 173/2 and 174/1 which were included in the lands now claimed by the appellant. Thereafter Punnappa died in 1901, and his son Gundappa in 1902, so that in 1905 Bhikappa and his-minor son Keshav were the only coparceners in the joint family. In 1905 Bhikappa died, leaving his widow Gangabai and his son Keshav. Thereafter Punnappa died in 1901, and his son Gundappa in 1902, so that in 1905 Bhikappa and his-minor son Keshav were the only coparceners in the joint family. In 1905 Bhikappa died, leaving his widow Gangabai and his son Keshav. In 1908 Narayan died, leaving a widow but no issue, and the widow having in or about that year remarried, the two plots which were his separate property devolved by inheritance on Keshav as being his nearest reversioner at the date of the remarriage. Keshav lived till 1917, when he died unmarried. At that date his nearest heir was the respondent Shankar, a somewhat remote collateral, who obtained possession of the suit properties from the collector in 1928 despite Gangabais opposition. Thereupon, in 1930, Gangabai adopted the appellant Anant as a son to her deceased husband Bhikappa, and in 1932, as next friend of her adopted son, brought the suit which was now before the Board. The learned trial judge gave the appellant a decree, dated November 22, 1933, for possession with mesne profits from the date of suit; also a declaration that he was the lawfully adopted son of Bhikappa, and that as such he was the heir of the last male owner, Keshav. The High Court (Rangnekar and Wadia JJ.) on December 16, 1937, set aside the order for possession and mesne profits, and qualified the declaration by adding the words " except as regards the watan property "which has already vested in the defendant." They made no specific reference to the two plots which had belonged to Narayan, and the order for possession and mesne profits was set aside without any exception being made as to those plots. The ground of the High Courts decision was that as the coparcenary which existed at the time of Bhikappas death ( 1905) had come to an end on the death of Keshav ( 1917), and the family property had then vested in his heir; the subsequent adoption ( 1930) by Bhikappas widow, though valid, would not revive the co-parcenary or divest Keshavs heir, the adopting widow not being herself Keshavs heir. 1943. May 28, 31; June 1,2. J. M. Parikh and Subba Row fo the appellant. Khambatta for the respondent. July 26. 1943. May 28, 31; June 1,2. J. M. Parikh and Subba Row fo the appellant. Khambatta for the respondent. July 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR GEORGE RANKIN, who stated the facts above set out, and continued In Chandra v. Gojarabai (( 1890) I. L. R. 14 B. 463.), it had been held that on the death of the sole surviving coparcener an adoption to a pre-deceased coparcener was ineffective to take property which had belonged to the joint family out of the hands of the formers heir and vest it in the adopted son. The decision was understood by the Board in Bhimabai v. Gurunathgouda Khandappagouda (( 1932) L. R. 60 I. A. 25, 40.), to mean that the adoption was invalid. In Chandra’s case (( 1890) I. L. R. 14 B. 463.), Bhau and Nana were undivided brothers. Nana survived all the other male members of the family and on his death without issue his widow, Gojarabai, took the family property by inheritance from him. After that Bhaus widow adopted the plaintiff, who sued Gojarabai to recover the property. The judgment of the Court (Sargent C.J. and Telang J.) was delivered by Telang J., a distinguished learned judge of special competence on questions of Hindu law. The ultimate ground of decision was that " strictly speaking, "according to the view taken by our courts, there was at "Nanas death no undivided family remaining into which an "adopted son could be admitted by virtue of his adoption (I. L. R. 14 B. 471.)." This reasoning had been questioned by Seshagiri Ayyar J. in Madana Mohana v. Purushothama Ananga (( 1914) I.L.R.38 M.1105, 1118.), and also by Venkatasubba Rao J. in P any am v. Ramalakshtnamma (( 1931) I. L. 55 M. 581, 590.). After Amarendras case (( 1933) L. R. 60. I. A. 242.) had cast further doubt on it, a Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay had, in Balu Sakharam v. Lahoo Sambhaji (I. L. R. [ 1937] B. 508.), dealt with the matter, the judgment of the Full Bench being that of Beaumont C.J., with which Wadia J. agreed, and from which Rangnekar J. dissented. I. A. 242.) had cast further doubt on it, a Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay had, in Balu Sakharam v. Lahoo Sambhaji (I. L. R. [ 1937] B. 508.), dealt with the matter, the judgment of the Full Bench being that of Beaumont C.J., with which Wadia J. agreed, and from which Rangnekar J. dissented. In that case, as in Chandras case (2), the property at the date of the adoption to a pre-deceased coparcener had already vested in an heir of the last male holder nearer to him than a natural born son of the predeceased coparcener would have been. The present case is different in that the appellant, if he is an heir of Keshav, is a nearer heir than the respondent. The learned Chief Justice dealt with both types of case, and held that in neither case did the adoption have effect to vest the property in the adopted son. His view was that an adoption made after the termination of the co-parcenary does not vest in the adopted son the interest in joint family property which would have vested in a natural born son of the adoptive father; also that Amarendras case (( 1933) L. R. 60. I. A. 242.), had not disturbed the rule of law that an adoption by the widow of a divided Hindu does not divest any estate of inheritance unless the estate was then vested in the adopting widow as heir either to her husband or to a deceased son. On that view it is irrelevant that as an heir to Keshav a brother would be nearer than the respondent Shankar. The learned judges who decided the present case in the High Court followed this Full Bench ruling, as their duty was. But their Lordships must examine its correctness, and for this purpose find it necessary to distinguish, and separately con sider, two lines of reasoning. As the respondent Shankar claims by inheritance from Keshav it might, or might not, be sufficient to determine whether by his adoption the appellant became Keshavs preferential heir. This is the ground on which the trial judge proceeded, and to the two plots which had once been Narayans this is the only ground of claim which the appellant can formulate. As the respondent Shankar claims by inheritance from Keshav it might, or might not, be sufficient to determine whether by his adoption the appellant became Keshavs preferential heir. This is the ground on which the trial judge proceeded, and to the two plots which had once been Narayans this is the only ground of claim which the appellant can formulate. But in view of the case law and the principles which govern the validity of an adoption, and the rights of an adopted son in cases of succession by inheritance and by survivorship, it will be safer to avoid making assumptions or taking partial views and to examine the appellants case at its highest. That case may be put as follows That the appellant by adoption was invested with the rights of a male member of the family in the family property as though he were a natural son of Bhikappa, and that his adoption, though made after the death of a sole surviving coparcener, took effect as the happening of a contingency to which Keshavs rights as sole owner had always been subject, in like manner as an adoption would have had effect if it had been made in Keshavs lifetime by the widow of a pre-deceased coparcener other than his father. This contention may be right or wrong, but it is not an argument that the appellant is Keshavs heir. It is an argument which cuts into Keshavs right, challenging its character as an absolute right and founding on qualifications which impair its completeness. This argument will be considered first. On the initial question of the validity of the appellants adoption their Lordships must reject the view that Gangabais power to adopt came to an end on her son Keshavs death by reason that he was the sole surviving coparcener in the joint family. This circumstance would seem, on the principles declared in Amarendras case (L. R. 60 I. A. 242.), to have no bearing on the continuance of Gangabais authority. This circumstance would seem, on the principles declared in Amarendras case (L. R. 60 I. A. 242.), to have no bearing on the continuance of Gangabais authority. As stated by the Board in Vijaysingji Chhattrasingji v. Shivsangji Bhimsangji (( 1935) L. R. 62 I. A. 161, 165.) "the power of a widow to adopt does not depend upon the "question of vesting -or divesting of the estate." Their Lordships on this point agree with the majority of the Full Bench in Balu Sakharams case (I. L. R. [ 1937] B. 508.), and find themselves unable to accept the conclusion of Rangnekar J. who supported Chandras case (I. L. R. 14 B. 463.). The learned judge seems also to have considered it to be settled law (I. L. R. [ 1937] B. 572.) that the widows power to adopt can be defeated by a partition between coparceners, a view which has since been negatived by two High Courts on very cogent reasoning Bajirao v. Ramkrishna (I. L. R. [ 1941] Nag. 707.) ; K. R. Sankaralingam Pillai v. Veluchami Pillai (( 1943) A. I. R. (Mad.) 43.). Of Chandra s case (2) it should be remembered that Telang J. had in 1890 to reconcile two lines of decisions—those which, following Raghunadha v. Brozo Kishoro (( 1876) L. R. 3 I. A. 154.), allowed an adoption to divest coparceners, and those which, as in Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore A char j Chowdhry (( 1865) 10 Moo. I. A. 279, 307.), refused to regard as valid an adoption which would divest persons (other than the adopting widow) who had taken by inheritance. He had to find a dividing line, and he drew the line at the death of the last surviving coparcener when the property passed by inheritance and not by survivorship. But Amarendras case (L. R.60 I. A.242.) has profoundly modified the effect of previous decisions in cases of inheritance, and the line of distinction need no longer be drawn in the same way. If, then, the appellants adoption was valid, can it be held that it does not take effect on the property which had belonged to the joint family because there was no co-parcenary in existence at the date of the adoption? On this point their Lordships, differing from the majority decision in Balu Sakharams case (1), hold that the adoption being valid cannot be refused effect. On this point their Lordships, differing from the majority decision in Balu Sakharams case (1), hold that the adoption being valid cannot be refused effect. That the property had vested in the meantime in the heir of Keshav is not of itself a reason, on the principles laid down in Amarendras case (8), why it should not divest and pass to the appellant. Keshavs right to deal with the family property as his own would not be impaired by the mere possibility of an adoption (cf. Veeranna v. Sayamma (( 1928) I. L. R. 52 M. 398.). But in his lifetime adoption by the widow of a collateral coparcener would have divested him of part of his interest, and the same right to adopt subsisting after his death must, in their Lordships view, have qualified the interest which would pass by inheritance from him. As Appoviers case (( 1866) 11 Moo. I. A. 75.) made clear, the fraction which is at any time employed to describe the quantum of the interest of a male member of the family does not represent his rights while the family is joint, but the share which he would take if a partition were then to be made.. His interest is never static but increases by survivorship as others die and lessens as others enter the family by birth or adoption. What principle requires that the death of the last surviving coparcener should prevent any further fluctuation of the interest to which he was entitled notwithstanding that a new male member has since then entered the family by adoption ? There is, of course, some convenience in bringing fluctuations to an end, but other principle it is difficult to find. There is force in the comment of Seshagiri Ayyar J. on the Bombay decisions "The learned "judges seem to regard the joint family as a quasi-corporation "which loses this character by the death of the last male "member " Madana Mohana v. Purushotama (I. L. R. 38 M. 1105, 1118.). A broader, and as their Lordships think, a more adequate view, is that taken by the High Court at Nagpur "We regard it as clear " that a Hindu family cannot be finally brought to an end while "it is possible in nature or law to add a male member to it. A broader, and as their Lordships think, a more adequate view, is that taken by the High Court at Nagpur "We regard it as clear " that a Hindu family cannot be finally brought to an end while "it is possible in nature or law to add a male member to it. "The family cannot be at an end while there is still a potential "mother if that mother in the way of nature or in the way of "law brings in a new male member” (I. L. R. [ 1941] Nag. 718.). And in Pratapsing Shivsing v. Agarsingji Raisingji (( 1918) L. R. 46 I. A. 97, 107.) it was said by Mr. Ameer Ali, delivering the judgment of the Board "Again, it is to be "remembered that an adopted son is the continuator of his "adoptive fathers line exactly as an aurasa son, and that an "adoption, so far as the continuity of the line is concerned, "has a retrospective effect whenever the adoption may be "made there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line. In "fact, as West and Buhler point out in their learned treatise "on Hindu law [3rd ed., p. 996, note (a)], the Hindu lawyers "do not regard the male line to be extinct or a Hindu to have "died without male issue until the death of the widow renders "the continuation of the line by adoption impossible." Taking first the simpler case where the adoption has been made by the widow of a pre-deceased collateral of the last surviving coparcener, their Lordships find it difficult on the foregoing principles to discover in the death of the latter before the adoption any ground for denying that the interest of the adoptive father, or any part of it, passes to the adopted son. Telang J in Chandras case (I. L. R. 14 B. 471-472.) considered that this result would lead to much inconvenience and embarrassment because more than one widow in the family might retain a rigt to adopt; and because an adoption not made until after the death of the last male holder would defeat his chance to obtain by partition a separate allotment of property descendible to his own heirs. The learned judge very fairly said that although the possibility of such difficulties arising "is not to prevent the rule of law from being enforced, it is " entitled to weight in the consideration of the question whether " the rule does really extend as far as has now been indicated" (Ibid. 472.). Their Lordships are not greatly impressed by the supposed grievance as regards partition, but they are bound to contemplate the possibility of more than one adoption being made in a family after the death of a sole surviving coparcener. They see no reason, however, to anticipate that such a case would ordinarily present any new or formidable difficulty. The second or third person to be adopted would, like the first, take his place in the family as son to his adoptive father, and the interest of the person or persons already entitled by adoption must fluctuate to make room for the new-comer. In the present case the adopting widow was the mother of the last surviving coparcener. Her power to adopt could not have been exercised in his lifetime, and if exercised after his death cannot, as their Lordships think, be given any less effect than would have attached to an adoption made after his death by the widow of a pre-deceased collateral. It must vest the family property in the adopted son on the same principle, displacing any title based merely on inheritance from the last surviving coparcener. On the latters death it might well be, as already noticed, that his mother was not the only lady who as widow of a pre-deceased coparcener still retained the right to adopt a son. If the rights of both were exercised and the other adopted son claimed to exclude the appellant from any share in the family property, the appellant would have no logical defence on the footing that he was merely Keshavs heir. If the rights of both were exercised and the other adopted son claimed to exclude the appellant from any share in the family property, the appellant would have no logical defence on the footing that he was merely Keshavs heir. In Balu Sakharam’s case (I. L. R. [ 1937] B. 508.) the question whether the adoption does not divest property in favour of the adopted son was referred to the Full Bench in a double form (question II (a) and (b) (I. L.R. [ 1937] B. 508,543-544.)) according as the person in whom the property at the date of the adoption had already vested was an heir of the last male holder nearer or remoter than a natural son of the adoptive father would have been. In both forms the question was answered by the Full Bench in the negative, because it was not considered that the adoption could be allowed to have any divesting effect after the co-parcenary had come to an end. But if, as their Lordships hold, it can have such effect, it becomes necessary to observe that remoteness from the last male holder has no relevance or effect as an answer to a claim by the adopted son to derive an interest in the family property from his adoptive father. If the adoption constitutes the person adopted the nearest heir of the last male holder, that is an alternative or additional ground of claim and one which proceeds on a different basis. In their Lordships opinion, the appellants claim to the lands other than the two parcels which had belonged to Narayan is made out independently of his being shown to be the person who is nearest in the line of Keshavs heirs according to the special rule which governs watan property. But it is necessary to consider this last mentioned ground of claim in order to decide whether the appellants adoption has divested the respondent of these two parcels of land—lands which were not in Keshavs hands joint family property, but his separate property, and in which Bhikappa at no material time had any interest whatever. As Bhoobun Moyees case (16 Moo. I. A. 279, 307.) was understood in Bengal (cf. As Bhoobun Moyees case (16 Moo. I. A. 279, 307.) was understood in Bengal (cf. Faizuddin AH Khan v. Tincowri Saha (( 1895) I. L.R. 22 .565, 571.)) it involved that no adopted son could claim as preferential heir the estate of any person other than his adoptive father if such estate had. vested before the adoption in some heir other than the adopting widow. So, too, in Chandras case (I. L. R. 14 B. 469.) Telang J. understood it to involve that adoption by a widow does not divest the estate of one on whom the inheritance has devolved from a lineal heir of the husband. Similar views could be cited from other High Courts. The question is whether after Amarendras case (L. R. 60 I. A. 242.) these propositions still hold good. Their Lordships think that they do not. Neither the present case nor Amarendras case (L. R. 60 I. A. 242.) brings into question the rule of law considered in Bhubaneswari Debt v. Nilkomul Lahiri (( 1885) L. R. 12 I. A. 137,141.) (cf. Kalidas Das v. Krishnachandra Das (( 1869) 2 B. L. R., F. B. 103.)) and stated by the Board to be that " according to the law as laid down in "the decided cases, an adoption after the death of a collateral "does not entitle the adopted son to come in as heir of the "collateral." Their Lordships say nothing as Law. Rep. 70 Ind. App. 232 ( 1942- 1943) Anant Bhikappa Patil V. Shankar Ramchandra Patil 125 to these decisions, which appear to apply only to cases of inheritance, and which do not seem to have proceeded on the footing that the adoptions in question were invalid. But in Amarendras case (L. R. 60 I. A. 242, 243.), Faizuddins case (I L. R. 22 C. 565, 571.) was among those cited to the Board. Yet Bibhudindra, the last male owner of an impartible estate, having died unmarried, his mother adopted Amarendra, and it was held by the Board that this adoption divested Banamalai, in whom at Bibhudindras death the estate had vested by virtue of the family custom. Yet Bibhudindra, the last male owner of an impartible estate, having died unmarried, his mother adopted Amarendra, and it was held by the Board that this adoption divested Banamalai, in whom at Bibhudindras death the estate had vested by virtue of the family custom. And in the later case of Vijaysingji Chhatrasinghji v. Shivsangji Bhimsangji (L. R. 62 I. A. 161, 165.) the Board stated the effect of their previous decision by saying that "the adoption in that case, which was made by a widow "after the death of her natural son without leaving a son or a "widow, was found to be valid, though the estate had vested "in a collateral of the son." In Vijaysingji’s case itself (L. R. 62 I. A. 161, 165.) the suit of the paternal uncle and nearest heir of the last male holder was held to be defeated by an adoption made by the latters mother after his death; though in the High Court it had been held that the widow could not make an adoption which would have the effect of divesting the estate which had vested in the uncle. A certain difficulty in interpreting these decisions of the Board arises from the absence in either judgment of a statement that the impartible estate descended as joint family property or as separate property; and in Balu Sakharam’s case (I. L. R. [ 1937] B. 508.) the learned Chief Justice seems to have thought that they were to be explained on the footing that a sort of co-parcenary was subsisting. This, however, is not the explanation of either decision. In neither case had the unsuccessful plaintiff claimed on the ground of jointness or survivorship, and in neither had the question whether the impartible estate descended as joint or as separate property been so raised at the trial as to be satisfactorily cleared up in the courts in India. But on the appeal to His Majesty in Council Amarendras case (L. R. 60 I. A. 242.) was clearly argued and decided on the footing that the estate was separate property. This is expressly stated both at p. 243 of the sixtieth volume of Indian Appeals and at p. 643 of the twelfth volume of the Patna series of the Indian Law Reports. This is expressly stated both at p. 243 of the sixtieth volume of Indian Appeals and at p. 643 of the twelfth volume of the Patna series of the Indian Law Reports. The language of the Boards judgment in Vijaysingjis case (L. R. 62 I. A. 161, 165.) may be thought applicable to either of the two positions, but they clearly followed Amarendras case (L. R. 60 I. A. 242.), and they say that in the presence of the adopted son "the plaintiff cannot inherit the "estate (Ibid. 165.). Now an impartible estate is not held in co-parcenary (Sartaj Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari (( 1888) L. R. 15 I. A. 51.)) though it may be joint family property. It may devolve as joint family property or as separate property of the last male owner. In the former case it goes by survivorship to that individual, among those male members who in fact and in law are undivided in respect of the estate, who is singled out by the special custom, e.g., lineal male primogeniture. In the latter case joint ness and survivorship are not as such in point the estate devolves by inheritance from the last male owner in the order prescribed by the special custom or according to the ordinary law of inheritance as modified by the custom. The zemindari property claimed in Amarendras case (1) was adjudged to belong to the adopted son on this last mentioned principle— that is, as heir of the last male owner. If the effect of an adoption by the mother of the last male owner is to take his estate out of the hands of a collateral of his who is more remote than a natural brother would have been, and to constitute the adopted person the next heir of the last male owner, no distinction can in this respect be drawn between property which had come to the last male owner from his father and any other property which he may have acquired. Keshavs separate watan property devolves not on his mother, who would be his heir at the general law, but on the nearest male in the line of heirs ; and if the appellants adoption as son to Bhikappa puts him in that position, his right to succeed cannot be limited to such watan property as Keshav derived from Bhikappa. Keshavs separate watan property devolves not on his mother, who would be his heir at the general law, but on the nearest male in the line of heirs ; and if the appellants adoption as son to Bhikappa puts him in that position, his right to succeed cannot be limited to such watan property as Keshav derived from Bhikappa. On this ground the appellants suit succeeds as regards the two parcels of land which Keshav inherited from Narayan. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court, dated December 16, 1937, set aside, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Dharwar, dated November 22, 1933, restored. The respondent will pay the appellants costs of this appeal and of both the Courts in India. PRACTICE NOTE App eal to Privy Council—Petitions for special leave to appeal in forma paup eris in criminal cases—Reasonable ground of appeal—Duty of certifying counsel—Judicial Committee Rules, 1925, r. 8. At the conclusion of the hearing of twenty-one petitions for special leave to appeal in forma pauperis in criminal cases, seventeen of which were from Lahore, Lord Atkin said In each of these applications there was a certificate by counsel in India that it was a fit case to be heard before the Privy Council. In all but one of the cases, once it is understood on what grounds the Privy Council entertains ap peals in criminal matters, there was absolutely no foundation at all for certificates being given that they were fit cases to be heard before the Privy Council. It is to be noted, I think, that in only two of the cases was the certificate granted by any advocate who had anything to do with the criminal proceedings. We have already had to call attention to the fact that to give a certificate in those circumstances is a breach of duty in the professional gentleman who is asked to act in that way. [See [ 1941] W. N. 172.] We shall feel it our duty to call the attention of the authorities in Lahore to the granting of these certificates. It is a matter of great p ublic imp ortance. [See [ 1941] W. N. 172.] We shall feel it our duty to call the attention of the authorities in Lahore to the granting of these certificates. It is a matter of great p ublic imp ortance. I do not attach so much imp ortance to the fact that there have been these twenty -one petitions, involving great loss of public time and great strain on the officials who have to deal with the papers, and so on, but tothe fact that the public interest suffers severely when there is delay interp osed between conviction and sentence, such as must necessarily happen in these times owing to these app eals. It is obvious that legal gentlemen are asked to give a certificate of this kind merely for the purp ose of obtaining a temp orary resp ite for their client, and they ought not to accede to a request of that kind. In all these cases a delay of some eight, nine or ten months has been secured from the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court, because it has to be remembered that every one of these app eals has been reviewed in the High Court. I do not use " reviewed " in the technical sense, but it has been before the High Court. In our opinion, it is quite a serious dereliction of duty on the part of these persons who give ill-considered certificates of this kind, and their conduct will be brought to the attention of those who are responsible for the discip line and professional behaviour of the Bar in Lahore. PRACTICE NOTE. Practice — Documents — Genuineness imp ugned — Production of originals essential. During the hearing of an ap peal from India in which the genuineness of an alleged will was in question, and the original was not produced before the Board, the following observations were made Lord Atkin How can any court determine a question of forgery of a will without seeing the will ? Counsel In this particular case we have in the judgment of the High Court a complete description. Lord Atkin Is that the equivalent of looking at a document and seeing whether it is forged or not ?—when we have to decide whether it is or not. Counsel In this particular case we have in the judgment of the High Court a complete description. Lord Atkin Is that the equivalent of looking at a document and seeing whether it is forged or not ?—when we have to decide whether it is or not. It may be sufficient to enable us to go on with this case, but their Lordships think that it Present Lord Atkin, Lord Porter and Sir George Rankin ought to be borne in mind that when there is a question arising before this Board as to the genuineness of a document the original document ought to be produced to their Lordship s, and, more than that, the practitioners who have to deal with the matter are at fault in not seeing that the document is produced before the Board. There is no reason why their Lordships should be hampered, as they must be as compared with the other courts, in dealing with a question of fact, and we must reserve to ourselves the possibility of saying, after hearing the judgments and the description of the will, if any real question arises, that we shall probably adjourn the case in order that the will may be p roduced. I wish practitioners to notice this. I do not know whether their Lordships can make a Rule of the Privy Council that it should be so, but their Lordships intimate that it ought to be an invariable rule of practice, where there is a real doubt as to the genuineness of a document, that the original document, or a photostat copy , should be before the Board. It sometimes happ ens, of course, that an official document is in constant use, but as a general rule the original ought to be here, and there ought to be no difficulty, in most cases at any rate, in getting a photostat cop y. Their Lordships have no doubt that on ap plication to the High Court in regard to such a matter they will make any order that is necessary in order that we should get the documents. However accurate the description of the will is in the judgment—and I am sure the learned judges have given the most accurate description they could—there is all the difference in the world in having a document described to you and having it Law. Rep. 70 Ind. App. However accurate the description of the will is in the judgment—and I am sure the learned judges have given the most accurate description they could—there is all the difference in the world in having a document described to you and having it Law. Rep. 70 Ind. App. 232 ( 1942- 1943) Anant Bhikappa Patil V. Shankar Ramchandra Patil 127 before y ou and seeing it. The question is very often, in cases of forgery, one of different inks and different colours, and so on ; the signature on the deed and the body of the document, and so forth. Sir George Rankin In this case I understand the question is whether it was signed to authenticate it as a will after it was written out. * No doubt the forgers would try to do it in such a way that one could not tell. In this case to look at it might not tell you very much, but we do not know what it would tell one until we have looked at it. Counsel The judge below does not take any point about the ink being of a different kind. Lord Atkin Are not we allowed to draw an inference for ourselves from the appearance of the document ? That is the difficulty . In principle the appellate court, like every other court when the genuineness of a document is impugned, ought to have the document before it. There is no doubt about it, and we shall have to see that it is carried out.