Judgement Appeal (No. 31 of 1942), by special leave, from a judgment of the High Court (November 14, 1941) by which the appellants were found guilty of contempt of court. The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee The first two appellants, Debi Prasad Sharma and Deva Das Gandhi, were respectively the printer and publisher and the editor of the Hindustan Times, a daily newspaper published in Delhi and having a large circulation in the United Provinces. The third appellant, Radhe Lal Singhal, was the local correspondent of the newspaper at Meerut, and at the material date had been so employed for the past seven years. In July, 1941, the Sessions Judge at Meerut, Mr. Hari Shankar Vidyarthi, had been engaged in the trial of twenty persons charged with murder, rioting, etc., which ended oh July 31, 1941, when the judge convicted four of the accused and sentenced them to transportation for life. The remaining sixteen were acquitted. On August 1 the third appellant sent the following news item to the newspaper "(F.O.C.) Meerut, August 1. With the judicial "officers also now co-operating actively in the war efforts,” the efforts are bound to receive a heavy push forward. "The judicial officers all over the province have been, I reliably "learn, asked by the new Chief Justice of the Allahabad High "Court, who, it is understood, has been requested by His "Excellency the Governor, for co-operation in war efforts, "to raise subscriptions for the war funds. The judicial "officers raising money make it quite clear to the persons, "whom they ask to contribute, that the donations were "voluntary and they were not exercising any compulsion in "asking for funds. They could donate as much or as little "as they pleased." On August 3 the newspaper published the news items with headings as follows " Judicial Officers for War Work. "Raising Subscriptions. New Chief Justices Circular." (From "Our Correspondent.) Meerut, Aug. 1. With the judicial "officers also now co-operating actively in the war efforts, "the efforts are bound to receive a heavy push forward. "The judicial officers all over the province have been, I "reliably learn, asked by the new Chief Justice of the Allahabad "High Court, who, it is understood, has been requested by "His Excellency the Governor for co-operation in war efforts, "to raise subscriptions for the war funds. "The judicial officers all over the province have been, I "reliably learn, asked by the new Chief Justice of the Allahabad "High Court, who, it is understood, has been requested by "His Excellency the Governor for co-operation in war efforts, "to raise subscriptions for the war funds. The judicial "officers raising money make it quite clear to the persons "whom they ask to contribute that the donations were "voluntary and they were not exercising any compulsion in "asking for funds. They could donate as much or as little "as they pleased." There followed a short report of the judgment in the murder case, headed "Murder Case Judgment." In the issue of the Hindustan Times of August 6 there appeared the following paragraph, which appeared to be an editorial comment "If it is true that the new Chief Justice of the Allahabad " High Court, Sir Iqbal Ahmad, in his administrative capacity, "has issued a circular to the judicial officers under his jurisdiction, enjoining on them to raise contributions to the war "funds, then it must said that he has done a thing which "would lower the prestige of the courts in the eyes of the "people. The presiding officer of a court, while asking for "funds, may say that the contribution is voluntary, but he "cannot remove the idea from the mind of a person, particularly a litigant, that the request is being made by one whom "it may not be safe to displease. To be absolutely voluntary, "war contributions ought to be raised only by non-official "committees or individuals. It was bad enough that the "services of the members of the executive were utilized for "the purpose, but to make judicial officers do this work is "something far worse." On August 8, Iqbal Ahmad C.J. and Collister J. ordered that notice should be given to the first two appellants to appear in court on September 9, 1941, to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court for publishing the above comment in the Hindustan Times. Notice of the proceedings was also ordered to be given to the Government Advocate. Notice of the proceedings was also ordered to be given to the Government Advocate. The notice was duly given entitled "In the matter of Miscellaneous Case No. 8/41 (Contempt of "Court) in re King Emperor applicant, Debi Prasad Sharma "and another opposite parties.1 It was also agreed during the course of the proceedings by Singhal and all the parties that Singhal should accept a notice then issued that he should "show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt "of this court with respect to the news published in the "Hindustan Times of Sunday, August 3, on information "supplied by him." The appellants, as stated, were all found guilty of contempt of court, and Singhal was committed to prison for two months. The printer was fined Rs.500 or, in default, a months imprisonment; Gandhi was fined Rs. 1000 or, in default, a months imprisonment. The court eventually refused a stay pending appeal, and Singhal and Gandhi had both served their terms of imprisonment. 1943. June 24, 25. Pritt K. C. and R, K. Handoo for the appellants. The editorial comment, fairly regarded, cannot be said to be contempt at all. The Chief Justice, who heard the case, should be regarded as disqualified by reason of his interest, and he acted very really as judge in his own cause. In any event, the local correspondent who, admittedly, did no more than send a report to a newspaper which could, and in fact did, exercise its own discretion whether it would publish it with or without first editing it, cannot be held guilty of contempt of court. The whole conduct of the proceedings, even if there is no technical disqualification for interest, was such, having regard to the personality involved, that the conviction ought not to be allowed to stand, for the Chief Justice was the only victim of the criticisms, he directed that the prosecution should take place, he sat as a judge at every stage of the prosecution, he was a witness as to the most vital facts in the case, he examined a witness without notice to the appellants and brought the witness into court and then examined him, he adjudicated on an acute contest of fact which made a considerable difference to the hearing, he sentenced the appellants, and then refused a stay of execution. On the question whether the words complained of are capable of being a contempt of court In re a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands ([ 1893! A. C. 138.) is of some assistance. In McLeod v. St. Aubyn ([ 1899] A. C. 549.) it was said that committal for contempt of court is a weapon to be used sparingly, and always with reference to the interests of the administration of justice. [Reference was also made to Reg. v. Gray ([ 1900] 2 Q. B. 36, 40.) and Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago ([ 1936] A. C. 322.)]. Here the criticism was not in relation to the administration of justice. Where criticism does not contain abuse, the mere fact that there is some inaccuracy in relation to the facts is not enough to justify a finding of contempt of court. Even if the news item here was untrue, the article on it was not contempt of court. On the question of the disqualification of the Chief Justice for interest, there are two propositions first, that he was disqualified from trying this case by the fact that he was interested in it; and econdly, by reason of all the circumstances of the trial, and in particular the many roles played by the Chief Justice, there was never the substance of a fair trial. [He was stopped, the Board intimating that they would hear the respondent on whether the words complained of were capable of being a contempt of court.] Sir Walter Monckton K.C., W. W. K. Page and B. MacKenna for the respondent. The authorities show, at any rate, that what amounts to contempt of court is something said or written which lowers the authority of the court in the sense of the dignity and position to which a court as a court administering justice is entitled. The contrast is between language which lowers the dignity of the court in that sense and language which can be justified on proved facts as criticism in the public interest. Language which is calculated to lower the dignity of the court is prima facie contempt of court Rex v. Davies ([ 1906] 1 K. B. 32, 40.). The contrast is between language which lowers the dignity of the court in that sense and language which can be justified on proved facts as criticism in the public interest. Language which is calculated to lower the dignity of the court is prima facie contempt of court Rex v. Davies ([ 1906] 1 K. B. 32, 40.). Bearing that principle in mind and turning to the present case, it is a very disparaging thing to say that a Chief Justice has enjoined such conduct as is alleged; it is a reflection on him qua judge, and amounts to a contempt of court in that it lowers the authority of the court and disparages the administration of justice. The Chief Justices criticism that it was unworthy of him is correct. With regard to the "if," the opening word of the comment, if the fair inference from the language of the comment is to make the insinuation I have asserted, then the mere fact that it is preceded by a conditional clause is not enough to prevent it being given that effect when in fact the appellants made no inquiry to find out if it was true. This case has to be fought on the assumption that the findings of fact of the Chief Justice are to be accepted, and from the outset it was assumed by all concerned that no circular had been issued by the Chief Justice and no instructions given of the kind alleged or at all; the Chief Justice also reached the conclusion that Mr. Vidyarthi did not say so. [On the use of the word "if" reference was made to Rex v. Almon ((1765) Wilmots Notes of Opinions, 243.)]. There was no reply. June 25. Their Lordships said that the appeal would be allowed, and their reasons given later. July 26. The reasons for their Lordships’ report were delivered by LORD ATKIN, who stated the facts, and continued When the parties appeared Mr. There was no reply. June 25. Their Lordships said that the appeal would be allowed, and their reasons given later. July 26. The reasons for their Lordships’ report were delivered by LORD ATKIN, who stated the facts, and continued When the parties appeared Mr. Gandhi filed an affidavit in which he said that since the notice was issued he had made personal inquiries at Meerut and had ascertained certain facts, which he set out, but desired to assure the court that it was no part of his intention to cast any reflection on the conduct of the Chief Justice or to bring the court into disrepute or contempt, and that he would be sorry indeed if his conduct in publishing the comments, which he did publish as editor, relying on the accuracy of his informant, were interpreted as implying any malicious intention on his part or intended to bring the court or any member of it into disrepute. Their Lordships, for reasons which will appear, do not find it necessary to enumerate the facts alleged in Mr. Gandhis affidavit. In substance, they were that Mr. Singhal had been present in the court of Mr. Vidyarthi on July 31 when he gave judgment in the murder case, and that after sentencing the four accused to transportation for life the judge made the following statement in open court " Since "the Chief Justice, who has been requested by His Excellency "the Governor to help in the war effort, has asked us to raise "subscriptions for the war fund, it is incumbent on us to raise "subscriptions and you should help me in this work." Thereupon, lawyers and litigants present in court held consultations; Rs.200 were collected in court and placed on the table of the judge and, according to Mr. Singhal, one of the counsel who appeared for some of the accused told the court that he had collected Rs.150 from his clients as requested by the judge and that he would present that money the next morning. The judge then declared the rest of the accused discharged. This statement was said to have been corroborated by various people in Meerut, some present at the trial and some not. At the hearing on September 9 no further evidence was tendered. The judge then declared the rest of the accused discharged. This statement was said to have been corroborated by various people in Meerut, some present at the trial and some not. At the hearing on September 9 no further evidence was tendered. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, counsel for the printer and the editor, repeated that it was no part of the intention of either to cast any reflection on the court. The Chief Justice stated that the information contained in the comment was based on untrue facts, and that no circular was issued by him, and he would like further discussion to proceed on that basis. This statement was accepted by counsel, and the case has proceeded on the footing that no circular and no request was issued by the Chief Justice to judicial officers of the subordinate courts to the effect stated. At the end of the hearing on September 9 the Chief Justice, addressing counsel, said " We are going to reserve judgment. "Having given due weight to what you have said, we have "arrived at the conclusion that your clients are guilty of "contempt of court ; and, in the absence of an apology, for "which we give time until the day after to-morrow, it shall be "our duty to pass sentence according to law." There then followed a series of transactions on which the appellants, in support of their case, proposed strongly to rely, but which their Lordships find in unnecessary to discuss in view of their opinion on the question whether the appellants were guilty of any contempt of court on which they ought to have been convicted. The Chief Justice, before the day reserved for judgment arrived, had with Collister J. interviewed Mr. Vidyarthi and gave notice to the appellants on September n that as he had asserted that most of the allegations in Mr. Gandhis affidavit were untrue, the court proposed to examine him and another witness in court on September 15, and that the appellants would be given the opportunity of calling further evidence. The two witnesses were examined, the case was further adjourned to September 25, the Chief Justice stating that in a way Mr. Vidyarthi was also on trial, and would be allowed to produce witnesses. At the resumed hearing the Chief Justice said that if Mr. Vidyarthi did not utter the words alleged then Mr. The two witnesses were examined, the case was further adjourned to September 25, the Chief Justice stating that in a way Mr. Vidyarthi was also on trial, and would be allowed to produce witnesses. At the resumed hearing the Chief Justice said that if Mr. Vidyarthi did not utter the words alleged then Mr. Singhal would primarily be guilty of contempt of court, having sent the information, and that it was desirable that the proceedings should continue together. Accordingly, it was agreed by Mr. Singhal and all the parties that Mr. Singhal should accept a notice then issued that he should " show cause why he should not be dealt with for "contempt of this court with respect to the news published "in the Hindustan Times of Sunday, August 3, on information "supplied by him." The case proceeded on this footing on September 26 and 27 and October 27 and 28, when Mr. Vidyarthi appeared by counsel who cross-examined the witnesses called by the appellants. It should be stated that no objection was taken by the appellants counsel to any of the procedure adopted by the court. On November 14 the Chief Justice delivered the considered judgment of the court. He reviewed the evidence and came to the conclusion that Mr. Vidyarthi had not made the statement imputed to him and that Mr. Singhal had founded his report on " nothing "more substantial than a suggestion or an easy inference "from the facts." The Chief Justice then stated that in the opinion of the court the charge of contempt was established against all three respondents. He proceeded to state what impression, in the opinion of the court, an ordinary intelligent reader would receive from reading the editorial comment of August 6. " The comment contains a clear insinuation that the Chief Justice had issued a circular to all judicial officers "to raise contributions from litigants and others to the War "Fund, that pressure was thereby being exerted by an "authority which it would not be safe to displease, and that "the prestige of the courts would thus be impaired. " The comment contains a clear insinuation that the Chief Justice had issued a circular to all judicial officers "to raise contributions from litigants and others to the War "Fund, that pressure was thereby being exerted by an "authority which it would not be safe to displease, and that "the prestige of the courts would thus be impaired. The "implication is that the Chief Justice had done something "which was unworthy of a person holding that high office, "and that as the head and representative of this High Court "he had committed the gross impropriety of forcing judicial "officers subordinate to this court to ask for war contributions "from litigants who, notwithstanding that the giving of "donations was ostensibly voluntary, were not in a position "to refuse." As to Mr. Singhal, the court found that he sent information which was probably founded either on his own inference from what took place or on a suggestion from other persons, and he had endeavoured to defend his action by giving evidence which they were unable to accept as true. As to the printer and Mr. Gandhi, they had no reason to suspect the accuracy of their correspondents reports, and were acquitted of malice. Nevertheless, they erred grievously in publishing the news item and the editorial comment without attempting to verify its truth. At the hearing of the appeal their Lordships intimated that they desired to deal first with the primary question whether in the circumstances the words complained of were capable of being a contempt of court, and counsel for both sides argued this point. On the conclusion of this argument their Lordships intimated that their decision was in favour of the appellants. The other points, therefore, raised by the appellants were not further discussed by counsel for the appellants or at all by counsel for the respondent, and their Lordships must not be taken as expressing any opinion one way or the other on them. In their Lordships opinion, the conviction for contempt of court cannot stand. The cases of contempt which consist of “scandalizing the court itself “are fortunately rare, and require to be treated with much discretion. In their Lordships opinion, the conviction for contempt of court cannot stand. The cases of contempt which consist of “scandalizing the court itself “are fortunately rare, and require to be treated with much discretion. In 1899 this Board pronounced proceedings for this species of contempt to be obsolete in this country, though surviving in other parts of the Empire, but they added that it is a weapon to be used sparingly and always with reference to the administration of justice McLeod v. St. Aubyn ([ 1899] A. C. 549.). In In re a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands ([ 1893] A. C. 138.) the test applied by the very strong Board which heard the reference was whether the words complained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of the law. In Reg. v. Gray ([ 1900] 2 Q. B. 36.) it was shown that the offence of scandalizing the court itself was not obsolete in this country. A very scandalous attack had been made on a judge for his judicial utterances while sitting in a criminal case on circuit, and it was with the foregoing opinions on record that Lord Russell of Killowen C.J., adopting the expression of Wilmot C. J. in his opinion in Rex v. Almon ((1765) Wilmots Notes of Opinions, 243.), which is the source of much of the present law on the subject, spoke of the article complained of as calculated to lower the authority of the judge. When the comment in question in the present case is examined it is found that there is no criticism of any judicial act of the Chief Justice, or any imputation on him for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the administration of justice. It can hardly be said that there is any criticism of him in his administrative capacity, for, as far as their Lordships have been informed, the administrative control of the subordinate courts of the Province, whatever it is, is exercised, not by the Chief Justice, but by the court over which he presides. The appellants are not charged with saying anything in contempt of the subordinate courts or the administration of justice by them. The appellants are not charged with saying anything in contempt of the subordinate courts or the administration of justice by them. In truth, the Chief Justice is alleged, untruly, as is now admitted, to have committed an ill-advised act in writing to his subordinate judges asking (as the news item says), enjoining (as the comment says) them to collect for the War Fund. If the facts were as alleged they admitted of criticism. No doubt it is galling for any judicial personage to be criticized publicly as having done something outside his judicial pro ceedings which was ill-advised or indiscreet. But judicial personages can afford not to be too sensitive. A simple denial in public of the alleged request would at once have allayed the trouble. If a judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect the administration of justice he has the ordinary remedies for defamation if he should feel impelled to use them. Their Lordships cannot accept the view taken by the court as stated above of the meaning of the comment the words do not support the innuendo. In the opinion of their Lordships the proceedings in contempt were misconceived, and the appellants were not guilty of the contempt alleged. At the end of the hearing their Lordships intimated they would advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed and the fine and the costs ordered to be refunded, and that they would give their reasons for their report later, as they have now done.