JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Bennett, J. - These are ten applications u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The persons concerned have been detained under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules. The order of detention was passed in the case of Suraj Prasad Shukla by the Commissioner of the Allahabad Division in the case of Praveen Chandra Deo by the Commissioner of the Benares Division; in the cases of B(Sic)j Lal, Makhan Lal Misra, Ram Krishna Sinha, Rajam Kant Misra, Basant Lal, and Ram Kishore Bhatnagar by the Commissioner of the Lucknow Division; in the case of Devendra Prasad Joshi by the Governor of the United Provinces; and in the case of R.N. Venky by the Home Secretary to the Provincial Government. 2. The applications are on the same lines. They challenge the legality of Rule 26 and further allege that the Governor did not exercise individual judgment as required by law in passing the order of detention. 3. The applicants have been all represented by the same Counsel. Mr. Bahadurji, the senior Counsel concedes that in view of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Federal Court in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee 1943 F.L.J. 151, provided the proper authority was satisfied that the detention of these persons was necessary to prevent them from acting in the manner stated in the orders, it is not open to him to contend that the detention of these persons is illegal, the Federal Court hiving ruled in the case cited that Section 3 of Ordinance XIV of 1943 is not ultra vires. This section points that no order made under Rule 26 shall be deemed to be invalid or shall be called in question on the ground merely that the said rule purported to confer powers in excess of the powers that might at the time the said rule was made be lawfully conferred by a rule made or deemed to have been made u/s 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939. 4. Learned Counsel has, however, contended that in view of the form in which the orders were passed it cannot be presumed that the proper authority was satisfied as stated in them. This contention is based on certain observations of the majority judgment in the case of Sibnath Banerjee. 4. Learned Counsel has, however, contended that in view of the form in which the orders were passed it cannot be presumed that the proper authority was satisfied as stated in them. This contention is based on certain observations of the majority judgment in the case of Sibnath Banerjee. The orders in the present cases were worded in much the same way as the orders in the case before Federal Court. It was said by Zafrulla Khan J. in the majority judgment that before any presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act can arise it must be shown that the orders are on the face of them regular and conform to the provisions of the rule under which they purport to be made. He criticised the orders in that case on the ground that they read as if all that the authority making the orders was satisfied about was that the person concerned in each case should be detained and was not certain as to the reason for detaining him. 5. In the cases now under consideration affidavits in support of the applications were filed to the effect that the Governor did not exercise individual judgment as required under law in passing the orders. Apart from the fact that the Governor was concerned in one case only there is nothing to show on what the applicants founded this allegation. No attempt has been made to explain on their behalf how they arrived at such a belief, and we cannot, therefore attach much importance to the allegation. In view, however, of the Federal Court ruling we considered it necessary to require some evidence from the Crown that the Governor had in fact been satisfied in the only case in which the order purported to show that the Government of the United Provinces satisfied, that is, in the case of Devendra Prasad Joshi. The Government Advocate has accordingly obtained from Mr. D.S. Barron, Home Secretary to the Provincial Government, an affidavit in which it is stated that before the issue of the order in his case (and before the issue of orders in other cases which have been considered separately) the cases were placed before His Excellency the Governor, and that the orders of detention were issued in accordance with the orders passed by His Excellency after he had considered the cases. 6. 6. The affidavit was shown to the learned Counsel for the applicants and they were given further opportunity of addressing us, but they intimated that they did not desire to be heard again. In view of this affidavit it is in our opinion no longer possible for the applicants to assert that the Governor did not exercise his individual judgment in passing the orders, and we presume that on this account their Counsel no longer wish to press this point. 7. In eight of the remaining nine cases the orders were passed by Commissioners under powers delegated to them under Sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939. In the case of the last person, R.N. Venky, the order was passed by the Home Secretary to the Government in the exercise of power similarly delegated to him under Sub-section (5) of Section 2. 8. We have been furnished with copies of the orders passed in each case, and we see no reason to think that they were not signed by the authority stated or that this authority was not satisfied that it was necessary to make the order in each case. 9. It has, however, been argued that the delegation of such power is ultra vires, and that the Governor must himself be satisfied before any such order under Rule 26 can issue. 10. Sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act provides that a Provincial Government may by order direct that any power or duty which by rule made under Sub-section (1) is conferred or impose on the Provincial Government... shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority, not being an officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government. In view of this provision under which the orders of delegation were passed we can see no reason to think that there is any force in Mr. Bahadurji's contention. He has argued that notwithstanding such delegation it is necessary for the Governor himself to be satisfied before the order is issued by the officer or authority to whom the power is delegated. We are unable to agree. Bahadurji's contention. He has argued that notwithstanding such delegation it is necessary for the Governor himself to be satisfied before the order is issued by the officer or authority to whom the power is delegated. We are unable to agree. It is, we consider, clearly implied in Sub-section (5) that it is the officer or authority to whom the power is delegated who must be satisfied according to the terms of Rule 26. There would indeed be no object in delegating the power if it was still necessary for the Provincial Government to be satisfied in each case before the order was passed. 11. Other questions raised (with reference particularly to certain provisions of the Government of India, 1935,) have been considered by us in our judgment passed on applications Nos. 44 to 46, 82, 106, 111 to 113 and 142 of 1943 and we need not repeat what we have said there. 12. We hold that there is no substance in the present applications and we dismiss them. 13. u/s 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, we certify that the applications involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of that Act.