JUDGMENT Mathur, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal directed against a judgment of the learned Additional Civil Judge of Etawah dated the 9th July, 1942, by which he modified a decree passed by the Assistant Collector, first class, of Etawah, dated the 10th November, 1941. The Plaintiff-Respondent brought a suit to recover arrears of rent relating to kharif and rabi 1343 F., kharif 1344 F. and rabi 1348 F. The learned Assistant Collector decreed the suit only for the rent relating to rabi 1348 F., holding that the suit for the other years was barred by Order 2, r. 2, C. P. C. In appeal the learned Additional Civil Judge took a contrary view and decreed the entire claim of the Plaintiff-Respondent. The Defendant has come up in appeal and the entire case turns upon the interpretation of Order 2, r. 2, C. P. C. Order 2, r. 2, as it now stands, runs thus: (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the Plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action ; but a Plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Where a Plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquished, any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. 2. It was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondent that this omission was not intentional, but that as he did not know that he was entitled to bring that part of the suit while Act XVIII of 1939 was in force, he omitted to include it in his former suit. It is urged that it was not an intentional omission, but an omission owing to want of knowledge and therefore the section would not apply. On behalf of the Defendant-Appellant reliance is placed on an old Privy Council ruling Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa (1867) 11 MLA 557. The passage on which reliance is placed occurs at page 604. There discussing the point their Lordships have remarked: To these reasons their Lordships cannot assent. On behalf of the Defendant-Appellant reliance is placed on an old Privy Council ruling Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa (1867) 11 MLA 557. The passage on which reliance is placed occurs at page 604. There discussing the point their Lordships have remarked: To these reasons their Lordships cannot assent. If the words of a law are clear and positive, they cannot be controlled by any consideration of the motives of the party to whom it is to be applied nor limited by what the Judges who apply it may supposo to have been the reasons for enacting it. The words of the law are. 'If a Plaintiff relinquish or omit to sue for any portion of his claims'. It plainly includes accidental or involuntary omissions as well as acts of deliberate relinquishment. 3. Then this case was followed in Ram Prasad Singh Vs. Radha Panday and Another, AIR 1941 Patna 37 . In that case it was observed by Fazl Ali and Meredith, JJ., that Order 2, r. 2, covered cases of accidental omission. On behalf of learned Counsel for the Respondent reliance is placed on another Privy Council ruling Amanat v. Imdad (1888) 15 Cal 800. In this case their Lordships remarked that the Plaintiff not then being aware of his right when he sued before, it cannot be regarded as a portion of his claim within the meaning of the section in question. Their Lordships were dealing with S. 7 of Act VIII of 1859, which was the CPC then in force, but it must be noticed that the wording of the section was slightly different. The section as it ran then was: If a Plaintiff relinquish or omit to sue for any portion of his claim, a suit for the portion so relinquished or omitted shall not afterwards be entertained. 4. It must be observed that in the present Code of CPC the word "intentionally" has been used before the word "relinquishes" in order to contradistinguish it from the word "omission". To my mind the said ruling of the Privy Council would not be of much use after the said change. It is, however, to be seen whether the said change has brought about any change in the law or not. Two rulings of this Court have been cited in order to show that although the word "intentionally" has been used, it governs both omission and relinquishment. It is, however, to be seen whether the said change has brought about any change in the law or not. Two rulings of this Court have been cited in order to show that although the word "intentionally" has been used, it governs both omission and relinquishment. One ruling is Batul Kunwar v. Munni (1910) 32 All. 625. In this case their Lordships Sir John Stanely and Griffin JJ., have followed the case Amanat v. Imdad (1888) 15 Cal 800. but this change was not brought to their Lordships' notice and they have only said that S. 43 of the former Code corresponded with Order 2 R. 2 (2) of Act v. of 1908 and then they proceeded to quote the present section. In the case Ram Harakh v. Ram Lal (1916) 38 All. 217." which was decided by Mr. Justice Piggott and Mr. Justice Walsh, Mr. Justice Piggott held that order 2, Rule 2, was not applicable because he said To begin with, it is open to question whether the Sultanpur Court could have entertained the present suit. and then again Apart from this, I am really of opinion that the present suit as brought is not based on the same cause of action as was the suit filed in the Sultanpur district. 5. His Lordship thus laid no particular stress on the words omission or relinquishment or the presence or absence of the word "intentionlly." Wallsh, J. however, went much further. He remarked: I do not think that Order 2, Rule 2, applies to a partition case at all. I think that 'omits to sue' involves intention. It is ejusdem generis with intentional relinquishment. Clause (2) must be read with Clause (1) Clause (1) enables a Plaintiff to relinquish. Clause (2) points out the two ways in which he may relinquish. He may omit, or he may expressly abandon. It is a pity that the expression 'intentionally omit' does not appear in the rule; but I think that is its meaning. 6. With great respect to his Lordship, I am unable to agree with this view which he has taken. He has read certain words into the section which do not appear there. It is a pity that the expression 'intentionally omit' does not appear in the rule; but I think that is its meaning. 6. With great respect to his Lordship, I am unable to agree with this view which he has taken. He has read certain words into the section which do not appear there. As I look at the section I find that the word "intentionally" was intentionally used by the Legislature in order to show that in the case of relinquishment it must be intentional, whereas in the case of omission it may be intentional or accidental. I think, therefore, that Order 2, r. 2, would apply even when the omission is accidental. But in the present case it cannot be said that the omission was accidental. What is alleged by the Plaintiff is that he did not know what were the provisions of Act XVIII of 1939 and whether under those provisions he was entitled to sue or not. It is one thing to omit to sue for a portion of the claim by accident and it is absolutely a different thing to make an omission on account of the want of knowledge of law. It has been held times over again that nobody can plead ignorance of law. It must be presumed that everybody knows the law and if he omits on account of the ignorance of law, that omission must be taken to be intentional. There is no accident about it. In this view also the plea cannot avail to the Plaintiff. In the Privy Council ruling which was relied upon by learned Counsel for the Respondent the Plaintiff was not aware of his right about a certain property. That is something very different from not knowing the law. I think the Privy Council case Amanat v. Imdad (1888) 15 Cal 800. can also be distinguished on that ground. In any aspect of the case. I think that Order 2, r. 2, applied and the decision of the learned Assistant Collector, first class, is correct. I therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge and restore that of the learned Assistant Collector. The Appellant shall get his costs in both Courts. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.