JUDGMENT Pal, J. - This Rule is directed against an order for repayment of the landlord's fee, made by the Third Subordinate Judge at Alipore in Title Execution Case No. 116 of 1936, against the Petitioner landlord to whom it was paid under sec. 26E of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Admittedly, the Opposite Parties No. 1 and 4 to 6 owned a holding under the present petitioner and the Opposite Party No. 3. This holding was mortgaged to the Opposite Party No. 2, who in execution of his mortgage decree put this holding to sale and purchased it himself on the 17th June, 1937. Some of the judgment-debtors made an application for setting aside the sale under Or. 21, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the same was ultimately disallowed, and an order confirming the sale was made on the 30th April, 1938. 2. Under the provisions of sec. 26E of the Bengal Tenancy Act as it then stood, the decree-holder auction-purchaser, before the order confirming the sale was made, had to deposit, in addition to the purchase money, the landlord's transfer fee amounting to Rs. 2,852-14 as. This was sent to the Collector by the Court under sub-cl. (4) of the section for transmission to the landlords, merely, the present Petitioner and Opposite Party No. 3. Out of this amount, the present Petitioner received the sum of Rs. 2,819-14 as. by the 5th August, 1938, and the Opposite Party No. 3 the balance of Rs. 33. 3. In the meantime, on the 17th May, 1938, the Opposite Party No. 1 made an application under Or. 21, r. 90, for setting aside the sale, and the same was ultimately allowed by an ex parte order made on the 10th December, 1938, and the sale was thus set aside. Admittedly, no notice of this application was given to the present Petitioner and the Opposite Party No. 3. Consequent on this order setting aside the sale, the order in question in the present Rule was made on the 22nd April, 1942, by the learned Subordinate Judge, purporting to act in exercise of his inherent powers under sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Consequent on this order setting aside the sale, the order in question in the present Rule was made on the 22nd April, 1942, by the learned Subordinate Judge, purporting to act in exercise of his inherent powers under sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. It may be noticed here that after the aforesaid ex parte order setting aside the sale, the decree-holder auction-purchaser Opposite Party No. 2 made an application for setting aside the ex parte order on the 10th December, 1938. During the pendency of the hearing of this application, the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 came into operation and the judgment-debtors made an application under sec. 36(6) of the Act for the review of the mortgage decree itself. Ultimately, the judgment-debtors and decree-holder Opposite Party No. 2 came to a settlement amongst themselves, and a fresh decree was made under the provisions of the Act on the 18th April 1942, in terms of the solenamah filed by the parties. One of the terms of the solenamah was that if the decree-holder succeeds in getting back the landlord's fee, the amount would be credited towards the fresh decree; otherwise, the judgment-debtors would pay the entire amount of the new decree. 5. The decree-holder, in the meantime, made an application under sec. 151 of the CPC to the Court for an order against the landlord for the repayment of the landlord's fee, and thereupon, the order complained of was made on the 2nd April, 1942. 6. Mr. Mookerjee, appearing in support of this Rule, contends that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the landlords were entitled to have a notice of the application made under Or. 21, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and as admittedly no notice was given to them, the ex parte order setting aside the sale is not of any avail against them. Consequently, the order for repayment of the landlord's fee based on this ex parte order is not sustainable. 7. Mr. Bankim Chandra Banerjee, appearing for the Opposite Party No. 2, contends (1) That the words "persons affected thereby" in the proviso to Or. 21, r. 92 (2) of the CPC mean and refer to persons directly and proximately affected by the order: These will be persons taking some interest in the property itself by or under the sale. 7. Mr. Bankim Chandra Banerjee, appearing for the Opposite Party No. 2, contends (1) That the words "persons affected thereby" in the proviso to Or. 21, r. 92 (2) of the CPC mean and refer to persons directly and proximately affected by the order: These will be persons taking some interest in the property itself by or under the sale. (2) That the title to the landlord's fee under sec. 26E of the Bengal Tenancy Act being itself contingent on the confirmation of the sale, the landlord takes no interest whatsoever by or under the sale till the same is confirmed, and consequently, he is not a person affected by the order setting aside the sale or by the application within the meaning of proviso to r. 92 (2) of Or. 21, as that rule contemplates a proceeding prior to the confirmation of the sale. (3) That, in any case, the order is not a nullity and cannot be challenged collaterally. 8. Mr. Baidyanath Banerjee, appearing for minor Opposite Party No. 6 represented by the Deputy Registrar of this Court, contends that as the landlord's fees were not paid to the landlords by the 17th May, 1938, when the application under Or. 21, r. 90 of the CPC was made, they were not entitled to any notice of the said application. 9. In our opinion, there is no substance in. the contention raised by Mr. Baidyanath Banerjee. It is the date of the confirmation of the sale which is material and which gives the landlord title to the fee. 10. We are also unable to accept the first contention of Mr. Bankim Chandra Banerjee. Or. 21, r. 92 (2), proviso, lays down that no order setting aside the sale on an application made under rr. 89, 90 or 91 of Or. 21, C.P.C., shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby. "To affect" is "to concern ", "to have an effect upon", "to act injuriously upon". In order to be affected by the order setting aside the sale, a person need not take any interest in the property sold. Any valuable interest arising from the sale and liable to be defeated by the setting aside of that sale will make him a person affected by that order within the meaning of the proviso. 11. The second contention of Mr. Any valuable interest arising from the sale and liable to be defeated by the setting aside of that sale will make him a person affected by that order within the meaning of the proviso. 11. The second contention of Mr. Banerjee perhaps raises a question which would require more serious consideration in a fitting case. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, however, it does not arise for our consideration at all. Whatever may be the position of a landlord under sec. 26E of the Bengal Tenancy Act before the confirmation of the sale, in this particular case, the sale was confirmed and the landlords acquired a title to the landlord's fees. This title of the landlord was liable to be defeated in case the sale was set aside. One of the direct and proximate effects of the order setting aside the sale would thus be to affect the title of the landlords to the fees deposited. In our opinion, the title of the landlords to the fees was the direct and proximate result of the sale and this title was liable to be affected directly and proximately by the order setting aside the sale. In this view, the present Petitioner was certainly a person entitled to a notice under the proviso to r. 92 (2) of Or. 21 and as no such notice was given, the ex parte order setting aside the sale is not binding on him. 12. The third contention raised by Mr. Bankim Chandra Banerji is supported by the decisions of this Court in Dwarikanath Par v. Krishna Barai 37 C.W.N. 64 (1932) and Umesh Chandra Majumdar Vs. Mt. Safiyatannessa Khatun and Others, AIR 1928 Cal 267 and we respectfully agree with the views expressed therein. The position of the person affected by the order setting aside the sale in respect of the order made without any notice of the application given to him is analogous to that of a Defendant in a suit against whom an ex parte decree is made without due service of summons. In either case the ex parte order or decree would require to be set aside by an application made for the purpose. In the present case, however, the moment the Petitioner came to know of the existence of the order, he challenged the same on the ground that no notice of the application was given to him. In either case the ex parte order or decree would require to be set aside by an application made for the purpose. In the present case, however, the moment the Petitioner came to know of the existence of the order, he challenged the same on the ground that no notice of the application was given to him. In order to challenge the order directly, all that was necessary for him was to add a prayer to that petition of objection that the order might be set aside. The order could be challenged by an application, and an application was, as a matter of fact, made by the present petitioner, though it was styled only as a petition of objection. We do not see any reason why the petition of objection made in this case should not be treated as an application for the purpose of setting aside the ex parte order. In view of the admitted fact that no notice of the application was given to the Petitioner, the ex parte order setting aside the sale cannot be allowed to stand. 13. In the result, this rule is made absolute. The order dated the 22nd April, 1942, is set aside. The ex parte order dated the 10th December, 1938, setting aside the sale is also set aside and the application for setting aside the sale under Or. 21, r. 90 of the CPC is restored to file for hearing in the presence of the Petitioner and Opposite Party No. 3 and for disposal according to law. If after hearing that application the sale is set aside ultimately, then the landlords will be bound to repay the landlord's fees; otherwise, they will be entitled to retain the same. If the sale is confirmed, it will be open to the decree-holder to make such applications to the Court for proper orders under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act as may arise in the case. 14. We make no order as to costs in this Rule. Mukherjea, J. I agree.