Judgement Appeal (No. 27 of 1943), by special leave in forma pauperis, from a judgment of the High Court (December 18, 1942) confirming the conviction of the appellant of the murder of his uncle, Nanhu, under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge of Rohtak (August 15, 1942). The validity of the conviction was challenged before the Board on two grounds, namely, (1.) that the appellant had been illegally arrested ; and (2.) that the court which tried him had no jurisdiction to do so. The following facts are taken substantially from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. First, with regard to the arrest of the appellant, he was not a British subject, but was a native of the State of Jind, in which he resided. The murder with which he was charged was committed in a train while it was running between two stations on the Southern Punjab Railway within the State of Jind. By an agreement entered into between the British Government and the State of Jind in 1900 the Rajah ceded to the British Government " full and exclusive power and jurisdiction of every kind over the lands in the said State which " are or may hereafter be occupied by the Southern Punjab " Railway .... and over all persons and things whatsoever " within the said lands " (Aitchisons " Treaties,” 5th ed., vol. I, 282, No. LI.). The body of the deceased was discovered on October 15, 1941, in a train at Kinana Station in Jind State by a constable of the British India railway police. At Jind, the next station, he reported his discovery to a Sub-Inspector of the British Indian railway police. The latter undertook the investigation of the matter and prepared a first information report. The body was taken next day to Rohtak, within British India, for post mortem examination. On October 18, the Sub-Inspector arrested the appellant at a place in the State of Jind outside the railway. He produced the appellant on the same day before the District Magistrate of Jind, who remanded the appellant to the custody of the police of the State of Jind, by whom the appellant was temporarily transferred to the British Indian railway police for investigation. On the following day a Sub-Inspector of the Jind police joined the investigation. He produced the appellant on the same day before the District Magistrate of Jind, who remanded the appellant to the custody of the police of the State of Jind, by whom the appellant was temporarily transferred to the British Indian railway police for investigation. On the following day a Sub-Inspector of the Jind police joined the investigation. On October 22 the Sub-Inspector of the railway police conveyed the appellant to Rohtak. A confession by the appellant was recorded by the Magistrate there, who thereafter remanded the appellant to the judicial lock-up. On January 14, 1942, the appellant, described as now confined in the judicial lock-up, Jind, was formally extradited and sanction was given by the Nizamat Jind for him to be handed over to the authorities of Rohtak District. That was duly effected, and the appellant was brought to trial and convicted at Rohtak, as already stated. With regard to the second point, as to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try the appellant for the offence charged, in the Gazette of India of July 5, 1924, there appeared a notification by the Governor General in Council that, for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction, within the lands occupied by the railways specified in the first column of an annexed schedule and lying within the States specified in the second column the court mentioned in the third column should exercise the powers of a District Magistrate. The following is an extract from the schedule as it appeared in the Gazette — The Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepur. 6. Southern .. Punjab Railway Main Line. Gaddarbaha Patiala Budhlada Budhlada Patiala Jind frontier near Uchana. Jind Jind .. frontier near Uchana- Karainthi. The Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak. .. The portion of the Southern Punjab Railway with which this case was concerned was that described in the first column as " Jind frontier near .Uchana—Karainthi " ; in the second column it was shown as lying within the State of Jind ; in the third column, where the appropriate court should be entered, there were two dots. The appellant said that those dots were meaningless, and that the Governor-General in Council had failed to indicate any court by which cases from that portion of the railway should be heard. The appellant said that those dots were meaningless, and that the Governor-General in Council had failed to indicate any court by which cases from that portion of the railway should be heard. The High Court (Young C.J. and Mohammad Munir J.), confirming the conviction by the Sessions Judge, held that pen if the arrest of the appellant was illegal, that illegality did not affect the jurisdiction of the court to try the appellant. They also repelled the objection to the jurisdiction under the notification. 1944. Jan. 25, 26. Khambatta for the appellant. The arrest was made by a British Indian police officer in the territory of the Native State outside the railway lands, and at that time no extradition proceedings had been taken, nor had any warrant for his arrest been taken out. The appellant was extradited on January 14, 1942, but, it is submitted, that was trying to put right what had already been illegal before. Extradition was necessary before the British Indian police could have legally arrested the appellant,and the court in British India does not get jurisdiction over a subject of a Native State by an illegal arrest made in another jurisdiction. This case must turn on the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if the arrest under the Code—on October 18, 1941—was illegal, then under the Code proceedings taken on that illegal arrest ought to be set aside; it vitiates the whole matter, and the proceedings on it are without proper jurisdiction. Section 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, provides that M A police-officer may, " for the purpose of arresting without warrant any person " whom he is authorized to arrest under this Chapter, pursue " such person into any place in British India." In Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. The Queen-Empress (( 1897) L. R. 24 I. A. 137.) the arrest was held illegal, and it was recommended that the warrant and the proceedings should be set aside. While on the facts that case may be the converse of the present one, in principle it is this case. While on the facts that case may be the converse of the present one, in principle it is this case. [Reference was also made to Emperor v. Chandri Bawoo (( 1924) I. L. R. 49 B. 212, 215-6.).] The provisions of s. 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be confined to subjects of British India, and do not apply here, and there is no other provision which applies directly to a subject of a Native State. The appellants arrest was illegal, as rightly conceded by the High Court, and that illegality vitiated the trial. With regard to the notification, in the schedule there is for " Jind” no corresponding entry. It was said in the court below that in the original notification there appears a bracket, so that the Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak, would apply both to Patiala and to Jind. The Crown produced a copy of the draft notification as sent to the press, and the High Court, who only had before them that draft—with the bracket— accepted it as sufficient to show that the Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak, had jurisdiction over Jind. Section 78 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that " the following "public documents may be proved as follows—(1.) Acts, "orders or notifications of the Central Government .... " by any document purporting to be printed by order of any "such Government . . . . " and by s. 81, which expressly relates to the Gazette, " The Court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be .... any Official " Gazette, or the Government Gazette . . . ." The presumption of correctness of the notification in the Gazette could not be rebutted by the production of the draft manuscript as certified by the Political Secretary, and, therefore, there was no jurisdiction in the trial court to try the appellant for the offence charged. The two dots in column three cannot mean " ditto," and if they do not the trial court had no jurisdiction. Roberts K.C., Wallach and MacKenna for the Crown. The point as to any irregularity in the arrest vitiating the proceedings ought to fail because nothing which occurred in Jind could affect the jurisdiction of the court in British India to try the case if it had jurisdiction under the notification. Roberts K.C., Wallach and MacKenna for the Crown. The point as to any irregularity in the arrest vitiating the proceedings ought to fail because nothing which occurred in Jind could affect the jurisdiction of the court in British India to try the case if it had jurisdiction under the notification. There is no formal extradition treaty between Jind and British India, and the practice of extradition is based on customary usage. There is no point in this case that the extradition was other than correct, or was illegal according to Jind law. The trial court, therefore, had jurisdiction, and it is immaterial what occurred in Jind in October, 1941. Emperor v. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (( 1910) I. L. R. 35 B. 225, 227.) is a striking case. Assuming that the appellant had been brought irregularly within the jurisdiction, that is no answer to the offence once he is there. That principle has been stated and followed on many occasions and is well established. It was said by Lord Halsbury L.C. in the course of the argument in Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. The Queen-Empress (L. R. 24 I. A. 137.) that " it may well be that the procedure taken was "irregular and improper, and brought a person wrongfully "within the jurisdiction, but if he is there, and if he has "committed an offence, whatever else may be said about it, "it is no answer to the offence committed within the juris-"diction that he has been brought irregularly within the " jurisdiction.” Emperor v. Chandri Bawoo (I. L. R. 49 B. 212.), relied on for the appellant, was a very special case, and there, under s. 190 of the Code, the Magistrate only had jurisdiction if certain conditions were fulfilled. On the second point, the Gazette, which is clearly admissible under s. 81 of the Evidence Act, does confer jurisdiction on the court in India. [Reference was made to the position between Jind and British India, and to Aitchisons Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. I., p. 282, No. LI.] If the dots are taken as meaning nothing, then that stretch of railway still has a Sessions Court and a High Court but not a Magistrates Court. There was no reply. Jan. 26. LORD MACMILLAN announced that their Lordships would humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed. Feb. 16. I., p. 282, No. LI.] If the dots are taken as meaning nothing, then that stretch of railway still has a Sessions Court and a High Court but not a Magistrates Court. There was no reply. Jan. 26. LORD MACMILLAN announced that their Lordships would humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed. Feb. 16. LORD MACMILLAN, delivering the reasons for their Lordships report, said that the contention of the appellant was that his arrest, having been effected in Jind territory by a British Indian officer, was illegal, and that the illegality of his arrest vitiated the whole subsequent proceedings. Their Lordships reject this contention. They assume that the arrest was open to objection as an infringement of the sovereignty of Jind, although the Jind authorities, so far from resenting what had been done, or regarding their rights as having been flouted, co-operated most readily with the British Indian police in bringing the appellant to justice. There was no suggestion of anything like kidnapping. In their Lordships view, the validity of the trial and conviction of the appellant was not affected by any irregularity in his arrest. When the appellant was presented for trial at Rohtak he had been validly surrendered to the court there by the Jind authorities, and so far as that court was concerned everything was regular and in order. In Ex parte Susannah Scott ((1829) 9 B. & C. 446.) the accused, a British subject charged with a crime committed in this country, had absconded to Belgium, and was arrested there by a British police officer and brought back to England. On objection being taken at the trial to the validity of the arrest Lord Tenterden C.J. said (9 B. & C. 446, 448.) " The question, therefore, is this, whether if a person " charged with a crime is found in this country, it is the duty " of the court to take care that such a party shall be amenable " to justice, or whether we are to consider the circumstances " under which she was brought here. I thought, I still continue " to think, that we cannot inquire into them." In Emperor v. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (( 1910) I. L. R. 35 B. 225.), the illegality of the arrest of the accused was pleaded and was held to be irrelevant. I thought, I still continue " to think, that we cannot inquire into them." In Emperor v. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (( 1910) I. L. R. 35 B. 225.), the illegality of the arrest of the accused was pleaded and was held to be irrelevant. Scott C. J. quoted from the charge to the jury of Cockburn L.C. J. in The Queen v. Nelson and Brand in which this passage occurs ("Charge of the Lord Chief "Justice of England to the Grand "Jury at the Central Criminal " Court in The Queen v. Nelson and " Brand." Edited by Frederick Cock burn, London William Ridgway, 1867. Pp. 118-9.) —" Suppose a man to commit a crime in this " country, say murder, and that before he can be apprehended " he escapes into some country with which we have not an " Extradition Treaty, so that we could not get him delivered “up to us by the authorities, and suppose that an English " police officer were to pursue the malefactor, and finding " him in some place where he could lay hands upon him, and " from which he could easily reach the sea, got him on board " a ship and brought him to England, and the man were to be " taken in the first instance before a Magistrate, the Magistrate “could not refuse to commit him. If he were brought here " for trial, it would not be a plea to the jurisdiction of the " court that he had escaped from justice, and that by some " illegal means he had been brought back. It would be said “ ‘Nay, you are here ; you are charged with having committed " a crime, and you must stand your trial. We leave you to “ settle with the party who may have done an illegal act in bringing you into this position ; settle that with him.’" The appellant can derive no assistance from Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. The Queen-Empress (( 1897) L. R. 24 I. A. 137.). In that case the arrest in Hyderabad State by a British railway constable of a British subject charged with bribery committed at Simla, in British India, was held to be illegal. In that case the arrest in Hyderabad State by a British railway constable of a British subject charged with bribery committed at Simla, in British India, was held to be illegal. The only question at issue was whether the arrest was lawful or not, and Lord Halsbury L.C, in delivering the judgment of their Lordships, expressly stated that they had not anything to do with the consequences of the arrest being lawful or otherwise. In the course of the argument the Lord Chancellor incidentally observed, as appears from a record in the possession of the India Office —" It may well be that the procedure taken was " irregular and improper, and brought a person wrongfully " within the jurisdiction, but if he is there, and if he has "committed an offence whatever else may be said about it, "it is no answer to the offence committed within the jurisdiction that he has been brought irregularly within the " jurisdiction. That has been decided more than once in our " courts. There was a case where a man was tried for murder " in which it was clear that he was not properly arrested in " the jurisdiction where he was found, but nevertheless, he was " tried, convicted and executed.” The appellant therefore fails on his first point. The second point may be said to be typographical rather than legal. Their Lordships have no hesitation in rejecting the appellants contention that the dots in the third column of the schedule annexed to the notification are meaningless, and that no court was indicated by which cases from this portion of the railway should be heard. It is in their opinion quite clear that the two dots are typographically equivalent to " do " or " ditto," and that the words " The Deputy Commissioner Rohtak" are thereby made applicable to the portion of the railway in question, with the consequence that the court at Rohtak had jurisdiction to try the appellant. Their Lordships so read the notification as printed in the Gazette irrespective of certain domestic documents produced on behalf of the respondent in support of this reading which, to say the least of it, are of dubious evidential value or admissibility. The appellant having thus failed, for the reasons indicated, to make good either of his two points, their Lordships advised His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed.