JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the decree-holder. It is directed against an order allowing an objection under S. 47, Civil P. C., to the effect that S. 168A, Bengal Tenancy Act, is a bar to the appellant's execution proceedings. The appellant is the zamindar. Under him there is a patni. The respondent is a darpatnidar holding under the patnidar. The patni was sold under the provisions of the Regulation and purchased by the appellant on 22nd August 1941. I am told that the usual kind of proceedings are going on between the appellant and the patnidar. At any rate, if the sale is confirmed and the darpatni is not annulled, the respondent will become the tenant of the appellant. 2. The present decree was obtained by the appellant in the following circumstances: Both parties were being troubled by the default of the patnidar. It appears that the respondent was in possession of the patni under the provisions of S. 13 of the Regulation. An agreement was made between the parties that the appellant (sic, respondent?) would pay a sum of money which was an equivalent of the rent due from the patnidar for the year 1338. I am told by Mr. Mitter that the consideration for the promiso was that the appellant agreed not to take steps for the sale of the patni under the Regulation. That is an obvious explanation. At any rate the respondent did not defend the suit on the ground that there was no consideration for the promise, and therefore there can be no doubt that there was consideration of some kind. The result was that the appellant obtained the decree which he is now seeking to execute. From what I have said above, it is not very easy to see what kind of application S. 168A, Bengal Tenancy Act, has to the present case. It is perfectly true that the sum of money which the respondent agreed to pay is the same as the money which was due from the patnidar to the appellant as rent. But S. 163A is part of the law of landlord and tenant and it cannot possibly have any application to decrees obtained by a plaintiff against a person with whom there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. 3. Mr. But S. 163A is part of the law of landlord and tenant and it cannot possibly have any application to decrees obtained by a plaintiff against a person with whom there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. 3. Mr. Dutta suggested that there is something in the provisions of the Patni Regulation which turns a darpatnidar holding possession of the patni as a girbidar into a tenant of a zamindar. But this argument eventually had to be abandoned and, if the position was such, the agreement upon which the suit was based would be wholly unnecessary, Section 13 gives the girbidar rights against the patnidar but docs not give the zamindar any rights against the darpatnidar. It is necessary to refer to one other matter. At the end of the paragraph in the plaint setting out the terms of the agreement, it is stated that the claim could be enforced under the provisions for the realisation of rents. The learned Judge treated it as though it created a sort of an estoppel. Now at the time the agreement was made, a rent decree was better than a money decree, The appellant is welcome to invoke this term of the agreement to plead that it raises an estoppel against the respondent but I vary much doubt whether he will get any benefit out of it. 4. Mr. Dutt suggested that the real meaning of the term is that a new tenancy was created by the appellant in favour of the respondent. That is not a question which arises for consideration now. If that contention is correct, the respondent is entitled to realise the rent from the patnidar and the appellant can realise anything from the respondent by asking for assessment of a fair rent. This contention may be put forward as a shield on an attempt being made by the appellant to annul the darpatni : all I need say now is that the present decree is not one for the rent alleged to be due on the tenancy which is supposed to have been created by this agreement. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the orders of both the Courts below are set aside and the objection of the respondent under S. 47 will be dismissed with costs in all Courts - hearing fee in this Court, one gold mohur.