Judgement Appeal (No. 12 of 1943) from a decree of the High Court (May 9, 1940), which varied a decree of the Subordinate judge of Delhi (April 28, 1938). The suit which gave rise to this appeal was brought by the first respondent against the second respondent and the appellant for dissolution of partnership and for accounts. On December 3, 1929, a deed of partnership was executed by the first and second respondents and the wife of the appellant. The business of the partnership was described as that of " hosiers, milliners, dressmakers, tailors and outfitters, etc." and was to begin from November 1, 1929, and " should continue unless otherwise determined by the mutual " agreement of the partners or by operation of law." The partnership deed provided " (5) The capital of the partnership shall consist of Rs. 90,000 to be subscribed by the " partners in equal shares .... (7) The net profits of the " business shall be divided in equal shares between the " partners .... (10) That it is understood that the third “partner enters into partnership with the first and second " partner in the present running concern. The third partner " does not in any way stand responsible for any profit or loss “shown by the firm up to the date of the third partner joining " the firm. The stock and liabilities (excluding the loss) of " the present firm shall Law. Rep. 71 Ind. App. 149 ( 1943- 1944) N. R. Kapur V. Murli Dhar Kapur 52 be deemed to be the stock and liabilities " of the partnership entered into by this agreement. The " stock shall be taken at its cost." On July 13, 1934, the first respondent instituted the suit out of which this appeal arose against the second respondent and the appellant, who, it was alleged, had become partner in the name of his wife, for dissolution of partnership and for accounts. The Subordinate judge directed that a preliminary decree for dissolution of partnership should be passed, and he ordered accounts to be taken. On April 28, 1938, he delivered judgment accepting the accounting Commissioners final report, and passed a decree in accordance therewith for Rs. 12,418-15-9 in favour of the first respondent and for Rs. 5,107-7—1 in favour of the appellant against the second respondent. On April 28, 1938, he delivered judgment accepting the accounting Commissioners final report, and passed a decree in accordance therewith for Rs. 12,418-15-9 in favour of the first respondent and for Rs. 5,107-7—1 in favour of the appellant against the second respondent. On appeal from that decree the High Court (Dalip Singh and Sale JJ.) varied the trial judges decree and directed a decree for Rs. 22,206—9-11 to be passed against the appellant and for Rs. 21,921-3-10 against the second respondent, with future simple interest at 3½ per cent, per annum from the date of the decree until realization. From that decree the appellant now appealed, and the reasons in his printed case included the following " (2) Because the judges of the High Court have misconstrued the terms of the partnership deed .... " (3) Because the judges of the High Court were wrong in "holding that the outstandings of the old partnership were “taken over by the new partnership. " (7) Because the judges of the High Court were wrong in " holding that the following payments were properly made " by the first respondent; none of these items were due from " the partnership [there followed a list of four payments, amounting in all to Rs. 5.323-15-0.] " (8) Because the sum of Rs. 2,400 having been admittedly " collected from the firm of Aux Elegantes, by the partner " R. N. Kapur, the judges of the High Court were wrong in " making the appellant liable for that sum. " (9) Because the appellant should have been credited by " the judges of the High Court with the sum of Rs. 2,293 " admittedly paid by him to Ram Kishan, a creditor of the " partnership." 1944. May 17. Rewcastle K.C. and Wallach for the appellant. Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. and Khambatta for the first respondent, by way of preliminary objection, contended that the questions raised in this appeal were not questions which ought to be made the subject-matter of an appeal to His Majesty in Council, and referred to Lala Hakim Rai v. Lala Ganga Ram (P. C. App. No. 81 of 1939 (See Practice Point in L. R. 69, I. A. 172).). May 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Thankerton. No. 81 of 1939 (See Practice Point in L. R. 69, I. A. 172).). May 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Thankerton. Their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should not be allowed to proceed as not presenting, apart from one possible point which will be mentioned in a moment, proper subject-matter for an appeal to His Majesty in Council. In the first place, the point on which a different argument might be suggested, is the point with reference to the out-standings, which is contained in reasons 2 and 3 of the appellants case. In their Lordships opinion the matter was rightly decided by the High Court, and there is no substance in the Law. Rep. 71 Ind. App. 149 ( 1943- 1944) N. R. Kapur V. Murli Dhar Kapur 53 argument suggested to the contrary. It is a question of construction of the partnership deed, and the phraseology of art. 10 of the partnership deed, in their Lordships opinion, does not present any such difficulty as would admit a contrary view to the view expressed by the High Court. The remaining three reasons on which Mr. Rewcastle addressed their Lordships were reasons 7, 8 and 9. In the opinion of their Lordships, all three are concerned with ordinary items of accounting in the taking of a partnership account, and would fall under the principle laid down in the judgment delivered by Lord Romer in Lala Hakim Rai v. Lala Ganga Ram (P. C. App. No. 81 of 1939 (See Practice Point in L. R. 69, I.A. 172).) on June 22, 1942, which is referred to in the practice note in L. R. 69 I. A. 172. In the present appeal, their Lordships are unable to find, apart from the reason already dealt with, any question of principle whatever, and the items concerned in these three reasons are just ordinary items, questions as to the inclusion or exclusion of which are raised, in making up a partnership account on the dissolution of a partnership. The first reason— reason 7—relates to four payments, made to members of the family of one of the partners, which were disallowed by the Subordinate Judge and were allowed by the High Court. This seems to be a pure question of fact, and Mr. The first reason— reason 7—relates to four payments, made to members of the family of one of the partners, which were disallowed by the Subordinate Judge and were allowed by the High Court. This seems to be a pure question of fact, and Mr. Rewcastle was prepared to admit that these were original liabilities of the firm ; in any event, the Subordinate Judges finding is very much vitiated by the fact that he has ignored the accounts of the firm, which was still running, in 1933, in which these are acknowledged as liabilities of the firm. That leaves the question whether in fact they had been discharged and, if discharged, by whom they had been discharged. There is no trace of any claim being made by the original creditors on the ground that the debts are alive. In any event, that seems to be a pure question of fact, and they are just the kind of items in an accounting, such as are covered by the decision of this Board in 1942. The next reason is reason 8. That is the liability of one of the partners, other than the appellant, to account for a sum which admittedly he has collected from the debtors, the firm of Aux Elegantes. The amount is alleged to be Rs. 2,400, which would benefit the particular appellant to the extent of Rs. 800. It is just a typical item in accounting, namely, the liability of a partner to account to the firm, and, in their Lordships opinion, is clearly covered by that previous decision. That leaves reason 9, which came to very little, because Mr. Rewcastle agreed that sufficient provision is made in the judgment of the High Court for his taking credit for this debt in reduction of any sum, execution for which is sought to be enforced against him. In fact, under the decree of the High Court he had a decree pronounced against him for a sum of Rs. 22,000, so that there is ample from which to deduct the amount of this debt. It is clear that if, rather than have execution against him, he is ready to pay up under the decree, he would be entitled to have credit for this amount. Therefore, there seems to be nothing in that point at all. 22,000, so that there is ample from which to deduct the amount of this debt. It is clear that if, rather than have execution against him, he is ready to pay up under the decree, he would be entitled to have credit for this amount. Therefore, there seems to be nothing in that point at all. For these reasons, their Lordships think that these questions are of the type which should not be entertained by their Lordships by way of appeal. Accordingly their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed, with costs.