JUDGMENT 1. The Petitioners in these six Rules lent certain sums of money to a Receiver in a partition suit. The loans were all raised with the sanction of the Court and were advanced on different dates prior to 1938, carrying interest at 12 per cent. per annum. They were loans on mortgage of immovable properties. It was not necessary for the Petitioners to bring any suits to enforce the mortgages, as the borrower fully satisfied all the debts amicably out of Court on or before the 22nd of February, 1940, paying interest at the full stipulated rate of 12 per cent. Thereafter the Bengal Money-Lenders Act of 1940 came into force on the 1st of September, 1940, and taking advantage of its provisions, the borrower filed six applications in respect of six of these loans, praying for relief under sec. 36 of the Act. These applications were afterwards converted into suits as contemplated by that section. The prayers were that the Court might hold that the borrower had made payments on account of interest in excess of the limits specified in cls. (1) and (2) of sec. 30 and thereupon direct the lenders to repay to him the amount of such excess payments. The relief asked for in each case evidently was in terms of cl. (d), read with cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 of the Act. The material defence, which is the only defence we are now concerned with, was that the Act had no application to the facts of these cases, seeing that all the loans had been fully satisfied before the date of the applications and at any rate before the date the Bengal Money-Lenders Act came into force. Both the Courts below overruled this contention and granted the reliefs asked for by the borrower. Hence the present Rules. In support of the Rules Mr. Chakravarty renewed the contention which had been raised in the lower Courts on behalf of his clients, and the only ground which he suggested in answer to the view taken by the Courts below was that the word " liability " in cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act meant liability which was subsisting at the date of the application. Mr. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act meant liability which was subsisting at the date of the application. Mr. Chakravarty was unable to give any cogent reasons for accepting this limited interpretation of the word "liability." It cannot be said that the policy of this Act, so far as it can be gathered from its provisions, is to exclude from its purview, for the purposes of relief thereunder, money-lending transactions which might have been closed before the date of applying for relief. On the other hand, there are abundant indications that the Act contemplates the re-opening of pa transactions within certain limits. It will be observed that the relief referred to in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 may be obtained either in a suit to which the Act applies in an independent suit which the borrower is empowered by this very sub-section to bring. In a case where application for relief is made in a suit to which the Act plies, sub-sec. (6) lays down the procedure to be followed. It provides that the Court may exercise the powers conferred by sub-sees. (1) and (2), either in any proceedings in execution of such decree or on an application for review of such a decree. Where the application is made in the course of execution proceedings, it presupposes that a decree is outstanding at the date of the application. Where, however, the relief is asked for by way of an application for review, the decree might or might not be outstanding at the date of the application, which clearly shows that the legislature did not necessarily require the existence of an unsatisfied decree as a condition precedent for the purpose of supporting an application for relief under sec. 36. The definition of a "suit to which the Act applies " requires that there must be some proceeding pending on the 1st of January, 1939. Supposing a decree in such a suit was made after that date and was fully satisfied either in execution proceedings or out of Court before the Act came into force, it cannot be said that no relief could be granted in respect of such a decree merely because it had been so satisfied and there was no liability in respect of it on the date the application for relief was made. It follows accordingly that in a case where relief is asked for in a suit to which the Act applies, the word " liability" in cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 cannot be taken to mean liability which is subsisting at the date of the application or at the date on which the Act came into operation. Mr. Chakravarty in fact conceded that in such cases such a limited interpretation was not warranted by the provisions of the Act. We are unable to hold that a different interpretation may be or ought to be put on the word "liability" in cl. (c) as regards cases where relief is sought by an independent suit under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36. To hold that where a liability had been satisfied, that fact alone would be sufficient to bar relief under the Act would be to render its provisions nugatory. The limits within which past transactions may be reopened have been specifically indicated in the Act itself. In so far as those limits are not exceeded in any particular case, we see no reason why relief should be denied. In this view of the matter we must hold that the Courts below were right in decreeing the suits. 2. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the Opposite Parties to the hearing of these Rules on the ground that appeals lay in these cases. It was contended that the suits were not suits of the nature cognisable by a Court of Small Causes and that the bar of sec. 102 of the CPC did not, therefore, apply because of the value of the suits being below Rs. 500. In view of the opinion we have expressed above, it is not necessary to go into this preliminary objection. We may, however, point out that three is nothing in the Bengal Money-Lenders Act to show that the present suits would not have been cognisable by a Court of Small Causes. The nature of the relief asked for in these cases does not appear to bring them within any of the exceptions set out in Schedule 2 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The only article which it is necessary to refer to in this connection is Article 31; but plainly these are not suits for accounts in any sense. The nature of the relief asked for in these cases does not appear to bring them within any of the exceptions set out in Schedule 2 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The only article which it is necessary to refer to in this connection is Article 31; but plainly these are not suits for accounts in any sense. The claims were for refund of specific sums of money, and merely because the Court had to find out that the sums claimed were actually due and for the purpose of ascertaining the sums, it might have had to take accounts, it did not follow that the suits were suits for accounts. Sec. 102 of the CPC would, therefore, bar an appeal in each of these cases, and the preliminary objection must be overruled. The result is that the Rules are discharged with costs-hearing-fee, one gold mohur to be paid by the Petitioner Balai Chand De who is common in four of the Rules, and one gold mohur by Ekkari Dutt who is Petitioner in the other two Rules.