JUDGMENT Plowden and Sinha, JJ. - This is a Defendant's appeal against a decree of the learned District Judge of Aazamgarh in an action for ejectment. 2. The facts briefly are these: The Plaintiff is a transferee from a Hindu widow Mst. Surta, under several transactions but not a transferee for value and consideration. Mst. Surta first made a will in his favour on April 11, 1930, and later executed two deeds of gift, one on February 15, 1932 and the other on June 13,1932. Shortly after she died in November 1932. Mst. Surta was the widow of a man named Lakshmi Prasad who died in 1910. Some further facts are also necessary. One Garui Charan died leaving two sons Sri Gopal and Nandu. Sri Gopal died leaving a son Parshottam who was married to a lady Mst. Hubraji. Nandu had two sons, Lakshmi Prasad and Ghilwa. Nandu's widow was Mst. Gulaba and Lakshmi Prasad's widow was Mst. Surta. It has come in evidence that Sri Gopal and Nandu were separate but Nandu's sons, Lakshmi Prasad and Ghilwa were members of a joint Hindu family. Parshottam died in 1907 and Mst. Hubraji's name was entered against his eight annas share. Lakshmi Prasad died in 1910 but instead of the name of Ghilwa being entered against the entire property as the surviving members of the joint Hindu family, the name of Mst. Surta was recorded over a four annas share and that of Ghilwa over the other four annas. In 1911 Ghilwa died and so did Mst. Hubraji. Under the Hindu law Mst. Surta was not entitled to the share recorded in the name of Ghilwa, much less was she entitled to the share entered against the name of Mst. Hubraji. Nevertheless, mutation was effected in favour of Mst. Surta alone. In 1918 Gulaba died with the result that the entire sixteen annas, which at one time belonged to the entire family of which the head was Gauri Charan came to be recorded in the name of Mst. Surta. It will be desirable to set forth the two pedigrees with which the parties came to Court. They are as below: 3. The Defendants are transferees from Shambhu Datt under a sale of October 9, 1933. The Plaintiff's name was mutated after the death of Mst. Surta by an order of November 30, 1932. Surta. It will be desirable to set forth the two pedigrees with which the parties came to Court. They are as below: 3. The Defendants are transferees from Shambhu Datt under a sale of October 9, 1933. The Plaintiff's name was mutated after the death of Mst. Surta by an order of November 30, 1932. He obtained possession but his possession was disturbed, in fact he lost it, with the result that he brought an action u/s 44 of the Tenancy Act in the Court of the Assistant Collector, I Class. It is this action which has given rise to the present second appeal. The Plaintiff treated the Defendants as trespassers and claimed ejectment. The Defendants on the other hand, claimed to be proprietors under the sale deed executed by Shambhu Datt. The issue of proprietary title was sent to the learned Munsif who held that Shambhu Datt was not connected with the family and that the Defendants had no title to the property. He also found that the possession of Mst. Surta to the extent of the entire sixteen annas was adverse and she had thus acquired complete title to the estate which she could validly pass both under the will and the gifts, to the Plaintiff. The learned Assistant Collector decreed the suit in accordance with the findings of the learned Munsif. Against this decision the Defendants went in appeal to the learned District Judge. 4. The learned District Judge has agreed with the Court of first instance and held that Shambhu Datt was a stranger to the family and no title passed to the Defendants. We shall, therefore, decide this case on the basis that the Defendants are trespassers. This, however, does not mean the end of all controversy. The Defendants put the Plaintiff to proof of his title and challenged his right to claim ejectment against them even though they might be trespasser. Their contention, in brief was that even if Mst. Surta remained in possession of the entire family estate for more than twelve years her possession was the possession of a Hindu widow and no title could be prescribed by her to the detriment of the estate of the husband. The learned District Judge accepted the Plaintiff's case and held that Mst. Surta remained in possession of the entire family estate for more than twelve years her possession was the possession of a Hindu widow and no title could be prescribed by her to the detriment of the estate of the husband. The learned District Judge accepted the Plaintiff's case and held that Mst. Sutra had prescribed complete title to herself which she could transmit both under the will and the gifts to the present Plaintiff and he was, therefore, entitled to dispossess the Defendants. 5. The Defendants have come in second appeal. They have repeated before us all the arguments which they had addressed to the learned District Judge. The prinicipal contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellants is that the admissions made by the lady destroy the very foundation of all claim for adverse possession. Mr. Pandey, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, however, argues that on the admitted facts Mst. Surta had no claim to any portion of the property and her possession must be deemed to be adverse and, once it is so treated she must be held to have prescribed complete title to the same. He contends that when in 1910 the name of Mst. Surta was entered against the four annas share of Lakshmi Prasad and she went into possession, it was unlawful possession to that extent. To proceed further when in 1911 on the death of Mst. Hubraji and Ghilwa, Mst. Surta's name was recorded against their shares, it was again an unlawful possession, and lastly when on the death of Mst. Gulaba, who was last to die, barring, of course M St. Surta herself, she obtained possession of the entire sixteen annas, her possession was again illegal. These links make the chain of her possession complete and each link, according to Mr. Pandey, was unlawful and she, therefore, prescribed absolute title to the entire sixteen annas. It is true that possession, unless it is based upon title, must be deemed to be adverse but the possession of a Hindu widow must be treated on a different basis. The true test has always been furnished by the character in which she steps into possession. It is true that possession, unless it is based upon title, must be deemed to be adverse but the possession of a Hindu widow must be treated on a different basis. The true test has always been furnished by the character in which she steps into possession. If she has entered possession not as a widow of the last male owner or as a widow of the family, the possession will be deemed to be adverse, but if she has entered in possession as a widow of the last male owner or as the widow of the family, her possession has never been treated as adverse. Mr. Pandey relies upon a case reported in Kali Charan v. Peari (1924) 22 A L J 725. That case was considered in Danger Singh v. Maid Kunwar (1993) 2 A W R 926, and it was pointed out that there was no evidence that the widow in question had limited her claim to a widow's estate. On the other hand, in the present case we find that whenever in the past an occasion arose for Mst. Surta to define the character of her possession, she always defined it as that of a Hindu widow. For instance in 1919 one Parmeshwar brought a suit for possession against her and in her writ en statement she pleaded that she continued in possession as the widow of Lakshmi Prasad her husband. There can thus be no room for controversy that she took a definite stand even so far back as 1919, i.e., within ten years of the death of her husband. There was ample opportunity for her to claim adverse possession then. If within towelve years of the death of her husband she had claimed adverse possession, the reversioners would have been entitled to assail it. This she never did. The next case on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the Respondent is Ram Sarup Singh v. Mohan Singh 1939 AWR (H.C) 625: ILR 1939 All 713. In answer to the argument that the widow had prescribed complete title by remaining in adverse possession for more than twelve years, it was pointed out that in the mutation proceedings she had only claimed on the basis of inheritance. Their Lordships held that it was evidently the doing of the patwari which could not be binding upon the widow herself. Their Lordships held that it was evidently the doing of the patwari which could not be binding upon the widow herself. From this conclusion we beg to enter our respectful dissent, if it were necessary to do that, and we would be fortified in our conclusion by a later case reported in Gaya Din v. Badri Singh (4), a case to which we shall refer at some length. But in the case before us we are not left to speculate whether it was the doing of the patwari or whether it was the doing of the lady herself, because we find, as said above, that in the written statement of 1919 she herself had very clearly defined her possession. In this view of the case we think that the decision of I. L. R. 1939 All is distinguished from the fact before us. 6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has, however, very strenuously relied upon the case of Gaya Din v. Badri Singh 1943 AWR (HC) 5: 1943 LJ 46. In that case Mr. Justice Allsop, agreeing with Mr. Justice Hamilton, has summed up the position in these words: It seems to follow, if there are no indications to the contrary, that a woman claiming an estate expressly by inheritance must be deemed to be claiming a limited estate. 7. With the above we respectfully agree. On the strength of this case we think it is abundantly established that the lady never claimed adverse possession in her capacity as a Hindu widow and her possession, whatever its length, could never secure to her complete and absolute title. 8. Mr. Pandey, however, strenuously argued that the question involved in this case is a pure question of fact and the finding of the learned District Judge should not be disturbed in second appeal. We do not agree that the question of adverse possession is a pure question of fact. In fact it is a question of inferences from the admitted and proved facts of the case. Their Lordships in Dhanna Mal v. Moti Sagar (1917) 15 LJ 959 had distinctly held: It is clear, however, that the proper effect of a proved fact is a question of law and the question whether a tenancy is permanent or precarious seems to them, in a case like the present, to be a legal inference from facts and not itself a question of fact. 9. Indeed, we are relieved of the necessity of going into the matter more fully, in view of the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Satgur Rrasad v. Raj Kishore Lal (1920) 42 All. 152. The question in that case was whether a certain lady had prescribed title by adverse possession. The Courts in India had observed that she had not. On appeal to his Majesty in Council their Lordships made the following observation: It is with reluctance that their Lordships differ from the concurrent opinions of the two Courts below on this point ; but it is one in reality of legal inference from documents and not of finding of fact, and their Lordships are unable to draw the inferences made by the Subordinate Judge and followed by the High Court. 10. If this is so-and indeed it must be so - we are entitled even in second appeal to go into various documents associated with the lady in order to arrive at the conclusion whether she asserted title as a Hindu widow or as a full owner. But in this case we find her own admission in documents to which reference has been made by the learned District Judge in his judgment and which are exhibits A12, A13 and A14 and in the written statement to which we have already made reference and which is Ex. A9 which conclusively establishes that she never made any departure from her claim as a Hindu widow. 11. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has, however, endeavoured to support the decree of the Court below on another ground. In order to appreciate this argument some facts may briefly be reiterated. On April 11, 1930, Mst. Surta made a will in favour of the Respondent who is her own brother, On February 15, 1932 she made a gift of the entire estate, again in his favour. She also made another gift on June 13, 1932. Although the first is of February 15, 1932 and the lady died on June 14, 1932 on the morrow of the second gift, it has come in evidence that the Respondent was living all along with Mst. Surta. This seems to be a very natural story. Surta had lost her husband and was in possession of a substantial estate. Although the first is of February 15, 1932 and the lady died on June 14, 1932 on the morrow of the second gift, it has come in evidence that the Respondent was living all along with Mst. Surta. This seems to be a very natural story. Surta had lost her husband and was in possession of a substantial estate. It is not surprising that the Respondent lived with his sister and assisted her in the management of that estate. He must, to all intents and purposes, have been in possession of the property in the lifetime of his sister, a possession which was legalised by the first gift of February 15, 1932. It was on the basis of the gift and consequent possession that mutation was ordered in his favour. The case of the Appellants is that they obtained a sale from Shambhu Datt on October 9, 1933, and soon after dispossession of the Respondent followed. Even if we accept the Appellant's case that they succeeded in dispossessing the Respondent soon after their sale, it cannot be denied that they disturbed the possession of a man who had good title to the property unless someone with a superior title came on the scene. It has been found definitely that Shambhu Datt was a stranger to the family and, that being so, no title could pass to the Defendant. It may well be that when the Defendant's secured this sale from Shambhu Datt who had nothing whatever to do with the family, no consideration really passed and they were gambling a litigation. Be that as it may, the legal position is clear that they had no title whatsoever and had no justification to take the law in their own hands and dispossess the Respondent. 12. Possessory title has been beld to be both heritable and transferable - Asher v. Whitlock 1866 LRI QB 1., the principle of which was followed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sundar v. Parbati (1890) 12 All. 51. A case the facts of which were in substance similar to the facts of the present case came before this Court of Gobind Prasad v. Mohan (1902) 21 All. 157. The question in that case was whether a person with a possessory title was competent to appeal to the court as a Plaintiff and seek ejectment of a rank trespasser. A case the facts of which were in substance similar to the facts of the present case came before this Court of Gobind Prasad v. Mohan (1902) 21 All. 157. The question in that case was whether a person with a possessory title was competent to appeal to the court as a Plaintiff and seek ejectment of a rank trespasser. The learned Subordinate Judge had held that possessory title was not a good title which could be the basis of a claim for ejectment. Sir John Stanley and Sir William Birkitt disagreed with this view and on the strength of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sunder v. Parbati held that possessory title constituted a very good foundation for a claim for ejectment. There can be no distinction, in principle, between that case and this. If anything the Respondent in this case is on a surer ground. His possessory title did not start merely with possession but could be traced back to the transaction of gift dated February 15, 1932, executed in his favour by a person who had good title to convey on the date that she executed the deed. In this view of the case we think that the decree of the courts below is correct and the suit was rightly decreed. 13. We, therefore, affirm the decree of the Courts below and dismiss this appeal. 14. The question of costs requires some consideration. We have affirmed the decree of the Courts below but on different ground. In fact the learned Counsel for the Respondent raised this ground for the first time in this Court and we, therefore, think that this is a fit case in which the parties should bear their own costs throughout.