JUDGMENT S.R. Das, J. - This matter has come up before me on a garnishee notice issued by the Master in course of proceedings for execution of the decree passed in this suit. The facts are shortly as follows: 2. On 27th August 1940, the plaintiff Bank instituted this suit against the defendant Rao and his wife on a promissory note executed by them in favour of the plaintiff Bank. On 17th January 1941 a decree was passed for Rs. 5037 with costs and interest on judgment at 6 per cent per annum. The costs have been taxed and an allocatur has been issued for Rs. 403-6-6. 3. The defendant Rao was an employee in the Bengal Nagpur Railway Co., Ltd. and was a subscriber to the Bengal Nagpur Railway Provident Fund. In September 1941, the plaintiff Bank in execution of the decree passed in this suit attached the salary of the defendant Rao. Another judgment-creditor of the defendant Rao had also taken out execution against him and attached his salary. On 1st June 1943, there was an order for rateable distribution and the plaintiff Bank realised Rs. 1197-8-0 as their share. 4. In the meantime, on 14th April 1943, the defendant Rao ceased to be an employee of the Railway Company and the amount standing to his credit in the provident fund account became payable to him. On 29th May 1943 the Railway Company issued a cheque on the Reserve Bank in favour of the defendant Rao for Rs. 26,272-5-0. 5. In the affidavit of Captain Murty filed herein on behalf of the Railway Company it has been stated that this cheque "was expressed on its face to he current for three months only" and that it was delivered to the defendant Rao "in payment of his dues from the said fund." On 27th August 1943 this cheque, endorsed by the defendant Rao, was forwarded to the plaintiff Bank with an unsigned covering letter dated 23rd august 1943 instructing the plaintiff Bank to credit the amount to the account of one T.R.V. Sarma of Madras in the plaintiff Bank. This letter, purported to have been written from Madras, was, however, sent to the plaintiff Bank in a peon book. The letter is said to have been in the handwriting of the defendant Rao. This letter, purported to have been written from Madras, was, however, sent to the plaintiff Bank in a peon book. The letter is said to have been in the handwriting of the defendant Rao. On the same day the plaintiff Bank by a telegram and also by a letter both addressed to T.R.V. Sarma asked for instructions. 6. On the same day i.e., 27th August 1943 the plaintiff Bank presented a tabular statement before the Master for execution of the decree against the defendant Rao. The mode in which the assistance of the Court was required was stated in column 10 as follows: The plaintiff Bank prays that the said sum of Rs. 5037-5-0 together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the said decree, namely, the 17th January 1941 until realisation as also the said sum of Rs. 408-6-6 together with interest thereon at the rate aforesaid from the date of taxation namely, the 30th June 1941 until realisation (less the said sum of Rs. 1197-8-0) and the costs of and incidental to this application and all subsequent costs be realised from the said judgment-debtor M.V.V. Rao by attachment of the sum of Rs. 26,272-5-0 being the debt payable by the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company Limited to M.V.V. Rao, the said judgment-debtor and in respect whereof the said Bengal Nagpur Railway Company Limited issued a crossed cheque on the Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta, bearing Book No. 4003, Cheque No. 28 and dated the 29th May 1943 and also by issuing a Prohibitory Order upon the said Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta, restraining them from paying the said cheque which still remains unpaid and also by attachment of the said cheque in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India, the said cheque being presented to the Reserve Bank. The judgment-debtor is no longer in service of the said Railway Company and unless the attachment is issued forthwith the plaintiff Bank will be unable to realise its just claim and thus suffer irreparable loss. The judgment-debtor is no longer in service of the said Railway Company and unless the attachment is issued forthwith the plaintiff Bank will be unable to realise its just claim and thus suffer irreparable loss. On the tabular statement being filed, the Master directed notice to issue on defendant Rao under O. 21, R. 22(1)(a), Civil P.C. and also made an interim order for attachment under O. 21, R. 46 prohibiting the defendant Rao from receiving from the Railway Company the sum of rupees 26,272-50 represented by the said cheque on Reserve Bank and prohibiting the Railway Company from making payment of the said money to any person whomsoever. An interim order under O. 21, R. 52 was also made on the Manager of the Reserve Bank requesting him to hold the said money subject to the further order of this Court. On 28th August 1948, the plaintiff Bank's solicitors notified the Agent of the Railway Company and the Chief Auditor of the Reserve Bank of the interim orders having been made. The respective orders were duly served on the Railway Company and the Manager of the Reserve Bank on 80th August 1943. 7. In the meantime on 28th August 1943 the plaintiff Bank received a telegram from T.R.V. Sarma as follows: Your telegram Cheque 26272 As, 5 May collect and credit my account if too late for collection as time expired please return cheque to M.V.V. Rao Esq., 14A Heysham Raod Elgin Road P.O. Calcutta. 8. The 3 months' tenure of the cheque expired on 29th August 1943 which was a Sunday. 9. On 31st August 1943 the plaintiff Bank wrote a letter to T.R.V. Sarma acknowledging receipt of his telegram and informing him of the interim orders and the expiry of the currency of the cheque and stating that until the defendant Rao repaid the judgment-debt to the plaintiff Bank the latter were retaining the cheque. 10. The notice under O. 21, R. 22(1)(a) was served on the defendant Rao personally. He did not appear to show cause and accordingly on 9th September 1943 an order was made directing the interim attachments to continue until the further orders of the Court. 11. 10. The notice under O. 21, R. 22(1)(a) was served on the defendant Rao personally. He did not appear to show cause and accordingly on 9th September 1943 an order was made directing the interim attachments to continue until the further orders of the Court. 11. On 30th November 1943, on the petition of the plaintiff Bank, the Master made an order for the issue of a garnishee notice to the Railway Company directing the latter to pay to the Sheriff the sum of Rs. 26,272-5-0 represented by that cheque on Reserve Bank and attached in their hands by order dated 27th August 1943 or otherwise to appear before the Judge and show cause to the contrary. The notice having been issued and duly served on the railway company the latter have appeared to show cause and filed an affidavit affirmed by Captain Murty to which I have referred. The plaintiff Bank has in reply filed an affidavit affirmed by Mr. N.L. Puri. 12. The principal questions argued before me are: (1) Whether the sum of Rs. 26,272-5-0 which became payable to the defendant Rao on his retirement from service and in payment whereof the railway company issued and delivered to him a cheque for that amount on the Reserve Bank can be attached in execution of the decree passed in this suit? (2) If yea, whether the mode of attachment adopted by the plaintiff Bank is such as would entitle them to initiate and maintain these garnishee proceedings? 13. Re (1): Section 60(1), cl. (k), Civil P.C. exempts from liability to attachment all compulsory deposits and other sums in or derived from any fund to which the Provident Funds Act, 1925 for the time being applies in so far as they are declared by the said Act, not to be liable to attachment. 14. Section 3(1), Provident Funds Act, 1925, provides that a compulsory deposit in any Government or Railway Provident Fund shall not be liable to attachment under any decree or order of any civil, revenue or criminal Court in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the subscriber. 15. A compulsory deposit is defined in S. 2, cl. 14. Section 3(1), Provident Funds Act, 1925, provides that a compulsory deposit in any Government or Railway Provident Fund shall not be liable to attachment under any decree or order of any civil, revenue or criminal Court in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the subscriber. 15. A compulsory deposit is defined in S. 2, cl. (a), Provident Funds Act, 1926 as follows: 'Compulsory deposit' means a subscription to, or deposit in, a provident fund which, under the rules of the fund, is not, until the happening of some specified contingency, repayable on demand otherwise than for the purpose of the payment of premia in respect of a policy of life insurance (or the payment of subscriptions or premia in respect of a family pension fund), and includes any contribution......and any interest or increment which has accrued under the rules of the fund on any such subscription, deposit or contribution, and also any such subscription, deposit, contribution, interest or increment remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor after the happening of any such contingency. 16. Turning to the Rules of the Bengal Nagpur Provident Fund, it will be seen that R. 6(g) and the first part of R. 22 simply reproduce S. 2, cl. (a) and S. 3(1) of the Act. 17. Mr. Choudhuri contends that the sum of Rs. 26,272-5-0 is "compulsory deposit" within the meaning of the above sections. This money has not yet reached the hands of the subscriber the defendant Rao and therefore it still retains the character of "a compulsory deposit" and cannot be taken in execution. In support of his contention Mr. Choudhuri relies on the following note at p. 246 of Edn. 11 of Sir Dinahaw Mulla's Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure: A deposit which, when it was made, was a 'compulsory deposit' continues to retain that character so long as it remains in the hands of the railway company. It does not lose that character though the employee may have ceased to be in the service of the company by retirement, resignation or dismissal, and though be may have become entitled in that event to be paid the amount due to his credit in the Provident Fund. It does not lose that character though the employee may have ceased to be in the service of the company by retirement, resignation or dismissal, and though be may have become entitled in that event to be paid the amount due to his credit in the Provident Fund. But once it is paid out by the company, on the happening of any of the above events, it loses the character of 'compulsory deposit' and it may be attached in the hands of the party to whom it has been paid. Indeed Mr. Choudhuri is even prepared to go so far as to contend that even after payment out to the subscriber the money retains its character as "compulsory deposit" and is exempt from liability to attachment. The money, however, not having been paid he does not consider it necessary for him to go to that length. 18. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the plaintiff Bank, however, points out that all the cases cited in foot-note (b) at p. 246 of Sir Dinshaw Mulla's book on which his note quoted above is based, except the case of Walchand Molaji Marwadi Vs. Charles A. Williams, AIR 1935 Bom 396 , were decided under the Provident Funds Act, 1897, which was then in force. He contends that the Provident Funds Act, 1925, has changed the law by introducing the words "until the happening of some specified contingency" in the earlier part of the definition of "compulsory deposit" in cl. (a) of S. 2 and by enacting a new section, namely, S. 4 of the present Act. In support of his contention the learned Advocate-General relies on the observations of Rangnekar J. in Walchand Molaji Marwadi Vs. Charles A. Williams, AIR 1935 Bom 396 . 19. To appreciate the rival arguments and the judicial decisions on which they are based, it is necessary first to refer to the provisions of the Act of 1897 and then to refer to the judicial decisions thereon. 20. Section 4 of that Act protected compulsory deposits in any Government or Railway Provident Fund from liability to attachment. Section 3(1) of the present Act corresponds to S. 4 of the old Act. 21. 20. Section 4 of that Act protected compulsory deposits in any Government or Railway Provident Fund from liability to attachment. Section 3(1) of the present Act corresponds to S. 4 of the old Act. 21. "Compulsory deposit" was defined by S. 2(4) of the old Act as follows: (4) 'Compulsory deposit' means a subscription or deposit which is not repayable on the demand or at the option, of the subscriber or depositor, and includes any contribution which may have been credited in respect of, and any interest or increment which may have accrued on, such subscription or deposit under the rules of the fund. 22. In Veerchand v. B.B. & C.I. Railway Company, (1904) 29 Bom. 259 (261) : (6 Bom. L.R. 921) the money had become payable but was still standing to the credit of the subscriber in the fund and it was attached in the hands of the railway company. Jenkins C.J., at pp. 262-263 observed as follows: The deposit, when it was made, was not repayable on demand and therefore at that time was 'a compulsory deposit' and having once acquired that character with the attendant consequences, it continued (in my opinion) to retain it. 23. In Hindhy v. Joynarain Marwari, (1919) 46 Cal. 962 : ( AIR 1920 Cal. 305), the subscriber had died without leaving a widow or children and the Providend Fund money was in the hands of the institution. At pp. 967-968 Rankin J. (as he then was) with his usual clarity of reasoning and vigour of expression analysed the purpose and intention of the Provident Funds Act. "Its intention" said the learned Judge, is that such people shall in case of necessity be able to afford a passage home to Europe, in case of retirement have something to live on, in case of death have something to leave. then his Lordship referred to the natural temptation of poor and improvident people to run into debts and the danger of the fund being wasted in maintaining a standing army of attorneys and attorneys' clerks for attending to notices of attachment from all Courts in India and finally concluded by saying: Whether the employee is in the service or out of service, whether he be alive or dead, his share is un-attachable in the hands of the institution. This is the very basis of the scheme. 24. This is the very basis of the scheme. 24. In The Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. Raj Kumar Mukherjee and Others, AIR 1923 Cal 585 the employee had retired but the money was standing to his credit in the fund. It was contended that the deposits, though they were compulsory deposits when they were made and so long as the subscriber continued in railway service, ceased to be compulsory deposits when he retired. The argument was based on the definition in S. 2(4) of the Act of 1897 and on R. 22 of the Rules contained in the State Railway Open Line Code, vol. II, App. 1 which is on the same lines as R. 18, Bengal Nagpur Railway Provident Fund Rules. It was argued that under those provisions the deposits became repayable on demand when the subscriber had left the service and were no longer "not repayable on demand" and, therefore, automatically ceased to be compulsory deposits. In repelling this contention Richardson J. at pp. 351-352 observed as follows: In my opinion that is a mistaken construction of the statutory definition. The definition speaks with reference to some fund in which the deposit is made, and, as it seems to me, it crystallises the nature of the deposit at the time at which it is made. A compulsory deposit is a deposit which goes into the fund as a compulsory deposit and is at that date received and classified as such. It is conceivable that the rules of a fund might subject the general right of withdrawal conferred by such a rule as R. 22 to restriction or condition so that the whole amount at a depositor's credit might never become freely payable or repayable on his demand. But quite apart from that, a depositor presumably continues to make compulsory deposits till he dies in service or retires and I can see no ground for a different classification of such deposits, or a different description being applied to them, after his death or retirement. In other words, as long as the deposits subsist in the fund, so long, at any rate, both as matter of legal construction and in the common and ordinary way of speaking, they are properly and correctly described as compulsory deposits. If that be so, under S. 4 of the Act, they are not liable to attachment. In other words, as long as the deposits subsist in the fund, so long, at any rate, both as matter of legal construction and in the common and ordinary way of speaking, they are properly and correctly described as compulsory deposits. If that be so, under S. 4 of the Act, they are not liable to attachment. At page 355, B.B. Ghose J., expressed the same views in the words following: It stems to me that the money in deposit is included within the definition of 'compulsory deposit' in the Act. The deposit was not repayable on the demand or option of the subscriber, but was payable only under certain circumstances. In my opinion, it cannot be said that the deposit was payable on demand by reason of the fact that it became payable under the rules on one of the events happening afterwards, and that the character of the deposit, that it was not repayable on demand remains unaltered. Hence it is not excluded from the definition of 'compulsory deposit'. The money, therefore, is not liable to attachment under the provisions of S. 4(1), Provident Funds Act, In this view I should follow the decision of Jenkins C.J. in Veerchand v. B.B. & C.I. Ry. Co., (29 Bom. 259 : 6 Bom. L.R. 921) and I need not refer further to the rules or to the policy of the Act on which arguments were addressed to us. 25. The above three decisions make it perfectly clear that for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the expression "compulsory deposit" in the old Act one had to look back to the crucial time when the subscription or deposit was made. The words "which is not repayable on demand" were interpreted as indicating the necessary attribute or limitation of the subscription or deposit at the time it was made. If the attribute or limitation of not being repayable on demand was attached to the subscription or deposit at that point of time, the subscription or deposit became "compulsory deposit" within the meaning of the definition. The subscription or deposit was thus indelibly impressed with the character of "compulsory deposit" and came within the protection of S. 4 of the old Act. The subscription or deposit was thus indelibly impressed with the character of "compulsory deposit" and came within the protection of S. 4 of the old Act. This interpretation was consonant with the general object and purpose of the Act which were, as pointed out by Rankin J., that the employee should have in case of retirement something to live on and in case of death something to leave. In each of the above three cases the money had become payable but was still standing to the credit of the subscriber in the fund and it was held that the money was protected from attachment. In none of them was it necessary for the Court to decide whether this protection would extend even alter the money had been paid out to the subscriber. 26. In AIR 1927 22 (Oudh) it was, however, held that a "compulsory deposit" as defined in the Act of 1897 was only a deposit so long as it remained in the fund and not after it had been paid over to the person to whose credit it had thitherto stood. To the like effect are the decisions in M. Ranganayaki Ammal Vs. The Official Assignee of Madras and Another, AIR 1931 Mad 797 and Rukmini Kumar Bhattacharjee v. The Assam Bengal Loan Co. Ltd., (1936) 40 C.W.N. 1406. 27. It was held in the three earlier cases that the character of the money had to be ascertained at the date when the subscription or deposit was made, and the words "which is not repayable on demand" had to be read as referring to that point of time. The fact that the money had subsequently become payable to the subscriber did not alter or affect its original attribute or limitation of not being repayable on demand at the time the subscription or deposit was made. If the construction put upon the definition of "compulsory deposit" in the old Act was correct, as I respectfully agree it was, and if the object and purpose of the Act required that the immunity from attachment should be extended to the money after it became payable on demand one may argue that there could be no logical basis for limiting this protection only upto the time the money would stand to the credit of the subscriber or depositor in the fund. The necessity for protection was equally, if not more, urgent when the money reached the hands of the subscriber or depositor. To give protection to the money after it had become due but to limit such protection to the time it stood to the credit of the subscriber or depositor in the fund and to withhold such protection as soon as it was paid out to him would, one may reasonably point out, be to encourage fraud or improvidence on the part of the retired employee by compelling him, after he had received the money, to contrive dubious means for concealing the same from his creditors or to dissipate the same as quickly as possible before the creditors came down upon him and thereby frustrate the very object and purpose of the Act. On the construction put upon the definition of "compulsory deposit" in the old Act by the first 3 cases I have mentioned and having regard to the object and purpose of the Act the three later decisions I have just referred to would seem to be somewhat illogical. Be that as it may, the old Act was, by judicial decisions, interpreted to give protection to the provident fund money only upto the time it stood to the credit of the subscriber or depositor in the Fund and to withhold such protection as soon as the money went out of the Fund. 28. It is argued by the learned Advocate-General that the Provident Funds Act 1925 has brought about a fundamental change in the law. The words "until the happening of some specified contingency" in the earlier part of the new definition of "compulsory deposit" in S. 2, cl. (a) indicate, according to him, that upon or after the happening of the specified contingency the subscription or deposit sheds the character of compulsory deposit and becomes a debt due to the subscriber and automatically becomes liable to attachment in execution of a decree against the subscriber. This leads me to consider the judicial decisions on the new Act. 29. In Secy. of State Vs. Har Charan Das and Another the subscriber had retired but the money was still lying to the credit of the subscriber in the fund. Kendall J. after referring to Veerchand v. B.B. & C.I. Ry. Co., (1904) 29 Bom. 259 : (6 Bom. L.R. 921), Hindley v. Joynarain Marwari, (1919) 46 Cal. 29. In Secy. of State Vs. Har Charan Das and Another the subscriber had retired but the money was still lying to the credit of the subscriber in the fund. Kendall J. after referring to Veerchand v. B.B. & C.I. Ry. Co., (1904) 29 Bom. 259 : (6 Bom. L.R. 921), Hindley v. Joynarain Marwari, (1919) 46 Cal. 962 : (A.I.R. 1920 Cal. 305) and The Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. Raj Kumar Mukherjee and Others, AIR 1923 Cal 585 observed as follows: But it may be said here that these three decisions are by no means without value in the present case, for they show that the sanctity attached by the Act to compulsory deposits as denned in the Act does not cease with the retirement of the contributor, or even at his death. The decisions relate to the period previous to 1925, which is the year of the current Act. But this is not a matter of any importance, as there has been no change in the Act of 1925 which affects any of the considerations in the present case. 30. The learned Judge then proceeded to deal with a special contention raised in that case based on R. 10 of the Rules regulating the General Provident Fund, which is not material for our purpose. This decision is an authority for the proposition that even under the present Act the protection is extended to the money after it becomes payable on the happening of the specified contingency and while it is still credited in the fund. It was not concerned with the question whether the protection extended to a period after the money had been paid out. This case does not take the matter any further than the three earliest cases I have mentioned. I refer to this case only to show that in the opinion of Kendall J. the new Act has brought about no change in the law in this respect and that under the new Act, as under the old, the money does not cease to be "compulsory deposit" immediately upon the happening of the specified contingency. In other words the addition of the words "until the happening of some specified contingency" has not altered the law as suggested by the learned Advocate-General. 31. The observations of Rangnekar, J., in Walchand Molaji Marwadi Vs. In other words the addition of the words "until the happening of some specified contingency" has not altered the law as suggested by the learned Advocate-General. 31. The observations of Rangnekar, J., in Walchand Molaji Marwadi Vs. Charles A. Williams, AIR 1935 Bom 396 has been relied on by the learned Advocate-General in support of his contention. It is necessary, therefore, to examine that case with some care. There the subscriber to the Provident Fund had retired and the money had been paid out to him in September 1931. Previous to that he had been adjudicated as insolvent. It was contended that under S. 28(4), Provincial Insolvency Act this money, as soon as it was received by him, vested in the receiver in insolvency. This contention was met by the argument that under S. 28(5) of the same Act the property of the insolvent did not include any property which was exempted by the CPC 1908 from liability to attachment in execution of a decree. Reference was then made to S. 60(1), cl. (k), Civil P.C., and from that to the Provident Funds Act. Rangnekar J. quoted with approval the note of Sir Dinshaw Mulla which I have hereinbefore set out in extenso and then proceeded as follows: This, then, would be the position under the old Act. But the position now is altered by reason of the new Act, Provident Funds Act, XIX of 1925. The first important alteration, which the Legislature has made, is in the definition of the expression 'compulsory deposit', which occurs in cl. (k) of S. 60(1), Civil P.C. Then his Lordship set out the definition of "compulsory deposit" in the old Act and that in the new Act and pointed out that the important words to notice were "until the happening of some specified contingency." Then the learned Judge referred to S. 4of the new Act and pointed out that under the old Act no subscriber was entitled to payment during his life time and concluded as follows: Under the present Act, therefore, it is clear that, on the happening of the contingency provided for in the rules, the amount becomes payable to the subscriber even during his life time. And that being so, it is difficult to see on what principle it can be said that the sum which is paid to the subscriber is not his property and still continues to retain its character of a compulsory deposit for all time. The learned Judge then expressed his disapproval of the case of Walchand Molaji Marwadi Vs. Charles A. Williams, AIR 1935 Bom 396 and referred to and approved the decisions in AIR 1927 22 (Oudh) and Ranganayaki v. Official Assignee, AIR 1931 Mad. 797 : (134 I.C. 179) to which I have referred. 32. The case of Raja Kirtyanand Singh Bahadur and Others Vs. Saileswar Sen, AIR 1937 Patna 22 was also a decision on the new Act. There the money was still in the Fund and it was held that it was not attachable in execution. The learned Judges expressly left open (and-Ed.) did not decide the question whether the immunity from attachment lasts only as long as the money is in the Fund and comes to an end when it reaches the hands of the depositor. 33. The last case on the new Act that has been brought to my notice is that of Baramdeo Pandey v. Mrs. Fay Smith, (1940) 44 C.W.N. 637. In that case there was first an application for the appointment of a receiver which was granted by Sen J., as will appear reported at p. 636 of the same volume. The money was paid to the receiver. Then there was a decree in the suit and then in execution of that decree the plaintiff prayed for a charging order on the funds in the hands of the receiver and for the appointment of the receiver as receiver in execution. McNair J. at p. 639 observed as follows: The answer is that this is not a compulsory deposit within the meaning of S. 3, Provident Funds Act, because a compulsory deposit continues to retain that character only so long as it remains in the hands of the provident fund trustees. Once it is paid out by the company, it loses the character of compulsory deposit and may be attached in the hands of the party to whom it has been paid. 34. Once it is paid out by the company, it loses the character of compulsory deposit and may be attached in the hands of the party to whom it has been paid. 34. It will be noticed that in two out of the four cases decided on the new Act, namely, in the first and third cases the money became payable but was in the hands of the Fund and yet it was held that it was not liable to attachment. This shows that there was no change, as regards this period, in the new Act as contended for by the learned Advocate-General. Indeed Kendall, J. in the first case expressly said that no change had been made by the new Act. In the second and fourth cases the money had gone out of the fund. It is only Rangnekar J. who said in the second case that the new Act has changed the law. 35. I confess I find it difficult to appreciate the reasoning adopted by Rangnekar J. If the words "which is not repayable on demand" occurring in the definition section of the old Act had to be read as referring to the point of time when the subscription or deposit was made I cannot see why the words "which is not, until the happening of some specified contingency, repayable on demand" in the new Act should not be read with reference to the point of time when the subscription or deposit is made. In my opinion the language of both the definitions, old and new, should be construed in the same way. The crucial time is the time of payment of the subscription or deposit, for it is then that the money acquires the character of compulsory deposit. In this view of the matter under the first part of the definition in the new Act "compulsory deposit" means subscription or deposit which, when made, was not, until happening of some specified contingency, repayable on demand and no change has been brought about by this part of the definition in the new Act. 36. Rangnekar J. approved of the decisions in Gauri Shankar v. R.J. DeCruz (1925) 1 Luck. 313 : (A.I.R. 1927 Oudh 22) and M. Ranganayaki Ammal Vs. 36. Rangnekar J. approved of the decisions in Gauri Shankar v. R.J. DeCruz (1925) 1 Luck. 313 : (A.I.R. 1927 Oudh 22) and M. Ranganayaki Ammal Vs. The Official Assignee of Madras and Another, AIR 1931 Mad 797 which were decided on the old Act and where it was held that "compulsory deposits" ceased to have that character as soon as the money was paid out. If those decisions were correct on a proper construction of the terms of the old Act, then also the new Act has not brought about any change in that respect. 37. Rangnekar J. appears to me to have overlooked the last clause in the definition in the new Act. In the new definition, as in the old, the term "compulsory deposit" is defined as meaning certain things and including certain other things. The first is the primary and natural meaning and that meaning is extended so as to include something which is outside the primary meaning. The last thing included in the term by the new definition is: and also any such subscription, deposit, contribution, interest or increment remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor after the happening of any such contingency. By this clause, even after the happening of the specified contingency, such subscription etc. retain the character of "compulsory deposit." This part of the definition makes the reasoning of Rangnekar J, on which the learned Advocate General founds his arguments, untenable and, if I may say so with respect, unsound. This part of the definition read with S. 3(1) makes it quite clear that the immunity from attachment extends even after the happening of the specified contingency and upto the time it remains to the credit of the subscriber. This part of the definition read with S. 3(1) makes it quite clear that the immunity from attachment extends even after the happening of the specified contingency and upto the time it remains to the credit of the subscriber. It must, therefore, follow that when the subscription or deposit ceases to remain to the credit of the subscriber or depositor it is no longer a compulsory deposit, for, were it intended that the money which was "compulsory deposit" when it was deposited, would be compulsory deposit for all time to come, it would be redundant to include within this definition "such subscription etc., remaining to the credit of the subscriber after the happening of any such contingency." The words "remaining to the credit of such subscriber or depositor" limit the extended protection up to the time it remains to the credit of the subscriber and shows that the protection does not extend beyond that period i.e., when the money is paid out. Whether this result is desirable or not, whether it stultifies the basic purpose and object of the Act so clearly laid down by Rankin J., the Court can only interpret the intention of the legislature as it appears from the language used in the new Act. It is for the legislature to consider whether the protection given to the dependants of a deceased subscriber under S. 3(2) of the Act should also be extended to the subscriber himself during his lifetime and whether S. 3(1) should be amended. 38. If the three later decisions on the old Act where it was held that the immunity ceased as soon as the money was paid out were correct then the new Act obviously has made no change. If, on the other hand, those decisions were incorrect on a true interpretation of the old Act, the new Act has altered the law only in this respect and given effect to those decisions. In my opinion the actual decisions in all the four cases decided on the new Act can be supported on the express language of the new Act although the reasoning of Rangnekar J. in the second case does not appear to me to be correct. In my opinion the new Act has not made any change as suggested by Rangnekar J. The new Act has adopted the interpretation put by the Courts on the old Act in this respect. In my opinion the new Act has not made any change as suggested by Rangnekar J. The new Act has adopted the interpretation put by the Courts on the old Act in this respect. 39. The question then remains whether, in the circumstances of this case, the sum of Rs. 26272-5-0 in payment of which the Railway Company had issued and delivered to the defendant Rao the cheque for that amount on the Reserve Bank is still to be regarded as "compulsory deposit" or whether it has ceased to have that character and has become liable to attachment. 40. Turning to the Bengal Nagpur Railway Provident Fund Rules I find a group of rules in chap X headed 'Closed Accounts.' Rules 32 and 33 are as follows: Rule 32. As soon as possible after a Member leaves the service of the Company, or in the case of a deceased Member, after the person entitled to receive the Provident Fund money has been ascertained, the account shall be closed and a notice in writing shall be given to the party concerned specifying the balance at the credit of the account and tendering payment thereof. No interest shall accrue, on any amount, after the date of tender of payment or after the end of the sixth month after the month, in which the amount becomes payable, whichever is earlier. Rule 33. On a Member ceasing to be in the service of the company, his account shall be closed and the same will be removed from the Provident Fund Ledger to a separate list. The balance on such accounts closed during the year will not be removed from the books of the Railway but will, in the accounts for March, be transferred to "Deposits." Any item so transferred not exceeding one rupee remaining unclaimed by the 31st March of the subsequent year and all items remaining unclaimed by the 31st March of the 3rd succeeding year will be credited to Revenue. Any amounts so dealt with which are subsequently paid shall be charged to Revenue and the fact of payment noted in the list of 'Closed Accounts'. There is nothing in the affidavits before me, one way or the other, as to whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been followed. Any amounts so dealt with which are subsequently paid shall be charged to Revenue and the fact of payment noted in the list of 'Closed Accounts'. There is nothing in the affidavits before me, one way or the other, as to whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been followed. There is, however, a presumption of regularity and I am entitled to presume that in this case the account of the defendant Rao in the Provident Fund has been closed and the same has been removed from the Provident Fund Ledger to the separate list. Further even if the amount was not bodily removed from the Provident Fund Ledger yet when the cheque was issued in payment of the amount a corresponding debit entry must have been made in the Provident Fund Ledger so as to square up the account. In either view of the matter, the money is no longer "remaining to the credit of the subscriber." The words "remaining to the credit of the subscriber" in the last clause of the definition in the new Act necessarily refers to the account in the Provident Fund and must mean "remaining to the credit of the subscriber in the Provident Fund account." In some of the earlier cases to which I have referred the expression used is that the immunity lasts as long as the money is "in the fund," or "in the hands of the institution" or "in the hands of the Company" or "as long as it does not reach the hands of the subscribers." In view of the words "remaining to the credit of the subscriber" the last two expressions appear to be a bit wide and slightly inaccurate. In my opinion the immunity ceases as soon as the money ceases to stand credited in the Provident Fund account i.e. goes out of Fund, and it is immaterial whether the money has actually reached the subscriber or is otherwise in the hands of the company. In my opinion, according to the Rules and in the events that have happened and particularly as the defendant Rao has taken the cheque and endorsed it over, the sum of Rs. In my opinion, according to the Rules and in the events that have happened and particularly as the defendant Rao has taken the cheque and endorsed it over, the sum of Rs. 26272-6-0 which is not now "remaining to the credit of the subscriber" in the Provident Fund Ledger is no longer "compulsory deposit" within the meaning of the Provident Funds Act 1925 and is therefore liable to be attached in execution. 41. Re (2): I now proceed to consider the second point discussed before me. Under R. 1 of Ch. XVIII of the Rules of this Court garnishee proceedings can be initiated only when any debt (not secured by a negotiable instrument) or any moveable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, or any negotiable instrument has been attached under O. 21, R. 46 or R. 51 of the Code, In this case, the attachment, so far as the Reserve Bank is concerned, was under O. 21, R. 52 and so far as the Railway Company is concerned was under O. 21, R. 46. Turning to O. 21, R. 46, I and that that rule deals with and lays down the mode of attachment of three kinds of properties, namely: (a) a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument, (b) a share in a capital of a Corporation, (c) other moveable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, except property deposited in, or in the custody of any Court. Reading the order of attachment made in this case it is quite clear to me that this money has been treated as a debt not secured by negotiable instrument. The cheque itself has not been actually seized under O. 21, R. 51 although in column 10 of the tabular statement there was a prayer for attachment of the cheque which was lying with the Reserve Bank. The question then is: is the sum of Rs. 26272-5-0, in payment of which the cheque was issued, "a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument?" 42. I have held that as soon as the sum of Rs. 26272/5/- which remained to the credit of the defendant Rao in the Provident Fund Ledger had been removed from that ledger to the separate list mentioned in R. 33 or as soon as the Provident Fund account of the defendant Rao had been squared up on payment of the sum of Rs. 26272/5/- which remained to the credit of the defendant Rao in the Provident Fund Ledger had been removed from that ledger to the separate list mentioned in R. 33 or as soon as the Provident Fund account of the defendant Rao had been squared up on payment of the sum of Rs. 26272/5/- by the cheque or when the defendant had accepted the cheque and exercised ownership by endorsing the same, it ceased to be "compulsory deposit." When the cheque was issued in payment of the debt either the debt was extinguished or it remained. If the debt was extinguished and was replaced by the cheque, then the only proper mode of attachment would be by actual seizure of the cheque under O. 21, R. 51. If, on the other hand, the debt was subsisting on the ground that the cheque, which was only a conditional payment, had not been cashed, then clearly the debt was secured by that cheque and attachment under O. 21, R. 46 was not a proper mode of attachment at all but the cheque should have been actually seized under O. 21, R. 51. When a debt is secured by a negotiable instrument you cannot attach the debt only, leaving the cheque in circulation and open to negotiation from hand to hand and thereby subject the debtor to a future claim on that cheque by a bona fide holder for value. In this case the cheque was, during its currency, endorsed by the defendant Rao to T.R.V. Sarma. Sarma is not a party to these proceedings. In my judgment the attachment under O. 21, R. 46 was not valid and effective and therefore the plaintiff Bank is not entitled to initiate or maintain these garnishee proceedings. The fact that the cheque has now become stale does not, in my opinion, validate or otherwise revive the previous invalid attachment. 43. A further point was taken by Mr. Chaudhuri that under R. 3 of the Bengal Nagpur Railway Provident Fund Rules the Fund is vested in the Government and therefore the Railway Company cannot be called upon to bring any money into Court. The garnishee proceedings according to him, should have been taken against the Government and not against the Railway Company. Chaudhuri that under R. 3 of the Bengal Nagpur Railway Provident Fund Rules the Fund is vested in the Government and therefore the Railway Company cannot be called upon to bring any money into Court. The garnishee proceedings according to him, should have been taken against the Government and not against the Railway Company. I have pointed out that under Rules 32 and 33 the money has been removed from the Provident Fund Ledger i.e., gone out of the fund and the Railway Company has taken upon itself the obligation to pay and has issued a cheque for payment. In this view of the matter I do not think there is any substance in this point. 44. In view of my decision on question (2) discussed above the garnishee notice must stand discharged with costs. The attachment should be discharged against the Railway Company.