JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This Rule is directed against an order of the learned District Judge of Hooghly dated the 19th February, 1944, by which he purported to frame what he describes as preliminary issues. The object of framing these issues is stated to be that unless there is a clear decision in respect of them, the Court and the parties will not be fully aware of what actually calls for decision, what evidence may be necessary and so forth. The matter arises out of an application which was made by the Petitioner in the Court below on the 27th June, 1942, for an alteration of a scheme in connection with the Tarakeswar Endowment. This endowment was the subject-matter of a suit under sec. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was finally disposed of as regards one part of the prayers made therein, by the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Satish Chandra Giri v. Dharanidhar Singha Ray L. R. 67 I. A. 32 (1939). There was no question before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee at that stage relating to the scheme. The scheme had been previously framed by the District Judge and subsequently approved with certain modifications by this Court by its judgment dated the 24th August, 1934. There was no appeal taken to the Judicial Committee against this decision settling the scheme. 2. The scheme was in several clauses one of which, cl. (17), provided that "on the occasion of any doubt, difficulty or disagreement in regard to any work connected with the shrine or its property, it will be competent to the Mohunt or to the Committee to apply to the District Judge in this suit for his directions." The following clause laid down that if in future it was found necessary to make any alteration in the scheme, it would be competent for the District Judge to do the same upon an application in this suit by the Mohunt or the Committee. Either of these provisions has been availed of by the Mohunt, who is the present Petitioner before us. Under cl. (17) he applied for a reference to the District Judge for the purpose of elucidation of certain points of difficulty which according to him had arisen in the course of the administration of the estate. Either of these provisions has been availed of by the Mohunt, who is the present Petitioner before us. Under cl. (17) he applied for a reference to the District Judge for the purpose of elucidation of certain points of difficulty which according to him had arisen in the course of the administration of the estate. The present application for an alteration of the scheme was made by him in pursuance of cl. (18). The reference under cl. (17) was disposed of by a judgment of this Court delivered by Mitter and Khundkar, JJ., and reported in the case of Srijib Nyayatirtha, Secretary v. Sreemat Dandy Swami Jagannath Asram, Mahant Maharaj of Tarakeswar 73 C. L.J. 532 (1941). There can be no doubt that the scheme as originally framed did contain various points of difficulty which required clearing up. The Petitioner is apparently of opinion that the clarification effected by the judgment of Mitter and Khundkar, JJ., is not sufficient, that it is therefore, necessary to proceed with the application for alteration of the scheme. 3. The alterations he asks for fall into two parts. In the first place, and that seems to be primary relief he seeks, the Mohunt desires that the Committee of management should be abolished altogether. It is his case that duality of control between the Committee on the one hand and the Mohunt on the other has not been conducive to the like this. This proceeding is to be confined solely to the question whether the scheme can or ought to be amended. So far as the allgeations against members of the Committee are concerned, evidence on these matters will be relevant only to the extent to which it bears on the question of the amendments asked for. As to what evidence will be allowed or will not be allowed, cannot be anticipated or decided at this stage, or under cover of framing of issues. That is a matter which must be left to the trying Judge to determine if and when evidence is offered. The Indian Evidence Act contains sufficient provisions for the purpose of guarding against the introduction of useless or irrelevant evidence. In dealing with this application the learned Judge will doubtless bear in mind the provisions of sec. That is a matter which must be left to the trying Judge to determine if and when evidence is offered. The Indian Evidence Act contains sufficient provisions for the purpose of guarding against the introduction of useless or irrelevant evidence. In dealing with this application the learned Judge will doubtless bear in mind the provisions of sec. 136 of the Evidence Act which expressly provides that "when either party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the Judge may ask the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant; and the Judge shall admit the evidence if he thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant and not otherwise ". As we have said, the question of relevancy cannot be determined at the present stage before the issues have been framed, nor can the issues be famed merely for the purpose of determining in advance what evidence may or will have to given or allowed. The learned Judge will admit the evidence in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. If he thinks that the actual working of the scheme is a matter relevant to the issues in the case, he will admit evidence of such working, and he will admit such evidence only in so far as it is necessary in order to support or repudiate the case for an alteration of the scheme. 4. At one stage of the arguments it was suggested on behalf of the opposite parties that we should exercise the powers given to the Court by Or. 6, r. 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or direct the Court below to exercise such powers, in order to strike out various portions from the petition as unnecessary or scandalous pleading or as pleading tending to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the case. It was afterwards pointed out that an application under this provision had not yet been made by the opposite parties, and that the question of striking out pleadings might, therefore, be taken up, if and when such an application was made. We do not propose to say anything which will hamper the discretion of the learned Judge in dealing with such an application, if it is made to him. We do not propose to say anything which will hamper the discretion of the learned Judge in dealing with such an application, if it is made to him. All that we should like to impress upon him is that he should try to avoid any unnecessary delay in the disposal of the case by allowing all sorts of applications to be presented to him which on the plea of shortening the proceedings might in the long run end in prolonging them. The mere fact that unnecessary matters are included in the pleading need not hamper the trial of the suit, provided the learned Judge strictly enforces the provisions of the Evidence Act regarding the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. The remedy against the introduction of irrelevant or unnecessary matters in the pleadings may not unoften be fully provided by a suitable order for costs. We need not, however, say anything further on this point at this stage. 5. So far as the present order is concerned we have no doubt that it must be set aside as being wholly misconceived, and we direct that the learned Judge should take up the question of framing the issues at once, and he should frame the whole set of issues at the same time. As to whether he will take them up all for trial at the same time, or he will take up what may be regarded as preliminary or decisive issues first, is a matter which it will be entirely for him to decide. We deem it necessary only to point out that there can and ought to be no issues which really raise the question of relevancy of evidence. The issues must be confined to the real questions in controversy. The me fact that certain allegations are made on the one side and denied on the other do not make them " material" for the purpose of the framing of issues. As already indicated, there is no doubt whatsoever as to what are the scope and object of the present application. The Petitioner's case is that actual exprience of the working of the scheme has disclosed certain defects. He wants those defects to be removed. As already indicated, there is no doubt whatsoever as to what are the scope and object of the present application. The Petitioner's case is that actual exprience of the working of the scheme has disclosed certain defects. He wants those defects to be removed. A radical remedy which he suggests is that the Committee should be abolished altogether As to whether evidence ought to be given regarding the conduct of parties in connection with the working of the scheme, is not a matter to be considered at the stage of framing issues. We think we have said enough to indicate the proper lines on which the learned Judge should proceed. With these observations, therefore, we make the Rule absolute, set aside the order made by the learned Judge and direct him to proceed according to law in the light of the observations we have made. 6. In this connection there is one other point which we desire to refer to, that is, the question of costs. There can be no doubt that the present application in so far as it seeks an alteration of the scheme cannot be summarily dismissed as frivolous or vexatious. As to whether the Petitioner can make out his case in respect of all or any of the alterations he has asked for, is another matter, but there can be no doubt that on the face of it is a bona fide application. It is also clear that the objections which have been raised on the other side cannot likewise be brushed aside as worthy of no consideration. None of the parties has any direct personal interest in the question which is being agitated between them. Both sides claim to be equally interested in the proper and efficient administration of the endowment. That being so, so far as the proceedings both in this Court and in the Court below have gone on up to this stage in connection with the present application, we see no reason why the parties should not be paid their costs out of the estate. We asked the learned Advocates if they were willing to name any definite sum for which an order might be made on account of their costs so far. That sum has not been named to us. We asked the learned Advocates if they were willing to name any definite sum for which an order might be made on account of their costs so far. That sum has not been named to us. We desire that the learned Judge should deal with the matter and make a suitable order for costs out of the estate in favour of the parties concerned, but without re-opening any orders already made. 7. So far as the present Rule is concerned, we direct that the Petitioner be paid a sum of Rs. 340 (Rupees three hundred and forty only) on account of costs, and that a similar sum be paid to Mr. Bankim Chandra Mukherjee's clients who are appearing as opposite parties. Mr. Ramaprosad Mukherjee who is appearing in person does not claim any costs himself. The Mohunt will make these payments out of the funds in his hands. The fact that this payment is not covered by any specific sanction of the Committee or by any specific provision in the current year's budget will not stand in the way of such payment being made. The payment for Mr. Bankim Chandra Mukherjee's clients may be made by the Mohunt to the Secretary who will give a receipt on their behalf. The fact of the payments should be reported to the Committee. Let the record be sent down without delay. 8. We desire to add that the learned Judge will make orders for payment of costs out of the estate in future proceedings arising out of this application for amendment of the Scheme in accordance with the principles laid down above. He will deal with each case on its merits. Latifur Rahman, J. I agree.