JUDGMENT Gentle, J. - By written contract No. 1005 dated 6th June 1939, the defendant firm agreed to sell and the plaintiffs to buy 6 cases of superfine cloth, shipment August/September 1939 upon the terms stated in the contract, the factum of which is not in dispute. The relevant terms are set out later when their meaning and effect will be discussed. 2. Prior to making this contract the defendant firm agreed with the Societa Commissionaria di Exportazione e di Importazione (hereinafter called "the Societa") to supply 150 cases of the same goods, shipment July/August/September 1939; the terms of the defendants' contract with the Societa are substantially the same as the terms of the suit contract, except for quantity, shipment and price. The Societa had its head office in Zurich, Switzerland and, in 1939, an office in Calcutta. The goods of the two contracts were to be exported from Italy. 3. In the plaint it is alleged that by an agreement between the parties the time for delivery was extended to June 1940; by their attorney's letter dated 27th June 1910 the defendants repudiated the suit contract and the plaintiffs claim Rs. 1963-4-6 as damages, being the difference between the contract and market prices at the date of breach. 4. In their written statement the defendants allege that (a) the goods were deliverable to the plaintiffs only if they arrived in Calcutta Port within the contract time otherwise performance of the contract would be dispensed with and (b) if they were shipped or arrived late or were likely to be shipped or arrive late the plaintiffs should, within 3 days of receipt of notice from the defendants of late shipment and/or late arrival, declare they would accept the goods beyond the contract time without any allowance; otherwise the contract would be considered cancelled. It is further alleged the goods never arrived in Calcutta Port and on 2nd September 1939 the defendants gave the plaintiffs notice that the goods would not arrive within the contract period and the plaintiffs did not intimate to the defendants they would accept the goods beyond the contract time without an allowance; consequently, the suit contract was cancelled. The alleged agreement extending the date of delivery is denied. The alleged agreement extending the date of delivery is denied. Further, in June 1940 Italy declared war against Great Britain and became an enemy country due to which and to the unsettled conditions in Europe, the goods were not shipped and did not arrive in Calcutta Port; in the premises performance of the contract became unlawful and/or otherwise impossible. 5. Although issue 5 deals with the last allegations in the written statement no argument was directed upon them and they must be presumed to have been abandoned. 6. As already mentioned, the factum of the suit contract is not in dispute. The evidence relating to the matters which thereafter occurred was given by Gajanand (the plaintiffs' gomastha), by Udoyram Khemka (the proprietor of the defendant firm and to whom it is convenient hereafter to refer as "the defendant") and by Nagoremull (the defendants' godown attendant and peon). All these witnesses were thoroughly unsatisfactory and untrustworthy. In light of the nature of their testimony the real facts are not easy of ascertainment and my conclusions regarding them and of the acceptance of their oral evidence are based upon the probabilities of the happenings, references to contemporaneous entries in books and to other documents and letters, and considerations as to whose testimony is supported by them. The observations I have made regarding the nature of the oral evidence do not apply to Mr. Jagannath Pandey who is a partner in a firm named Bahadur Mull Shew Lal, piece goods merchants in Calcutta. 7. Before considering the meaning and effect of the relevant term of the suit contract and of some of the documents, it is convenient to express findings of fact which are required. 8. The contract was made on 5th June 1939, the goods of which were to be shipped the following August/September. Affairs in Europe were in an unsettled state during the intervening period and war between Great Britain and Germany was declared on 3rd September 1939, about one month prior to the end of the shipment date. 9. The first matter requiring decision is whether the defendant firm wrote and delivered to the plaintiffs a letter dated and September 1939 and, if so, its contents. 10. In his evidence the defendant said he wrote a letter dated 2nd September to the plaintiffs in terms of a copy which he produced. 9. The first matter requiring decision is whether the defendant firm wrote and delivered to the plaintiffs a letter dated and September 1939 and, if so, its contents. 10. In his evidence the defendant said he wrote a letter dated 2nd September to the plaintiffs in terms of a copy which he produced. It states that owing to the present very unsettled international situation and the consequent suspension of merchant shipping it will no more be possible for the yet unshipped portion of your indents to be shipped during the contracted period. It is unnecessary to refer to the remaining contents. The plaintiffs' clerk, Gajanand, denied that this letter was received by his principals. 11. In the defendant firm's peon book, under date 2nd September 1939, there is an entry of a letter being despatched to the plaintiffs on that day, against which is a signature of its acknowledgment. Gajanand said this is not a signature by anyone in the plaintiffs' employment. The defendant said that upon receiving a letter from the Societa, who were the suppliers of goods, some of which he had re-sold to the plaintiffs and to other customers, he wrote a similar letter, as given above, to all who had re-purchased the Societa goods. The peon book contains, in addition to the defendants' (plaintiffs'?), the names of several other of his customers as those to whom letters were sent on 2nd September. Undoubtedly the suit contract was sent to and was received at the plaintiffs' office and a signature is in the peon book in acknowledgment of it. Gajanand denied that this signature is that of one of the plaintiffs' employees. When he was asked about this signature, the remaining portion of the page upon which it appears was covered from his view. I am satisfied he thought he was being asked to identify the signature for the letter of and September and, therefore, denied its authenticity. I do not accept his denial that the signature for the 2nd September letter was written by an employee of the plaintiffs. 12. Nagoremull, the defendant firm's peon, said he delivered a letter at the plaintiffs' office on 2nd September and a clerk there signed for its receipt in the peon book. I do not accept his denial that the signature for the 2nd September letter was written by an employee of the plaintiffs. 12. Nagoremull, the defendant firm's peon, said he delivered a letter at the plaintiffs' office on 2nd September and a clerk there signed for its receipt in the peon book. Although this book ceased to be used at the end of 1940 and there are a number of unused pages at its back, the entries upon the used pages have the appearance of authenticity and that they were properly made in the ordinary course of business. The book contains acknowledgments by many recipients of letters, including several addressed to the Central Bank against each of which is a rubber stamped acknowledgment impression. I am satisfied the peon book is not a concoction. The letter addressed to the plaintiffs is entered in the correct place and I find that on 2nd September 1939 a letter was written by the defendant firm to the plaintiffs and was delivered to them. In this respect I accept the defendant's and Nagoremull's evidence. 13. The defendant produced a press copy book containing, what he said is, a copy of the letter which he wrote to the plaintiffs on 2nd September. Only 30 of the 500 pages in this book have been used, the last being a letter dated 29th September 1939. All the letters, of which copies are in this book, were written either to the Societa or to buyers from the defendant firm of goods they obtained from the Societa. They ceased to have dealings with the Societa in 1939. The defendant said the book ceased to be used because he broke his press, a statement with which his peon, Nagoremull, disagreed. I do not believe this was a reason for the book ceasing to be used but I think the cessation of its user was occasioned by the termination of dealings with the Societa, the press book being used solely for the purpose of making copies of letters referable to goods which were obtained from the Societa; however this was not stated in evidence. A letter dated 2nd September was undoubtedly written to and received by the plaintiffs and, in the absence of production by them of any other letter of that date from the defendant firm, I find that the copy produced is a copy of the one which was in fact written to and received by the plaintiffs. Its effect is considered later. 14. The question of the existence of an oral agreement, by which the plaintiffs allege the time for delivery was extended, now requires examination. 15. Gajanand said he had two interviews with the defendant and Nagoremull, the first in October or November 1939 and the second between 10th and 15th January 1940. 16. At the first interview, Gajanand said, he enquired about the goods saying the arrival notice and invoices had not been received; the defendant and Nagoremull told him the goods had not been received; they would be delivered immediately on arrival; and the Societa had informed the defendant the goods would arrive by the end of December. The defendant and Nagoremull denied that this interview took place. Gajanand said he reported the result of this interview to Dwarkadas, a partner in the plaintiff firm. 17. About the time of this alleged interview the Societa asked the defendant to pay 15 per cent. increase upon the amount of the contract price as the exchange value of the Italian lira had depreciated. The defendant refused to do so. He was then asked to pay an increase of 6 per cent. which also he would not do. Between the dates of the two alleged interviews the plaintiffs wrote two letters to the defendant firm dated 22nd December 1939 and 9th January 1940. The first letter refers to the contract goods and states that nothing had been heard from the defendant firm as yet and calls for a report; and if the defendant firm failed to give proper delivery they would be liable to meet all the loss. No reply was written by the defendant firm. The plaintiffs' second letter refers to the earlier one and complains that no reply had been received to it and a report is asked to be made and legal proceedings are threatened in the event of nondelivery. No reply was written by the defendant firm. The plaintiffs' second letter refers to the earlier one and complains that no reply had been received to it and a report is asked to be made and legal proceedings are threatened in the event of nondelivery. No reference is made in either letter to the alleged interview in October or November at which delivery was promised as soon as the goods arrived and whereat, Gajanand said, he was told the Societa had stated the goods would arrive at the end of December. 18. Gajanand said that at the 2nd interview be asked for a date for delivery to be fixed; the defendant and Nagoremull requested him to wait until June when the goods would be delivered and he agreed to do so. 19. On 8th January 1940, namely, a few days before Gajanand said the 2nd interview took place, the defendant firm filed a suit against the Societa in respect of the goods the subject of their contract with the Societa. Ultimately they obtained an ex parte decree for about Rs. 37,500. In these circumstances, it was contended on the defendant firm's behalf, it was most unlikely that a promise or an agreement would be made in January for delivery in the following June, more especially since previously the defendant firm had refused to pay increases of 15 per cent. and 6 per cent, upon the price payable to the Societa, in order to obtain delivery. 20. On 6th Jane 1940, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendant firm a letter in which they refer to the two earlier letters of 22nd December and 9th January and stating they are sorry to remind the defendant firm that they had not as yet received any report from them and asking to be informed at once whether the contract goods would be supplied otherwise the case would be banded to their attorney. No reply having been received a reminder was sent by the plaintiffs on 15th June. There is no reference in any of these letters to any promise or agreement made in January to deliver in June or to any interview having taken place at which such promise or agreement was made. 21. No reply having been received a reminder was sent by the plaintiffs on 15th June. There is no reference in any of these letters to any promise or agreement made in January to deliver in June or to any interview having taken place at which such promise or agreement was made. 21. If the two interviews had taken place and if the promise or agreement had been made to deliver in June assuredly there would have been reference to them in the letters. On the contrary the letter of 22nd December negatives that an interview had previously taken place since it states we have heard nothing from you as yet. Delivery of the goods appear to be overdue. Please report us immediately about same. Gajanand said that at the first interview, before this letter was written, he was told delivery would be made in December, The subsequent letters each call for the report, which was requested in the 22nd December letter. 22. In their attorneys' letter dated 26th November 1940 the plaintiffs gave particulars of the agreement, pleaded in para. 2 of the plaint, by which it is alleged the time for delivery was extended to June 1940. The particulars state that the agreements (the plaint states agreement) were arrived at with the defendant and Nagoremull on behalf of the defendant firm; the plaintiff firm were represented sometimes by Gajanand and sometimes by their partner Dwarkadas. This does not accord with Gajanand's evidence that be, alone, represented the plaintiffs when the delivery date was agreed to be extended. Dwarkadas has not been called as a witness. 23. I am satisfied and I find as a fact that neither of the alleged interviews took place and that no agreement was made to extend the time for delivery either to December 1939 or to June 1940. Dwarkadas has not been called as a witness. 23. I am satisfied and I find as a fact that neither of the alleged interviews took place and that no agreement was made to extend the time for delivery either to December 1939 or to June 1940. I have arrived at these conclusions from the following: the absence of any mention of the interviews or the agreement in any of the plaintiffs' letters; the difference between the persons said to be acting for the plaintiffs, as given in the particulars and as stated by Gajanand in evidence, when the agreement is alleged to have been made; the absence of Dwarkadas from the witness box; the improbability, to Bay the least, that the defendant firm would have promised delivery in December when they had refused to pay the Societa, from whom they expected to obtain the plaintiffs' goods, an increase upon the price in order to obtain delivery from them; and, again, the unlikelihood to promise or agree in January to give delivery in June when, a few days before such alleged promise or agreement, a suit had been instituted against the Societa in respect of the goods which should have been delivered by them. 24. In the course of the opening of the plaintiffs' case it was stated by Learned Counsel on their behalf that the goods, the subject matter of the suit contract, had arrived in Calcutta. Mr. S. Pandey was called as a witness to establish ibis statement. He is, as I have already mentioned, a partner in Messrs. Bahadur Mull Shamlal, piece goods merchants in Calcutta. 26. Mr. Pandey said in November 1939, through a broker named Neepchand who is now dead he contracted to buy goods from the Societa; Neepchand told him that the Societa had entered into contracts with some party and afterwards required an increase of 6 per cent. upon the agreed price which the party would not pay. The witness added the party might be one, Gopinath, or the defendant firm but he did not remember the names. On 25th November, he said, he agreed to buy 56 cases at 1/6 1/2 (Sterling) plus 6 per cent. and on 29th November a further 44 cases at 1/10 (Sterling) without any addition; he obtained delivery in February or March 1940 and sold these goods at prices varying between Rs. 2-3-0 to Rs. On 25th November, he said, he agreed to buy 56 cases at 1/6 1/2 (Sterling) plus 6 per cent. and on 29th November a further 44 cases at 1/10 (Sterling) without any addition; he obtained delivery in February or March 1940 and sold these goods at prices varying between Rs. 2-3-0 to Rs. 2-4-0 on or about Baisakh Budi 12, Sambat year 1996/97 (2nd June 1940). He added that the names of other purchasers were printed on the goods, but he could not remember them, there might have been the defendant firm's name and there might have been other names. 26. Mr. Pandey produced a considerable number of documents, relating to his purchases. Amongst them are 60 invoices 12 of which are dated 30th November 1939 in respect of goods per S.S. "Sumatra" giving the bills of lading as dated 30th November; the remaining 48 invoices are dated 17th December 1939 of goods per S.S. "Moncalieri" giving the bills of lading as dated 17th December, According to those documents the goods were not shipped in August/September, as the suit contract provides, but in November and December. 27. According to Gajanand goods from Italy would arrive in Calcutta within about 3 months of shipment; in this respect he is not contradicted and his evidence can be accepted. Therefore, August/September shipment would arrive by, about, the end of December. Since Mr. Pandey obtained delivery in February and March, this bears out Gajanand's evidence. Since his shipment was in November and December Mr. Pandey was doing his utmost to be perfectly fair and correct when giving his evidence but his testimony accounts to no more than that be could not remember whether he was told the defendant firm was the party who had previously bought the goods, which he purchased, and had not paid an additional 6 per cent. above the agreed price; and he could not remember whether the name of the defendant firm was printed on the goods. Shipment is part of the description of goods in a contract and Mr. Pandey's goods were not the defendants. 28. Further, the defendant firm's contract with the Societa was for 160 cases and Mr. Pandey bought 100 cases. The suit contract was for 5 cases out of the defendants' 150 and, even assuming, Pandey's 100 formed pact of the defendant firm's 150, it does not follow they included the plaintiff's 5 cases. Mr. Pandey's goods were not the defendants. 28. Further, the defendant firm's contract with the Societa was for 160 cases and Mr. Pandey bought 100 cases. The suit contract was for 5 cases out of the defendants' 150 and, even assuming, Pandey's 100 formed pact of the defendant firm's 150, it does not follow they included the plaintiff's 5 cases. Mr. Pandey's evidence does not establish that the plaintiff's goods ever arrived. 29. It is convenient to summarise the above findings of fact. They are: (1) On 2nd September 1939 the plaintiffs received from the defendant firm a letter of that date in the terms of the copy produced by the latter. (2) There was no agreement between the parties to extend the date of delivery to June 1940. (3) The goods of the suit contract description, shipment August/September 1939, did not arrive in Calcutta, or in India; (4) It has not been established that the 100 cases bought by Mr. Pandey from the Societa in November included the 5 cases sold by the defendant firm to the plaintiffs. 30. The meaning and effect of the relevant terms of the suit contract can now be examined, and which I will set out verbatim. They are: (1) The defendant firm (called the sellers) agree to sell and the plaintiffs (called the buyers) agree to buy the under mentioned goods (set out in 2 below) or such portion thereof as may be ready for delivery or as may arrive and be deliverable under the condition of the contract and at the rates and on the terms stated. (2) five cases, Meltone Qual as Indent No. 1427 Superfine' 52" x 30/35 yds. 12 pieces in a case @ 1/6 1/2 (Sterling) per yard C.I.F. nett D/P shipment August/September 1939. (3) Buyers are to apply for and to take delivery of the goods or any part thereof which may arrive as agreed to below. This time shall be deemed to be of the essence of the contract.... Entry of vessel at custom house means arrival under this contract. (3) Buyers are to apply for and to take delivery of the goods or any part thereof which may arrive as agreed to below. This time shall be deemed to be of the essence of the contract.... Entry of vessel at custom house means arrival under this contract. (4) Should the goods or any portion of same be shipped or arrive or are likely to be shipped or arrive late buyers shall declare within three days from receipt of notice from sellers whether they will accept the portion overdue without an allowance otherwise this portion of the contract shall be considered cancelled and sellers shall not be responsible for any such non-fulfilment of contract. (5) Should the goods or any portion of same not have been shipped owing to suppliers and/or producers stopping payment or being prevented by accident to the works from preparing the same, the contract shall lapse for that portion not shipped. (6) Buyers have the right to cancel this contract or any portion thereof if the goods from any unavoidable cause such as short shipment from want of accommodation on vessel....strikes, look-outs, war, tempest.....blockade quarantine, bankruptcy (and several other specified causes) or any circumstances beyond the sellers' control are shipped or arrive later than the dates stipulated....buyers agree to take up the late goods without allowance. 31. The contract is a long printed document containing many other terms which are irrelevant to the present matter. At various places in it the following words are found: "In case of goods of which delivery is taken within the contract time" "after expiry of the contract time" "taking delivery beyond the contract time" "goods not taken delivery of within the contract time." But the contract does not prescribe any contract time, (other than in the descriptive part of the goods of shipment August/September 1939) although condition three makes time the essence of the contract. At the foot of the document there are the words, "Delivery to be taken within ( ) from the date of arrival" but the blank space remains and no period has been inserted. It would seem that, upon the evidence that goods would arrive within about three months of shipment, the time for delivery to be given and taken would probably be about the end of December 1939. 32. The contract does not mention Calcutta Port, or Calcutta. It would seem that, upon the evidence that goods would arrive within about three months of shipment, the time for delivery to be given and taken would probably be about the end of December 1939. 32. The contract does not mention Calcutta Port, or Calcutta. It provides that entry of vessel at Custom house means arrival under the contract (Condition 3), that is to say arrival of the contract goods as envisaged in condition 1. I have already held that the contract goods did not arrive in India. On behalf of the defendant firm it was argued that, according to conditions 1 and 2, there was no obligation upon the defendants, as sellers, to deliver the goods unless they arrived. Reliance was placed for this contention upon Tribhoovandas v. Nagindas, 21 Bom. L.R. 1137 : (A.I.R. 1920 Bom. 182). In that case the words in the contract were "goods which are to arrive" "to be delivered as and when the same-may be received" "to be delivered on the safe arrival of the Steamer." It was held by Macleed C.J., and upon appeal from him by Marten J. (sitting with Heaton J. whose decision rests on another ground), that the arrival of the goods contracted for was a condition precedent which had not been fulfilled and the contract was therefore at an end. In Hollis Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. White Sea Timber Trust Ltd., 1936 3 A.E.R. 895 : (56 LL. L. Rep. 78), Porter J., as he then was, held that the words "sold subject to shipment: any goods not shipped to be cancelled" gave the sellers an option whether or not they would ship and, at p. 900, the learned Judge observed "....in the 'to arrive' cases there is no sale of the goods until the goods arrive in the ship." In Johnson v. Mac Donald, (1842) 9 M. & W. 600 : (12 L.J. Ex. 99), it was held by Parke B, the other members of the Court concurring that: a contract for the sale of Nitrate "to arrive" by a certain vessel, had the same meaning as "on arrival" and was a contract not passing any property at the time it was made but was merely an agreement for the sale and delivery of a portion of the cargo at a future period, namely, when the vessel should arrive; performance of the contract was conditional on the arrival in safety of the vessel and her cargo; and this construction was not altered by later words "should the vessel be lost, this contract to be void." 33. On behalf of the plaintiffs it was contended that the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hurnandrai Fulchand v. Pragdas Budhsen, 50 I.A. 9 : (A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 54), covers the present case. There the sellers sold to the buyers 864 bales of dhotis, as specified, to be manufactured by named mills. After the words, which completed the description of the goods, the contract contained the added words: The same are to be taken delivery of as and when the same may be received from the mills. Delivery is to be caused to he given in full by 31st December in the year 1918. The sellers had contracted with the mills for a larger number of dhotis than they had sold to the buyers. After the mills made some deliveries to the sellers the looms were used to manufacture goods for the Government and the remainder of the goods deliverable to the sellers were not supplied. At p. 14 their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the mills continued to exist and continued to manufacture the goods in question; only they were made for and delivered to somebody else. At p. 11 the Board expressed the opinion that the goods to be manufactured were elaborately described and that the later words "the same are to be taken delivery etc." regulated the manner of performance but did not reduce the fixed quantity sold to a mere maximum or limit the sale to such goods as the mills might deliver to the sellers. 34. In my view Hurnandrai Fulchand's case, 50 I.A. 9 : (A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 54), is distinguishable from the present one. 34. In my view Hurnandrai Fulchand's case, 50 I.A. 9 : (A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 54), is distinguishable from the present one. In the suit contract the goods which the defendant firm agreed to sell and the plaintiffs agreed to buy are those which "as may be ready for delivery or as may arrive and be deliverable." The words "under-mentioned goods" in condition 1 incorporate the words in condition 2 which must be read in their place and the provisions in these 2 conditions are the description of the contract goods of which the words "as may be ready etc." quoted above, form part. This is in contra. distinction with the contract in the case before the Judicial Committee in which, after the description of the goods agreed to be sold, there followed a separate provision dealing with the mode and time for their delivery. The words in the suit contract do not regulate the manner of its performance but they do limit the sale to such goods as are covered by, or included in, those words. Further, by condition 3, the buyers were under obligation to take delivery of the goods which may arrive; this provision is reciprocal so that the sellers must give delivery of such goods. In my opinion the words "as may arrive" have, in this contract, the same meaning as the words "to arrive" or "on arrival" which latter words were discussed and held to mean the same in Johnson's case (1842) 9 M. & W. 600 : (12 L.J. Ex. 99) and the language used renders the performance of the contract conditional upon the event of the arrival of the goods similar as, in Johnson's case, 1842 9 M. & W. 600 : (12 L.J. Ex. 99), it was conditional upon the arrival of the vessel and her cargo. Since the goods of the contract description did not arrive, performance of delivery by the sellers was either not obligated or required or was excused, (it matters not which way it is expressed). 99), it was conditional upon the arrival of the vessel and her cargo. Since the goods of the contract description did not arrive, performance of delivery by the sellers was either not obligated or required or was excused, (it matters not which way it is expressed). The later provisions in the contract, namely, its cancellation if within 3 days of notice by the sellers of late arrival, the buyers did not declare they would accept the goods without an allowance (condition 4) and the lapsing of the contract in the event of non-shipment on account of specified reasons (condition 5), do not alter or affect the construction of the provisions in condition 1. The defendant firm, as sellers, are not liable to the plaintiffs for non-delivery of the suit goods which, I am satisfied, did not arrive. 35. Consideration is now required whether the contract became cancelled by reason of the provisions in condition 4. Under this condition when the goods or any portion of the same are shipped or arrive late or are likely to be shipped or arrive late the sellers can give notice thereof to the buyers. Within three days of receipt of such notice, the buyers must declare they will accept the portion overdue without an allowance, otherwise that portion shall be considered cancelled and the sellers shall not be responsible for such non-fulfillment of the contract. 36. In the present matter the whole of the contract goods are affected and the relevant part of the condition is when they "are likely to be shipped or arrive late." The defendant firm contends that the letter of 2nd September 1939 was notice pursuant to condition 4 and, since the plaintiffs did not declare within its terms, the contract became cancelled and they are not liable for non-delivery of the goods. 37. It was not disputed and it was not contended that, at the date of the defendant firm's letter, circumstances justifying notice being given had not arisen. The factum of the letter being received was contested but I have already expressed by finding that it was received and that the press copy book contains a copy of it. This letter states clearly that, owing to the unsettled international situation and consequent suspension of merchant shipping it would not be possible for the unshipped portion of the plaintiff's indents to be shipped during the contracted period. This letter states clearly that, owing to the unsettled international situation and consequent suspension of merchant shipping it would not be possible for the unshipped portion of the plaintiff's indents to be shipped during the contracted period. This letter was notice to the plaintiffs that the goods would not be shipped in August/September, as provided by the contract, and, it follows, were likely to be shipped or arrive late. The letter was, therefore, notice pursuant to Condition 4 and, unless there is any other term in the contract which prevents the operation of its provisions, upon the plaintiffs failing to declare, as they did fail, within the specified period that they would accept the goods without an allowance, the contract thereupon became cancelled. 38. Condition 5 allows the contract to lapse if the goods or any portion of them are not shipped at all owing to the suppliers or producers stopping payment or being prevented by accident to the works from preparing them. This condition relates solely to goods which are not shipped or manufactured by the suppliers or producers and does not relate to late shipment or arrival. 39. Condition 6 enables the buyers to cancel the contract if, owing to causes (other than those in condition 5) which are unavoidable and which are specified or owing to circumstances beyond the sellers' control, the goods are shipped or arrive late. The concluding part of this condition, that the buyers agree to take up the late goods without allowance, means that if the goods are shipped or arrive late owing to the causes specified in this condition and the buyers do not avail themselves of their right to cancel the contract but, instead, they take delivery of them, in that event they are entitled to no allowance. 40. Condition 4 does not apply to goods which are not shipped at all but it applies to all goods which are likely to be shipped or arrive late irrespective of the cause or of the responsibility or otherwise of the sellers for lateness. By condition 6 the contract lapses if the goods are not shipped at all by reason of action by the seller's suppliers or the producers or production being prevented through an accident to the works. By condition 6 the contract lapses if the goods are not shipped at all by reason of action by the seller's suppliers or the producers or production being prevented through an accident to the works. By condition 6 the buyers, but not the sellers, can cancel the contract when shipment or arrival is late owing to the causes which the condition prescribes but if the buyers elect not to cancel but to take delivery of goods which are shipped or arrive late owing to such causes then they must do so without allowance; it does not apply to all late shipments or arrivals but only to those which are occasioned by the specified causes or in circumstances beyond the sellers' control. 41. Condition 5 relieves the sellers from liability for non-delivery, which would follow non-shipment, when they have not obtained the goods from their suppliers owing to the limited specified causes. Condition 6, in addition to giving the buyers the right to cancel the contract, also relieves the sellers from liability, if the buyers elect to take delivery of late shipment or late arrival goods, when the lateness is occasioned by specified reason or in circumstances beyond the sellers' control. If goods are shipped or arrive late through the sellers' fault, they are not relieved from liability either by condition 5 or by condition 6; but in those circumstances, by Condition 4, they can give notice to the buyers of the lateness and, if the buyers declare after its receipt, they must then take the goods without an allowance or, if they do not declare, the contract becomes cancelled; if the sellers fail to give notice, they remain liable to the buyers for late shipment and, possibly, late delivery. Although, when the lateness of shipment or arrival is occasioned by circumstances beyond the sellers' control and under Condition 6, the buyers must take the goods without an allowance if they elect not to cancel the contract, but this relief to the sellers does not make their rights under Condition 4 inapplicable for the reason that they are relieved by the provisions in another condition nor does it justify, in my view, construing condition 4 as applicable only to late shipment or arrival due to the seller's default. A meaning must be given to each term in a contract and the rights under condition 4 are in addition to and not in substitution for, the sellers' rights under condition 6. 42. Condition 4 applying, as it does, to all late shipments or arrivals, it enables the sellers to exercise its provisions in all circumstances. The defendant firm gave the plaintiffs notice pursuant to this condition when late shipment or arrival was likely and the plaintiffs did not declare within three days of receipt of the notice that they would accept the goods without an allowance. Thereupon the contract became cancelled, the defendant firm was discharged from liability for its non-fulfilment, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to delivery and are not entitled to recover damages for non-delivery. 43. The question of the quantum of damages does not arise, and the suit is dismissed with costs which will carry interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from taxation.