JUDGMENT Gentle, J. - This appeal arises out of an administration suit in which the appellant was not a party, but acted as the attorney for the plaintiff. The appeal is against an order setting aside the final decree in the administration suit and also against an order directing a final decree containing different provisions, to some extent, from those in the previous decree. Both these orders were passed by Ameer Ali, J. 2. In 1932 a man named Amrita Lal Chunder died leaving his widow, Biraj Mohini Dasi, who is an illiterate purdanashin lady, three sons named Subal, Udai and Jagat, and widowed daughter named Brikavanu. Jagat subsequently died leaving a widow, Promodini, and three daughters, the youngest being still a minor. By his will dated 4th September 1947, the testator appointed two executors and directed that during her lifetime his widow should receive the whole of the income from the estate and after her death a sum of Rs. 15 per mensem should be paid to his widowed daughter and she should have two rooms in the family house for her residence and that the three sons should be the residuary legatees of the remainder of the estate. The executors duly obtained a grant of probate of the will. One of them subsequently died and the survivor, Manick Lal Chunder has, at all material times, acted as the sole executor. 3. On 26th Match 1933, the testator's widow instituted a suit in this Court claiming construction of the will, administration by the Court of the estate, taking of the executor's accounts and other consequential reliefs. All the beneficiaries and the members of the testator's family were made defendants in the suit in addition to the executor, the youngest grand-daughter of the testator was represented by a guardian ad litem. Appearance was entered on behalf of the executor and the guardian for the minor grand-daughter. Otherwise no appearance was made by any of the defendants. 4. On 14th December 1939 the suit came before Panckridge J. He construed the will in accordance with the provisions which I have set out previously and passed a preliminary decree directing the taking of accounts in the ordinary course. He also discharged the executor as that gentleman had expressed his unwillingness to continue to administer the estate. The matter was referred to the Assistant Referee of the Court. He also discharged the executor as that gentleman had expressed his unwillingness to continue to administer the estate. The matter was referred to the Assistant Referee of the Court. One of the sons, Udai, entered appearance in the reference, not having previously appeared in the suit and he gives as his reason that he wished to avoid unnecessary expenditure and costs. It is conceded that by entering appearance in the reference Udai was entitled thereafter to be given notice of all subsequent proceedings in the suit. He did not further participate in the enquiry. After a lengthy investigation the Assistant Referee reported the result to this Court on 6th May 1941. He found that all the executor's accounts were correct and no money was due to the estate from that gentleman. The Assistant Referee recommended that the plaintiff's costs in the reference and those payable by her to the executor and the guardian ad litem, all of whom had appeared in the reference, should be taxed as between attorney and client and be paid out of the estate. All costs incurred before the reference had already been directed to be paid out of the estate and had been paid; the present appellant receiving about Rs. 2334 in respect of the costs incurred by the plaintiff with him up to the passing of the preliminary decree. 5. The report came before Ameer Ali J. on 9th July 1941, Notice was not given to the son Udai that the matter would come before the Court for confirmation of the Assistant Referee's report and he was unaware of the proceedings then taking place. The learned Judge passed a decree, which it is conceded was by consent of all the parties then appearing, namely, the plaintiff, the executor and the guardian ad litem, although the decree does not expressly so state. By the decree the report of the Assistant Referee was confirmed and the costs of the respective parties appearing in the reference were directed to be taxed as between attorney and client and to be paid by the Administrator General out of the estate in his hands to the respective attorneys of the parties. The estate had become vested in the Administrator General, the executor having been discharged, and an order had been made directing the grant of letters of administration. The estate had become vested in the Administrator General, the executor having been discharged, and an order had been made directing the grant of letters of administration. de-bonis-non with a copy of the will annexed to the Administrator General who took over charge of the estate at or about the time of the commencement of the reference. Since Udai was not given notice of the proceedings for consideration and confirmation of the Assistant Referee's report, counsel on behalf of the appellant concedes that, so far as Udai is concerned, he is entitled to ask for this decree to be set aside inasmuch as he was not given an opportunity of being heard upon the consideration of the report. 6. The appellant's contention is that the provision in the decree that the costs of the respective parties should be paid to their respective attorneys gave to the appellant (and of course it would follow to the attorneys for each of the other parties) a personal right to enforce payment of costs against either the Administrator General or against the estate and thereafter each attorney was entitled to execute the decree to obtain recovery of the costs outstanding. It was further suggested that by this decree the appellant thereafter ceased to have any remedy against the plaintiff, who was his client and by whom the costs were incurred, and no longer was he entitled to look to her for payment. The appellant's costs were taxed and allowed at a sum of Rs. 2420 odd. The Administrator General paid to the appellant a sum of Rs. 500 towards these costs and by December 1941 an amount of Rs. 1920 remained unpaid. On 15th December of that year the appellant, as the applicant, issued execution in respect of the balance of his costs purporting to do so under the decree. Execution was sought by attachment of a house in which all the members of the family resided and which formed part of the estate, 53 Ahiritolla Street, Calcutta. An order for attachment was made on 16th January, notice of which order was affixed to the premises on that date. Subsequently an order for sale was made, but no further action was taken by the appellant. 7. An order for attachment was made on 16th January, notice of which order was affixed to the premises on that date. Subsequently an order for sale was made, but no further action was taken by the appellant. 7. On 9th February 1942, Udai presented a petition to this Court in which he sets out all the facts and circumstances relating to the mattes to which reference is not required in every detail. He Says that upon the attachment order being affixed to the premises, for the first time he became aware of the decree of 9th July 1941, by which all costs of the parties appearing in the reference were directed to be paid out of the estate and to the Attorneys of the parties, and by the petition he seeks to have that decree set aside on the ground that he was not given notice of the matter coming before the Court and could not therefore present his submissions to the Court. The petition came before Ameer Ali J. on 11th January 1943 when he considered it together with another suit No. 688 of 1938, which was preferred by some creditors of the estate. He set aside the final decree dated 9th January 1941. Subsequently, on 26th August 1943 the learned Judge confirmed the Assistant Referee's report of the enquiry and the investigation of accounts save that the plaintiff was directed personally to pay her own costs and they were cot to be paid out of the estate. It followed, therefore, that the earlier decree was varied inasmuch as whilst the costs of the executor and of the guardian of the grand-daughter were to be paid by the Administrator-General out of the estate to their respective attorneys, no such order was made that the plaintiff's costs should be paid to the appellant. The learned Judge further directed that the appellant should repay to the Administrator-General the sum of Rs. 500 which he had received towards the costs incurred in the reference. 8. On 16th December 1943 the appellant filed his notice of appeal against the orders of Ameer Ali J. The memorandum of appeal was filed approximately twenty-two months after Udai had filed his petition to set aside the decree of 9th July 1941. 9. 500 which he had received towards the costs incurred in the reference. 8. On 16th December 1943 the appellant filed his notice of appeal against the orders of Ameer Ali J. The memorandum of appeal was filed approximately twenty-two months after Udai had filed his petition to set aside the decree of 9th July 1941. 9. Substantially the appellant's grounds are that the decree of 9th July 1941 should not have been set aside nor the order of 26th August 1943 have been made without notice being given to the appellant in his personal capacity and position. Since he was not given notice both the orders are bad. 10. The appellant was served with the notice of motion issued by Udai on or about 9th February 1941. It was served upon him in his capacity as the attorney for the plaintiff. He actively engaged himself as her attorney, instructed counsel on her behalf to oppose the petition and the notice of motion and there can be no doubt, although it has not been affirmatively established, that he was present in Court on each occasion when the notice of motion and the petition came before the Court and there is no doubt that he knew every detail of the matter and must have been aware that in the event of its succeeding, part of the decree of 9th July 1941 which directed the plaintiff's costs to be paid out of the estate and to be paid direct to the appellant, might be set aside. He did nothing on his own behalf. He neither informed the Court himself nor instructed counsel to inform the Court that he was entitled to notice nor made any application to the Court to be made a party to the petition and to the motion so that his personal position could be presented to the Court. It was never suggested to the Court that the decree of 9th July 1941 gave to the appellant any personal right. But, as I mentioned above, twenty two months after he had received, as the plaintiff's attorney, the notice of motion and the petition for the first time it was then suggested that he received a personal benefit by the decree and personally was entitled to look upon it as giving a right to him. But, as I mentioned above, twenty two months after he had received, as the plaintiff's attorney, the notice of motion and the petition for the first time it was then suggested that he received a personal benefit by the decree and personally was entitled to look upon it as giving a right to him. He had, as appellant, at the end of the year 1941, issued execution but I am referring to the period between the time of the filing of the petition by Udai and representation of the appeal by the appellant. The matters which arise out of the foregoing statement of facts do not appear to have been the subject of previous consideration by any Court either in this country or in England and. no authority has been cited. 11. The first matter which requires consideration is whether the decree of 9th July 1941 gave a personal right and remedy to the appellant. He was not a party to the suit nor was he a party to the reference. He was merely acting as the attorney to the plaintiff. The decree was passed by consent of the parties who had participated in the reference. The argument on his behalf went to the length of suggesting that, although he was not a party to the proceedings, nevertheless by its decree the Court took from him the remedy which, as an attorney, he previously had against the plaintiff and after the date of the decree he was no longer entitled to look to her for payment of his costs since the Court had substituted in place of his client another party (the estate) as his creditor. I cannot see that the decree gave any right personal to the appellant. What it did so, in effect, was to direct that the plaintiff's costs of the reference should be paid out of the estate and that the payment of those costs be made to her attorney. This was, to my mind, merely a convenience. The plaintiff ordinarily would be entitled, when an order for costs out of an estate is made in favour of such a party, herself to look to the estate and then of course she must hand over those costs to the attorney. This was, to my mind, merely a convenience. The plaintiff ordinarily would be entitled, when an order for costs out of an estate is made in favour of such a party, herself to look to the estate and then of course she must hand over those costs to the attorney. In the present instance the order, to my mind, has no more effect than that the payment to her attorney should be payment to her and the attorney's receipt shall amount to a discharge which the Administrator-General was bound to recognise. 12. Since the appellant was not a party to the suit or to the decree passed upon confirmation of the report of the Assistant Referee he was not entitled to be given notice personally of the petition and notice of motion issued by Udai to have the decree of 9th July 1941 set aside. On 26th August 1943, Ameer Ali J. passed an order directing a decree to be made in substitution for the one which he had previously set aside. Again, in my view, for the same reasons the appellant was not entitled to notice of the application made to Ameer Ali J. 13. It must follow, therefore, that, in respect of the main contentions in this appeal, none of the appellant's rights have been improperly taken away because he was not personally given notice of the application made to the Court to set aside the decree of 9th July 1941 and of the application for the order for a fresh decree. 14. There remains the question whether the appellant should be directed to repay the sum of Rs. 500 which be received from the Administrator-General out of the estate. This direction forms part of the order of 26th August 1943. When this money was paid to the appellant by the Administrator-General out of the assets of the estate, it was to my mind, in effect, payment to the plaintiff, the client of the appellant, in respect of her costs which she had incurred and which, at that time and under orders of Court, she was entitled to receive from the estate. This was not a payment to him personally, but to him as the plaintiff's attorney's and representative. This was not a payment to him personally, but to him as the plaintiff's attorney's and representative. There can be no doubt that this sum has been allocated towards the costs which the plaintiff incurred the payment being really made to the plaintiff, although into the hands of the appellant. In these circumstances it is not the appellant who should be called upon to make the repayment but the plaintiff herself who received the money through and by her agent, the attorney. She has, so we have been told, died recently and if she has an estate then her estate will be responsible in her place. In my view the part of the order which directed the appellant to repay the money is one that should not have been passed. 15. Since the appellant was not a party to the proceedings the order must have been made against him as an attorney and, therefore, as an officer of this Court and over whom as, an officer, this Court has jurisdiction and control. Whilst the appellant has no right to appeal against the setting aside of the decree of 9th July 1941 nor against the issue of the order for the decree in its place, but he has a right to come to this Court in respect of that part of the order made against him as an officer of the Court directing him to refund the money, so that he can have set aside that part of the order which was made against him. 16. The result is that the appeal will be dismissed save that the part of the order directing the appellant to repay to the Administrator-General the sum of Rs. 500 will be set aside. The appellant has succeeded in part and has failed in part. The interests of all the respondents in this appeal are identical and there was no need for each to be separately represented. Whilst the appeal will be allowed to the limited extent indicated above there will be no order as to costs save that the costs of the guardian ad litem will come out of the estate. Sen, J. 17. I agree. This appeal relates mainly to an order for costs passed in an administration suit on 9th July 1911. Whilst the appeal will be allowed to the limited extent indicated above there will be no order as to costs save that the costs of the guardian ad litem will come out of the estate. Sen, J. 17. I agree. This appeal relates mainly to an order for costs passed in an administration suit on 9th July 1911. An order was passed directing that the costs of the respective parties including the costs of the infant defendant appearing through her guardian ad litem should come out of the estate and be paid to the respective attorneys of the parties and to the guardian ad litem of the infant defendant. After this order was passed an application was made by Udai one of the parties in the suit to have the order set aside on the ground that neither he nor the Administrator-General were given notice prior to the order being passed. Ameer Ali J. accepted the contention raised by Udai, set aside the order of 9th July 1941 and directed that the matter would be set down for reconsideration. On 26th August 1913 the matter was heard and the material variation in the order was that the costs of the plaintiff in the administration suit, namely, Biraj Mohini Dasi, should not come out of the estate but that she should bear her own costs. It was also farther directed that Mr. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee, the attorney for the aforesaid Biraj Mohini Dasi, should refund to the Administrator-General a sum of Rs. 500 which had been paid to him by the Administrator-General pursuant to the previous order. 18. Mr. Mukherjee now appeals against this order and the argument urged on his behalf is that he was given certain valuable rights by the order of 9th July 1941 and that those rights should not have been taken away without notice being given to him. Now, it is quite true that although notice was given to Biraj Mohini Dasi and to Mr. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee as her attorney of the application for setting aside the order of 9th July 1941, no notice was given to Mr. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee in his personal capacity. The question which arises, first, is whether any such notice was necessary. In my opinion, it was not. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee as her attorney of the application for setting aside the order of 9th July 1941, no notice was given to Mr. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee in his personal capacity. The question which arises, first, is whether any such notice was necessary. In my opinion, it was not. The order passed on 9th July 1941 which was a final decree passed in accordance with a report of the Assistant Master and Referee was an order which affected the parties to the administration suit. It gave those parties certain rights. It was not an order passed either in favour of or against the attorneys of the parties. It is true that the final decree contained an order that the costs of the respective parties should be paid to their respective attorneys out of the estate. Costs were being awarded not to the attorneys but to the parties and the order was not one which purported to create any rights in the attorneys directly. The parties and the parties alone were affected by this order and in any application made to set aside this order there was absolutely no necessity to give notice to the attorneys of the parties in their personal capacity. That being so, the appellant had no locus standi to oppose the application and, therefore, he has no locus standi to appeal against the order whereby the final decree of 9th July 1941 was set aside and a new final decree was passed in its place. 19. In the new final decree, however, there was a direction given to Mr. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee to refund a certain sum of money which had been paid to him pursuant to the decree of 9th July 1941. This direction given to Mr. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee was obviously given to him in his capacity as an officer of the Court. The payment to Mr. Mukherjee of the Rs. 500 was really a payment to Biraj Mohini Dasi and the decree which was passed on 26th August 1943 which altered Biraj Mohini Dasi's rights would render her liable to refund the same. There would be no liability on Mr. Mukherjee, the payment, as I have said before, being really to Biraj Mohini through his attorney. As Mr. 500 was really a payment to Biraj Mohini Dasi and the decree which was passed on 26th August 1943 which altered Biraj Mohini Dasi's rights would render her liable to refund the same. There would be no liability on Mr. Mukherjee, the payment, as I have said before, being really to Biraj Mohini through his attorney. As Mr. Mukherjee has been directed to refund this money, I agree with my learned brother that he has a right to appeal against this part of the order. I am also of opinion, that this part of the order cannot be sustained for the reasons given by my learned brother.