Rajamannar, C.J.- Only one question arises in these two connected appeals in which the Municipal Council of Eluru represented by its Commissioner is the appellant. The question is whether the respondents had contravened the provisions of sections 216 and 215 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. The respondents are the owners of the sites and building bearing T.S. Nos.778/1 and 782/1 and 783/1 in a street in Ward No.11 of the Municipality. The building housed a rice mill. The plaintiffs alleged, and it has been found, that in the central portion of the building the walls gave way and began to crumble, and to avoid sudden collapse it became necessary for them to demolish the existing walls and to put up new walls on new foundations. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not obtain the permission of the Commissioner before commencing the construction. The learned District Judge who tried the two suits out of which these two appeals arise held on the evidence that the roof and the four walls of the main hall of the mill were removed, the old foundations were dug out and new foundations were put up and new walls were created on these fresh foundations. The height of the two walls on the gable sides were increased and floor was raised by about 6 or 7 inches. But the learned Judge held that the plaintiffs had not made a re-construction of a building within the meaning of section 216(1) of the Act, nor had they made any alteration to the building within the meaning of section 215(1) of the Act. The Municipality appealed to this Court and Subba Rao, J., dismissed the appeals and confirmed the decision of the Court below. He held (1) that there was no re-construction within the meaning of the Act, and (2) that though there was an alteration the alteration consisted in works of necessary repair which did not affect the position or dimensions of the building. The Municipality has filed these present appeals against the decision of Subba Rao, J., under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Municipality has filed these present appeals against the decision of Subba Rao, J., under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Section 3(3) of the Madras District Municipalities Act defines a building thus: "‘Building’ includes a house, out-house, stable, latrine, shed, hut, wall (other than a boundary wall not exceeding eight feet in height) and any other such structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever." Section 3, clause (24) defines re-construction as including the re-erection wholly or partially of a building after more than one-half of its cubical contents has been taken down or burnt down or has fallen down, whether at one time or not. The other portions of the definition are not material for this case. The argument of the appellants’ learned counsel was that ‘building’ according to the definition includes a ‘wall’ and admittedly there has been a re-erection of some of the walls in the building. It is true that the definition of a ‘building’ includes a ‘ wall’; but it must not be overlooked that this definition is subject to the condition " unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context ". It is not as if wherever the word ‘building’ occurs, the entire definition can be substituted always. In clause (24)(b), it is obvious that the word is used as not including a wall, because there is a reference to "an outer wall" of the building. It is, therefore, necessary that the definition should be appropriately applied according to the context. In Emperor v. B.H. De Souza1, the question arose on the construction of a similar provision in the District Municipal Act. Under section 96 of that Act, before beginning to erect any building, or to alter externally or add to an existing building, or to re-construct any projecting portion of any building, the person intending to build, alter or add, should give the Municipality notice in -writing, and if any one began or made any building or alteration without giving such notice, he was liable to be punished with fine. One of the side walls of a house had fallen down and the owner re-built it upon its foundation without getting the permission of the Municipality. He was thereupon charged under the above section for having erected a building without the permission of the Municipality. One of the side walls of a house had fallen down and the owner re-built it upon its foundation without getting the permission of the Municipality. He was thereupon charged under the above section for having erected a building without the permission of the Municipality. There was a difference of opinion between Chandavarkar, J. and Heaton, J., on the question whether the accused had committed any offence, and there was a reference to a third Judge, Sir Basil Scott, C.J., who held, agreeing with Heaton, J., that the accused had committed no offence. The contention of the Municipal Council in the case was based upon the definition of "building" which included ""walls." It was held, however, by a majority of the learned Judges that re-construction of a small wall in the building did not constitute the erection of a building. Scott, C.J., observed: “Whether the re-construction of a wall of whatever importance forming part of a house is necessarily the ‘erection of a building’ depends upon whether the interpretation clause, section 3(7), is to be taken as substituting impliedly for the word ‘building’ wherever it occurs in the Act not merely all erections falling within the ordinary comprehension of the term ‘building’ but also all other things included within the definition. It is recognised in England to be a rule with regard to the effect of interpretation-clauses of a comprehensive nature such as we have here that they are not to be taken as strictly defining what the meaning of a word must be under all circumstances, but merely as declaring what things may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that they should.” The learned Chief Justice distinguished an earlier case of the same Court in Emperor v. Kalekhan Sardarkhan1, as being based on the particular facts of that case. We respectfully agree with the above observations of Scott, C.J. Another decision of the same Court in Bandra City Municipality v. D.A. D’Monte2, was brought to our notice, but it contains no discussion whatever of the points. Nor is there any reference in the judgment to the earlier decision referred to above. Following the observations of Scott, C.J., in Emperor v. B.H. De Souza3, we hold, agreeing with Subba Rao, J., that the mere demolition and re-construction of the walls on new foundations would not amount to re-construction of a building. Nor is there any reference in the judgment to the earlier decision referred to above. Following the observations of Scott, C.J., in Emperor v. B.H. De Souza3, we hold, agreeing with Subba Rao, J., that the mere demolition and re-construction of the walls on new foundations would not amount to re-construction of a building. The reference in clause (a) of section 3(24) to “one-half of its cubical contents” also supports our conclusion. The next question is whether the respondents have contravened the provisions of section 215 of the Act. The learned Judge, Subba Rao, J., was inclined to hold that there was an alteration within the meaning of that section, but the respondents were saved by the application of the proviso. He found, and in this he concurred with the trial Court, that the works did not affect the position or dimension of the building or any room therein. It was contended before us on behalf of the Municipal Council that this finding is not correct because there was an admission on the part of the plaintiffs that the height of the walls had been increased and the floor had been raised by 6 or 7 inches. So far as the walls are concerned, the explanation given by the plaintiffs is adequate. The walls whose height has been increased are the walls on the gable side of the building and such increase of height would not necessarily result in an increase in the dimensions of the building. The floor appear to have been raised by a few inches. But we do not think that this small increase can be said to “affect” the dimension of the building. In our opinion, the word “affect” should be given a liberal meaning so as to mean ‘materially or substantially affect’ and not technically or mathematically affect the dimension of a building. We are satisfied that there has not been such a substantial change in the dimension of the building as to take the case out of the proviso to section 215(1) of the Act. On this point also, we are in agreement with Subba Rao, J. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs in one appeal. R.M. ----- Appeals dismissed.