JUDGMENT Bennett and Misra, JJ. - These three appeals arise out of proceedings in execution of a decree for arrears of theka money passed in favour of Judhnath Singh, the then lambardar, against Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh on the 30th of September, 1926. 2. One Rudra Pratap Singh was the owner of 7 villages in Pargana Hisampur, Tahsil Qaiserganj, district Bahraich. He died issueless a long time ago and was succeeded by his widow, Thakurain Bhagwant Kuar, who in 1903 executed thekanama in favour of Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh in respect of 5 out of the 7 villages. As regards the remaining two villages she gave another theka in 1904 to Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh and Indraj Bakhsh Singh jointly. Thakurain Bhagwat Kuar died in 1921, and in mutation proceedings consequent on her death the names of Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh, Indraj Bakhsh Singh and Jadu Nath Singh were entered in her place. The last named person was later appointed a lamburdar. In 1924, however, Sheo Naresh Singh along with two others instituted a suit for possession and mesne profits of these seven villages against Bisheshwar Bakshh Singh, Indraj Bakhsh Singh and Jadu Nath Singh claiming as the nearest reversioners of Rudra Partap Singh. The suit was decreed on the 26th of February, 1926, but the amount of mesne profits was left to be determined subsequently. In June, 1926, Jadu Nath Singh in his capacity as lambardar sued for recovery of arrears of rent due on the two thekas for the years 1923 to 1926 and obtained to decrees from the Revenue Court on the 30th September, 1926. The mesne profits, to which Sheo Naresh and others were held entitled as against Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh and Indraj Bakhsh Singh, were finally determined under Order 20, Rule 12, Code of Civil Procedure, in 1932. After this date Jadu Nath Singh died and was succeeded by Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh and four others. Bishshwar Bakhsh Singh also died and was succeeded by his widow, Mst. Patraj Kuar. 3. On the 29th of October, 1936, Mst. Patraj Kuar applied u/s 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, and her application was in due course forwarded to the Special Judge in pursuance of Section 6. Bishshwar Bakhsh Singh also died and was succeeded by his widow, Mst. Patraj Kuar. 3. On the 29th of October, 1936, Mst. Patraj Kuar applied u/s 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, and her application was in due course forwarded to the Special Judge in pursuance of Section 6. Her application was, however, eventually dismissed u/s 8, Clause (3) on the 21st of May, 1938, on account of delay in filing her written statement, though it had, in fact, been filed a day before the order was passed. The lady appealed, and on the l5th of September, 1943, the appeal was allowed by this Court and the dismissal set aside. Meanwhile, the successors of Jadu Nath Singh applied for the execution of the decree of 1926 for arrears of theka money against Mst. Patraj Kuar and attached village Dharampur which belonged to her In connection with the other rent decree held by Jadu Nath against Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh and Indraj Bakhsh Singh jointly an application was filed for rateable distribution u/s 73, CPC To the execution of the decree the judgment-debtor, Mst. Patraj Kuar filed objections on the 7th October, 1938, wherein she stated that sheo Naresh had already obtained a decree from the Court of the Special Judge, Bahraich, for mesne profits inter alia against her husband for the period covered by the rent Court decree. It was alleged that Jadu Nath Singh had been absolved by the Civil Court from the liability to pay the mesne profits upon his representation that the property was in actual possession of Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh and Indraj Bakhsh Singh after the death of Thakurain Bhagwant Kuar. It was also pointed out in the objections that this Court in appeal against the rent decree of 1926 had ordered that either Sheo Naresh and his co-reversioners could execute it or it should be executed by Jadu Nath Singh for the benefit of the reversioners above named. It was, therefore, pleaded that both the decrees could not be operative simultaneously against the objecto and having regard to the decree for mesne profits passed in 1932 under Order 20, Rule 12 Jadu Nath Singh's decree was no longer executable It was, therefore, prayed that the application for execution of that decree be dismissed. It was, therefore, pleaded that both the decrees could not be operative simultaneously against the objecto and having regard to the decree for mesne profits passed in 1932 under Order 20, Rule 12 Jadu Nath Singh's decree was no longer executable It was, therefore, prayed that the application for execution of that decree be dismissed. These objections were rejected on the 25th February, 1939, by the learned Assistant Collector, and it was ordered that the property be sold but the confirmation of sale should remain stayed. Mst. Patraj Kuar has come up in appeal against the aforesaid decision. (Execution of Decree Appeal No. 27 of 1939). 4. In order to understand the facts which give rise to the execution of decree appeals Nos. 53 and 54 of 1940 another set of facts may now be stated. It has already been mentioned that the decree for mesne profits obtained by Sheo Naresh and others was against Bisheshwar Bakhsh Singh and Indraj Bakhsh Singh. The successors of Indraj Bakhsh applied under the U.P Encumbered Estates Act in 1936, and their application was in due Course forwarded to the Special Judge u/s 6. The claim in respect of the decree of 1932 for mesne profits in favour of Sheo Naresh and others and that in respect of Jadu Nath Singh's rent decree of 1926 were both before the Special Judge in that case, and it was held that the decree for theka money could not be regarded as being in force in view of the decree for mesne profits, and under the circumstances it was found that the latter decree was alone enforceable. This order was passed on the 31st October, 1939, and an appeal against that order is at present pending before this Court (First Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1940) On the basis, however, of the order of the 31st of October, 1939, Mst. Patraj Kuar filed fresh objections in the execution case which by virtue of the order dated the 25th February, 1939 was still continuing. In these objections she again prayed that the execution case be dismissed and the property attached be released. The learned Assistant Collector found that the theka money related to the period after the death of Thakurain Bhagwant Kuar and if Jadu Nath Singh's decree was still to be considered as operative the judgment-debtor would have to pay the money twice over. The learned Assistant Collector found that the theka money related to the period after the death of Thakurain Bhagwant Kuar and if Jadu Nath Singh's decree was still to be considered as operative the judgment-debtor would have to pay the money twice over. He accordingly allowed the objections of Mst. Patraj Kuar and dismissed the execution case by his order, dated the 13th November, 1940. Execution of decree Appeal No. 53 of 1940 has been filed by the successors of Jadu Nath Singh against this order of the Assistant Collector, and as the order has the effect of dismissing also the application of Jadu Nath Singh's successors for rateable distribution in respect of the other rent decree of 1926, these persons have filed another appeal which is numbered as 54 of 1940. 5. It will be apparent from the facts stated above that the Encumbered Estates Act case of Mst. Patraj Kuar is at present pending before the Special Judge, the order, dated the 21st May, 1938, passed by the Special Judge dismissing her case u/s 8, Clause (3) having been set aside. The result, therefore, is that the proceedings in that case must be deemed to have remained pending in the Court of the Special Judge throughout. Having regard to the mandatory provisions of Section 7 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act the execution of the rent decree cannot proceed after the order u/s 6 forwarding the application to the Special Judge and all proceedings before the execution Court have to be regarded as ultra vires. 6. It is, however, urged on behalf of Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh and others that at the time when the order under appeal was passed, Encumbered Estates Act case of Mst. Patraj Kuar had, in fact, come to an end, and Section 7 was no longer operative and could not prevent the execution Court from proceeding with the sale of the property. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that by virtue of the decision of this Court, dated the 15th of September, 1943, the order of dismissal was wiped out The parties must-in consequence be restored to the position which they would or might have occupied if the order of the 21st May, 1938, had never been passed. In order that they may be so restored, the execution against Mst. In order that they may be so restored, the execution against Mst. Patraj Kuar should automatically by force of Section 7 be regarded as having been stayed. In Har Charan Lal v. Sukha Nand 1942 O.A. 46 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 68 : O.W.N. 78, an order had been passed under Regulation of Sales Act after the order u/s 6 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. The former was, it was found, ultra vires, but it was said that the rights of the parties were fundamentally altered by the fact that the Collector's order u/s 6 was subsequently cancelled by the Board of Revenue. It may be mentioned that the applicant under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act in that case had before his application obtained a discharge from the insolvency Court, and at the date when the application u/s 4 was made no exception could be taken to it. The order of discharge was subsequently set aside in appeal. The Board of Revenue, therefore, took into consideration the appellate order by virtue of which the applicant was regarded as an undischarged insolvent, on the date of his application u/s 4. Upon this view the order u/s 6 was cancelled. The judgment of the Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member after setting out the facts proceeded as follows-- "It appears to us that the rights of the parties were fundamentally altered on the cancellation of the Collector's order by the Board of Revenue. It may be said that when the Collector passed the order there was no legal objection to it, since Nurul Hasan had been granted a discharge by the District Judge. On the other hand when the Collector's order was passed the order of discharge was not final, because there was a possibility of it being set aside in appeal. The Board of Revenue took into consideration the fact that the order of discharge had been set aside by this Court and therefore Nurul Hasan must be considered to have been an undischarged insolvent when he made his application On that view he was clearly not entitled to make it. The Board of Revenue took into consideration the fact that the order of discharge had been set aside by this Court and therefore Nurul Hasan must be considered to have been an undischarged insolvent when he made his application On that view he was clearly not entitled to make it. If the view taken by the Board of Revenue is sound, which, if we may say so, we see no reason to doubt, it may be said that on the same principle we should take into consideration the effect of their order on the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act. Though the sale officer may be said to have acted without jurisdiction if the Collector's order u/s 6 was valid so as to make Section 7 applicable, on the cancellation of the Collector's order by the Board of Revenue that order must be considered to have been invalid and consequently Section 7 was not a legal bar to the execution proceedings. If the sale officer had stayed the proceedings u/s 7 the order of stay would have been vacated upon the passing of the order of the Board of Revenue cancelling the Collector's order, and now that this order has been cancelled it cannot be considered to retain any legal effect on anything which has been done. Regarding the matter in this light it is clear that no objection can now be advanced to the execution proceedings because what might have been a bar to those proceedings has disappeared and it follows from the decision of the highest Revenue Court which we do not and cannot question that the bar was never legally effective." 7. In our opinion the same principles would apply to the present case. 8. The appeals are, therefore, allowed, the orders which are now under appeal are set aside, and the proceedings in execution, shall remain stayed as contemplated by Section 7 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. In the circumstances of this case the parties shall bear their own costs.