Judgement Appeal (No. 28 of 1943) from a judgment and decree of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (March 17, 1939), affirming a judgment and decree of that court made in its original jurisdiction (January 25, 1939). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. In the suit which gave rise to the present appeal the appellant, as assignee of the purchaser from a member of a joint family of a one-sixth share in the joint family property, sued for partition of the family property and to have her one-sixth share allotted to her. She also sought, as assignee of a mortgage on another sixth share, to have her mortgage enforced ; but that part of the suit resulted in a decree in the present appellants favour for a trifling sum, and the only question raised in regard to that part of the case related to a question of costs. The question remaining in controversy was whether the appellants claim was barred by the law of limitation. The value of the interest which the appellant claimed was well under Rs. 10,000, probably about Rs. 3,000. The total value of the joint family property exceeded Rs. 10,000. There was no controversy as to the identity or extent of the family property, or as to the right of partition to which the appellant would be entitled if the law of limitation were not a bar to her claim. In the court of first instance the claim was held to be barred by the law of limitation and the suit, so far as it related to the claim for partition, was dismissed. On appeal, the appellate court dismissed the appeal as well on the question of the present appellants claim to partition, as also on the question of costs. The appellant in due course applied to the appellate court for the usual certificate for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The power of the appellate court to grant the necessary certificate turned on the true construction, in its application to the present case, of s. no of the Civil Procedure Code which is as follows —" no. The appellant in due course applied to the appellate court for the usual certificate for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The power of the appellate court to grant the necessary certificate turned on the true construction, in its application to the present case, of s. no of the Civil Procedure Code which is as follows —" no. In each of the cases " mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 109, the amount or " value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first " instance must be ten thousand rupees or upwards, and the " amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to " His Majesty in Council must be the same sum or upwards." " Or the decree or final order must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of like " amount or value, and where the decree or final order appealed 14 from affirms the decision of the court immediately below the " court passing such decree or final order, the appeal must " involve some substantial question of law." The appellate court took the view that there was no question in this case of such a character as to make it a fit case for the grant of a certificate under s. 109 (c), and dismissed the applica tion on the ground that, the share of the appellant in the property of which she sought partition being less in value than Rs. 10,000, the subject-matter of the appeal was below the minimum value required by s. no. The present appellant thereupon petitioned His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal, and leave was so granted, but on the terms that liberty should be reserved to the respondents to contend that such leave to appeal ought not in the circumstances of the case to have been granted. On the appeal coming before their Lordships, the respondents, in exercise of the liberty so reserved, contended, by way of preliminary point, that leave to appeal ought not in the circumstances of the case to have been granted. 1944. Jan. 31, Rewcastle K.C. and Khambatta for the respondents. It was said on the hearing of the petition for special leave to appeal, that this case must be regarded as one involving more than Rs. 1944. Jan. 31, Rewcastle K.C. and Khambatta for the respondents. It was said on the hearing of the petition for special leave to appeal, that this case must be regarded as one involving more than Rs. 10,000 because, although the amount involved in the appeal is only about Rs. 3,000, the matter in issue is a share of a joint Hindu family property, and that for the purpose of regarding the value of the suit the value of the entire property must be taken. That is wrong. The Board was asked to grant leave in a matter of Rs. 3,000, and it is said that there are points of law—mainly, whether, if an outsider purchases a share of a member of a joint undivided family she becomes a tenant in common with the other members of the family, but it is well settled by decision of this Board that an alienee from a member of a joint Hindu family is not a tenant in common with the other members of the family, and does not acquire any right to possession of any part of the property. All she gets is an equity to come to the court and ask for a general order for partition so that she may obtain whatever property is given to the vendor. In Radha Kunwar v. Reoti Singh (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 187, 190.), which was not a partition suit, it was said " the " subject-matter of the dispute [a two-biswas share in mortgaged property] was simply the value of the property which " the appellant claimed, and it was quite immaterial for that " purpose what the value of the mortgage might be." The amount which is in dispute in the appeal is the amount which would be involved if the decision went in favour of the appellant. That is precisely the position here. The appellant is not really concerned in the partition as such, but only entitled to enforce it ; she cannot get possession of anything until she has put her vendor in possession of a divided share, which she can then get transferred to herself. That is precisely the position here. The appellant is not really concerned in the partition as such, but only entitled to enforce it ; she cannot get possession of anything until she has put her vendor in possession of a divided share, which she can then get transferred to herself. In Lala Bhugwat Sahay v. Rat Pashupati Nath Bose (( 1906) 10 C. W. N. 564.) the valuation for a partition suit was said to be the value of the whole suit, but all that that indicates is that the valuation of the share in dispute would depend on the value of the whole. The position here is the same as in De Silva v. De Silva (( 1904) 6 Bom, L. Rptr. 403.), which was followed in Nariman Rustomji v. Hasham Ismayal (( 1924) I. L. R. 49 B. 149, 152.), where it was said that the value of the appellants share in the property must be looked at, and not the value of the whole. Muhammad Asghar v. Abida Begam (( 1932) I. L. R. 54 A. 858.), a partition suit, is against the respondents here. In Subramania Ayyar v. Sellammal (( 1915) I. L. R. 39 M. 843.) " the words involve directly, contained " in the second para, of s. no of the Code cannot be read as " including cases which involve nothing but the actual subject-" matter in dispute in the appeal." The headnote in Raoji Bhikaji v. Laxmibai (( 1919) I. L. R. 44 B. 104.) says that " in a suit for partition of " joint family property, the amount or value of the subject-"matter, for the purposes of s. no of the Civil Procedure Code " of 1908, is the value of the share which the appellant claims " and not the value of the entire property." The matter must be looked at from the angle of the person affected. The question is, what will pass if the appeal succeeds ? Radha Kunwars case (L. R. 43 I. A. 187.), though not a partition case, settles the matter in principle. Should this preliminary point succeed, a petition to rescind the special leave is not necessary Zahid Husain v. Mohammad Ismael (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A 186.). Sir Thomas Strangman K,C. and A. G. P. Pullan for the appellant. Radha Kunwars case (L. R. 43 I. A. 187.), though not a partition case, settles the matter in principle. Should this preliminary point succeed, a petition to rescind the special leave is not necessary Zahid Husain v. Mohammad Ismael (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A 186.). Sir Thomas Strangman K,C. and A. G. P. Pullan for the appellant. The question is whether the words " of like amount u or value " in the second clause of s. no of the Code qualify " property " or " claim or question." The Calcutta and the Allahabad High Courts have held that they qualify " property," and that is the ordinary grammatical construction of the section. Sir Lawrence Jenkins, however, has said, not explicitly, but by necessary implication, that they govern the words" claim or question." In Manilal v. Bannbai (( 1920) 23 Bom. L. Rptr. 374.), the court took the view which had been taken by Sir Lawrence Jenkins. It was an easement suit, but in principle it stands on the same footing as a partition suit, and the easement involved was less than Rs. 10,000. [Reference was also made to Appaya v. Lakhamgowda (( 1922) 25 Bom. L. Rptr 77.).] It is clear that, in granting leave to appeal in Manilals case (( 1920) 23 Bom. L. Rptr. 374.), the Privy Council considered the construction which the appellant here suggests should be adopted. Apart from the authorities, there is the fact that the claim relates to property worth over Rs. 10,000. It is conceded that, if the language of the section were that it is the appellants interest that must be considered, then the appellant here would be in a difficulty ; she can only come in under the second para, to s. 110. May 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD CLAUSON, who stated the facts above set out and continued The respondents contended that the High Court had correctly taken as the " value of the subject-matter in " dispute on appeal " the value of the interest claimed by appellant. They pointed out that this view of the matter accorded with that taken by the Bombay High Court in De Silva v. De Silva ( 1904) 6 Bom. L. Rptr. They pointed out that this view of the matter accorded with that taken by the Bombay High Court in De Silva v. De Silva ( 1904) 6 Bom. L. Rptr. 403.), followed by the same High Court in Raoji Bhikaji v. Laxmibai (( 1919) I. L. R. 44 B. 104.), and in Nariman Rustomji Mehta v. Hasham Ismayal (( 1924) I. L. R. 49 B. 149.). The appellant based the contention that the High Court had wrongly refused to grant a certificate on the second clause in s. no, and argued that the decree in the present case involved directly or indirectly a question respecting the whole of the joint family property, admittedly of a value exceeding Rs. 10,000. They referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Lala Bhugwat Sahay v. Rai Pashupati Nath Bose (( 1906) to C. W. N. 564.) and to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Muhammad Asghar v. Abida Begam (( 1932) I. L. R. 54 A. 858.). Their Lordships are satisfied that the appellate court were correct in holding that the value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council must be taken to be the value of the share of the joint family property in respect of which the appellant is claiming, and, indeed, this view was not disputed before their Lordships Board. A further question, however, remains, namely, whether the decree refusing partition on the ground that the claim is barred by the law of limitation " involves directly or indirectly some claim or question to or " respecting” the joint family property as a whole. Their Lordships do not find it necessary to decide whether the words of the second clause in s. no can on their true construction ever refer to any property but that outside the suit. It is enough for the purposes of the present case to say that their Lordships feel no doubt that a question as to the title of the plaintiff to the share which she claims in the joint property does not become a question respecting the whole of the joint family estate merely because if her title is established it will result in the joint family estate being partitioned. Their Lordships are thus of opinion that the High Court were right in refusing to grant the certificate, and that accordingly the appellant was not justified in asking this Board for special leave to appeal. The contention which the respondents were by the Order in Council of March 7, 1940, given liberty to bring forward thus succeeds. In accordance with their Lordships practice in analogous cases (see Zahid Husain v. Mohammad Ismael (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 186.) and Mukhlal Singh v. Kishuni Singh (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 279.), no petition to rescind the leave to appeal will be required. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed. The appellant will be ordered to pay the costs of respondents 8 and 9, who alone appeared. PRACTICE NOTE. Practice—Heaving of appeal—Preparation—Readiness to proceed. On an application by counsel for the appellant to postpone the hearing of an appeal on the ground that the respondents Case had only been received at 4 p.m. on the previous day, Lord Porter, while saying that their Lordships would grant an adjournment, observed that the introductory facts were a little complicated, but that the point, so far as he could see, was quite short. To those of them who were accustomed to carrying on practice in the courts, he said, it seemed that counsel whose practice was confined to the Privy Council were in an advantageous position compared with those who had to be prepared to be in more than one court on any given day. Counsel before the Privy Council had the advantage of being able to attend to one court only. "In a case of the " present kind," added Lord Porter, " their Lordships do not " see why it should not be got up subject to receiving the " respondents Case afterwards, so that counsel may be " prepared to go on." Those observations, he concluded, should be borne in mind. Present Lord Porter, Goddard L.J. and Sir Madhavan Nair.