JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the defendants. It is common ground that the disputed land is covered by a certain wakf. The plaintiff claims to be the sole mutwalli. According to the defence, his half-sister defendant 1, is also a mutwalli. The previous history of the wakf is set out in the plaint. The plaintiff bases his actual title, however, on a decree made in title suit No. 1 of 1924 by which he was declared to be the sole mutwalli. It is not disputed that the wakf is a public wakf and the suit was instituted under the provisions of S. 92, Civil P.C. A compromise was arranged between the parties and the final order of the Court was that the suit was decreed in terms of the petition of compromise by which the plaintiff was declared to be the sole mutwalli. 2. The first question for consideration is whether this decree was made under the provisions of O. 23, R. 3, Civil P.C. It appears probable that the learned Judge thought that it was. But the real point is whether a compromise of a suit under S. 92, Civil P.C., is a lawful compromise within the meaning of the rule. 3. Prima facie, it would be opposed to public policy that a suit instituted with the sanction of the Advocate-General in connection with a public trust, should be compromised on terms detrimental to the interests of that trust. Unless, therefore, the Court examines the terms and is satisfied that they are not detrimental to the interest of the trust, it can hardly be said that, it has been proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the compromise is lawful. 4. This seems to be the effect of the decision in the case of Abdul Karim Abu Ahmad Khan v. Abdus Sobhan Choudhury and others 18 C.W.N. 1264 : (A.I.R. 1915 Cal. 193). In the case of Muthukrishna Naicken v. Ramchandra Naicken and others, AIR 1919 Mad. 659, (47 IC 611) the learned Judges refused to sanction a compromise because they were not satisfied that it was in the interest of the trust. Another case to which my attention was drawn was the decision in the case of Syed Abu Mahomed Barakat Ali and Others Vs. Abdur Rahim and Others, AIR 1925 Cal 187 . 659, (47 IC 611) the learned Judges refused to sanction a compromise because they were not satisfied that it was in the interest of the trust. Another case to which my attention was drawn was the decision in the case of Syed Abu Mahomed Barakat Ali and Others Vs. Abdur Rahim and Others, AIR 1925 Cal 187 . The suit was instituted to set aside a decree passed ou compromise in a suit under S. 92, Civil P.C., on the ground that it was made without jurisdiction. In dealing with that argument, the learned Judge said this:- These eases only show that in a suit brought under S. 92, Civil P.C., when a petition of compromise is filed it is open to the Judge to say that the compromise is not lawful and he could than refuse to pass an order on the basis of the compromise. But it is another thing to say that a Judge has no jurisdiction to pass a decree on the basis of compromise in a suit brought under S. 92, Civil P.C. Order 23, Civil P.C., dealing with adjustment of suits makes no such distinction. 5. The actual order made in title suit No. 1 of 1924, is not very specific. But there can be no question that it was made with jurisdiction. It should be interpreted to mean either that the learned Judge satisfied himself that the compromise was lawful or that he himself after hearing the parties made the order in the exercise of his discretion. 6. The next question for consideration is whether the matter is res judicata. That depends upon whether the case is governed by S. 11, Expln. VI, Civil P.C. 7. In order to attract the provisions of that explanation it must be shown that title suit No. l of 1924 was a bona fide litigation in respect of & public right and that the defendants are persona interested in that right. The question raised was the removal of one mutwalli and the appointment of the plaintiff as the sole mutwalli. The defendants were certainly interested in that question and as such would be bound by the decree. 8. It would, however, be impossible to hold that the litigation was bona fide. The argument of res judicata assumes that defendant 1 was a mutwalli. The defendants were certainly interested in that question and as such would be bound by the decree. 8. It would, however, be impossible to hold that the litigation was bona fide. The argument of res judicata assumes that defendant 1 was a mutwalli. In that case deliberately to ignore her and to carry on the litigation behind her back would be the strongest possible evidence of bad faith. I am, therefore, of opinion, that she is entitled to say that the declaration made in the decree to the effect that plaintiff 1 is the sole mutwalli is wrong. 9. In order to establish this the defendants must show that there is some other mutwalli. Their only definite case on this point is that defendant 1, is herself a co-mutwalli with the plaintiff. 10. At the trial they adduced evidence to show that she was appointed. The learned Munsiff disbelieved it. The learned Subordinate Judge does not discuss it. But as no such case was made in the written statement, it was unnecessary for him to do so. On the case made there the defendants can only succeed by showing that she succeeded by inheritance. 11. The plaintiff attempted to put forward a case that females are excluded from inheritance by custom. Under the Muhammadan Law, the office of mutwalli is not hereditary. The office may become hereditary by custom (vide Mullah's Principles of Muhammadan Law, 12th Edition, paragraph 166.) The plaintiff has attempted to go far beyond that. He suggests that by custom there may be a devolution unknown to the Muhammadan Law of Inheritance. Mr. Lahiry could not show me any authority for such a proposition and I have no hesitation in rejecting it. 12. Accordingly in order to succeed, the defendant must show that on the death of a mutwalli he has been succeeded by his heirs. Mr. Mitter suggested that I should remand the case in order that there might be a further examination from this point of view. After going through the evidence on the record, I am not prepared to take any such course. No suggestion of devolution by inheritance was made to the plaintiff or any of his witnesses in their cross-examination. On the contrary an attempt was made to show that defendant 1 was appointed, which is quite inconsistent with the present suggestion. After going through the evidence on the record, I am not prepared to take any such course. No suggestion of devolution by inheritance was made to the plaintiff or any of his witnesses in their cross-examination. On the contrary an attempt was made to show that defendant 1 was appointed, which is quite inconsistent with the present suggestion. Apart from that there was mere evidence of possession from which the Court was asked to infer that defendant 1 must be a mutwalli somehow or other. This evidence has been disbelieved by the learned Judge. I am, therefore, of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge was correct when he found that the defendants had failed to prove that defendant 1 is a mutwalli. 13. The appeal is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.