JUDGMENT Bennett and Ghulam Hasan, JJ. - The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought for a declaration that an arbitration award was illegal and ineffective. The case was tried by "Mr. Abid Raza, Civil judge of Gonda, who disallowed the declaratory relief sought and held that the award could not be declared invalid, but at the same time corrected what he considered to be an inaccuracy in accounting and halved a sum of Rs. 1,680-13-3 which the arbitrator had allowed the Plaintiff Appellant. Learned Counsel for the Appellant says he would not himself describe it as an inaccuracy in accounting and from what Mr. Abid Raza himself says in his judgment it seems to be rather an inadvertent omission, There is no cross objection relating to it, and the order being in the Appellant's favour it is unnecessary for us to deal with this matter. 2. The parties to the arbitration were two brothers, Panna Lal and Jagannath. They executed an agreement on the 25th December, 1937, appointing Babu Shyam Manohar Seth, a Vakil of Gonda, as arbitrator to divide between them their joint property in certain shops. There had previously been a division of house property by another arbitrator and B. Shyam Manohar Seth was concerned only with the partition of two shops, for which purpose he had to consider the stock and the accounts relating to them. It was agreed that he might arrive at such decision as he considered proper alter inspecting the accounts, assets and liabilities and the stock. He could take help from the previous arbitrator or from any other person: he could make enquiry in the presence or absence of the brothers: he could make secret enquiry to find out the correct facts, and he could use his personal knowledge. 3. The arbitrator pronounced his award on the 2nd February, 1938. The main result was that Panna Lal was held liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1,775 to his brother Jagannath. Panna Lal retained one of the shops and Jagannath the other. There was also a provision for the redemption of a loan taken was by one brother from the other on the security of certain ornaments. The loan was taken in connection with the business. 4. 1,775 to his brother Jagannath. Panna Lal retained one of the shops and Jagannath the other. There was also a provision for the redemption of a loan taken was by one brother from the other on the security of certain ornaments. The loan was taken in connection with the business. 4. The award was made a decree of the Court under the provisions of the Second Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no objection appears to have been taken to it under the provisions of that Schedule. 5. One of the defences to the declartory suit to set aside the award was that the suit was not maintainable, and there was an issue on this point. It was not properly considered by Mr. Abid Raza. He took with it the previous issue, whether the award had been acted upon by the parties and, if so, what its effect was, and he observed that he had very little to say on these issues. The plea that the award had been enforced was of no consequence. No misconduct or corruption on the part of the arbitrator had been established, and the award could not be set aside. That is all he said, and it is clear from this that he did not really consider the question of maintainability. 6. In our view the suit was entirely misconceived and it should have been held that it was not maintainable. It was open to the Appellant to challenge the award before judgment was pronounced by the Court according to it under the provisions of Schedule II of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it was not open to him to challenge it in any other away. On becoming a decree of the Court, the only remedy open to him was to appeal from the decree and he could only appeal on the ground that the decree was in excess of or not in accordance with, the award. These were the only remedies open to him. The suit should therefore have been dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable. 7. We might dismiss this appeal at once for these reasons, but we think it desirable to add some further observations as it seems clearly that both the Court and the Plaintiff failed to appreciate what an award should contain, and how it may be challenged. 7. We might dismiss this appeal at once for these reasons, but we think it desirable to add some further observations as it seems clearly that both the Court and the Plaintiff failed to appreciate what an award should contain, and how it may be challenged. From the arguments put forward, both in the suit and in the appeal, it would appear that the Plaintiff and his Counsel were under the impression that the award of an arbitrator is much the same as a judgment of a Court and can be challenged in the same way. The award under consideration for instance has been challenged on the ground that the arbitrator has not explained his decisions and that the award is vague, indefinite, and incomplete. We have considered the award with the agreement to refer and we see no reason to think that the arbitrator did not do everything that he was required to do under the agreement. It is said that he failed to take some accounts into consideration, but in view of the terms of reference it is not open to the Plaintiff to raise such an objection. In fact all that was necessary for the arbitrator to do was to state the amount due from one party 10 the other, one shop being allotted to each. It was quite unnecessary for him to give reasons and his award with reference to the accounts. 8. In this connection we would refer to certain observations made in a case of the late Judicial Commissioner's Court, Badruddin Hassan v. Amir Begam (1911) 14 O.C. 308. Inter alia it was said that Courts should not interfere with an award on the mere ground of mistake, (a remark which we commend to the notice of the Civil Judge, but the observations to which we would in particular refer subordinate Courts, litigants generally and also, we may add their counsel, are these:-- "There seems to be a notion abroad among litigants in this province that after having entered into solemn engagements to refer their disputes to arbitration and after having had proceedings taken ending with an award they are at liberty to come into Court and dispute the award in the most reckless fashion. It is by no means an uncommon experience to find parties behaving as the Defendants have done in this case. It is by no means an uncommon experience to find parties behaving as the Defendants have done in this case. They do not get all they want out of the arbitrator and forthwith proceed to resist the filing of the award by putting forward wild accusations of misbehaviour and what not on the part of the arbitrator.... In short the inclination seems to be to look upon arbitration proceedings as a more or less solemn farce, a mere interlude in the course of litigation which either party can ignore if he is disappointed in his expectations. We think it is proper that this peculiar view of the nature of arbitration proceedings should be discouraged to the utmost extent." 9. The appeal is dismissed with costs.