JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This Rule arises out of certain proceedings under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, and is directed against an order of the Additional District Judge of Dacca, dated the 24th November, 1943, dismissing the Petitioners' application under sec. 40A of the Act for revision of the order of an Appellate officer, dated the 20th September, 1943. On 6th June, 1932, the Opposite Parties to the Rule who are husband and wife borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,700 from the Petitioners' mother on executing a joint mortgage bond in her favor. On the death of their mother, the Petitioners, as her heirs, instituted a suit on the mortgage in the Court of the first Subordinate Judge of Dacca, claiming to recover a sum of Rs. 2,780. Thereafter the Opposite Parties made an application to a Debt Settlement Board at Munshiganj for settlement of their debts, in which they included the debt under this mortgage. The application was made under sec. 9 (1) (b) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act on the footing that they were both debtors within the meaning of the Act and the debt was their joint liability. As required by the Rules, each of the Opposite Parties submitted with the application a separate statement of debt. In their application they showed that Opposite Party No. 1, the husband, had only 28 acres of land, inclusive of all culturable, bhiti and garden land, of which the quantity of culturable land was only 1 3/4 kattas, and Opposite Party No. 2, the wife, had only, 03 acres of bhiti land and no culturable land at all. It was further stated that Opposite Party No. 1 received annually a sum of Rs. 125 from his sons, Rs. 75 from his disciples and Rs. 5 from tenants. 2. The Petitioners state that no proper notice of the application was served on them, and on the 22nd July, 1921, the Munshigunje Board, in the absence of the Petitioners and other creditors, adjudicated the Opposite Parties as debtors. In paragraph 7 of the petition on which this Rule has been issued it is further stated that the Board came to this finding without any evidence, and there is no denial of this in the affidavit in apposition which has been filed on behalf of the Opposite Parties, though Mr. Ghose says his instruction is that evidence was taken. 3. Ghose says his instruction is that evidence was taken. 3. The Petitioners on coming to know of the order first applied for review, but the application was rejected. They then preferred an appeal to the Appellate Officer (Sub-Divisional Officer, Munshigunj). That officer, by his order of the 17th March, 3942, held that notice had not been served on the creditors and accordingly remanded the case to the Board for re-trial. The Appellate Officer, however, added a remark the in his opinion the "Respondent" (in the singular number), referring apparently to Opposite Party No. 1 alone, might be called an agricultural debtor. 4. The Petitioners thereafter moved the Collector of Dacca and obtained a transfer of the case from the Munshigunj Board to the Dacca Co-operative Bank Special Debt Settlement Board at Dacca for disposal. It appears that evidence was led by the parties before this Board as to whether the applicants were debtors or not and as to whether the liability in respect of which they had made their application was a debt or not. 5. At the hearing, Opposite Party No. 1 alone was actually present, but it is said that he was representing his wife also as her agent. Be that as it may, on the 11th May, 1943, the Dacca Board, made its order, holding in concurrence with the Munshigunj Appellate Officer that the debtor in question was a debtor within the meaning of the Act, using the singular number throughout. Reading the order as it stands, there can hardly be any doubt that the adjudication referred only to Opposite Party No. 1, and not to both the applicants. 6. Against this order, the Petitioners took an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer (south) of Dacca as the Appellate Officer on the ground among others that the decision of the Board had been arrived at without any consideration of the statements made by the Opposite Parties in their own application to the Board regarding the quantity of agricultural lands held by them, which clearly showed that agriculture could not be the primary means of their livelihood. It was further contended that in any case there having been no adjudication that Opposite Party No. 2 was a debtor, the joint application was not maintainable under sec. 9 (1) (b) of the Act. 7. It was further contended that in any case there having been no adjudication that Opposite Party No. 2 was a debtor, the joint application was not maintainable under sec. 9 (1) (b) of the Act. 7. The Appellate Officer disposed of the appeal by a very short order, dated the 20th September, 1943. All that he said was this: Perused record. The Board heard both the parties and after duo and proper consideration ad jubilated the debtor as an agriculturist within the meaning of the B. A. D. Act. The decision of the Board appears to he right. The appeal is dismissed. 8. It will be seen that this order also refers to the adjudication of one of the debtors only, and not of both. 9. The Petitioners thereupon moved the District Judge of Dacca in revision under sec. 40A of the Act. The District Judge appears to have transferred the case to an Additional District Judge under him as he was entitled to do under the proviso to the section. It is against the order of the Additional District Judge dismissing the application in revision that the present Rule is directed. The order is in these terms: 24-11-43.-This issue disputed is whether the (Respondent ' (the reference again is in the singular number) 'is an agriculturist or not. The question was first decided by the S. D. O. Munshigunj on 17-3 and the Dacca C. C. B. Special Board accepted this decision. I agree with this issue of the Board, for as a transferee Board they could re-open question decided by the earlier Board but not by the Appellate Officer. The application is dismissed 10. Incidentally, we may point out that this order was passed by the Additional District Judge, but the certified copy which has been filed in this Court shows in the heading the name of the District Judge: Present: J. De, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.," and at the end: "Sd. Illegible, Dt. Judge." How the name of the District Judge who did not dispose of the case came to be recorded in the order, we do not know, and we should like to draw the attention of the District Judge to this irregularity. 11. The question is whether the order was a proper order under sec. 40A. Illegible, Dt. Judge." How the name of the District Judge who did not dispose of the case came to be recorded in the order, we do not know, and we should like to draw the attention of the District Judge to this irregularity. 11. The question is whether the order was a proper order under sec. 40A. Sec. 40A was not in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act when it was originally passed, but was introduced later by an amendment, presumably in view of the experience gained in the actual working of this enactment. The can be no doubt that the object was to provide for some sort of judicial control, however limited, over the proceedings of the special tribunals set up under this statute. It is very important and necessary, therefore, that the revisional authority under the new section should discharge its functions in a way which would carry out the objects which were in view. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 40A enjoins that the District Judge (which includes the Additional District Judge to whom the case may be transferred under the proviso) shall not hear the parties or any person appearing on their behalf. That, in our opinion, only increases the responsibility that lies on the District Judge under this section. He is required to "consider " such papers as may be forwarded to him by the Appellate Officer. Such consideration ought clearly to be a real and effective judicial scrutiny of all the materials on the record. Sub-sec. (5) shows that the District Judge is required to satisfy himself that there has been no substantial failure of justice by reason of any illegality or irregularity in the order of the Appellate Officer, or for any other sufficient cause. A proper discharge of this function evidently requires a careful examination of the whole case. It is also important, we think, that the order on the face of it must show that such examination has taken place. It should not be enough for the learned Judge merely to say that he has considered the matter and that, in his opinion, the application should be rejected. We may add that an order expressed in such terms places this Court in a difficult position in exercising its own revisional powers under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has now been held that an order of the District Judge under sec. We may add that an order expressed in such terms places this Court in a difficult position in exercising its own revisional powers under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has now been held that an order of the District Judge under sec. 40Aof the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is subject to revision by the High Court, and we may reasonably require, therefore, that the order should be recorded in such terms as to render a proper exercise of this revisional jurisdiction possible. 12. Applying this test, it is difficult to support the order which the Additional District Judge has made in this case. It does not show that there was a proper consideration of the case with reference to the materials which were on the record. The order shows, on the other hand, that for one thing the learned Judge repeated the same mistake as the Board and the Appellate Officer had made in entirely ignoring the existence of Opposite Party No. 2, as if the question whether she was a debtor or not did not require consideration. It was overlooked that under sec. 9 (1) (B) of the Act, an application for settlement of a debt for which two or more persons were jointly liable was not maintainable unless all such persons were debtors within the meaning of the Act. To entertain such an application without this condition being satisfied would manifestly amount to a substantial failure of justice, and it was certainly the duty of the learned Judge to satisfy himself that the proceedings did not suffer from any such fundamental infirmity, particularly in view of the specific objections which the Petitioners had taken in this behalf. Then, again, the learned Judge appears to have been influenced to some extent by the order which had been passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Munshiganj on the 17th March, 1942. The fact was ignored that that order had been made behind the back of the present Petitioners, and further, if the Petitioners are right, that it had been made without taking any evidence. The learned Judge also failed to observe that in so far as the Sub-Divisional Officer purported to find that the "respondent" was an agricultural debtor, it was an unnecessary finding in view of the order which he himself made, directing a re-trial. 13. The learned Judge also failed to observe that in so far as the Sub-Divisional Officer purported to find that the "respondent" was an agricultural debtor, it was an unnecessary finding in view of the order which he himself made, directing a re-trial. 13. The learned Additional District Judge referred also to the order of the Dacca Special Board, and pointed out that this Board had accepted the decision of the Munshiganj Board. A reference to the order of the Dacca Board, however, will show that this Board also took no notice of Opposite Party No. 2, and recorded its finding only as regards Opposite Party No. 1. Even as regards this finding, again, the order does not show that the Board could have applied its mind to the evidence before it. There is no doubt a statement that it had come to this finding upon a consideration of the evidence, but this is about all. It is not shown how the evidence could override the statements which the Opposite Parties had themselves made in their application. 14. Mr. Ghose, on behalf of the Opposite Parties, rightly drew our attention to the provisions of sec. 45 of the Act, which lays down that except as otherwise provided in the Act, the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and of the CPC shall not apply to any proceeding before a Board. It should, therefore, be no valid ground of criticism against an order of a Debt Settlement Board that it is not founded on a strict compliance with the provisions of these two enactments. All the same, we do not think that the legislature intended that the members of a Debt Settlement Board should be entitled to import their personal knowledge into a case. It is not possible to overlook in this connection sec. 16 of the Act which provides that subject to rules made under the Act, a Board may exercise all such powers connected with the summoning and examining of parties and witnesses and with the production of documents as are conferred on a Civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sec. 12 (3) also contemplates the examination of the applicant on oath or affirmation. All these provisions, in our opinion, seem to postulate the observance of some regularity in the proceedings of a Board, however, technically informal they may be. Sec. 12 (3) also contemplates the examination of the applicant on oath or affirmation. All these provisions, in our opinion, seem to postulate the observance of some regularity in the proceedings of a Board, however, technically informal they may be. At any rate, this much seems to us to be certain that the Board shall be bound to place upon the record all materials, from whatever source they may be derived, upon which it chooses to base its decision. Assuming, therefore, that it was open to the Board in the present case to act on the personal knowledge possessed by any of its members, as was suggested by Mr. Ghose, it should have been its duty to indicate that it had done so, and at the same time to indicate the nature of the extraneous information so introduced. 15. As matters stand upon the record, we find it difficult to say that a mere reference to the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Munshiganj, or of the Dacca Board is sufficient to show that the learned Additional District Judge had duly " considered " the case as he was required to do under sec. 40A. 16. The learned Advocate for the Opposite Parties further contended that among the papers which were before the learned Judge was the explanation which the Munshiganj Board had submitted to the Appellate Officer under sec. 40 (5), and that if the statements contained in the explanation were referred to, it would appear that they provided a sufficient answer to the Petitioners' case. We are not at all impressed by the argument. In the first place there is nothing to show that the learned Judge had considered this explanation. Secondly, if no evidence had been taken by the Munshiganj Board, and the only materials before it were those contained in the application of the Opposite Parties, it is not clear how this Board could have incorporated any new facts in its explanation or, if it had done so, how these facts could be taken any notice of. 17. Secondly, if no evidence had been taken by the Munshiganj Board, and the only materials before it were those contained in the application of the Opposite Parties, it is not clear how this Board could have incorporated any new facts in its explanation or, if it had done so, how these facts could be taken any notice of. 17. The order of the learned District Judge, again, appears to be quite unintelligible in the concluding portion of it, where he says that "as a transferee Board, the Dacca Board could re-open questions decided by the earlier Board but not by the Appellate Officer." If this means that it was open to the Dacca Board to go behind the finding of the Munshiganj Board, the remark seems to be wholly inapposite, as the Dacca Board did not profess to go behind the Munshiganj Board. If, on the other hand, the learned Judge means that though it was open to the Dacca Board to go behind the decision of the Munshiganj Board, it was not entitled to go behind the finding of the Appellate Officer, all that need be said it" that the finding of the Appellate Officer was itself based on no evidence, and was a mere obiter dictum. 18. On all these grounds we must hold that the order of the learned Additional District Judge was not a proper order. The result is that this Rule must be made absolute and the case sent back to the learned District Judge in order that he may deal with it himself or transfer it to some other Additional District Judge under him for disposal. In disposing of the case disposal, the learned Judge, whoever he may be, will pay due regard to the directions contained in this judgment as regards the manner in which he should deal with it. It should be his duty to consider all the materials on the record, including the oral and documentary evidence which either early had placed before the Board. 19. The Petitioners are entitled to costs of this Rule: hearing-fee two gold mohurs. Latifur Rahman, J. I agree.