JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment. The lower appellate Court dismissed the defendant-appellant's appeal against the decree for ejectment passed against him by the trial Court. 2. The defendant-appellant was put into possession of the premises in suit in accordance with a lease for one year from November 1, 1939. It was expressly stated in the document that the lease expired on October 31, 1940. The defendant-appellant held over after that date for about two years. The plaintiff-respondent issued a notice to him on November 29, 1942, that he should vacate the premises on December 31, 1942. The notice was served on him by post on December 5, 1942. As he did not comply with the notice the decree for ejectment was passed against him. 3. As the defendant-appellant was in fact using the premises for industrial purposes it is argued that he was holding over from year to year and that six months' notice was necessary. The original lease, however, fixed a monthly rent and the point that the lease was one from year to year was not taken in the Courts below and is not mentioned in the grounds of appeal in this Court. The parties, therefore, seem to have accepted the position that the defendant-appellant was holding over from month to month and it is too late to raise the point in arguments. Questions of fact would be involved. 4. The second argument is that it must be presumed in accordance with the provisions of S. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act that the original lease expired on November 1,1940 and that, thereafter, the lease expired on the first of each succeeding month so that the notice to vacate on December 31, 1942 was invalid. This argument might have been a good one if the lease had merely been for one year from November 1, 1939, but it has no force because the lease specifically stated the tenancy expired on October 31, 1940, not on November 1, 1940. 5. The third argument is that the suit should have been dismissed because the District Magistrate had passed an order under the Defence of India Rules that no tenant should be ejected. The trial Court held that the order applied only to residential houses. 5. The third argument is that the suit should have been dismissed because the District Magistrate had passed an order under the Defence of India Rules that no tenant should be ejected. The trial Court held that the order applied only to residential houses. This finding was contested in the grounds of appeal to the lower appellate Court but was apparently not seriously contested because there is no mention of it in the judgment. However, that may be, I do not think it is necessary to construe the order because in any case I think it is an order which should be applied at the time of actual ejectment in the course of execution rather than at the time when the decree is to be passed. Learned Counsel for the appellant is doubtless justified in saying that orders of such nature are part of the law of the land for the time being, but basically they are orders for the benefit of the community, not for the benefit of individuals and I should say that the obligation not to eject corresponds not with a right in the individual to resist ejectment in his own interests but with a right in some public officer, not a party to the decree, to resist ejectment in the interests of the state. An order of this nature is in my judgment irrelevant to a private dispute between the parties. If this were not so, obvious inconsistencies and inconveniences might arise. The order might issue while the suit was pending and the plaintiff would then lose his court-fees on a perfectly justifiable plaint on account of an event over which he had no control. . Or the order might issue between the date of the decree and the date of its execution in which case it might be argued that the executing Court could not question the validity of the decree at the instance of the judgment-debtor, with the result that there would be an ejectment against the interests of the state. Or a decree might be refused on the basis of an order which might be withdrawn the day after the suit was dismissed with, the result that the plaintiff would be put to the delay and expense of issuing a new notice and instituting and prosecuting a new suit while the defendant would secure a new period of wrongful possession. Or a decree might be refused on the basis of an order which might be withdrawn the day after the suit was dismissed with, the result that the plaintiff would be put to the delay and expense of issuing a new notice and instituting and prosecuting a new suit while the defendant would secure a new period of wrongful possession. Orders of this kind may be varied from time to time as public advantage requires and should not be construed as affecting the private rights and liabilities of landlord and tenant. Decrees for ejectment should not be refused on their basis but Courts executing such decrees should take judicial cognizance of orders which are) brought to their notice and should either dismiss applications for execution or stay proceedings or, in case of doubt, should bring the proceedings to the notice of the authority issuing the order and give him an opportunity of being heard in the interests of the. state. 6. On the remaining ground of appeal I may say that rent was not accepted for any period after the expiry of the notice and no question of waiver can arise. 7. The appeal is dismissed with costs. 8. I certify this as a fit case for appeal under the Letters Patent.