JUDGMENT Gentle, J. - This is an application by the Plaintiff in the suit praying that the Defendant be committed to prison for contempt of this Court. The present suit having been instituted by the Plaintiff claiming about Rs. 9,000 for the price of goods sold and delivered. On the 12th June the Plaintiff's Manager, Kartar Singh and another employee Bhulan Singh, went with a Sheriff's Officer, Hrishikesh Das, to the Defendant's shop, in the New Market, Calcutta, for the purpose of serving the writ of summons. It is in respect of the events and happenings which took place at the Defendant's shop that the present application is made. 2. The application was supported by the affidavits of the three persons mentioned and affidavits in opposition were filed by the Defendant and by one Habibur Rahaman Pahlwan. The subject of these affidavits being controversial, I directed that the deponents should appear in Court and be cross-examined. This has taken place to-day. 3. The substance of the affidavits filed in support of the application is as follows: Upon arrival at the Defendant's shop or stall in the New Market, which is a large, covered market, having numerous ways and passages to the shops situated on each side of them, the Defendant was identified by Kartar Singh to the Sheriff's officer. The Sheriff's officer thereupon informed him that he had come for the purpose of serving the writ of summons in the present suit. The Defendant became furious and called upon his employees, about four or five in number, to attack the bailiff and Kartar Singh. The Defendant, according to Kartar Singh, caught hold of his, Kartar Singh's hair, according to the bailiff, he assaulted Kartar Singh with his hand or fist on the head or shoulder. The Sheriff's officer and Bhulan Singh went outside the shop where they stood and saw the subsequent events. Several of the Defendant's employees further assaulted Kartar Singh who eventually left, joined the other two, and all three departed. The writ of summons was not served. 4. The Defendant's account is to the following effect: In his affidavit he said the Sheriff's officer informed him that he had come to serve the writ of summons and the Defendant thereupon told Kartar Singh that the goods, the subject-matter of the claim, had been returned, and therefore no money was due. The writ of summons was not served. 4. The Defendant's account is to the following effect: In his affidavit he said the Sheriff's officer informed him that he had come to serve the writ of summons and the Defendant thereupon told Kartar Singh that the goods, the subject-matter of the claim, had been returned, and therefore no money was due. Upon this, hot words were exchanged between the Defendant and Kartar Singh. The latter threatened he would teach the Defendant a lesson and immediately thereafter he asked the Sheriff's officer to leave, and they went without serving the summons. 5. The evidence given in the affidavits, and in cross-examination of the deponents to the affidavits, supporting the application, are in substantial accord. In some respects there are one or two differences which one expects to find when witnesses are speaking from recollection of events which they saw occur and not from recollection of a story which they invented together and agreed to give when testifying in the witness box. If witnesses tell exactly the same story in every respect, then one has reason to suspect that it is not an account of their personal recollection of happenings. 6. So far as the evidence of the Defendant is concerned: in his affidavit he said the bailiff told him that he had come to serve the summons; in cross-examination he denied it was the bailiff who so informed him and said it was Kartar Singh; further in cross-examination the Defendant denied knowledge of a man named Parmanand; he then admitted this man obtained a decree against him; he denied some other man had obtained a decree in another suit; subsequently he admitted this was so. The Defendant occupies three shops in the bay or passage in question. It was suggested to him that he was the proprietor of all the shops, 15 or 20 in number. He denied that he was the proprietor and the conclusion to which one would arrive from his denial is that he was in no way concerned with the remaining shops. Subsequently he admitted that upon execution of a decree obtained against him, all the shops in the bay were attached. He also admitted that two of them belonged to his son, three belonged to nephews. Subsequently he admitted that upon execution of a decree obtained against him, all the shops in the bay were attached. He also admitted that two of them belonged to his son, three belonged to nephews. The matters which are outside the ken of the enquiry are important only to test the truthfulness, as a witness, of the Defendant. I watched his demeanour whilst he gave evidence. It was thoroughly unsatisfactory, and 1 express the opinion that he is in every way entirely untrustworthy and untruthful. I reject his evidence in its entirety wherever it is at variance with that of Kartar Singh, Bhulan Singh and the Sheriff's officer. I accept their evidence. I believe they were speaking no more and no less than the exact truth. It is peculiar, to say the least, that it being common ground the sole object of the Sheriff's officer with the other two persons who went with him was to effect service of a writ of summons, but it was not served. I do not believe, as the Defendant stated in evidence, that there being a dispute arising regarding the subject-matter of the suit, Kartar Singh told the Sheriff to leave without serving the summons. 7. The question is why was it not served? I am satisfied that the attitude and conduct exhibited and language which the Defendant used, including calling upon his employees to beat or eject or attack the party, frightened the bailiff, and he was afraid to complete service. My attention has been drawn to the provisions of Or. 5, r. 17 which provides that upon a Defendant refusing to sign the process presented by a serving officer, the serving officer can affix a copy of the summons on the outer door in some conspicuous place. That may be so; I am satisfied here the Sheriff's officer was frightened to do it and frightened by the conduct of the Defendant. In the course of the remarks which he made, he threatened the bailiff, Kartar Singh and expressed offensive remarks concerning the High Court. To the remarks concerning the Court I pay no attention. 8. Learned Counsel on behalf of the Defendant contended that this was a matter which could receive adequate and complete disposal by process in the Magistrate's Court and that the powers of this Court should not be invoked in a matter of this kind. To the remarks concerning the Court I pay no attention. 8. Learned Counsel on behalf of the Defendant contended that this was a matter which could receive adequate and complete disposal by process in the Magistrate's Court and that the powers of this Court should not be invoked in a matter of this kind. In support of this contention Vernon Milward Bason v. Ann Holen Skone I. L. R. 53 Cal. 401 (1925) is cited. In that case a solicitor's clerk went to serve some form of notice upon the Respondent who assaulted him but the process was served. Proceedings were instituted in this Court for contempt and as the result, the learned Judge of first instance fined the Respondent Rs. 200 and directed him to pay the costs, against which finding there was an appeal. The appeal was dismissed out in the course of his judgment Sir Lancelot Sanderson, Chief Justice, expressed the opinion that the powers of this Court should not be invoked if proceedings in Magistrate's Courts would suffice and he seems to place some reliance for his observation upon the fact that in that case service had been effected. 9. In another decision Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee v. Mahendra Lal Sarkar 41 C. W. N. p. 1325 (1937) the Official Receiver's clerk or employee was obstructed in removing some books of account and upon proceedings for contempt being taken Mr. Justice Panckridge expressed the opinion that it would have been sufficiently salutary for proceedings to have been taken in the Magistrate's Court and that invoking the powers of this Court was not called for. In my opinion this is a different case from those to which reference has been made. The Sheriff's officer went in the ordinary course of his duty to serve the Defendant with a writ of summons in a suit which previously had been instituted against him. The Defendant manifested violence and strong language including threats. As the result, the Sheriff's officer was prevented from serving the process because of the threats and the apprehension into which he had been put by the conduct of the Defendant. Unless officer, carrying out their duties in the administration of justice, are properly protected, there will be an end to the due course of justice. The Sheriff's officer has important functions. Unless officer, carrying out their duties in the administration of justice, are properly protected, there will be an end to the due course of justice. The Sheriff's officer has important functions. It is, in my opinion, a gross abuse and contempt of this Court when he was obstructed in the way in which the Defendant obstructed the Sheriff's officer in this case. 10. In these circumstances I come to the conclusion that this proceeding was correct and that the Defendant was in contempt. I have hesitated whether or not I should send him to prison without giving him an opportunity of paying a fine. I have decided upon the latter course, after reflection. The Defendant will be fined Rs. 250 and will pay the costs of the applicant as between solicitor and client. Stay is refused. Certified for two Counsel. 11. I am asked by Learned Counsel for the Respondent to record one fact. The matter came before me two days ago and since it appeared that it could not be decided upon affidavit, on account of the controversial nature of this document, I directed an oral hearing so that the deponents could be cross examined. At the time, I directed that the hearing would be confined to examination of deponents to the affidavits. When the matter commenced this morning I refused an application to allow further evidence to be called. I consider that the evidence was complete save for cross-examination of the deponents. The fine is to be paid forthwith.