JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Madeley, JJ. - This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from the judgment and decree of this Bench dated the 10th December, 1941, passed in First Civil Appeal No. 112 of 1937. 2. The application is made by Defendants Nos. 2 to 6 who were Appellants in the aforesaid appeal. It appears that the Plaintiffs Respondents' suit was partly decreed and partly dismissed by the trial Court. The Defendants applicants filed appeal No. 112 of 1837, against the decree while the Plaintiffs-respondents filed cross-objections. This Court dismissed the appeal with costs by its order dated the 10th December, 1941, and allowed the cross objections partly with proportionate costs. The main question upon which this Court agreed with the view of the trial Court was whether the Plaintiffs had succeeded in proving jointness or the Defendant had succeeded in proving separation. This Court upheld the decision of the trial Court in favour of the Plaintiffs upon this question. The finding on the question whether the family was joint or separate is one which was arrived at on a consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence on the record and is a finding of fact. It raises no question of law much less any substantial question of law. Indeed it is not alleged on behalf of the applicants that any substantial question of law is involved in the case, nor is the leave sought on this ground. The applicants contend that they are entitled as a matter of right to leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council because the decree of this Court did not affirm the decree of the Court below. The reason given is that it allowed the cross-objections filed by the Plaintiffs and granted additional relief to them in respect of the property in dispute. We are of opinion that there is no substance in this contention. It is admitted on behalf of the applicants that if, instead of the cross-objections, the Plaintiffs had filed a cross-appeal the applicants would not have been entitled to contend that the decree was not one of affirmance. We are of opinion that there is no substance in this contention. It is admitted on behalf of the applicants that if, instead of the cross-objections, the Plaintiffs had filed a cross-appeal the applicants would not have been entitled to contend that the decree was not one of affirmance. It is, however, urged that the cross objections formed an integral part of the appeal, that there was one decree prepared by this Court both in the appeal and in the cross-objections, and u/s 110 of the CPC the decree from which the applicants now desire to appeal does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below. We do not think that in point of principle there is any difference between the case where an appeal and a cross-objections are preferred. It was held in M.L.M. Ramanathan Chetti Vs. V.K.N.S.P. Subramanian Chetti and Others, AIR 1926 Mad 1024 that where the High Court's decree in the main appeal confirms that of the lower Court, the mere fact that a cross-appeal has been allowed and the lower Court's decree modified accordingly does not give the right of appeal to the Appellant who otherwise would not " have that right. One of the learned Judges who decided that case (Phillips J.) observed:-- "A memorandum of objections is in effect a cross-appeal, and although it is the practice in this Court to draft only one decree with reference to both the main appeal and the memorandum of objections, it is also the practice to do the same in respect of two or more cross-appeals from- the same decree. In effect there are two orders of this Court, dismissing the appeal and affirming the decree of the lower Court and the other allowing the memorandum of objections or cross-appeal and modifying the decree of the lower Court. So far, then, as the decree affirming the decree of the lower Court is concerned, no appeal would lie to the Privy Council. Similarly, no appeal would lie to the Privy Council in respect of the order on the memorandum of objections: because the subject-matter of that appeal was only Rs. 300." 3. We have no hesitation in agreeing with this view. This decision was relied upon in P.R.N.S.M. Chokkalingam Chetti v. Official Assignee, Madras AIR 1941 Mad 227. 4. Similarly, no appeal would lie to the Privy Council in respect of the order on the memorandum of objections: because the subject-matter of that appeal was only Rs. 300." 3. We have no hesitation in agreeing with this view. This decision was relied upon in P.R.N.S.M. Chokkalingam Chetti v. Official Assignee, Madras AIR 1941 Mad 227. 4. Accordingly we hold that the decree passed in appeal by this Court having affirmed the decision of the trial Court, the applicants are not entitled to leave as of right. The application is liable to dismissal on this ground alone. It has, however, been contended on behalf of the Plaintiffs-respondents that the case does not satisfy the requirements of Section 110 of the CPC inasmuch as the valuation of the subject- matter in appeal to the Privy Council is below Rs. 10,000. We are of opinion that this contention is not without force. The valuation of the appeal filed by the applicants in this Court was admittedly Rs. 7-936 6-3. If the valuation of the appeal alone were taken into consideration, there can be no doubt that the applicants will not be entitled to appeal and if the valuation of the cross-objections were also added to the above valuation, the total valuation would still be under Rs. 10,000. The valuation of the cross objections in the original decree of this Court is Rs. 1,327-1-0 and the valuation of the cross-objections which were further allowed on the review application by the Plaintiffs is given in the decree as Rs. 1,116-2-4. The total, therefore, comes to Rs. 2,443 3 4. The Plaintiffs had claimed only half the share in the properties in dispute The two valuations given above represent the entire share. Accordingly the valuation of the share which is decreed to the cross-objections must be taken to be Rs. 1,221-9 8. Adding this to the valuation of the appeal, namely Rs. 7,936-6-3, the total valuation comes to Rs. 9,157-15-11. The subject-matter of the appeal to the Privy Council, therefore, falls short of the requisite valuation. We hold that on this ground also the applicants are not entitled to a certificate. 5. Accordingly we dismiss the application with costs