JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Madeley, JJ. - This is a debtor's appeal arising out of proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. 2. The Appellant is the Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki incharge of Subeha (Khanpur) estate under the Court of Wards. The previous proprietor of this estate was Chaudhri Mustafa Husain upon whose death in 1913 the present proprietor Chaudhri Mustafa Husain succeeded. On the 3rd June, 1904, Chaudhri Mustafa Husain executed a simple mortgage-deed of a number of villages in favour of Lala Murli Dhar, a money-lender of Lucknow, in lieu of Rs. 75,000. Mustafa Husain defaulted in payment of the mortgage was passed against Mustafa Husain on the 16th March, 1912, for a sum of Rs. 1,38,315-6-5 with future interest at six percent per annum. On the 26th April, 1913, the decree-holder field an application for sale (vide Ex, 91) of the mortgaged property. On the 10th May, 1913, the executing Court transferred the decree to the Collector for execution u/s 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the property was ancestral. In transferring this decree to the Collector the Court also said that the application for execution be consigned to records (vide Ex. 63). The necessary papers were sent to the Collector. In April, 1913, the Court of Wards assumed superintendence of the estate of Chaudhri Mustafa Husain and it is common ground that the Deputy Commissioner being incharge of the Court of Wards who was also occupying the position of Collector for the purpose of executing the decree, continued to make payments from September, 1914, to January, 1933, both towards the principal and the interest. 3. On the 14th December, 1935, an application was made by the Appellant u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act. Lala Murli Dhar had died and was succeeded by his widow Mst. Basanti Devi. She was not mentioned as a creditor in the application. The order u/s 6 of the Act was made by the Collector on the 21st December, 1935. After the notification in the Gazette had been issued the creditor put forward the claim on the 25th April, 1936, for a sum of Rs. 71,496 6.0 after allowing deductions for the payments made from time to time. An account of these payments was filed along with this claim. After the notification in the Gazette had been issued the creditor put forward the claim on the 25th April, 1936, for a sum of Rs. 71,496 6.0 after allowing deductions for the payments made from time to time. An account of these payments was filed along with this claim. On behalf of the Appellant the title of the claimant to represent Lala Murli Dhar deceased was not admitted and the debt was alleged to be barred by Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act and Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The following two issues were framed:-- 1. Is the claimant, Mst. Basanti Devi, heir and successor of the late Lala Murli Dhar? 2. Is the decree dated the 16th March, 1912, in favour of Lala Murli Dhar in time? 4. After the settlement of these issues Mst. Basanti Devi died and one Anand Behari Lal claimed substitution in her place on the basis of a will executed by her in his favour. This being disputed by the debtor, another issue was framed whether Anand Behari Lal was the legal representative of the late Mst. Basanti Devi. 5. The learned Special Judge held that Mst. Basanti Devi was the heir and successor of the late Murli Dhar and Anand Behari Lal was the legal representative of Mst. Basanti Devi. He also held that the debt was not time-barred either under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act or u/s 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. In appeal both these findings have been contested before us. 7. We may dispose of the contention about the right of the Respondent Anand Behari Lal in a few words. Ex. 94 is a decree which was passed by this Court in an original suit upon compromise. Under this decree Mst. Basanti Devi acquired full proprietary title by virtue of the will executed in her favour by her husband and was empowered to make all sorts of transfer. To the family arrangement which was embodied in the decree all possible claimants of Lala Murli Dhar, including the present Respondent Anand Behari Lal, were parties. She was treated as the absolute owner of the property under the family arrangement. The will made by Basanti Devi in favour of Anand Behari Lal was duly proved and no evidence in rebuttal was produced by the Appellant. She was treated as the absolute owner of the property under the family arrangement. The will made by Basanti Devi in favour of Anand Behari Lal was duly proved and no evidence in rebuttal was produced by the Appellant. We hold, therefore, in agreement with the finding arrived at by the Court below that Anand Behari Lal is the rightfull successor and legal representative of Mst. Basanti Devi. 8. As regards the question of limitation, it has been argued that the order dated the 10th May, 1913, was an order which consigned the execution of the decree to records and not having been appealed against it became final. No application as a step-in-aid of execution of the decree having been taken by the decree-holder subsequent to this order the decree became time-barred after three years under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. Reference is made in this connection to Ex. A-1, an extract from the register of cases, which shows that the sale of the property by the Collector did not take place and the case was consigned to the record on the 9th August, 1913. We are of opinion that this contention has no force. Ex. 91 is the application dated the 26th April, 1913, under Order XXI Rule 11 of the CPC for execution of the decree. It states that in spite of the final decree having been passed in the case the judgment-debtor bad not paid the amount and it was prayed therefore that the hypothecated property which was the ancestral share of the judgment-debtor be sold and the amount of the decree-holder be paid off. Upon this application the Court ordered that as the decree had been passed more than a year ago, there was no need to issue any injunction order and that the property being ancestral the execution of the decree be transferred to the Collector of the district and the case be consigned to the record. By consigning the case to the record, we do not think, the Civil Judge meant anything more than this that for the time being the proceedings in his Court were suspended and that the Collector was to sell the property in execution of the decree as required by Section 68 of the CPC read with the third Schedule of the Code. A reference to the provisions of the third Schedule shows that the Collector is not the final authority in the matter of execution and after the satisfaction of the decree, whether complete or partial, the papers are to be returned to the executing Court which transferred the decree for execution. The executing Court had neither intended to consign the application for execution to the record nor had the power to do so when the property being adjudged ancestral the execution of the decree was transferred to the Collector u/s 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The mere addition of the words "consigned to records" in the order of transfer did not put an end to the application for execution, nor did it divest the Court of jurisdiction to revive the application upon the papers being returned by the Collector. The application for execution remained pending throughout the period when the papers were in the Court of the Collector. On the 21st December, 1935, when the order was made by the Collector u/s 6 of the U P. Encumbered Estates Act, the application for execution was therefore within time. It appears that payments were made by the Collector right up to January 1933. There are several letters and loan statements on the record which show that the Court of Wards acknowledged the debt due from time to time, that they assured the creditor that every effort was being made to pay the money due to the creditor both towards the principal and the interest. The Collector never communicated any information to the Civil Court which had transferred the decree to him about the execution of the decree or the sale of the property. The only information that can be traced from the record is that the file and papers received from the Civil Court about this decree were weeded out on the 22nd January, 1916, and no sale took place. (Vide Exs. 93 and A-1). It cannot be seriously suggested that the Collector had any power to consign the case to the record without any reference to the Civil Court. The application for execution of the decree filed on the 26th April, 1913 was still alive and must be deemed to have been pending at the time when the order transferring the application to the Special Judge was passed on the 21st December, 1935. 9. The application for execution of the decree filed on the 26th April, 1913 was still alive and must be deemed to have been pending at the time when the order transferring the application to the Special Judge was passed on the 21st December, 1935. 9. The case of AIR 1937 92 (Nagpur) , is nearly on all fours with the present case. The headnote of this case runs thus:-- "A decree was transferred to Collector for realisation of decretal amount mentioned in the C form, and the executing Court ordered the case to be struck off as transferred to Collector. The Collector sold three out of the six items of the landed property attached, but found that the sum court not satisfy the decretal amount due to claim for rateable distribution. Therefore an application for issue of second C form was filed in the Civil Court for sale of remaining properties. It was contended that there being no execution application pending at that time, the application for issue of the second C form was a fresh application for execution and was therefore barred by time: Held: that the order of the Civil Court striking off the case was clearly not an order dismissing the case. The case was bound to go back to the Civil Court when the decree was returned by the Collector to the Civil Court with the sale proceeds and the order was merely one adjoining the proceedings until that date. A subsequent application for the sale of the remainder of the attached property was not a fresh application for execution either in form or substance, but merely an application ancillary to the substantive application. The application therefore for sending of a second form C to the Collector was not barred by limitation." 10. Next it has been contended that the execution is barred u/s 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section lays down that "Where an application to execute a decree... has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from (a) the date of the decree sought to be executed...." 11. As we have already held that the application for execution was still pending before the Civil Court, there is no question of the applicability of Section 48. As we have already held that the application for execution was still pending before the Civil Court, there is no question of the applicability of Section 48. On the date when the claim was put forward by the creditor the application was a live application, no fresh application had been made by the creditor and the previous application for execution of the decree was still pending. In Misri Lal v. Ishri Prasad 1942 O.A. 69 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 91 : O.W.N. 123, the facts were that "In an execution case the Sale Officer drew up a proclamation of sale and issued notices to the parties to file objections, if any. On the date fixed nobody appeared for the decree-holders and one of the decree-holders was reported to be dead. The Sale Officer without deciding whether the summonses were properly served on the remaining decree-holders and without determining whether the decree-holders had defaulted or not returned the case to the Civil Court and the Civil Court consigned the case to the record. On an application for revival of the execution application: "Held, that the order consigning the case to the records could not be regarded as a final order disposing of the application for execution and that the time limit provided by Section 48 CPC was no bar to the application for revival of the application for execution." 12. It was held in Bhagwan Das v. Peare Lal 1939 O.A. 817 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 240 : O.W.N. 123 that Section 48 bars a fresh application for execution and not an application by which a previous application for execution is revived. 13. If therefore the application for execution made in April 1913 was merely dormant the proceedings must be considered to remain pending. The fact that the Collector did not sell the property shows that there was some arrangement that the money will be paid without the sale of the property. The Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki possessed a dual capacity. He was manager incharge of the ward's estate which was under the Court of Wards and he was also the Collector entrusted with the execution of the decree and sale of the property. In the former capacity it was both his right and duty to satisfy the debt due from the ward. He was manager incharge of the ward's estate which was under the Court of Wards and he was also the Collector entrusted with the execution of the decree and sale of the property. In the former capacity it was both his right and duty to satisfy the debt due from the ward. In the latter capacity it was his duty to sell the property if the debt could not be otherwise satisfied. He appears to have chosen the former course, viz., to satisfy the debt by periodical payments towards the principal and the interest and to dispense with the sale of the property, While this arrangement lasted, no question of the sale of the property arose and the Collector did not consider it necessary to inform the Civil Court as to what he had done. In the meantime he took advantage of the proceedings of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act in the interest of the debtor and filed an application u/s 4 of the Act and it was then that the claim was put forward by the creditor. The previous application for execution was pending and the provisions of Section 48 which is limited to the fresh application did not come into play. The claim made in the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act was a live claim. If these proceedings had not been taken by the debtor, the decree-holder would no doubt have asked the executing Court to request the Collector to expedite the sale proceedings. We do not think, therefore, that Section 48 of the CPC bars the creditor's claim. 14. On behalf of the Respondent, Dr. Katju has urged a fresh ground of defence on the strength of paragraph 11 (3) of Schedule III of the CPC and has contended that the decree was not time barred. Paragraph 11(1) says;-- "So long as the Collector can exercise or perform in respect of the judgment-debtor's immoveable property, or any part thereof, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on him by paragraphs 1 to 10, the judgment-debtor or his representative-in-interest shall be incompetent to mortgage, charge, lease or alienate such property or part except with the written permission of the Collector, nor shall any Civil Court issue any process against such property or part in execution of a decree for the payment of money." 15. The above clause imposes a restriction on the judgment-debtor to transfer his property without the permission of the Collector. It also imposes a restriction on the Civil Court to issue any process in execution of the decree so long as the Collector is seized of the case. Clause (3) of the same paragraph lays down:-- "The same period shall be excluded in calculating the period of limitation applicable to the execution of any decree affected by the provisions of this paragraph in respect of any remedy of which the decree-holder has been temporarily deprived." 16. According to the view taken in Shiam Karan v. The Collector of Benares (1920) 42 All. 118, Clause (3) of paragraph 11 of the third Schedule is wide enough to include the case of an application to which Section 48 of the Code applies and is not confined to "periods of limitation" prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. 17. In Madhav Prabhakar Oka Vs. Balaji Govind Joshi, AIR 1927 Bom 123 it was held that the presentation of an application for execution by one of the surviving co-parceners of deceased decree-holder cannot be said to be invalid so as to render the proceedings before Collector invalid and so as to prevent the deduction of the time mentioned in sub-para. (3) of para. 11 of the 3rd Schedule of the Code. 18. We hold, therefore, that limitation is also saved by Paragraph 11 (3) Code of Civil Procedure 19. It was also urged as an alternative argument on behalf of the creditor that u/s 19 of the Indian Limitation Act there was an acknowledgement of liability in respect of the debt made by the Special Manager of the Court of Wards in various letters and loan statements. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this point, as in our judgment neither Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act nor Section 48 of the CPC which were urged as a bar to execution bars the claim of the creditor. 20. We hold, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the lower Court that the claim of the creditor is within time. The amount of the claim was not disputed on behalf of the Appellant. 21. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.